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Summary 
This dissertation considers the housing rights of unlawful occupiers in the post-1994 
constitutional dispensation. Section 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 affords everyone a right of access to adequate housing. This provision is a 
decisive break with the apartheid past, where forced eviction banished black people to 
the periphery of society. The central hypothesis of this dissertation is that the 
Constitution envisages the creation of a society that is committed to large-scale 
transformation. This dissertation posits that it is impossible to realise the full 
transformative potential of section 26 of the Constitution in the absence of an 
independent and substantive understanding of what it means to have access to 
adequate housing. 
This dissertation traverses legal theory as well as the common law of evictions, 
constitutional law and international law. A consciously interdisciplinary approach is 
adopted in seeking to develop the content of section 26 of the Constitution, drawing on 
literature from social and political science. This dissertation develops an organising 
framework for giving substantive content to section 26(1) of the Constitution with 
reference to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the 
Revised European Social Charter, the American Convention on Human Rights and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
This dissertation shows that the adjudication of eviction disputes has moved away 
from a position under the common law where Courts had no discretion to refuse eviction 
orders based on the personal circumstances of the squatters. The adjudication of the 
eviction of unlawful occupiers now requires a context-sensitive analysis that seeks to 
find concrete and case-specific solutions. These solutions are achieved by considering 
what would be just and equitable for both the land owner and the unlawful occupiers. 
This dissertation also shows that the government has a markedly different role to fulfil in 
post-apartheid evictions through the necessary joinder of local authorities to eviction 
proceedings, meaningful engagement with unlawful occupiers and the provision of 
alternative accommodation in terms of its constitutional and statutory obligations. 
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Opsomming 
Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die behuisingsregte van onregmatige okkupeerders in die 
post-1994 grondwetlike bedeling. Artikel 26 van die Grondwet van die Republiek van 
Suid-Afrika, 1996 gee elke persoon die reg op toegang tot geskikte behuising. Hierdie 
bepaling is ‘n duidelike breuk met die apartheid-verlede waar gedwonge uitsettings 
swart mense na die periferie van die samelewing verban het. Die sentrale hipotese van 
hierdie proefskrif is dat die Grondwet beoog om ‘n samelewing te skep wat verbind is tot 
grootskaalse transformasie. Hierdie proefskrif voer aan dat dit onmoontlik is om die 
volle transformerende potensiaal van artikel 26 van die Grondwet te verwesenlik in die 
afwesigheid van ‘n onafhanklike en substantiewe begrip van wat dit beteken om 
toegang tot geskikte behuising te hê. 
Hierdie proefskrif deurkruis regsteorie sowel as die gemenereg ten aansien van 
uitsettings, staatsreg and internasionale reg. ‘n Doelbewuste interdisiplinêre benadering 
word gevolg in die soeke na die ontwikkeling van die inhoud van artikel 26 van die 
Grondwet met verwysing na literatuur uit die sosiale- en politieke wetenskappe. Die 
proefskrif ontwikkel ‘n organiserende raamwerk waarmee substantiewe inhoud aan 
artikel 26(1) van die Grondwet verleen kan word met verwysing na die Internasionale 
Verdrag op Ekonomiese, Sosiale en Kulturele Regte; die Konvensie vir die Beskerming 
van Menseregte en Fundamentele Vryhede; die Hersiene Europese Sosiale Handves; 
die Amerikaanse Konvensie op Menseregte en die Afrika Handves op Mense en 
Persoonsregte. 
Hierdie proefskrif wys dat die beregting van uitsettingsdispute wegbeweeg het van ’n 
posisie onder die gemenereg waar howe geen diskresie gehad het om uitsettingsbevele 
te weier op grond van die persoonlike omstandighede van die plakkers nie. Die 
beregting van uitsettingsdispute vereis nou ‘n konteks-sensitiewe analise wat strewe 
daarna om konkrete oplossings te vind. Hierdie oplossings word bereik deur in ag te 
neem wat reg en billik sal wees vir beide die eienaar en die onregmatige okkupeerders. 
Die proefskrif wys ook dat die regering ‘n merkbaar nuwe rol vervul in post-apartheid 
uitsettings deur die noodsaaklike voeging van munisipaliteite tot uitsettings, sinvolle 
interaksie met onregmatige okkupeerders en die voorsiening van alternatiewe 
akkommodasie in terme van grondwetlike and statutêre pligte. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
1 1 Introduction 
In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd and Another1 (‘Blue Moonlight Properties SCA’) the first respondent instituted 
eviction proceedings against the occupiers in terms of section 4(7) of the Prevention of 
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (‘PIE’). Kernel 
Carpets, the previous owner and former employer of the majority of the occupiers, 
erected a double storey office building, two large garages and a small factory on the 
property. When Kernel Carpets stopped trading, it allowed the occupiers to stay on the 
property against payment of rent to the caretaker. The occupiers continued paying rent 
to various individuals until the end of 2005, at which time the buildings had deteriorated 
to the point of being uninhabitable and without any water supply. Many of the occupiers 
relied on the meagre income that they generated from informal trading, which made it 
impossible to find other lawful and affordable accommodation within the inner city of 
Johannesburg. The applicant alleged that it had no knowledge of the events prior to 
2004, when it purchased the property for development purposes, and that it did not 
receive any rent from any of the occupiers. The applicant also alleged that it would not 
be economically viable to restore the commercial property so that it complied with the 
provisions for residential use.  
Initially, the matter came before Masipa J in the South Gauteng High Court, 
Johannesburg, who instructed the City of Johannesburg to investigate the 
circumstances of the case and to consult the interested parties to provide the court with 
a full and meaningful report. She postponed the proceedings sine die and ordered the 
City to report to the court on the steps that it had taken and what it could do in future to 
                                                 
1 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA). 
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provide the respondents with emergency shelter.2 The City filed this report five months 
later under the threat of contempt proceedings.  
In Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue & 
Another3 (‘Blue Moonlight Properties II’), Spilg J considered the content of the City’s 
report against the background of the obligations placed on local authorities to assist 
unlawful occupiers in securing access to adequate housing,4 while simultaneously 
protecting private landowners from unlawful occupation of their land.5 He proceeded to 
weigh the rights of Blue Moonlight Properties to evict unlawful occupiers from its 
property6 in terms of section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(‘the Constitution’) against the  unlawful occupiers’ right to have access to adequate 
housing7 in terms of section 26 of the Constitution. The cumulative effect of these rights 
and obligations steered him to the conclusion that it was just and equitable8 in the 
circumstances to evict the unlawful occupiers from the property9 and he ordered them to 
vacate the property on or before 31 March 2010.10 He also ordered the municipality to 
pay constitutional damages to the applicant for the occupation of the property by the 
unlawful occupiers in the form of a monthly rental for the period between 1 July 2009 
and 31 March 2010.11 He further declared the municipality’s housing policy 
unconstitutional to the extent that it excluded all persons within its jurisdiction who faced 
the threat of eviction from privately owned land.12 
The Supreme Court of Appeal agreed with Spilg J that the eviction would be just and 
equitable in the circumstances but held that he erred in granting Blue Moonlight 
Properties constitutional damages, because the unique circumstances that gave rise to 
the granting of that order in Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v 
                                                 
2 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and Others 2009 (1) SA 470 
(W) paras 75 and 78 (‘Blue Moonlight Properties’). See section 2 1 2 6 in chapter 5 for a discussion of 
Masipa J’s reasoning on the joinder of the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality. 
3 [2010] JOL 25031 (GSJ). 
4 Blue Moonlight Properties II paras 128-130. 
5 Blue Moonlight Properties II paras 131-135. 
6 Blue Moonlight Properties II paras 93-113. 
7 Blue Moonlight Properties II paras 114-127. 
8 Blue Moonlight Properties II paras 172-195. 
9 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 196, Order 1. 
10 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 196, Order 2. 
11 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 196, Order 3. 
12 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 196, Order 4. 
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Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae); 
President of the RSA and Others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal 
Resources Centre, Amici Curiae)13 were absent in this case.14 Navsa JA and Plasket 
AJA further found that Spilg J categorised the differentiation in treatment incorrectly and 
therefore held that the housing policy of the City is discriminatory on the incorrect basis. 
However, they concluded that the City’s housing policy is discriminatory and therefore 
unconstitutional to the extent that it excludes the occupiers of privately owned buildings 
that are not fit for human habitation. Currently the City’s housing policy only provides 
temporary emergency accommodation to those evicted from publicly owned unsafe 
buildings by the City itself or at its instance in terms of the National Building Regulations 
and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977.15 
While the brief discussion of the Blue Moonlight Properties case focuses on evictions 
that can be instituted at the behest of private landowners to the exclusion of evictions 
that can be instituted by the government, the case remains important because the 
particular set of facts provides a useful insight into the dynamics at play in housing 
development and evictions in South Africa. Furthermore, the appeal to the 
Constitutional Court against parts of the order of the Supreme Court of Appeal in this 
case will ensure that Blue Moonlight Properties adds to the burgeoning jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Court on the right of access to adequate housing.16 I will engage with 
the impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the eviction of a specific type of unlawful 
occupier by both private and public landowners throughout this dissertation. 
The circumstances leading up to the hearing on the substantive issues in the Blue 
Moonlight Properties case provide a perfect example of the housing problems in South 
Africa. Hundreds of thousands of poor people live in abandoned buildings or informal 
                                                 
13 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA) par 43. The appropriateness of constitutional damages in that case was 
subsequently confirmed by the Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) par 65 
(‘Modderklip CC’). 
14 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 70.  
15 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 77, Order 3. 
16 The Constitutional Court granted the City of Johannesburg leave to appeal against parts of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment and set City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue 
Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another CCT 37/11 down for oral hearing in the Constitutional 
Court on 11 August 2011. 
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settlements in urban areas17 because their meagre income, derived from informal street 
trading and insecure seasonal or domestic work, is insufficient to obtain better 
accommodation. Inner city accommodation is often not fit for human habitation because 
it is harmful for their health and dangerous. Their occupation is a double-edged sword to 
the extent that they have to live in the city to conduct their informal trading and to take 
any other available employment, but while doing so, they expose themselves to 
dangerous, unhealthy living conditions and the occasional police raid, aimed at 
identifying illegal immigrants. This is exacerbated by the fact that an increasing number 
of local authorities in the big urban centres of South Africa – Johannesburg, Cape Town 
and Durban – prefer to distance themselves from the housing crises that prevails in their 
areas of jurisdiction by consistently disputing the fact and the extent of their 
constitutional and statutory obligations to provide access to adequate housing for 
people living in abject poverty. 
The case law on joinder in eviction cases shows that in the majority of cases local 
authorities get involved in the case either when the respondents apply for a 
postponement sine die of the proceedings so that the local authority can be joined or 
when a court orders ex mero motu a local authority to be joined to the proceedings. 
Blue Moonlight Properties II illustrates that local authorities often submit that they have 
no function to fulfil in eviction disputes where a private land owner seeks to evict 
unlawful occupiers from her property and therefore request a further stay of eviction 
proceedings in order for them to obtain a declaratory order that sets out their 
constitutional and statutory obligations. 
Once such an order is obtained, a local authority usually submits a further 
application to stay eviction proceedings in order to join the MEC for Housing and Local 
                                                 
17 A recent study by Statistics South Africa revealed that 1 082 207 households or 11.14% of the 
9 708 854 households in nine major municipal areas lived in informal dwellings. Individually, the results 
are: 220 830 households or 26% of the 849 349 households in Ekurhuleni, 214 362 households or 18.4% 
of the 1 165 014 households in Johannesburg, 184 019 households or 26.8% of the 686 640 households 
in Tshwane, 142 589 households or 17.1% of the 833 859 households in eThekwini, 139 853 households 
or 15.5% of the 902 278 households in Cape Town, 54 660 households or 37.3% of the 146 542 
households in Rustenburg, 51 055 households or 24.5% of the 208 389 households in Buffalo City, 
37 937 or 13.7% of the 276 881 households in Nelson Mandela Metro, and 36 902 households or 18.2% 
of the 202 762 households in Mangaung. See Statistics South Africa Community Survey 2007: Key 
Municipal Data (2008) (‘Stats SA Community Survey 2007’) available online at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/communitynew/content.asp (accessed on 28 February 2011). 
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Government and the National Department of Human Settlements. Local authorities 
argue that this joinder is necessary because they have no role to play in complex 
eviction cases since they merely execute national and provincial housing policy. As 
such, so the argument continues, they cannot be held to account for the housing crisis 
that prevails in their jurisdictions, because they are dependent on the higher echelons of 
government to provide the requisite funding for expensive housing development and 
urban regeneration projects. Some local authorities even contend, so the argument 
concludes, that they should be applauded for what they have accomplished for 
occupiers living on privately owned land “without being obliged to do so”,18 given their 
passive role in housing development and their limited financial resources. 
The intransigent attitude of local governments impacts negatively on the housing 
rights of unlawful occupiers and the property rights of private owners. The constant 
delay in eviction proceedings requires the owner to tolerate the unlawful occupiers on 
her property throughout the protracted legal process without any guarantee that an 
eviction order will be granted. However, once an  eviction order is granted the owner 
could be required to tolerate the occupation even further if the court finds that it would 
be just and equitable to afford the local authority some time to identify alternative land or 
alternative accommodation and ensure its adequacy. In the event that this additional 
waiting period does not come into play, the owner runs the further risk that the sheriff of 
the court could be unable to execute the eviction because it would be too costly or too 
dangerous to attempt the execution of the eviction order.19 This stands in stark contrast 
to the “simple and drastic”20 eviction process that was available to owners in terms of 
the rei vindicatio and the government’s exercise of its police powers to evict people for 
health and safety reasons during apartheid. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 32.5. 
19 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die RSA en Andere 2003 (6) BCLR 638 (T) par 13. 
20 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) par 8 (‘PE Municipality’). 
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1 2 Research problem 
1 2 1 The common law of eviction 
In the South African common law, ownership has been described as the real right that 
confers the most complete control over a thing.21 According to this perception, it is 
argued that ownership has an individualistic nature and that it is an absolute right that 
can be enforced against anyone.22 The owner can achieve this, inter alia, through the 
entitlement to recover (ius vindicandi) her property from any person who retains 
possession of it, using the rei vindicatio. 
The rei vindicatio is regarded as the most important real action available to the 
owner and in the case of immovable property it adopts the form of an eviction 
application. To succeed with this real action the owner merely had to allege and prove 
that she is the owner of the property and that the property is in possession of the 
defendant.23 The owner would satisfy these requirements by proving that the property is 
                                                 
21 This definition can be traced back to Hugo Grotius and the distinction he drew between complete and 
incomplete ownership, by defining complete ownership as “[v]olle is den eigendom waer door iemand met 
de zake alles mag doen nae sijn geliefde en t’sijnen bate dat by de wetten onverboden is”. This definition 
was partly influenced by Bartolus de Saxoferrato who defined dominium as “ius de re corporali perfecte 
disponendi, nisi lege prohibeatur”. See De Groot H Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid 
edited by F Dovring, HFWD Fischer and EM Meijers (eds) 2nd edition (1965) 2.3.9–2.3.11 and Bartolus ad 
D 41.2.17.1. 
22 The abovementioned definitions of ownership by Bartolus de Saxoferrato (“nisi lege prohibeatur”) and 
Hugo Grotius (“by de wetten onverboden”) make it clear that the Roman-based concept of ownership was 
restricted by the objective law and thus by no means absolute. During the French Revolution, the 
population campaigned for the abolition of the feudal system, because the increased political freedom 
that followed was inextricably linked to possession of land. This gave rise to the reinstatement of private 
ownership and the establishment of separate public- and private law measures with regard to land. The 
concept of absolute, inviolable and individualist private ownership was emphasised, because government 
interference was regarded as a violation of personal liberty. This understanding of ownership was 
characterised as a return to the Roman law concept of ownership in an effort to afford greater authority to 
this idea. It is easy to see how the entitlement of full disposal in the definitions of Bartolus de Saxoferrato 
(“perfecte disponendi”) and Hugo Grotius (“met de zake alles mag doen nae sijn geliefde en t’sijnen 
bate”), together with the industrial revolution in Great Britain and the revaluation of capitalism in the 
western world, lead the nineteenth century Pandectists to accentuate the absoluteness of ownership. The 
notion of absoluteness of ownership was thus erroneously attributed to Roman- and Roman-Dutch law. 
See Birks P “The roman law concept of dominium and the idea of absolute ownership” 1985 Acta Juridica 
1-37; Visser DP “The ‘absoluteness’ of ownership: The South African common law in perspective” 1985 
Acta Juridica 39-52; Pienaar G “Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 
1986 TSAR 295-308 and Van der Walt AJ “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasie 
daarvan sedert die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 305-321. 
23 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) at 20A (‘Chetty’). Confirmed in Akbar v Patel 1974 (4) SA 104 (T) 
at 109F-H; Vogel NO v Volkersz 1977 (1) SA 537 (T) at 552E-H; Worcester Court (Pty) Ltd v Benatar 
1982 (4) SA 714 (C) at 721G-722D; Shimuadi v Shirungu 1990 (3) SA 344 (SWA) at 347B-G; Port Nolloth 
Municipality v Xhalisa and Others; Luwalala and Others v Port Nolloth Municipality 1991 (3) SA 98 (C) at 
110B-D; Warrenton Munisipaliteit v Coetzee 1998 (3) SA 1103 (NC) at 1109I; Unimark Distributors (Pty) 
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registered in her name24 and that the defendant occupies it. The onus then shifts onto 
the defendant to establish a valid and enforceable right of occupation, which may take 
the form of a real or personal right, acquired in terms of legislation or a right, permission 
or licence granted by the owner. However, if the owner acknowledges that the occupier 
has or had a right of occupation, without there being any obligation to admit this fact, the 
owner had to prove that the right no longer exists or is no longer enforceable. The 
owner would satisfy this additional requirement by proving that the right of occupation 
has expired or has been terminated.25 The owner would only bear this additional onus in 
cases where she acknowledged the existence of or relied on the termination of the right 
of occupation from the outset and the defendant relies on the right as a defence.26 Once 
the owner satisfied these requirements, the court will have no discretion to refuse the 
eviction order based on the social and economic circumstances of the unlawful 
occupiers or any other general policy considerations.27 
This entitlement to evict was based on the assumption that it is normal for a 
landowner to be allowed exclusive and undisturbed possession of her property.28 It 
follows that once ownership has been proved it will be regarded as superior to all other 
conflicting interests.29 In the case of evictions the ability to exclude unlawful occupiers 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 986 (T) at 996A-C; Pareto Ltd and Others v Mythos 
Leather Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd 2000 (3) SA 999 (W) at 1001I-1002B; Khuzwayo v Dludla 2001 (1) SA 
714 (LCC) par 11; Ellis v Viljoen 2001 (4) SA 795 (C) at 803A-D; Dreyer and Another NNO v AXZS 
Industries (Pty) Ltd 2006 (5) SA 548 (SCA) par 4; De Villiers v Potgieter and Others NNO 2007 (2) SA 
311 (SCA) par 12; Van der Merwe v Taylor NO 2008 (1) SA 1 (CC) paras 131-132 and Jackpersad NO 
and Others v Mitha and Others 2008 (4) SA 522 (D) at 528H-529A. See Keightley R “The impact of the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act on an owner’s right to vindicate immovable property” (1999) 15 
SAJHR 277-307 283 (‘Keightley “The impact of ESTA”’). 
24 She can prove this inter alia by producing the title deeds in court. See Goudini Chrome (Pty) Ltd v MCC 
Contracts (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 77 (A) at 82A and Ex parte Menzies et Uxor 1993 (3) SA 799 (C) at 804F. 
25 See Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 
(2006) 244; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 410-411 and Keightley R “The impact of 
ESTA” 284. 
26 Chetty at 21. 
27 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 54 (‘Van der Walt Property in the Margins’). 
28 See Chetty at 20A where Jansen JA stated that 
“[i]t may be difficult to define dominium comprehensively … but there can be little doubt … 
that one of its incidents is the right of exclusive possession of the res, with the necessary 
corollary that the owner may claim his property wherever found, from whomsoever holding it. 
It is inherent in the nature of ownership that possession of the res should normally be with 
the owner, and it follows that no other person may withhold it from the owner unless he is 
vested with some right enforceable against the owner ….”  
29 Underkuffler LS The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power (2003) 64-71 describes this as the 
“presumptive power” of property rights in terms of the common perception of property. She argues further 
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was protected because this ability leads to greater security and autonomy for the owner. 
In the final analysis the most persuasive rationale for the “presumptive power” of rights 
is that the interests that underlie those rights are prima facie more important than 
conflicting public interests.30 In this sense “presumptive power” is an authoritative 
affirmation of individual autonomy that affords strong protection to the owner of land. 
With the owner presumed to be entitled to exclusive possession of her property the 
onus is on the unlawful occupier to show a legal basis for her continued occupation of 
the land. According to Singer, the occupier bears the “burden of persuasion” to show 
why the owner’s rights must be limited in terms of a right or, failing that, an overriding 
public interest.31 According to US doctrine this “burden of persuasion” is assigned 
according to the core stick in the owner’s bundle of rights. In the case of evictions the 
core stick is the right to exclude others from your property. This right to exclude others 
provides the owner with the certainty that her vested rights and interests as owner will 
be protected through the stability that an established regime of property rights 
maintains.32 The owner’s need for stability and certainty is satisfied with reliance on the 
tradition or convention that she will be able to evict any unlawful occupier based on her 
stronger right to possession. Coombe describes this reliance on convention for firm 
background or “normality conditions” as the “politics of interpretation”.33 Coombe argues 
                                                                                                                                                             
that this position, where individual rights are considered dominant and normatively more compelling than 
conflicting non-right interests, must prevail if individual rights are to be taken seriously. Individual rights 
are important because they protect a certain state of affairs and do so for a particular reason. The 
common perception of property recognises the individual interests of owners as strong “property rights” 
which have been fixed in time and are protected against the threat that public interests pose. Underkuffler 
refers to Alon Harel who argues that legal rights are both content-specific, because there is a certain 
content that is associated with every legal right, and reason-dependent, in the sense that aforementioned 
states of affairs are only protected for a particular reason. See further Harel A “Revisionist theories of 
rights: An unwelcome defense” (1998) 11 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 227-244 and Harel 
A “What demands are rights? An investigation into the relation between rights and reasons” (1997) 17 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 101-114. 
30 Underkuffler The Idea of Property 74. 
31 Singer JW Entitlement - The Paradoxes of Property (2000) 62. 
32 Van der Walt Property in the Margins 59. 
33 Coombe RJ “‘Same as it ever was’: Rethinking the politics of legal interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill Law 
Journal 603-652 637-639 (‘Coombe “Same as it ever was”’) analyses the “politics of interpretation” 
against the backdrop of the concern with “contextual” interpretation and theoretical developments 
regarding the “interpretive turn” in the social sciences. The “interpretive turn” signals a turn away from 
conventional understandings of language that underlie traditional legal scholarship and adjudication 
towards the recognition that there is no inherent or stable meaning in words. It is argued that convention 
is unstable and socially contingent because it always privileges one set of meaning to the violent 
exclusion of all others and thus it cannot provide a ready-made, neutral and objective source of stable 
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that the “politics of interpretation” adopts the guise of an adjudicative strategy that 
attempts to limit the apparent indeterminacy of interpretation by seeking stable legal 
meaning in convention as found in a doctrinal tradition or a core text like a constitution.34 
During apartheid courts found stable legal meaning in the South African doctrinal 
tradition that entitle a private owner to exclude others from her property and to enforce 
this right against others with the rei vindicatio. The result was that evictions from land 
occurred without any regard for the personal circumstances of the unlawful occupiers 
because these considerations were simply not relevant in terms of the rei vindicatio in 
the absence of a constitutional provision that guaranteed people access to adequate 
housing and forced courts to consider all relevant circumstances before issuing an 
eviction order. This position was exacerbated during apartheid when the powerful rei 
vindicatio was legislatively enhanced to establish and maintain a land use system that 
was segregated along racial lines. 
 
1 2 2 Apartheid land law 
During apartheid the Union government of South Africa developed the institution of 
segregation with the enactment of a plethora of racist laws. These pieces of legislation 
established a special relationship between power, land and labour. In rural areas black 
farmers lost their land and were forced into some form of oppressive labour relationship 
with white farmers in terms of three principal pieces of legislation. The purpose of the 
Black Land Act 27 of 191335 was to identify “traditional” black land and to reserve this 
land for the exclusive use and occupation by black people. The only way that black 
                                                                                                                                                             
meaning. P Schlag “Rights in the postmodern condition” in Sarat A and Kearns TR (eds) Legal Rights - 
Historical and Philosophical Perspectives (1996) 263-304 takes this argument further in his “politics of 
form” where he draws a distinction between the analytic aesthetic and instrumental aesthetic. The former 
reflects the pre-modern legal world and is described as static, based on order, stability and status. It 
operates with static, territorial terminology and metaphors that are strongly based on property notions 
which bear a striking resemblance to the common law (at 270-284). The instrumental aesthetic, on the 
other hand, reflects the modern legal world and is described as dynamic, based on progress, change and 
contract. The instrumental aesthetic operates with dynamic, purposive terminology and metaphors that 
refer to progress and the developmental characteristic of the change and reform that international human 
rights law represents (at 284-300). I rely on Van der Walt’s description of the analytic and instrumental 
aesthetic. See Van der Walt AJ “Modernity, normality, and meaning: The struggle between progress and 
stability and the politics of interpretation” (2000) 11 Stell LR 26-49, 226-243 235 (‘Van der Walt 
“Modernity, normality, and meaning”’). 
34 Van der Walt AJ “Modernity, normality, and meaning” 231. 
35 See section 2 2 1 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this Act. 
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people could remain on land outside “traditional” areas without the fear of criminal 
prosecution was to enter into a labour tenant contract with a white farmer. The Black 
Service Contract Act 24 of 193236 was the first comprehensive attempt to regulate 
labour tenancy in the Union. Many white farmers entered into labour tenancy 
relationships with black people and allowed their families to stay on the farms with them 
until the government stepped in to limit the number of black people that were 
congregating on farms. Chapter 4 of the Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 193637 
placed extensive limitations on the tenure of black people who resided on land other 
than the “traditional” areas. Chapter 4 of the Act also placed onerous obligations on 
farmers to register all labour tenants with the native commissioner of the district and to 
appear before a labour tenant control board to explain why the number of labour tenants 
on his farm should not be reduced. While some farmers subjected themselves to this 
bureaucracy, others simply found this too onerous and allowed labour tenant contracts 
to lapse. This forced many black people to return to overcrowded “homelands” while 
others chose to travel to the big urban centres of South Africa in search of minimum 
wage-paying unskilled employment opportunities. 
The process of urbanisation that ensued created a severe shortage in the availability 
of formal housing in urban areas, which led to the creation of informal settlements and 
urban squatting. In urban areas the policy of separate development was enforced 
through the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966.38 The purpose of the Act was to establish 
separate areas for the different race groups defined in the Act39 and to control the use, 
occupation and acquisition of ownership of land in those areas. The Act accordingly 
prohibited persons of other race groups from using, occupying or acquiring ownership of 
land in areas designated to a particular group. The Black (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 
1923,40 the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 194541 and the Regulations 
Governing the Control and Supervision of an Urban Bantu Residential Area and 
                                                 
36 See section 2 2 1 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this Act. 
37 See section 2 2 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this Act. 
38 See section 2 3 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this Act. 
39 Section 12(1) of the Act distinguished between white, black (originally termed “native”) and coloured 
(with subdivisions for Indian, Chinese, Malay and a “residual” class) groups. 
40 See section 2 2 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this Act. 
41 See section 2 2 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this Act. 
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Relevant Matters42 placed further limitations on the nature and duration of black tenure 
in urban areas to the point where the presence of black people in urban areas was 
considered to be of a temporary nature only. 
The operation of the rei vindicatio, in conjunction with rural and urban land tenure 
measures during apartheid, ensured that black people only settled in group areas or 
official townships as they were driven from rural areas to the cities in search of 
employment. The steady influx into urban areas quickly wiped out the supply of 
residential space for black people and forced them to occupy land close to employment 
opportunities in contravention of the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966. 
In turn the government acted decisively by using its police powers to evict people for 
health, safety and public interest reasons in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting 
Act 51 of 1952 alone, or in conjunction with the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966, the Slums 
Act 53 of 1934,43 the Trespass Act 6 of 1959,44 the Physical Planning Act 88 of 196745 
or the Health Act 63 of 1977.46 These pieces of legislation were used to remove the 
squatters with force and to relocate them to densely populated areas on the fringes of 
society without any regard for the personal hardship inflicted on the people that were 
evicted or their housing need. It was possible to evict and relocate people in this way 
during apartheid because there was no constitutional right to housing that could act as a 
counterweight to the owner’s proprietary rights or the police powers of the state. 
The rural and urban legislation that regulated the land tenure of black people 
ensured that they were systematically moved out of city centres and relocated to pieces 
of vacant land that were located on the periphery of urban areas. These areas were 
serviced with very little infrastructure or municipal services. Over time these areas 
deteriorated and people were forced to live in intolerable conditions that posed serious 
risks to their health and safety. The result of these land tenure measures was the 
                                                 
42 Proclamation R1036 of 1968 in GG Extraordinary 2096 of 14 June 1968. See section 2 2 in chapter 2 
for a discussion of this Act. 
43 See section 1 in chapter 2 for a brief discussion of this Act. 
44 See section 1 in chapter 2 for a brief discussion of this Act. 
45 See section 1 in chapter 2 for a brief discussion of this Act. 
46 See section 1 in chapter 2 for a brief discussion of this Act. 
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establishment of large, impoverished black settlements that existed alongside small, 
prosperous white neighbourhoods.47 
 
1 2 3 Housing need and service delivery 
In 1994 the Department of Housing (as it was then known) published a White Paper on 
Housing48 (‘White Paper’) to mark the beginning of its process to house the nation in 
terms of an inclusive and comprehensive housing policy framework. The White Paper 
estimated49 that there were 8.3 million households in South Africa in 1994 and that the 
projected annual population growth would result in the formation of an additional 
200 000 households per year, on average, until 2000.50 The White Paper envisaged that 
the population growth coupled with “[a] relatively small formal housing stock, low and 
progressively decreasing rates of formal and informal housing delivery”51 would result in 
a surge of households seeking alternative accommodation in informal settlements,52 
“squatter housing”53 and already overcrowded formal housing.54 The White Paper 
further noted that overcrowding in informal settlements and an increasing number of 
land invasions in urban areas not only threatened to rapidly increase the estimated 
housing backlog of 1.5 million housing units, but it also aggravated the insecurity and 
frustration that individuals and communities as a whole felt on a daily basis, which 
would only contribute to the rising levels of criminal activity and instability already 
prevalent in many communities.55 
                                                 
47 PE Municipality par 10. 
48 GG 354 GN 1376 of 23 December 1994. 
49 White Paper at 7 the Department of Housing stated that “there is no comprehensive source of 
information on housing” and therefore added the disclaimer that “the statistical information in this section 
must be seen as indicative only.” 
50 White Paper par 3.1.1(b). 
51 White Paper par 3.1.3. 
52 White Paper par 3.1.3(b) estimated that approximately 1.5 million urban informal housing units existed 
in South Africa. 
53 White Paper par 3.1.3(d) estimated that approximately 1.06 million households or 13.5% of the total 
population lived in free standing “squatter housing” on the periphery of cities and towns. The White Paper 
defined “squatter housing” as “any housing unit over which no formal tenure is held” and noted that such 
housing would generally be “of a poor standard, with minimal or no access to basic services.” 
54 White Paper par 3.1.3(a) estimated that the formal housing stock (houses, flats, townhouses and 
retirement homes) at 3.4 million units. 
55 White Paper par 3.21. 
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Since 1994 the housing backlog increased to 2 470 000 units during the 2001/02 
financial year,56 to 2 475 200 units during the 2005/06 financial year57 and showed a 
slight decrease to 2 154 000 units during the 2008/09 financial year.58 The government 
completed 2 604 763 units at the end of the 2007/08 financial year59 and estimates that 
it will deliver a further 1 134 899 houses by the end of the 2013/14 financial year.60 
Despite these ambitious expectations, the Department of Human Settlements (as it is 
currently known) is unlikely to deliver on its promises, because it is plagued by inter alia 
                                                 
56 Department of Human Settlements Need for Adequate Shelter Estimates (Housing Backlog) since 1994 
(2010) (‘Department of Human Settlements Need for Adequate Shelter Estimates’) available online at 
www.pmg.org.za/questions/table1866.pdf (accessed on 28 February 2011). The Department provided 
this information in reply to a parliamentary question. During this period the housing backlog per province 
was as follows: 330 000 in the Eastern Cape, 220 000 in the Free State, 750 000 in Gauteng, 400 000 in 
KwaZulu-Natal, 120 000 in Limpopo, 145 000 in Mpumalanga, 35 000 in the Northern Cape, 240 000 in 
the North West and 230 000 in the Western Cape. This information is significant, because it shows the 
housing backlog in the financial year following the judgment of Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (‘Grootboom’). Statistics South Africa 
does not have information available on the housing backlog for the 2000/01 financial year. 
57 Department of Human Settlements Need for Adequate Shelter Estimates. During this period the 
housing backlog per province was as follows: 352 600 in the Eastern Cape, 169 000 in the Free State, 
697 950 in Gauteng, 533 200 in KwaZulu-Natal, 112 800 in Limpopo, 132 500 in Mpumalanga, 32 200 in 
the Northern Cape, 222 100 in the North West and 222 850 in the Western Cape. This information is 
significant, because it shows the housing backlog in the financial year following the judgments of PE 
Municipality and Modderklip CC. 
58 Department of Human Settlements Need for Adequate Shelter Estimates. During this period the 
housing backlog per province was as follows: 235 000 in the Eastern Cape, 160 000 in the Free State, 
615 000 in Gauteng, 365 000 in KwaZulu-Natal, 110 000 in Limpopo, 128 000 in Mpumalanga, 34 000 in 
the Northern Cape, 202 000 in the North West and 305 000 in the Western Cape. This information is 
significant, because it shows the housing backlog in the financial year following Occupiers of 51 Olivia 
Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others 2008 (3) 
SA 208 (CC) (‘Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road’) and preceding Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western 
Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) (‘Residents of Joe Slovo’), Joseph and 
Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) (‘Joseph’), Abahlali baseMjondolo 
Movement of South Africa and Another v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal and Others 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) 
(‘Abahlali baseMjondolo’), Nokotyana and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and Others 2010 
(4) BCLR 312 (CC) (‘Nokotyana’) and Betlane v Shelly Court CC 2011 (1) SA 388 (CC) (‘Betlane’).  
59 National Treasury Provincial Budgets and Expenditure Review 2005/06 – 2011/12 (2009) 102 available 
online at http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/igfr/2009/prov/00.%20Title%20page,%20 
Foreword,%20Technical%20notes%20and%20Contents.pdf (accessed on 11 July 2011). During the 
period of the 1994/95 and 2002/03 financial years the government completed 1 420 897 houses. This 
was followed by 193 615 houses in the 2003/04 financial year, 217 348 houses in the 2004/05 financial 
year, 252 834 houses in the 2005/06 financial year, 271 219 houses in the 2006/07 financial year and 
248 850 houses in the 2007/08 financial year. 
60 Department of Human Settlements Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements, 5 
March 2010 (2010) available online at www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/100305dhs.ppt (accessed on 11 July 
2011). Preliminary results show that the government delivered 219 899 houses in the 2009/10 financial 
year and expects to deliver an average of 230 000 houses until the end of the 2013/14 financial year. 
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underspending at provincial level, as a result of poor programme management;61 a lack 
of coordination between the different arms and other spheres of government that are 
involved in the housing delivery process; severe delays in the initiation, approval, 
implementation and completion of housing projects; and the ultimate derailment of 
housing projects as a result of fraud, corruption and escalations in construction costs.62 
Tissington therefore observes that the “housing need”63 is set to  increase, even if the 
Department succeeds in delivering an average of 230 000 houses per year until the end 
of the 2013/14 financial year, because by then the “housing need” will  still amount to 1 
million houses on the information available at present.64 The “housing need” in South 
Africa is exacerbated by the fact that it is closely linked to a lack of access to basic 
services including water,65 sanitation66 and electricity for lighting.67 
                                                 
61 National Treasury Press Release, Provincial Budgets: 2010/11 Financial Year, Mid-Term Provincial 
Budgets and Expenditure Report, 18 November 2010 (2010) 5 shows that provincial housing and local 
government departments spent R 8 billion or 38.6% of the R 20.8 billion budget appropriated to them 
collectively. This represents a 14.9% year-on-year decrease in spending.  The spending per province 
was: R 1.129 million or 44.6% of the R 2.533 million budget in the Eastern Cape, R 0.449 million or 
26.7% of the R 1.684 million in the Free State, R 1.738 million or 38.5% of the R 4.511 million budget in 
Gauteng, R 1.459 million or 35% of the R4.173 million budget in KwaZulu-Natal, R 0.882 million or 46.8% 
of the R 1.885 million budget in Limpopo, R 0.650 or 40.6% of the R 1.601 million budget in Mpumalanga, 
R 0.267 million or 54.2% of the R 0.493 million budget in the Northern Cape, and R 0.652 million or 
38.3% of the R 1.704 million budget in the Western Cape. The press release is available online at 
www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2010/2010111801.pdf (accessed on 11 July 2011). 
62 National Treasury Provincial Budgets and Expenditure Review 2005/06 – 2011/12 (2009) 103-104 
available online at http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/igfr/2009/prov/00.%20Title%20 
page,%20Foreword,%20Technical%20notes%20and%20Contents.pdf (accessed on 11 July 2011). 
63 Tissington K A Resource Guide on Housing Policy and Implementation in South Africa 1994-2010 
(2011) 34 (‘Tissington Resource Guide on Housing’) observes that the Department recently abandoned 
the term “housing backlog”, because the time-specific nature of the term and rapid urbanisation made it 
very difficult to quantify housing backlogs accurately. Instead, the Department adopted the term “housing 
need” to refer to the investment required to provide housing for those in need of housing. 
64 Tissington Housing Resource Guide 30. 
65 White Paper par 3.1.4(a) estimated that 25% of all functionally urban households did not have access 
to piped potable water supply in 1994. Stats SA Community Survey 2007 shows that 11.4% or 5.529 
million people did not have access to water in 2007 compared to the 15.5% or 6.947 million people in 
2001. 
66 White Paper par 3.1.4(b) estimated that 48% of all households did not have access to flush toilets or 
ventilated improved pit latrines (‘VIP toilets’) whilst 16% of all households did not have access to any type 
of sanitation system in 1994. Stats SA Community Survey 2007 5 shows that 60.4% or 29.295 million 
people, 6.8% or 3.298 million people, and 8.6% or 4.171 million people had access to flush toilets, VIP 
toilets and no toilets respectively in 2007. This shows an increase in access since 2001, when 51.9% or 
23.261 million people, 5.7% or 2.554 million people, and 13.6% or 6.095 million people had access to 
flush toilets, VIP toilets and no toilets respectively. 
67 White Paper par 3.1.4(c) estimated that 46.5% of all households did not have a link to the electricity 
supply grid in 1994. Stats SA Community Survey 2007 4 shows that 20% or 9.7 million people did not 
have access to electricity for lighting in 2007, compared to the 30.3% or 13.580 million people in 2001. 
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A recent study conducted under the auspices of the Community Law Centre68 shows 
that both the frequency69 and violent nature70 of community protests71 have increased 
significantly since 2007. The study further shows that 36.33% or 190 of the 523 
instances of community protest concerned the lack of access to affordable or adequate 
housing.72 This is followed by 96 instances (18.36% of the community protests) of 
complaints about the lack of access to clean drinking water,73 95 instances (18.16% of 
the community protests) of complaints about the lack of access to electricity or the 
exorbitant rates charged,74 and 75 instances (15.43% of the community protests) of 
complaints about the lack of access to adequate refuse removal services and 
unsanitary toilet facilities.75 This has resulted in the Department recently conceding that 
its housing provision will “remain inadequate because of the lack of access to basic 
services.”76 
Since the advent of democracy in 1994 the Constitution has come into force. 
Amongst other things it sets out to “[i]mprove the quality of life for all citizens”.77 
Significantly, in the housing and eviction context, the Constitution includes a right that 
                                                 
68 Jain H Community Protests in South Africa: Trends, Analysis and Explanations (2010) (‘Jain 
Community Protests’) available online at http://ldphs.org.za/publications/publications-by-theme/local-
government-in-south-africa/communityprotests/Final%20Report%20%20Community%20Protests%20 
in%20 South%20Africa.pdf (accessed on 28 February 2011). 
69 During 2007, there was an average of 8.73 community protests per month. During 2008, this number 
increased modestly to 9.83 protests per month, while in 2009 the number nearly doubled to 19.18 
protests per month. In the period of January to June 2010, the number of community protests decreased 
slightly to 16.33 per month. See Jain Community Protests 4-5. 
70 During 2007, 41.66% of the community protests were violent. This percentage decreased slightly in 
2009 when 38.13% of the community protests were violent, but increased again in 2009 when 43.60% of 
the community protests were violent. In the period of January to June 2010, the percentage of violent 
community protests increased even further to 54.08%. Jain defines “violent community protests” as 
“protests in which some participants engaged in physical acts that either caused immediate physical harm 
to a person or were substantially likely to result in such harm.” See Jain Community Protests 9-12. 
71 Jain defines “community protest” as including “instances of unrest where protestors did not explicitly 
cite the inadequacy of municipal service delivery, but referred to ‘corruption’ on the part of municipal 
officials or to inadequate housing (for which local government is not legally responsible) as grievances.” 
See Jain Community Protests 2. 
72 Jain Community Protests 30. 
73 Jain Community Protests 30. 
74 Jain Community Protests 30. 
75 Jain Community Protests 30. 
76 Department of Human Settlements Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements, 5 
March 2010 (2010) available online at www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/100305dhs.ppt (accessed on 11 July 
2011). 
77 Preamble of the Constitution. 
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guarantees everyone the right of access to adequate housing.78 The Constitution 
requires that government adopt legislative and other measures that will enable the 
progressive realisation of this right within its available resources.79 Parliament has 
sought to adhere to this provision with the enactment of the Housing Act 107 of 1997. 
The Act provides for the facilitation of a sustainable housing development process and 
lays down general principles that apply to all housing developments in all spheres of 
government. Sections 3, 7 and 9 of the Act clearly enumerate the functions of national, 
provincial and local government in the housing development process.80  
Following the Grootboom judgment the Department of Housing (as it was then 
known) adopted a programme to provide Housing Assistance in Emergency Housing 
Situations as chapter 12 of the National Housing Code. The aim of this programme is to 
provide assistance to people who, for reasons beyond their control face disasters, 
evictions or threatened evictions, demolitions or imminent displacement, or immediate 
threats to life, health and safety and therefore find themselves in an emergency 
situation. The Department of Housing adopted a further programme to provide for 
Upgrading of Informal Settlements as chapter 13 of the National Housing Code. The 
aim of this programme is to provide grants to local authorities so that they can upgrade 
informal settlements in their jurisdiction in a structured way according to a phased 
development approach. This programme enables local authorities to fulfil their 
constitutional obligations of providing services to communities in a sustainable manner81 
and promoting a safe and healthy environment for the inhabitants of its jurisdiction.82 
Recently Parliament also enacted the Social Housing Act 16 of 2008. According to 
its long title the aim of this Act is to establish a sustainable social housing environment 
and to define the functions of national, provincial and local government in this regard. 
Finally, the Constitution states that a court may only grant an order for the eviction 
from or demolition of a home after it has considered all the relevant circumstances and 
that no legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.83 The Prevention of Illegal Eviction 
                                                 
78 Section 26(1) of the Constitution. 
79 Section 26(2) of the Constitution. 
80 See section 1 of chapter 5 for a discussion of the Act. 
81 Section 152(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
82 Section 152(1)(d) of the Constitution. 
83 Section 26(3) of the Constitution. 
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from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (‘PIE’) was enacted to ensure 
that: firstly, evictions were decriminalised; secondly, adequate procedural protections 
were put in place to prevent arbitrary evictions; and thirdly, substantive rights were 
included for courts to have regard to in considering whether it would be “just and 
equitable” in the circumstances to issue an eviction order. This coincided with a major 
shift in the focus of eviction legislation, from the prevention of illegal squatting during 
apartheid to the prevention of illegal eviction during democracy. With this shift the term 
“squatter” became obsolete because it was incompatible with the foundational values of 
the Constitution, the right to equality and the right to human dignity. 
South Africa has come a long way in addressing the problem of housing need and 
service delivery since the beginning of democracy. Parliament has enacted legislation 
and the Department of Human Settlements has adopted policies to give effect to section 
26(2) of the Constitution. The constitutional, policy and legislative framework to address 
housing need and service delivery has been created. The challenge remains to find a 
way of interpreting these provisions in a structured manner so that it gives substantive 
content to the right of access to adequate housing in section 26(1) of the Constitution. 
 
1 2 4 Interpretation of the right of access to adequate housing 
In Grootboom the Constitutional Court stated that the right of access to adequate 
housing amounted to “more than bricks and mortar.”84 However, in the ten years since 
this judgment the Constitutional Court has failed to elaborate on the normative purposes 
and substantive content of this right.85 In Grootboom the Constitutional Court also 
rejected the submission that the right of access of adequate housing contained a 
“minimum core obligation” that government had to comply with, in order for it to 
“respect, protect, promote and fulfil”86 the right. While it can be argued that the 
Constitutional Court was correct in refusing to adopt a “minimum core obligation” in the 
South African context, it must also be noted that the court has not developed its own 
                                                 
84 Grootboom par 35. 
85 See section 2 1 2 in chapter 3 for a discussion of the home interests of unlawful occupiers. 
86 Section 7(2) of the Constitution. See section 2 in chapter 4 for the development of an organising 
framework for giving substantive content to the right of access to adequate housing. See also section 3 in 
chapter 4 for interpretive guidance from the European, Inter-American and African human rights systems 
on the substantive content of the right to housing. 
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approach to give substantive content to the right of access to adequate housing since 
Grootboom. In this regard the Constitutional Court could have adopted the 
characteristics that the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights identified in 
General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1))87 as being indicative of 
having access to adequate housing. These characteristics include legal security of 
tenure;88 availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure;89 affordability;90 
habitability;91 accessibility;92 location;93 and cultural adequacy.94 
In the absence of a developed normative purpose and substantive content of the 
right of access to adequate housing, applicants have found it difficult to express their 
housing related and service delivery concerns as a violation of section 26(1) of the 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court judgments of Joseph and Nokotyana serve as 
recent examples of this problem. In Joseph and Nokotyana the Constitutional Court 
opted to decide the cases in terms of administrative law considerations despite the fact 
that the applicants couched their constitutional challenge in terms of section 26(1) of the 
Constitution. The failure of the Constitutional Court to engage with arguments about the 
content of the right of access to adequate housing is limiting the development of a 
substantive understanding of this right that would include the need for electricity, water, 
sanitation, refuse removal and other municipal services. 
Instead the Constitutional Court chose to read sections 26(1) and (2) of the 
Constitution together and developed under it the model of “reasonableness review”.95 
                                                 
87 UN Doc E/C 1992/23. 
88 Par 8(a). 
89 Par 8(b). 
90 Par 8(c). 
91 Par 8(d). 
92 Par 8(e). 
93 Par 8(f). 
94 Par 8(g). 
95 Grootboom paras 39-44. The authors that have engaged critically with this model of reasonableness 
review are: Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 132-186; Liebenberg S “Socio-economic rights: Revisiting the reasonableness review/minimum 
core debate” in Woolman S and Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Conversations (2008) 303-330; Pieterse M 
“On ‘dialogue’, ‘translation’ and ‘voice’: A reply to Sandra Liebenberg” in Woolman S and Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Conversations (2008) 331-347; Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The 
Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights (2007); McLean K “Housing” in Woolman S, 
Bishop M and Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd edition (Original Service, July 2006) 
55-14 - 55-26; Steinberg C “Can reasonableness protect the poor? A review of South Africa’s socio-
economic rights jurisprudence” (2006) 123 SALJ 264-284; Brand D “The proceduralisation of South 
African socio-economic rights jurisprudence or ‘What are socio-economic rights for?’” in Botha H, Van der 
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This model has dominated the jurisprudence of the courts under section 26 (and section 
27) of the Constitution and has precluded them from giving independent and 
substantive content to the right of access to adequate housing. As a result, there is no 
normative foundation or clearly identified set of characteristics that constitute what 
adequate housing means and against which the obligation to “progressively” realise can 
be measured. 
The dominance of the inquiry into the reasonableness of the government’s actions 
has also forced counsel in constitutional litigation to cast their heads of argument into a 
form that only evaluates the (un)reasonableness of the governments’ actions, where in 
some cases it might have been easier to launch a constitutional attack in terms of 
sections 26(1) or (3) of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court judgment of Abahlali 
baseMjondolo serves as a recent example of this problem. In Abahlali baseMjondolo the 
applicants couched their constitutional challenge to various provisions of the KwaZulu-
Natal Elimination and Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Act 6 of 2007 in terms of 
section 26(2) of the Constitution. The purpose of this Act is to prevent the re-emergence 
of slums and is not to provide access to adequate housing on a progressive basis. It 
would therefore have been better to conceptualise a constitutional challenge in terms of 
section 26(3) of the Constitution because this would have forced the court to scrutinise 
the Act from a different perspective and could have prompted added nuance to the 
jurisprudence on the right of access to adequate housing. 
As a result, the courts, and especially the Constitutional Court, has allowed the 
government to hide behind institutional, financial and capacity concerns to excuse its 
poor performance in terms of housing delivery, despite otherwise clear policy and 
legislative obligations in the Housing Act 107 of 1997, the National Housing Code 
(2000, revised in 2009)96 and the Breaking New Ground: A Comprehensive Plan for the 
Development of Sustainable Human Settlements (2004)97 policy. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Walt AJ and Van der Walt J (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 33-56; 
Van der Walt AJ “A South African reading of Frank Michelman’s theory of justice” in Botha H, Van der 
Walt AJ and Van der Walt J (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 163-211 
and Liebenberg S “The interpretation of socio-economic rights” in Woolman S, Bishop M and Brickhill J 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd edition (Original Service, December 2003) 33-32 - 33-41. 
96 Available online at http:///www.dhs.gov.za (accessed on 28 February 2011). 
97 Available online at http://www.capegateway.gov.za/Text/2007/10/bng.pdf (accessed on 28 February 
2011). 
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1 2 5 Obligations of the State 
Over the past seven years, the High Courts developed the law of evictions and the 
common law rules of joinder in a series of cases where local authorities contested the 
applicants’ application to have it joined to the eviction proceedings, on the basis that it 
has no role to play in those proceedings.98 However, these cases show that the courts 
have not adopted a uniform approach in their reasoning for the joinder of local 
authorities to eviction proceedings. The courts have consistently relied on a combination 
of arguments founded on the interconnected nature of the notice requirement in section 
4(2) of PIE; the requirement to attempt mediation in section 7(1) of PIE; and finally, the 
constitutional and statutory obligations of local authorities. In Occupiers of  Erf 101, 102, 
104 and 112 Short Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments (Pty) Ltd and 
Others99 and Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v 
Steele100 the Supreme Court of Appeal recently held that the primary reason for joining 
local authorities to eviction proceedings flows from their constitutional and statutory 
obligations. One further positive development that flowed from the series of cases 
before the High Courts is the requirement that local authorities have to compile and 
submit reports that provide relevant and up to date information on the housing 
conditions in the area of the jurisdiction of the specific local authority101 to the courts in 
eviction cases.  
This obligation to submit a report to a court on the housing conditions that prevail in 
a specific local authority coincides with the obligation of “meaningful engagement” that 
the Constitutional Court recently created in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road.102  After 
hearing oral argument, the Constitutional Court issued an interim order103 that directed 
                                                 
98 ABSA Bank Ltd v Murray and Another 2004 (2) SA 15 (C) (‘Murray’); Cashbuild (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd 
v Scott and Others 2007 (1) SA 332 (T); Lingwood and Another v The Unlawful Occupiers of R/E of Erf 9 
Highlands 2008 (3) BCLR 325 (W) (‘Lingwood’); Sailing Queen Investments v The Occupants La Colleen 
Court 2008 (6) BCLR 666 (W) (‘Sailing Queen Investments’); Blue Moonlight Properties; Blue Moonlight 
Properties II and Chieftain Real Estate Incorporated in Ireland v Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2008 
(5) SA 387 (T). These cases are discussed in section 2 1 2 in chapter 5. 
99 2010 (4) BCLR 354 (SCA) par 14. 
100 2010 (9) BCLR 911 (SCA) par 14. 
101 Blue Moonlight Properties par 75. 
102 The Constitutional Court subsequently applied and developed this obligation further in Residents of 
Joe Slovo and Abahlali baseMjondolo. This obligation is discussed in section 2 2 in chapter 5. 
103 The interim order was issued on 30 August 2007 (Interim order Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road). 
Available online at www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/ Archimages/10731.PDF (Accessed on 7 March 2010). 
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the parties “to engage with each other meaningfully”.104 The Court found that a local 
authority would be acting in a manner that was generally in conflict with the spirit and 
purpose of its obligations to, on the one hand, provide access to adequate housing105 
read with the right to human dignity106 and the right to life,107  and on the other hand, to 
fulfil the constitutional functions of local government in section 152 of the Constitution, 
when it evicted people from their homes without first engaging with them.108 
In Residents of Joe Slovo the Constitutional Court made it clear that meaningful 
engagement could even have a significant role to play after litigation came to a close. 
While engagement, at this stage, should by no means be viewed as a substitute for the 
engagement that precedes litigation, it could concern the upgrading of the properties 
where the unlawful occupiers currently reside in order to make it safer or more suitable 
for human habitation.109 However, engagement at this stage will invariably pertain to the 
details of the eviction,110 possible relocation to temporary accommodation,111 and 
ultimately the provision of permanent alternative accommodation.112 The subsequent 
decision of the Constitutional Court in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western 
Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions and 
Another as Amici Curiae)113 shows that meaningful engagement after litigation has 
come to a close has the potential to be highly unproductive because the parties failed to 
reach agreement on a proposed time table for the relocation of the unlawful occupiers 
from the Joe Slovo informal settlement to Delft. The MEC for Human Settlements in the 
Western Cape requested that the execution of the original order be postponed because 
there were grave concerns about the social, financial and legal costs of relocating the 
unlawful occupiers to Delft and the timing of the construction of the temporary 
residential units. 
                                                 
104 Interim order Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Order 1. 
105 Section 26 of the Constitution and section 9(1)(a)(i) of the Housing Act 107 of 1997. 
106 Section 10 of the Constitution. 
107 Section 11 of the Constitution. 
108 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 16.  
109 See Interim order Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Orders 1 and 2. 
110 See Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Orders 4-7 and 11-15. 
111 See Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Orders 8-10. 
112 See Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Orders 17-20. 
113 2011 (7) BCLR 723 (CC). 
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The availability of alternative accommodation has not been considered in any 
principled manner, despite it being widely regarded as “the most important factor for a 
court to have regard to in determining whether it is just and equitable to issue an 
eviction order.”114 Courts have correctly been at pains to incorporate detailed 
descriptions of the squalid conditions115 that prevail in informal settlements and inner 
city buildings that have been abandoned by their owners. It has also become customary 
to include a detailed overview of the history of the occupation116 to highlight the daily 
struggles of these unlawful occupiers.117  
Sadly, the acknowledgment of the realities of the accommodation of impoverished 
groups has not translated into a substantive contextual analysis of their right of access 
to adequate housing and how such an analysis could add nuance to the housing 
development obligations of government,118 because the courts have continued to issue 
eviction orders that are sought in the name of health and safety considerations119 or 
development120 without any serious regard to the disastrous impact that the evictions 
and subsequent relocations will have on the livelihoods of these unlawful occupiers.121 
 
1 2 6 Summary 
Currently evictions still occur, on the one hand, at the behest of private land owners who 
seek to obtain vacant possession of their land for private use or development, and on 
the other hand, upon application from local authorities that seek to keep people off land 
and out of buildings in the name of health, safety and public interest considerations. 
These evictions from private and public land have social and legal consequences to the 
                                                 
114 Lingwood par 18. 
115 See Grootboom par 7 and City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 (6) SA 
404 (SCA) par 10. 
116 See Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 (4) SA 199 (SCA) par 3; Pedro and 
Others v Greater George Transitional Council 2001 (2) SA 131 (C) paras 5-6; City of Cape Town v 
Rudolph and Others 2003 (11) BCLR 1236 (C) at 1239D-F; Baartman and Others v Port Elizabeth 
Municipality 2004 (1) SA 560 (SCA) paras 2-3 and Murray par 6. 
117 See Sailing Queen Investments par 4 and Lingwood par 5. 
118 See section 3 in chapter 5 for a discussion of the development of an alternative approach to the 
consideration of alternative accommodation. 
119 See Groengras Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Elandsfontein Unlawful Occupants and Others 2002 (1) SA 
125 (T) and Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 (4) SA 199 (SCA). 
120 See City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 (1) SA 78 (W); City of 
Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 (6) SA 404 (SCA); Occupiers of 51 Olivia 
Road and Residents of Joe Slovo. 
121 See Residents of Joe Slovo par 321. 
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extent that they contribute to the growing need for housing and service delivery in urban 
areas throughout South Africa. The courts has taken into account that severe hardship 
flows from most evictions and have therefore ordered the government to ameliorate 
these hardships through various housing programmes in those instances where it was 
deemed “just and equitable” to evict the unlawful occupiers. These same courts, 
especially the Constitutional Court, have in the process placed too much emphasis on 
section 26(2) of the Constitution and failed to give substantive content to section 26(1) 
of the Constitution. The result is that courts have been able to accept that an eviction 
will be “just and equitable” for purposes of section 26(3) of the Constitution and PIE with 
greater ease than it would have been able to do had the courts developed an 
independent and substantive content for section 26(1) of the Constitution. 
The South African courts have been reluctant to engage with international law on 
housing and evictions in terms of section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. In the process the 
courts have deprived themselves from participating in and learning from the 
international human rights debate about housing and evictions. The result is that the 
courts have not identified or developed characteristics that would be indicative of having 
access to adequate housing in the South African context like the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have done at the United Nations level. The Courts 
have similarly failed to develop an understanding of having access to adequate housing 
as being “more than bricks and mortar”. This can be ascribed to the lack of engagement 
with literature from the social sciences about the meaning and affective value of a 
home. The result is that evictions are considered to be “just and equitable” with greater 
ease because the courts have firstly, failed to engage with the human cost and hardship 
that coincides with evictions in a principled manner; secondly, failed to place the rights 
and interests of those that stand to be evicted in an international legal context; and 
finally, been unable to read existing constitutional and statutory obligations of 
government in light of such developments. 
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1 3 Research question, hypothesis and methodology 
In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court laid down its approach to the interpretation of 
section 26 of the Constitution, by stating that it “must be construed in its context.”122 
Yacoob J explained that this required 
“the consideration of two types of context. On the one hand, rights must be 
understood in their textual setting. This will require a consideration of chap[ter] 2 and 
the Constitution as a whole. On the other hand, rights must also be understood in 
their social and historical context.”123 
 
With regard to the textual context of the right of access to adequate housing, Yacoob J 
noted that all the rights in the Bill of Rights are interrelated and mutually supportive of 
each other.124 The right of access to adequate housing can therefore not be viewed in 
isolation, because it has a close relationship with all the other rights in the 
Constitution.125 
Chaskalson P (as he then was) summarised the social and historical context within 
which socio-economic rights - including the right of access to adequate housing - must 
be interpreted in Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal126 as follows: 
 
“We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people 
are living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of 
unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do not have access to clean 
water or to adequate health services. These conditions already existed when the 
Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, and to transform our 
society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at 
the heart of our new constitutional order. For as long as these conditions continue to 
exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring.”127 
 
The Constitutional Court has engaged with the textual context of section 26 of the 
Constitution by emphasising the interrelationship between the right of access to 
adequate housing and equality;128 human dignity;129 life;130 citizenship;131 access to 
                                                 
122 Grootboom par 21. 
123 Grootboom par 22. 
124 Grootboom par 23. 
125 Grootboom par 24. 
126 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
127 Par 8. 
128 See Grootboom paras 23 and 83; PE Municipality par 15; Residents of Joe Slovo paras 142, 191 and 
231. See also Liebenberg S and Goldblatt B “The interrelationship between equality and socio-economic 
rights under South Africa’s transformative constitution” (2007) 23 SAJHR 335-361. 
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courts;132 and administrative justice.133 However, the Constitutional Court has only 
engaged with the social and historical context of section 26 to a limited extent in cases 
where it focussed on the history and duration of the occupation.134 
I pose the research question of this dissertation against the background of this 
interpretative approach and the problems experienced in housing delivery. The central 
research question of this dissertation is whether squatters will be afforded greater 
protection through a substantive interpretation of section 26 of the Constitution that is 
influenced by a contextual understanding of evictions and international law.  
The central hypothesis of this dissertation is that the Constitution envisages the 
creation of a society that is committed to large-scale political, social and economic 
transformation based on human dignity, equality and justice. In the housing and eviction 
context this requires among other things the development of an independent and 
substantive understanding of what it means to have access to adequate housing for 
purposes of section 26(1) of the Constitution. Developing an independent and 
substantive content for the right of access to adequate housing must be understood 
against the background of the evictions that occurred during apartheid without any 
regard for the personal circumstances or subsequent hardship that flowed from these 
evictions. During apartheid evictions occurred without any concern for the interests that 
unlawful occupiers had in their homes. I contend that it is impossible to realise the full 
transformative potential of section 26 of the Constitution in the absence of such an 
independent and substantive understanding of what it means to have access to 
adequate housing. 
                                                                                                                                                             
129 See Grootboom paras 23 and 83; Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 
2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) par 29; PE Municipality paras 12, 15, 18 and 41-42; Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road 
par 16; Residents of Joe Slovo paras 75, 119, 173, 218, 231, 329 and 406 and Machele and Others v 
Mailula and Others 2010 (2) SA 257 (CC) par 29. See also Chaskalson A “Human dignity as a 
foundational value of our constitutional order” (2000) 16 SAJHR 193-205; Sachs A “The judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2003) 56 Current Legal Problems 579-601 and Liebenberg S 
“The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights” (2005) 21 SAJHR 1-31. 
130 PE Municipality par 10; Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 16 and Residents of Joe Slovo paras 18, 24, 
265 and 387. 
131 PE Municipality par 19; Residents of Joe Slovo paras 147, 199, 265, 387 and 408 and Joseph paras 
46 and 52.  
132 Modderklip CC paras 39-51. 
133 Residents of Joe Slovo par 296 and Joseph par 43. 
134 PE Municipality paras 8-10 and Residents of Joe Slovo paras 20-35. 
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The aim of chapter 2 is to place forced evictions in their legal-historical context by 
analysing the rural and urban land tenure measures that were used during apartheid to 
limit the nature and duration of the tenure of black people. The hypothesis of this 
chapter is that the prevalence of homelessness and the scope of the housing crisis in 
present day South Africa originated with the rural and urban land tenure measures that 
the government used in conjunction with the common law remedies of private owners to 
conduct large-scale forced evictions during apartheid. This chapter will show that a 
renewed appreciation of the legal-historical context of forced evictions will form the 
background against which the exploration of the process to “transform our society into 
one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and equality”135 must begin.  This 
renewed appreciation of the legal-historical context of forced evictions will enable courts 
to understand the social and historical context of section 26 of the Constitution and to 
develop a substantive meaning for the right of access to adequate housing. I have 
adopted adopt the methodology of a limited historical study to place forced removals 
and the demolition of homes in the context of apartheid land law for purposes of 
investigating the hypothesis of this chapter. I have limited my description and analysis of 
legislation and case law to the period between 1913 and 1994. The former date is when 
the Black Land Act 27 of 1913 was enacted while the latter date marked the official end 
of apartheid. 
The first aim of chapter 3 is to provide an analysis of the impact of section 26 of the 
Constitution and PIE in an attempt show how the law of evictions has changed since the 
advent of democracy. The second aim of chapter 3 is to develop the normative content 
of section 26(1) of the Constitution by drawing on literature about the affective value of 
the “home” and its relevance in the law. The first hypothesis of this chapter is that the 
coming into force of the right of access to adequate housing and the enactment of PIE 
marked a decisive shift from the apartheid past where evictions occurred without any 
regard for the personal circumstances of unlawful occupiers to the current position 
under the democratic dispensation where each eviction application requires a careful 
appreciation of all the relevant circumstances surrounding the eviction. The second 
hypothesis is that the literature about the affective value of the “home” will enable courts 
                                                 
135 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) par 8. 
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to develop the current understanding of the right of access to adequate housing as 
simply amounting to “more than bricks and mortar”. The analysis of the constitutional 
and statutory context of evictions in post-apartheid South Africa will enable courts to 
understand the textual context of section 26 of the Constitution and PIE. This will enable 
courts to immerse themselves in the intricacies of each eviction within the textual 
bounds of the Constitution and PIE by way of creative reasoning and crafting of 
responsive remedies. A developed understanding of the normative content of the right 
of access to adequate housing with reference to the affective value of the “home” will 
increase the likelihood of finding violations of section 26(1) of the Constitution and 
developing remedies that are responsive to those infringements. I will adopt the 
methodology of a descriptive and analytical overview of the provisions and case law 
flowing from section 26 of the Constitution and PIE. This methodology will reveal the 
manner in which the courts have grappled with the right of access to adequate housing 
and the provisions of PIE. I will conduct a literature review of the sources on the 
affective value of the “home” in the law. This methodology will show that the value of a 
“home” is gaining strength outside the fields of sociology and anthropology. 
The aim of chapter 4 is to identify international instruments that can be considered 
by South African courts in their effort to develop a substantive understanding of the 
scope and content of the concept of “adequacy”. The hypothesis of this chapter is that 
there are treaties and regional human rights instruments that can be used by South 
African courts to interpret the scope and content of adequacy. An overview of the 
jurisprudence that have been generated at the United Nations and regional human 
rights level in terms of the housing provisions in these international law sources will 
assist South African courts in developing a substantive content of section 26(1) of the 
Constitution. I will adopt a methodology of a descriptive and analytical overview of the 
respective provisions and case law. This methodology will show how treaty monitoring 
bodies at the United Nations and regional human rights level have interpreted the right 
to housing to give substantive content to the provisions in a specific context. 
The aim of chapter 5 is to trace the recent jurisprudential developments in the law of 
evictions that have provided clarity on the obligations of the state for purposes of 
section 26 of the Constitution. The hypothesis of this chapter is that these developments 
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have the potential of ushering in a new phase in the adjudication of the right to housing. 
This chapter will show that the necessary joinder of a local authority to eviction 
proceedings within its jurisdiction, the development of meaningful engagement and the 
consideration of alternative accommodation flows from a proper understanding of the 
normative purpose and substantive content of the right of access to adequate housing. I 
will adopt the methodology of a descriptive and analytical overview of the case law on 
joinder, meaningful engagement and alternative accommodation. This will be 
supplemented with a limited literature review of the common law on joinder, the scope 
and content of procedural fairness in terms of section 33 of the Constitution and the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’), and the rights and needs of 
the elderly, children, people with disabilities and female-headed households in 
considering the availability of alternative accommodation. The descriptive and analytical 
overview will reveal the development of the respective concepts while the literature 
review will illuminate the importance of the development for purposes of the 
interpretation of section 26 of the Constitution and the procedural protections and 
substantive safeguards contained in PIE. 
 
1 4 Chapter overview 
Chapter 2 provides the social and historical context of evictions in South Africa. The 
chapter begins with a general discussion of how legislative measures were used for 
political purposes. This is followed by a detailed discussion of the development of rural 
land tenure measures with specific reference to the Black Land Act 27 of 1913, the 
Black Service Contract Act 24 of 1932 and the Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 
1936. These pieces of legislation, in combination with the uncertainty of obtaining 
further employment as a labour tenant on farms and the prospect of having to return to 
overcrowded “traditional” or “released” areas, caused black people to seek employment 
in urban areas. The following section traces the development of the urban land tenure 
measures that sought to keep black people spatially separated from white people with 
specific reference to the Black (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923, the Black (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act 25 of 1945, the Regulations Governing the Control and Supervision of 
an Urban Bantu Residential Area and Relevant Matters, and the Black Communities 
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Development Act 4 of 1984. The chapter concludes with a detailed overview of the 
history and powers to remove, demolish and approve informal settlement areas that the 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 afforded individual owners and local 
authorities and how that relates to the creation and scope of homelessness. 
Chapter 3 is the first of three chapters that provide the textual context of evictions in 
South Africa. The first part of the chapter is divided into sections for each of the three 
subsections of section 26 of the Constitution. In the first of these sections a theoretical 
concept of “home” is developed in an effort to build on the normative foundation created 
for the right of access to adequate housing in Grootboom when the Constitutional Court 
stated that the right amounts to “more than bricks and mortar”. The second section 
provides a brief overview of the positive obligations incumbent on government to ensure 
the realisation of the right of access to adequate housing. The third section is devoted to 
a discussion of the negative obligation in section 26(3) of the Constitution and the 
prohibition against arbitrary evictions. The second part of the chapter provides a 
detailed analysis of the PIE with reference to its drafting history, the concept of unlawful 
occupation, the notice requirement for imminent eviction proceedings; the requirement 
that courts must be satisfied that evictions from private land, urgent evictions and 
evictions from public land must be just and equitable, and the form of the eviction order 
and ancillary matters thereto. 
Chapter 4 places evictions in its international context through the interpretation 
clause of the Constitution which requires that courts must consider international law 
when interpreting the rights in the Bill of Rights. The aim of this chapter is to identify 
international instruments that can be considered by the South African courts in their 
effort to develop a more substantive understanding of the scope and content of the 
concepts of “home” and “adequacy” in section 26 of the Constitution. The chapter 
begins with a discussion of the development of the concept of “adequacy” by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights for purposes of article 11 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.136 This section builds 
on the section in chapter 3 that developed the normative foundation of the right of 
access to adequate housing, by showing that it is possible to use the characteristics 
                                                 
136 993 UNTS 3. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
30 
identified by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in General 
Comment 4 to give substantive content to section 26(1) of the Constitution, without 
defining a minimum core obligation for the right. The section concludes with the 
development of an organising framework for giving substantive content to the right of 
access to adequate housing. This is followed by sections that discuss the development 
of the concept of adequacy with reference to the case law generated in terms of article 
8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,137 
articles 16, 31 and E of the Revised European Social Charter,138 sections 5 and 6 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights139 and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights140 respectively. 
Chapter 5 places evictions in the context of the obligations that the state has to 
provide housing with reference to three recent developments. The chapter is introduced 
with a brief overview of the statutory obligations that are imposed on the state in terms 
of the Housing Act 107 of 1997. The remainder of the chapter is divided into two 
sections on current developments and pending developments. The section on current 
developments analyses the case law on the necessary joinder of local authorities to 
eviction proceedings and the development of the concept of meaningful engagement. 
The case law on joinder provides a detailed overview of the reasoning adopted in the 
High Courts for postponing eviction proceedings instituted in terms of PIE and ordering 
the necessary joinder of organs of state to those proceedings. It is therefore argued that 
a more nuanced approach for the joinder of local authorities would focus singularly on 
the obligations of local authorities that flow from section 26(3), read with sections 26(1) 
and (2), of the Constitution and section 9 of the Housing Act. This approach 
acknowledges that local authorities have a direct and substantial interest in eviction 
proceedings, because a range of their constitutional and statutory obligations are 
triggered when a court finds that it is just and equitable to evict unlawful occupiers. This 
is followed by an analysis of the development of meaningful engagement with a specific 
focus on the reasons advanced for this development and the description of this 
                                                 
137 213 UNTS 221. 
138 CETS No 35. 
139 OASTS No 36. 
140 1520 UNTS 217. 
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obligation. It will be argued that meaningful engagement creates a space for public 
participation that transcends procedural fairness in terms of PAJA. This space requires 
unlawful occupiers to appreciate the budgetary and policy challenges of providing for a 
range of interests, while the government is similarly required to respond in a manner 
that is consistent with the normative purposes and objectives of section 26(1) of the 
Constitution. The section on pending developments proposes an organising framework 
for the consideration of the rights and needs of vulnerable people in determining 
whether there is alternative land or accommodation available for the unlawful occupiers. 
 
1 5 Scope and terminology 
Evictions occur in the following areas of South African law: firstly, civil procedure - 
following sale in execution proceedings;141 secondly, landlord and tenant law - where 
former tenants hold over;142 and thirdly, property law - where people settle on property 
without any right, permission or licence to do so. This dissertation focuses exclusively 
on the latter form of evictions and the rights of the people that occupy those properties. 
The use of the term “squatter” in the title of this dissertation and in the main 
hypothesis may appear inappropriate and counterintuitive to a human rights analysis, 
                                                 
141 In the magistrates court this process was regulated by section 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 
32 of 1944 until the Constitutional Court declared the former provision unconstitutional and invalid in 
Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC). See also 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Snyders and Eight Similar Cases 2005 (5) SA 610 (C) and Mkize v Umvoti 
Municipality and Others 2010 (4) SA 509 (KZP). In the High Courts this process is regulated by section 
27A, read with section 36, of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. See De Wet v Le Riche 2000 (3) SA 
1118 (T), Nedbank v Mortinson 2005 (6) SA 462 (W); Campus Law Clinic, University of KwaZulu-Natal v 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another 2006 (6) SA 103 (CC) and Gundwana v Steko 
Development and Others 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC). 
142 See ABSA Bank Ltd v Amod [1999] 2 All SA 423 (W); Ross v South Peninsula Municipality 2000 (1) 
SA 589 (C); Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-Epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W); Ellis v Viljoen 2001 (4) SA 
795 (C); Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) and Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika 2003 
(1) SA 113 (SCA). Van der Walt AJ “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A 
critical evaluation of recent case law” (2002) 18 SAJHR 372-420 provides a detailed analysis of these 
cases. Following the Ndlovu judgment the Department of Housing published the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Amendment Bill B8-2008 to amend section 2 of PIE so 
that PIE did not apply to tenants or persons who initially occupied the property with the consent of the 
owner or person in charge of the property. In August 2008 the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
Housing recommended that the amendment Bill be rejected and sent back to the Department of Human 
Settlements and the Department of Land Affairs for further review. Subsequently the courts instructed the 
parties in Kendall Property Investments v Rutgers [2005] 4 All SA 61 (C); Jackpersad NO and Others v 
Mitha and Others 2008 (4) SA 522 (D) and Shulana Court that the eviction proceedings provided for 
under PIE should be followed even though the application for eviction was brought under the common 
law. 
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but it serves to place the law of evictions relating to this particular category of unlawful 
occupiers in its proper historical context and to proceed from that context to consider 
the impact of section 26 of the Constitution on this area of South African law through a 
constitutional and international law lens. This approach to the human rights analysis of 
the law of evictions is in accordance with the interpretive approach to the right of access 
to adequate housing laid down by the Constitutional Court in Grootboom. 
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2 
The Legal and Historical Context of Forced Evictions 
 
2 1 Introduction 
During apartheid an owner had a qualified right to exclude all lawful occupiers from her 
land if she could prove that any right, permission or licence that she granted previously 
had been revoked or if she could prove that any real or personal right that entitled the 
occupiers to occupy the property lawfully had been terminated. In the case of unlawful 
occupiers - who never had any right, permission or licence to occupy the property - the 
enquiry into their eviction would end once the owner satisfied the requirements of the rei 
vindicatio. During apartheid the rei vindicatio was interpreted as if it provided an owner 
an absolute right to evict all occupiers of her property without any regard for their 
personal circumstances or housing need. This was possible because there was no 
constitutional right to housing that could act as a counterweight for the owner’s 
proprietary rights. 
The powerful rei vindicatio was enhanced by the police powers of the government to 
evict people for purposes of health, safety and public interest reasons1  in terms of the 
Slums Act 53 of 1934,2 the Trespass Act 6 of 1959,3 the Physical Planning Act 88 of 
                                                 
1 Van der Walt AJ “Towards the development of post-apartheid land law: an exploratory survey” (1990) 23 
De Jure 1-45 32 (‘Van der Walt “An exploratory survey”’) and Van der Walt AJ “Exclusivity of ownership, 
security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate South African land-reform legislation” 2002 
TSAR 254-289 259-263. 
2 A medical officer of health could file a report with a local authority in terms of section 1(2) of the Act if 
she was of the opinion that a nuisance existed in or on a premises or piece of land because (a) there was 
inadequate space, inadequate separation of the sexes over 12 years of age, insufficient number of toilets 
or insufficient cooking facilities; (b) its condition favoured “the spread of infectious disease”; (c) it was 
“situated, used or kept as to be unsafe or injurious or dangerous to health”; (d) it was so congested that it 
could be “injurious or dangerous to health” or (e) it did not have “proper, sufficient and wholesome water 
supply” available within reasonable distance. The local authority could then declare the premises or piece 
of land to be a slum in terms of section 4(7)(a) or 4(8) of the Act. The local authority would then cause a 
notice to be served on the owner in terms of section 5 of the Act that (a) directed her to remove the 
nuisance by taking “such steps for the reduction of the number of occupiers of the slum”; (b) directed her 
to demolish the slum; or (c) notified her that “it intends to acquire such property by expropriation” in terms 
of chapter 3 of the Act. Where the owner failed to prevent, in terms of section 12 of the Act, further 
occupation of the slum, in contravention of sections 10 and 11 of the Act, a court could order the eviction 
of such occupiers in terms of section 28 of the Act in addition to the 25 pound fine for such unlawful 
occupation in terms of section 33(1), read with sections 10(5) and 11(4), of the Act. See De Jager and 
Others v Farah and Nestadt 1947 (4) SA 28 (W). 
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1967, and the Health Act 63 of 1977.4 Van der Walt observes that there is nothing 
extraordinary about the state powers to evict people for these purposes.5 However, he 
adds that during apartheid these powers were used to advance the political purpose of 
establishing and maintaining an unequal and unjust land-use system that was 
segregated along racial lines.6 Various pieces of apartheid legislation7 were then 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 Section 1 of the Act made it an offence to enter or be on land or in a building without the permission of 
the lawful occupier (section 1(1)(a)), or owner or person in charge of the land (section 1(1)(b)). Any 
person found to be in contravention of section 1 would be punishable with a maximum fine of 25 pounds 
or to imprisonment for a maximum period of 3 months in terms of section 2 of the Act. See R v Maduma 
1959 (4) SA 204 (N); R v Ramakakau 1959 (4) SA 642 (O); R v Badenhorst 1960 (3) SA 563 (A); R v 
Mcunu 1960 (4) SA 544 (N); R v Mgwali 1961 (1) SA 51 (E); R v Venter 1961 (1) SA 363 (T); The State v 
Mdunge 1962 (2) SA 500 (N); Die Staat v Nkopane 1962 (4) SA 279 (O); S v Lekwena and Others 1965 
(1) SA 527 (C); S v Ziki 1965 (4) SA 14 (E) and S v Brown 1978 (1) SA 305 (NC). Keightley R “The 
Trespass Act” in Murray C and O’Regan C (eds) No Place to Rest - Forced Removals and the Law in 
South Africa (1990) 180-193 192 argued that it was possible to achieve “important moral and political” 
victories if the people accused in terms of this Act could present defences based on tactical, legal and 
absence of mens rea considerations. Keightley notes further that “[a]lthough the (…) Act lacks many of 
the alarming features of other statutes concerned with control over access to land, its role within the 
context of land disputes should not be underestimated.”  
4 Section 20(1) of the Act authorises a local authority to “take all lawful, necessary and reasonably 
practicable measures” to (a) maintain hygienic and clean conditions in its district; (b) prevent the 
occurrence of any nuisance, unhygienic condition, offensive condition or “other condition which will or 
could be harmful or dangerous to the health of any person within its district”; (c) prevent the pollution of 
water; and (d) render services for inter alia the promotion of the health of persons in its district. See 
Eskom v Rini Town Council 1992 (4) SA 96 (E) and City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and 
Others 2007 (1) SA 78 (W). The Minister of Health is empowered make regulations relating to nuisance, 
as defined in section 1(xxvii) of the Act, in terms of section 39 of the Act. The Minister can also make 
regulations on conditions dangerous to health with specific reference to “the prevention and remedying of 
over-crowded, dirty, insanitary or verminous conditions in any dwelling or other building” (section 34(d)); 
“the control, restriction or prohibition of the erection of new buildings, and to the provision of sewerage 
and drainage systems for buildings, the siting, construction and repair of buildings and the provision of 
water, washing and sanitary conveniences, lighting and ventilation in buildings” (section 34(h)); and “the 
periodical cleansing of premises, the removal from premises of rubbish, waste or spillage, the evacuation 
of any premises on which a condition exists which constitutes a danger to health, the prohibition of 
entrance upon such premises and the remedying of such condition” (section 34(l)). 
5 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 413 (‘Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law’). 
6 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 414. 
7 This included, in addition to the pieces of legislation discussed in this chapter, inter alia the Asiatic Land 
Tenure Amendment Act 15 of 1950, the Black Authorities Act 68 of 1951, the Land Settlement 
Amendment Act 22 of 1952, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 49 of 1953, the Blacks (Abolition 
of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act 67 of 1952, the Public Safety Act 3 of 1953, the Blacks 
Resettlement Act 19 of 1954, the Black Administration Amendment Act 13 of 1955, the Land Settlement 
Amendment Act 31 of 1955, the Group Areas Development Act 69 of 1955, the Coloured People in 
Towns and Villages Amendment Act 6 of 1956, the Land Settlement Act 21 of 1956, the Blacks 
(Prohibition of Interdicts) Act 64 of 1956, the Housing Act 10 of 1957, the Black Taxation and 
Development Amendment Act 38 of 1958, the Black Affairs Act 55 of 1959, the Coloured Persons 
Communal Reserves Act 3 of 1961, the Preservation of Coloured Areas Act 31 of 1961, the Urban Black 
Councils Act 79 of 1961, the Rural Coloured Areas Act 24 of 1963, the Removal of Restrictions in 
Townships Amendment Act 32 of 1963, the Better Administration of Designated Areas Act 51 of 1963, the 
Residence in the Republic Regulation Act 23 of 1964, the Black States Development Corporations Act 86 
of 1965, the Community Development Act 3 of 1966, the Housing Act 4 of 1966, the Land Tenure Act 32 
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enacted to further bolster this absolute right of the government to evict and displace 
people irrespective of their personal circumstances or housing need. 
The aim of this chapter is to place forced evictions in its proper legal-historical 
context by showing how the common law right to evict was legislatively enhanced to 
ensure stability and security for individual owners through the exercise of arbitrary and 
discriminatory state power. Part two of this chapter traces the development of black land 
tenure in rural and urban areas through an overview of the most important pieces of 
legislation. Part three of this chapter provides an overview of the powers that the 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 afforded individual owners and local 
authorities. 
 
2 2 Black land tenure and urbanisation 
2 2 1 Introduction 
The modern history of South Africa is characterised by the special relationship that 
existed between power, land and labour.8 Terreblache notes that the colonial powers 
and the white farmers enriched themselves at the cost of the indigenous people from 
the mid-17th century until the late 20th century by creating political and economic “power 
structures” that entrenched their privileged position vis-à-vis the indigenous people. 
Indigenous people were reduced to “different forms of unfree and exploitable labour” by 
depriving them of the opportunity to cultivate land, draw surface water and herd cattle.9 
The Union government of South Africa further developed the British institution of 
segregation with the enactment of a plethora of racist laws that suppressed and 
exploited black people with greater vigour than any other government that preceded it.10 
Black farmers lost their land and were forced into some form of oppressive labour 
relationship with white farmers. Some of these white farmers entered into labour 
tenancy relationships with black people and allowed their families to stay on the farms 
                                                                                                                                                             
of 1966, the Black Affairs Administration Act 45 of 1971, the Promotion of the Economic Development of 
National States Amendment Act 80 of 1977, the Designated Areas Development Act 87 of 1979,  the 
Black Local Authorities Act 102 of 1982 and the National Policy for General Housing Matters Act 102 of 
1984. 
8 Terreblanche S A History of Inequality in South Africa 1652-2002 (2002) 6 (‘Terreblache History of 
Inequality’). 
9 Terreblache History of Inequality 6. 
10 Terreblanche History of Inequality 299. 
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with them until the government stepped in to limit the number of black people that were 
congregating on farms. This forced many black people to return to overcrowded 
“homelands” while others chose to travel to the big urban centres of South Africa in 
search of minimum wage-paying unskilled employment opportunities. This had 
substantial implications for land tenure of black people in both rural and urban areas. 
 
2 2 2 Rural land tenure 
This process of instituting and maintaining racial segregation in rural areas was 
streamlined with the enactment of the Black Land Act 27 of 191311 (‘BLA’). The purpose 
of the BLA was to identify “traditional” black land and to reserve this land for the 
exclusive use and occupation by black people. Section 1(1)(a) of the BLA therefore 
prohibited black people from acquiring a right to, interest in or servitude over land that 
was not “traditional” land in terms of a sale, lease or other agreement. Section (1)(1)(b) 
of the BLA provided that only black people could obtain a right to, interest in or servitude 
over land that was located outside these “traditional” areas if it was owned by another 
black person. These provisions ensured that the movement of black people was limited 
to these traditional areas and that their ownership of land could not increase in those 
rare instances where they owned land outside the traditional areas.12 Section 1(2) of the 
BLA furthermore provided that only black people could acquire a right to or interest in 
land located in the traditional areas. Any person found to be occupying land in 
                                                 
11 When South Africa became a Union in 1910 all the colonies had legislation in place that dealt with 
racial segregation. The Natal Ordinance 2 of 1865, the Orange Free State Ordinance 4 of 1895 and the 
Transvaal Ordinance 21 of 1895 all sought to limit the number of squatting families per farm. The 
Vagrancy Act 23 of 1879, the Vagrancy Amendment Act 27 of 1889, the Native Locations Amendment 
Act 33 of 1892, the Native Locations Amendment Act 30 of 1899 and the Private Locations Act 32 of 1909 
imposed prejudicial taxes upon landowners and squatters in the Cape Colony who were not in a direct 
employment relationship. 
12 Claassens A “Rural land struggles in the Transvaal in the 1980s” in Murray C and O’Regan C (eds) No 
Place to Rest - Forced Removals and the Law in South Africa (1990) 27-65 30-43 (‘Claassens “Rural land 
struggles”’) provides a detailed anecdotal account of the strategies that the landowning communities of 
Driefontein and kwaNgema adopted during the 1980s to resist their forced removal “by exploiting the 
excesses of the racial platteland, to turn the contradictions in the dominant ideology to their advantage” 
(at 31). Claassens notes that this forced government to adopt a policy of voluntary removals which, 
according to her, “amounted to ‘persuading’ people to move by means that progressed rapidly from 
discussion, to withdrawal of health services, to demolition of schools, to withholding pensions and 
finally … to surrounding the village with armed police in the dead of night” (at 31). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
37 
contravention of section 1 would be guilty of an offence.13 However, black people could 
avoid these fines and possible imprisonment if they worked as labour tenants on white 
farms.14 
The Black Service Contract Act 24 of 1932 (‘BSCA’) was the first comprehensive 
attempt to regulate labour tenancy in the Union.15 The BSCA defined a labour tenant as 
any black person who was bound to render a service or had permission to occupy and 
use land in terms of a labour tenant contract.16 The BSCA required no formalities for the 
formation of the labour tenant contract,17 but created reciprocal obligations for the 
                                                 
13 Section 5 of the BLA. This offence was punishable with a fine of 100 pounds, incarceration for six 
months (with or without hard labour) upon non-payment of the fine or a further fine of five pounds per day 
for a continuation of the offence after release from prison. 
14 C Bundy “Land, law and power” in Murray C and O’Regan C (eds) No Place to Rest - Forced Removals 
and the Law in South Africa (1990) 3-12 6 (‘Bundy “Land, law and power”’) notes that  
“[w]hat the 1913 Act attempted was to legislate out of existence the more independent forms 
of tenure and to perpetuate instead the most dependent. Its intention was to outlaw cash-
paying tenants, and in the Orange Free-State to forbid all sharecropping agreements. The 
Act was intended to reduce cash tenants and sharecroppers to the status of labour tenants 
or wage labourers.”  
See further Plaatjie ST Native Life in South Africa (2009) and Van Onselen C The Seed is Mine - The Life 
of Kas Maine, A South African Sharecropper 1894-1985 (1996). 
15 Earlier attempts to exercise control over the occupation of white owned farms by black people and the 
regulation of the relationship between farmer and labour tenant included Natal Ordinance 2 of 1855 and 
Transvaal Ordinance 21 of 1895. See Haythorn M and Hutchison D “Labour tenants and the law” in 
Murray C and O’Regan C (eds) No Place to Rest - Forced Removals and the Law in South Africa (1990) 
194-213 195 (‘Haythorn and Hutchison “Labour tenants”’). 
16 Section 1 of the BSCA. Section 1 further defined a “labour tenant contract” as  
“a contract whereby a native binds himself or binds his ward ... to render any services of 
whatever nature as a consideration for permission granted to such native or any member of 
his family or of the kraal or household to which he belongs to occupy or use any land, by any 
person who has the right to grant such permission.”  
Section 2 of the BSCA required black people to furnish a farmer with certain documentary proof of age, 
domicile in South Africa and, if under the age of 18 years, permission to be employed as a labour tenant. 
In R v Ndoweni and Others 1949 (2) SA 86 (N), De Wet J found that the appellants were not labour 
tenants for purposes of the BSCA because they did not enter into an agreement out of free will to become 
labour tenants for Mr Miller on his farm Grassfields when they accompanied him from East Griqualand to 
Natal during July 1947. De Wet J found that section 49 of the Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 
1936 made a distinction between labour tenants and servants who were “bona fide and continuously 
employed by the owner under a contract in domestic service or in or about farming operations.” De Wet J 
further found that a servant naturally has to occupy land on the farm and that it would therefore not be 
irregular for the servants to receive “cash wages, rations, quarters and some fields to plough for their own 
use.” De Wet J therefore found that the court a quo erred when it found that appellants were in 
contravention of section 28(5) of the Natal Master and Servant Act 40 of 1894 read with sections 5(3) and 
(4) of the BSCA when they left the employ of Mr Miller on 1 October 1948. See also Malemone v Dreyer 
and Another 1949 (2) SA 824 (T) and Haythorn and Hutchison “Labour tenants” 198-200. 
17 Section 5(2) of the BSCA. 
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parties.18 The duration of the labour tenant contract was limited to a maximum of three 
years.19 The labour tenant contract came to an end through effluxion20 and would be 
presumed to have been terminated if the farmer was unable to call upon the services of 
the labour tenant for a period exceeding three months due to his or her absence from 
the farm without the permission of the farmer.21 Upon termination of the labour tenancy 
contract a labour tenant would be entitled to tend to any crop that was standing on the 
land “till it matures and thereafter to reap and remove it”.22 The labour tenant would also 
be entitled to demolish and remove or destroy any building or structure erected on the 
land that he or she was entitled to occupy and use in terms of the labour tenant contract 
if that building or structure was not erected with building materials that the farmer 
provided free of charge.23 Failure to vacate the farm within one month after termination 
of the labour tenant contract would render the former labour tenant guilty of an 
offence.24 
                                                 
18 The labour tenant had to (a) provide personal services or those of an able-bodied family member to the 
farmer for the specified period of each year and (b) use the land allocated to them only for their own 
private purposes as agreed upon in the labour tenant contract. The farmer had to (a) make the land 
agreed upon in terms of the labour tenant contract available to the labour tenants; (b) allow the labour 
tenants to reside on that land with their families and dependants; (c) allow the labour tenants to erect 
buildings and structures on that land; (d) allow the cattle or other stock of the labour tenants to graze on 
the land allocated to them; and (e) allow the labour tenants to plough the land, sow seed and to reap the 
crops. See Haythorn and Hutchison “Labour tenants” 200-201. 
19 Section 5(1) of the BSCA. Section 5(2) created a presumption that the labour tenant contract was 
entered into for one year unless the parties specifically agreed otherwise. See Haythorn and Hutchison 
“Labour tenants” 201-202. 
20 Section 5(4) of the BSCA provided that a labour tenant contract would be renewed for one year if either 
party to the labour tenant contract did not give the other notice of its intention to terminate the contract 
three months before the date of its termination. According to section 5(6) any successors in title to the 
farmer “shall assume all rights and liabilities as employer” in terms of the labour tenant contract provided 
that both the new owner and the labour tenant could terminate the labour tenant contract thereafter on 
three months’ notice to that effect. See Haythorn and Hutchison “Labour tenants” 208-210. 
21 Section 5(5) of the BSCA. Section 5(11) further provided that where two or more labour tenants from 
the same kraal or household were bound to render services in terms of labour tenant contracts to one or 
more farmers (individually or jointly), these contracts could be terminated if any one of the labour tenants 
failed to render such services. See R v Shapiro 1949 (3) SA 581 (T), R v Ndiyase 1959 (3) SA 818 (N) 
and Haythorn and Hutchison “Labour tenants” 202-206. 
22 Section 5(7) of the BSCA. See Matjila v Moore 1948 (3) SA 1001 (T). 
23 Section 5(8) of the BSCA. See Haythorn and Hutchison “Labour tenants” 206-208. 
24 Section 5(12) of the BSCA. Section 10 of the BSCA held any offenders liable for a maximum fine of ten 
pounds or incarceration for a maximum period of two months (with or without hard labour) upon non-
payment of the fine. In R v Mokwena 1947 (2) SA 686 (T), Ramsbottom J found that the accused was 
wrongfully convicted for allegedly contravening section 5(12) because a period of four months 
(comprising the three months’ notice of termination in terms of section 5(4) and the one month period to 
vacate the farm) had not passed when the case was heard on 24 October 1946. 
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The Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 (‘DTLA’) was the legislative 
embodiment of the government’s growing concern with the large number of black 
people who were living and working on white farms as labour tenants.25 Chapter 4 of the 
DTLA contained a number of provisions that sought to regulate the tenure of black 
people who resided on land other than the traditional and “released” areas.26 Black 
men27 were prohibited from occupying certain land unless they were either (a) the 
registered owner of that land; (b) a servant of the owner of that land; (c) a registered 
labour tenant; (d) a registered squatter; or (e) otherwise exempted from the prohibitions 
contained in chapter 4 of the DTLA.28 Any black person who occupied land in 
contravention of these prohibitions would be guilty of an offence.29 
Any farmer who required the services of black people on a farm therefore had to 
ensure that they were registered as labour tenants30 with the native commissioner of 
                                                 
25 Haythorn and Hutchison “Labour tenants” 196. 
26 Section 25(1) of the DTLA. Section 25(2) of the DTLA enabled the State President to extend the 
application of chapter 4 to these areas or to suspend the operation of the chapter as a whole. In R v 
Maluma 1949 (3) SA 856 (T) the court a quo found that the appellant lived on the farm Kalkfontein in the 
district of Lydenburg without a permit and that he was therefore in contravention of section 7 of Transvaal 
Ordinance 21 of 1895. De Villiers J held that the court a quo erroneously found that Proclamation 218 of 
1940 revived Transvaal Ordinance 21 of 1895 when it repealed proclamation 264 of 1937 which extended 
the operation of the DTLA to the district of Lydenburg. De Villiers J held that Transvaal Ordinance 21 of 
1895 was repealed in its entirety in terms of section 50(4) read with part 2 of schedule 3 of the DTLA and 
that the appellant was therefore convicted for an offence in terms of a piece of legislation that had no 
force and effect in the area. 
27 Section 26(2) of the DTLA excluded the wife, children and dependent family members of the category 
of people subjected to the prohibitions of section 26(1). 
28 Section 26(1) of the DTLA. Section 34 of the DTLA provided special permission for (a) a chief or 
headman; (b) an employee of the government, the South African Native Trust, any council or other body 
established for the administration of the affairs of black people; (c) a minister, an evangelist and a 
teacher; or (d) a person that is elderly, chronically ill or destitute to for purposes of section 26(1)(e). 
29 Section 26(4) of the DTLA. See R v Mabindla 1960 (4) SA 307 (E) and S v Lawrence 1962 (2) SA 498 
(N). In Mabaso and Others v Native Commissioner, Ladysmith and Another 1958 (1) SA 130 (N) the court 
had to interpret the meaning of “reside” for purposes of section 26(1). In this case eighteen black people 
occupied the farm Wittekleifontein since 1940. The native commissioner found that the applicants 
occupied the farm unlawfully because they were not registered squatters. Milne J held that the phrase 
“metterwoon vestig” (Afrikaans for the word “reside”) referred to the act of establishing a residence and 
therefore did not include people who already resided on land. Milne J accordingly held that section 26(1) 
only prohibited the “taking up of residence” and that this clearly did not apply to the applicants who 
lawfully resided on the farm since before the operation of chapter 4 of the DTLA was extended to the 
district of Klip River with proclamation 177 of 1956. This interpretation of “reside” was confirmed by Galgut 
AJ in R v Chomo 1958 (4) SA 241 (T). The legislature accordingly amended the meaning of “reside” with 
section 4 of the Development Trust and Land Amendment Act 41 of 1958 to bear the meaning of “being 
resident”. See also R v Nhlanhla 1960 (3) SA 568 (T). 
30 Section 27(2) of the DTLA. 
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that district.31 A farmer could be requested by the native commissioner of the district to 
appear before a labour tenant control board32 to explain why the number of labour 
tenants on his farm should not be reduced given the fact that there are more labour 
tenants registered for his farm than are “actually and bona fide” required by him to 
conduct his domestic services or “in any other industry, trade, business or handicraft” 
carried on by him on the land where the labour tenants reside.33 
The labour tenant control board had to determine34 what number of labour tenants 
the farmer “actually and bona fide” required for abovementioned operations and could 
order that the current number of labour tenants be reduced if this number exceeded the 
number of labour tenants registered with the native commissioner.35 The labour tenant 
control board could terminate labour tenant contracts to achieve this reduction.36 
All farmers were furthermore required to prepare a prescribed form with the details 
(number, full names and the particulars of the licence, permission or terms and 
conditions of employment) of all the black people residing on the farm and to submit it 
periodically to the native commissioner of the district.37 The submission of incorrect and 
incomplete details or failure to comply with this requirement as such would amount to an 
offence.38 This ensured that no farmer could go by undetected if he employed and 
allowed more labour tenants to reside on his land than he paid licence fees for and had 
registered with the native commissioner. 
                                                 
31 Section 27(1) of the DTLA. Section 26(3) provided that no black person “shall be deemed to be a 
labour tenant under this Chapter unless he has been registered in [the] manner prescribed by regulation 
in the register of labour tenants kept by the native commissioner of the district ….” 
32 Established in terms of section 28(1) of the DTLA. 
33 Section 29(1) of the DTLA. 
34 Section 30(1) of the DTLA provided that the labour tenant control board “shall presume unless and until 
the contrary is proved that five labour tenants are required by any owner in respect of each farm” and 
“that every labour tenant is engaged to render services for at least six months in every calendar year”. 
35 Section 29(3) of the DTLA. 
36 Section 29(4) of the DTLA. Section 29(5) empowered the labour tenant control board to “rescind or vary 
its order for good cause shown”. Any order made by the labour tenant control board had to be 
communicated to the native commissioner in the district so that it could be recorded on the register. 
37 Section 35(1) of the DTLA. 
38 Section 35(2) of the DTLA. According to section 47 of the DTLA a farmer could be incarcerated for a 
maximum of fourteen days with the option of a fine of ten pounds. In the case of a continued offence the 
farmer would be fined an additional pound per day for the duration of the offence. 
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All black people who unlawfully39 occupied land outside the traditional and released 
areas would be served with a written notice that requested them to show cause why 
they should not be evicted.40 In the event that the native commissioner could not be 
persuaded that a right of occupation existed a warrant would be issued which 
authorised the police to evict the unlawful occupiers,41 directing the police to use 
reasonable force if necessary.42 The government and the Department of Native Affairs 
incurred an obligation to accommodate these black people in a traditional or released 
area subsequent to the eviction.43 
These provisions paved the way for the extensive eviction of labour tenants from 
farms during the 1960s and 1970s44 as part of the eventual plan to abolish labour 
tenancy in South Africa by replacing labour tenants with full time wage earning farm 
labourers.45 To this end the provisions in chapter 4 of the DTLA were applied strictly and 
                                                 
39 Section 37(5) of the DTLA deemed black people to be in unlawful occupation of the land if they failed to 
vacate the land after the notice of termination period (one month for a servant and three months for a 
labour tenant, squatter or any other black person) expired. 
40 Section 37(1) of the DTLA. In S v Mafora and Others 1970 (3) SA 190 (T) the court a quo found that the 
appellant and nineteen others lived on the farms Braklaagte and Leeufontein without the permission of 
the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development in contravention of section 26(1)(b) of the DTLA. 
These farms were owned by the government and controlled by the South African Native Trust in terms of 
chapter 4 of the DTLA. Hiemstra J held that the government erroneously instituted criminal proceedings 
against the appellants in terms of section 26(4) of the DTLA because it would have to institute criminal 
proceedings against itself for permitting the unlawful occupation. Hiemstra J stated that “the Government 
in any event has powers to remove them and it is obvious that all those concerned should co-operate in 
speeding up this removal which can in any event be achieved if the correct procedure is followed” (at 
192B). Hiemstra J upheld the appeal and set aside the convictions and sentences. 
41 Section 37(3) of the DTLA. 
42 Section 37(4) of the DTLA. 
43 Section 38 of the DTLA. 
44 Platzky L and Walker C The Surplus People: Forced Removals in South Africa (1985) 138 calculated 
that between 1960 and 1983 1.13 million people were evicted from farms and a further 614 000 people 
were evicted from black spots and consolidation areas. Morris M “State intervention and the agricultural 
labour supply post-1948” in Wilson F, Kooy A and Hendrie D (eds) Farm Labour in South Africa (1977) 
62-71 71 (‘Morris “State intervention”’) analysed these numbers further and found that 
“[b]etween 1960 and 1970, 340 000 labour tenants plus 656 000 squatters and 97 000 
squatters in ‘Black Spots’ were estimated to have been removed. In addition, an estimated 
400 000 labour tenants were removed between 1971 and 1974. By 1976 labour tenancy in 
South African agriculture has to all intents and purposes been abolished and farm labour 
was stabilised.”  
45 The Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee of Enquiry in Connection with the Labour Tenant 
System and Matters Related Thereto (1961) recommended the enactment of legislation that abolished 
the labour tenant system by 1968. However, the Report (at 5) recognised that the abolition of the labour 
tenant system in one step would cause problems and therefore recommended that the system be phased 
out “by means of proclamation to a particular farm, area, district or province according to circumstance.” 
These recommendations were given effect to in the Bantu Laws Amendment Act 42 of 1964, which 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
42 
executed with extreme efficiency to ensure that the land purchased to create the 
released areas could “accommodate the displaced squatters resulting from the 
application of chapter IV” of the DTLA.46 The DTLA has therefore been described as 
“perhaps the most concerted legislative attack on peasant squatters and labour 
tenants”.47 
The strengthened measures for regulating rural land tenure of black people 
intensified the need for land in the traditional and released areas48 as the employment 
conditions worsened on white farms.49 Industrial growth and the promise of employment 
opportunities in urban areas created a way for black people to avoid the nearly 
impossible task of acquiring suitable accommodation in the traditional or released areas 
and to escape the prospect of criminal prosecution for not being a registered labour 
tenant or squatter. Bundy notes that 
“[i]f the reserves were the sources of migrant labour, the mining compounds and the 
squalid urban townships were its destination: the system as a whole was propped 
up on the [Black] Land Act, the pass laws, influx control, and political exclusion. 
Denied access to land elsewhere, the inhabitants of the increasingly crowded 
reserves were condemned to a sphere of existence simultaneously distant, 
debilitating and deteriorating.”50 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
repealed the BSCA and substantially amended chapter 4 of the DTLA. Chapter 4 of the DTLA was 
repealed by the Abolition of Influx Control Act 68 of 1986. 
46 Morris “State intervention” 68. 
47 O’Regan C “No more forced removals? An historical analysis of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act” 
(1989) 5 SAJHR 361-394 364 (‘O’Regan “No more forced removals”’) and Van der Walt “An exploratory 
survey” 5. 
48 As a result the “traditional” land was extended to thirteen per cent of the land in the Union with the 
addition of certain “reserved” land in terms of the DTLA. Section 10(1) of the DTLA limited the total area 
of land for exclusive use and occupation by black people to 7.25 million morgen in the whole Union, while 
the Transvaal, Natal, Orange-Free State and Cape colonies were limited to 5.028 million morgen (section 
1(1)(a)), 526 000 morgen (section 1(1)(b)), 109 000 morgen (section 1(1)(c)) and 1.587 million morgen 
(section 1(1)(d)) respectively. 
49 O’Regan “No more forced removals” 365. Claassens “Rural land struggles” 48 notes that white farmers 
often abused the political power and access to land that their skin colour provided them to assert their so-
called superior position over black people by assaulting and often murdering disobedient labourers. 
Claassens found that there were very few instances where white farmers were prosecuted because the 
black labourers did not lay charges. In those rare instances that charges were laid, the “half-hearted” 
prosecution process resulted in white farmers seldom serving prison sentences in the unlikely event that 
they were convicted. 
50 Bundy “Land, law and power” 8-9. 
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The process of urbanisation that ensued created a severe shortage in the availability of 
formal housing51 in urban areas, which led to the creation of informal settlements and 
urban squatting. 
  
2 2 3 Urban land tenure 
In urban areas the policy of separate development52 was enforced through the Group 
Areas Act 36 of 1966.53 The purpose of the Act was to establish separate areas for the 
different race groups defined in the Act54 and to control the use, occupation and 
acquisition of ownership of land in those areas.55 The Act accordingly prohibited 
persons from other race groups to use, occupy or acquire ownership of land in areas 
designated to a particular group.56 The Act therefore provided various types of areas 
that differed with regard to the kind and/or extent of control exercised over use, 
occupation and ownership. If these areas were represented by points on a continuum 
the “controlled areas”57 would be on the left and the “group areas”58 on the right. The 
progression from left to right on the continuum not only signalled an increase in the type 
and/or extent of control but also the time when the area was created.59 In principle the 
Act applied to the whole of South Africa with the exception of certain areas that were 
excluded from its operation.60 
                                                 
51 See section 2 3 in chapter 1 for statistics on the backlog in formal housing, informal housing, hostels 
and “squatter housing” in 1994. 
52 Schoombee JT “Group areas legislation - The political control of ownership and occupation of land” 
1985 Acta Juridica 77-118 77 (‘Schoombee “Group areas legislation”’) argues that group area legislation 
not only formed the cornerstone of racial segregation but also of the all-encompassing government policy 
of separate development. 
53 Section 49 of this Act repealed the Group Areas Act 77 of 1957, which in turn repealed the Group 
Areas Act 41 of 1950. 
54 Section 12(1) of the Act distinguished between white, black (originally termed “native”) and coloured 
(with subdivisions for Indian, Chinese, Malay and a “residual” class) groups. 
55 Van der Walt “An exploratory survey” 26. 
56 Section 23(6)(c)(ii) of the Act and the definition of “black residential area” in section 1 of the Black 
(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 expressly excluded these areas from the ambit of the Group 
Areas Act 36 of 1966. See Schoombee “Group areas legislation” 78. 
57 In these areas the race group of a person determined her eligibility for lawful occupation of land; 
occupation contrary to this constituted a criminal offence in terms of section 46(1) of the Group Areas Act 
36 of 1966. 
58 Areas proclaimed for occupation and ownership by a specific race group in terms of section 23 of the 
Act. 
59 Schoombee “Group areas legislation” 79. 
60 These areas included (a) released areas in terms of the DTLA; (b) black urban townships in terms of 
the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945; (c) coloured areas in terms of the Coloured 
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The purpose of the Black (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923 was to ensure that black 
people had adequate accommodation in or near urban areas.61 To this end an urban 
local authority62 could, upon approval of the Minister of Native Affairs,63 “define, set 
apart and lay out” land for the “occupation, residence and other reasonable 
requirements” of black people64 and “define, set apart and lay out” any portion of a 
location or any other land within its jurisdiction where black people could lease a lot for 
the erection of “houses and huts for their own occupation.”65 An urban local authority 
could provide buildings or huts to black people “on such terms and conditions as, with 
the approval of the administrator and the Minister,” it could prescribe through regulation 
to black individuals66 and families67 within locations or native villages.  
An urban local authority was furthermore empowered to acquire any land or interest 
in land within or outside its jurisdiction,68 to borrow money against the provision of 
security,69 and to advance moneys or supply material to black people on credit70 “for the 
purpose of providing, setting apart, establishing, equipping and maintaining” any 
location, native village and native hostel. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Persons Settlement Act 7 of 1946, the Preservation of Coloured Areas Act 31 of 1961 and the Rural 
Coloured Areas Act 24 of 1963; (d) missionaries and reserves in terms of the Coloured Missions and 
Reserves Act 12 of 1949; (e) national parks in terms of the National Parks Act 57 of 1976; and (f) land 
under the control of the South African Development Trust. 
61 Long title of the Act. 
62 Section 29 of the Act defined an “urban local authority” as “any municipal council, borough council, 
town council or village council, or any town board, village management board, local board, health board 
or health committee.” 
63 According to section 1(2) of the Act, the Minister of Native Affairs could withhold this permission until he 
was satisfied with 
“the suitability of [the] area and situation of the land set apart and the title thereto, the 
general plan and lay-out of the location or native village, the situation, nature and dimensions 
of any building and the provision made for water, lighting, sanitary and other necessary 
services for the location, native village or hostel, as the case may be.” 
Section 2(1) of the Act empowered the Minister to require an urban local authority to take all reasonable 
measures to comply with section 1(1)(a)-(d) where “the provision made in the area of [its] authority for the 
needs of natives ordinarily employed within that area for normal requirements is inadequate or 
unsuitable.” Where the urban local authority failed to adhere to this request section 3(1) of the Act 
authorised the Minister “to exercise all such rights, powers and authorities as might have been exercised 
by the urban local authority” to “carry out such works and do all such things as may be necessary to give 
effect to” section 1(1)(a)-(d) of the Act. 
64 Section 1(1)(a) of the Act. These areas would be known as “locations”. 
65 Section 1(1)(b) of the Act. These areas would be known as “native villages”. 
66 Section 1(1)(c) of the Act. These areas would be known as “native hostels”. 
67 Section 1(1)(d) of the Act. 
68 Section 7(1)(a) of the Act. 
69 Section 7(1)(b) of the Act. 
70 Section 7(1)(c) of the Act. 
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Only black people were allowed to “enter into any agreement or transaction for the 
acquisition” of a right to, interest in or servitude over a piece of land in a location or 
native village.71 Any person who was party to any agreement that attempted to 
circumvent section 4(1) would be guilty of an offence.72 All black people who were 
employed within the jurisdiction of an urban local authority were further prohibited from 
obtaining residence anywhere else than in locations, native villages or native hostels.73 
Any person who harboured or otherwise provided accommodation to black people in 
contravention of section 5(1) would be guilty of an offence.74 The Act furthermore 
prohibited owners, lessees and lawful occupiers of land from allowing the congregation 
of black people on their land if that land was situated within three miles of the urban 
authorities’ jurisdiction.75 Any person who allowed black people to congregate on their 
land in contravention of section 6(1) would be guilty of an offence.76 This ensured that 
black people congregated in certain defined areas for domestic employment purposes 
                                                 
71 Section 4(1) of the Act. However, coloured people could stay in locations and native villages if they 
were and continued to be ordinarily resident in that location or native village at the commencement of the 
Act (section 4(3)(a)), until the urban local authority could satisfy the Minister that “adequate and suitable 
accommodation” was available for them somewhere else in its jurisdiction (section 4(3)(b)). 
72 Section 4(2) of the Act. This offence was punishable with a maximum fine of 100 pounds and a further 
five pounds per day on which the act or default continued. 
73 Section 5(1) of the Act. Section 5(2) of the Act exempted the following black people from this provision: 
(a) a registered owner of immovable property valued at 75 pounds or more; (b) a successor in title in 
terms of a valid will or through intestate succession; (c) a registered voter in the Cape Colony; (d) the 
wife, minor child, unmarried daughter or bona fide dependent of abovementioned persons; (e) a bona fide 
domestic servant that receives sleeping and sanitary accommodation from his or her employer; (f) where 
accommodation is provided by the employer in terms of section (1)(1)(e) of the Act; (g) a resident of a 
mission house, private hostel or similar institutions; (h) a resident of an area proclaimed as an approved 
area for black occupation; (i) a resident of a location in the Orange Free State Colony on the date that it 
was proclaimed as a coloured location in terms of section 27(3) of the Act; and (j) the holder of an 
exemption otherwise granted permanently or for a specified period. 
74 Section 5(3) of the Act. This offence was punishable in terms of section 25 of the Act with a maximum 
fine of ten pounds, or with incarceration (with or without hard labour) for a maximum period of two months 
upon default of the fine, or with both the fine and imprisonment, or to imprisonment without the option of a 
fine for a first time conviction. All subsequent convictions were punishable with a maximum fine of 25 
pounds, or with incarceration (with or without hard labour) for a maximum period of three months upon 
default of the fine, or with both the fine and imprisonment, or to imprisonment without the option of a fine. 
75 Section 6(1) of the Act. The Governor-General could increase this area to a maximum of five miles in 
terms of section 6(2) of the Act. 
76 Section 6(3) of the Act. This offence was punishable with a maximum fine of 50 pounds. 
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where they could be carefully managed77 and could have their living conditions 
inspected on a regular basis.78 
However, black people were required to live in “proclaimed areas” if they sought 
employment in the mining and industrial sector.79 Black people had to report to an 
authorised officer upon their arrival in these proclaimed areas.80 The authorised officer 
would, upon payment of a licence fee,81 issue them with a certificate stating that they 
duly reported their arrival in the proclaimed area82 and provide them with a badge that 
identified them as eligible people to take up employment by the day.83 Any person who 
intentionally attempted to deceive another;84 or wilfully altered, defaced, destroyed or 
mutilated a certificate or document issued in terms of section 12 of the Act;85 or aided 
and abetted any person in the commission of abovementioned86 would be guilty of an 
offence.87 
This enabled the urban local authority to “establish, equip, control and manage” the 
accommodation required for all the black people who sought employment in the 
proclaimed areas. All employers were obliged to pay a registration fee for the 
registration of the service contract entered between them and their black labourers.88 All 
                                                 
77 According to section 11(1) of the Act every urban local authority had to appoint or assign officers for the 
management of every location, native village and native hostel within its jurisdiction. 
78 According to section 11(2) of the Act the Minister could appoint officers who would be responsible for 
the inspection of every location, native village and native hostel or any other area in the jurisdiction of the 
urban local authority where black people were accommodated to establish whether there were “any 
matter affecting the well-being and welfare” of those black people that required attention. Section 11(4) of 
the Act then required these officers to submit a report to the Minister about the factual living conditions of 
the black people in those areas. 
79 Section 12 of the Act. 
80 Section 29 of the Act defined an “authorised officer” as “a magistrate, justice of the peace, a European 
member of the police, and such other officers as may be authorised by the Minister to demand the 
production of documents under this Act or the regulations.” 
81 Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. 
82 Section 12(1)(b) of the Act. Section 12(1)(d) of the Act empowered an authorised officer to refuse to 
issue this certificate to any black person who appeared to be under the age of 18 years and who could 
not provide evidence to the contrary unless they entered the proclaimed area with a parent or guardian. 
83 Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. 
84 Section 14(1)(a) of the Act. 
85 Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. 
86 Section 14(1)(c) of the Act. 
87 Section 14(1) of the Act. This offence was punishable in terms of section 14(2) of the Act with a 
maximum fine of 50 pounds, or with incarceration (with or without hard labour) for a maximum period of 
six months upon default of the fine, or with both the fine and imprisonment, or to imprisonment without the 
option of a fine. 
88 Section 12(1)(a) of the Act. Section 18(1) of the Act prohibited any employer from employing more than 
50 labourers who did not reside in a native hostel within the jurisdiction of the urban local authority. 
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black labourers who remained in a proclaimed area after the termination of their 
employment contract, expiration of their licence or release from prison had to report to 
an authorised officer to receive a certificate of that fact89 so that they could reside at a 
prescribed place until they found employment again.90 
A black labourer could be brought before a magistrate or native commissioner to 
“provide good and satisfactory account of himself” where there was reason to believe 
that he was (a) habitually unemployed; or (b) is “by reason of his own default” not in a 
position to lead a honest livelihood; or (c) is leading an idle, dissolute or disorderly life; 
or (d) has been ordered to leave the proclaimed area in terms of section 12(1)(h) of the 
Act.91 If the labourer failed to provide a good and satisfactory account of himself a 
magistrate or native commissioner could order the eviction of that black labourer, order 
his return to his place of origin and enforce a time limitation on his return to the 
proclaimed area,92 or impose detention for a maximum period of two years “in a farm 
colony, work colony, refuge, rescue home, or similar institution established or approved 
in terms of section [50] of the Prisons and Reformations Act” 13 of 1911.93 
These provisions were copied verbatim in the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 
25 of 1945, which in turn led to the proclamation of the Regulations Governing the 
Control and Supervision of an Urban Bantu Residential Area and Relevant Matters.94 
Chapter 2 of these regulations provided for various forms of urban tenure for black 
people that conformed to the policy whereby the presence of black people in urban 
areas was considered to be of a temporary nature. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Section 18(3) of the Act made any contravention of this prohibition an offence that was punishable in 
terms of section 25 of the Act. 
89 Section 12(1)(c) of the Act. 
90 Section 12(1)(g) of the Act. 
91 Section 17(1) of the Act. 
92 Section 17(2)(a) of the Act. 
93 Section 17(2)(b) of the Act. 
94 Proclamation R1036 of 1968 in GG Extraordinary 2096 of 14 June 1968. The relevant matters referred 
to include the administration of and control over trading, business and professional sites (chapter 3); the 
possession of dangerous weapons (chapter 4); the administration of and control over communal halls and 
recreational grounds (chapter 5); the keeping of animals (chapter 6); the administration and control over 
bantu hostels (chapter 7); and the establishment of cemeteries, internment and funerals (chapter 8). 
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These regulations empowered a superintendent95 of a black residential area to issue 
a site permit96 and a building permit97 to an emancipated black male who was “desirous 
of taking up residence in the Bantu residential area with his dependents and of erecting 
a dwelling”98 if his application fulfilled certain requirements.99 The site permit afforded 
the holder the right to the exclusive use and occupation of the site100 in terms of a 
lease.101 The holder of the site permit was required to maintain and repair the site102 
and could not transfer the permit;103 let, sublet or transfer the dwelling;104 or sell, cede, 
assign, make over, alienate, pledge or hypothecate his permit105 without the written 
permission of the superintendent.  
The superintendent was also empowered to issue a residential permit106 to an 
emancipated black male who was “desirous of taking up residence in the Bantu 
residential area and of occupying together with his dependents a council dwelling”107 if 
his application fulfilled certain requirements.108 The residential permit afforded the 
holder the right to occupy the council dwelling as a tenant109 on certain conditions.110  
                                                 
95 Regulation 1 of Chapter 1 defined a “superintendent” as “the officer referred to in regulation 1(2) of 
Chapter 2 of these regulations, being the officer appointed and licensed under the provisions of section 
22(1) of the [Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation] Act [25 of 1945] for the management of the Bantu 
residential area and includes a deputy or assistant to such officer.” 
96 The site permit had to include the name, date of birth, identity number and ethnic group of the holder 
(regulation 6(6)(e)) and all other occupiers (regulation 6(6)(f)) of the site. The site permit further had to 
include a description of the site (regulation 6(6)(b)) and had to “specify which buildings, structures or 
fences have been or may be erected on the relative site” (regulation 6(6)(c)). 
97 According to regulation 6(3) the holder of the building permit had to begin with building operations 
within three months of receipt of the permit if he wished to avoid its cancellation, withdrawal and ipso 
facto lapsing of any rights he acquired in terms of it. 
98 Regulation 6(1). 
99 Regulation 6(2). 
100 Regulation 6(6)(a). 
101 According to regulation 6(4) the rent and service charges was “payable monthly in advance with effect 
from the date of beneficial occupation of the site by the holder of the site permit.” 
102 Regulation 12. 
103 Regulation 9. 
104 Regulation 10. 
105 Regulation 11. 
106 The residential permit had to specify the number of the allotted dwelling (regulation 7(3)(a)); the date 
on which it was issued (regulation 7(3)(e)); the name, identity number and ethnic group of the holder 
(regulation 7(3)(c)) and all other occupiers (regulation 7(3)(d)) of the site. 
107 Regulation 7(1). 
108 Regulation 7(2). 
109 Regulation 7(6)(a). 
110 Regulation 7(6)(b)-(i). 
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The holder of a residential permit was under the same obligations as the holder of a 
site permit, with the exclusion of the prohibition in terms of regulation 9, which did not 
apply. The superintendent was further empowered to issue a certificate of occupation111 
to an emancipated black male who was “desirous of acquiring the right of occupation of 
a dwelling”112 if his application fulfilled certain requirements.113 The certificate of 
occupation afforded the holder a protected personal right of occupation to a house that 
he purchased from the local authority. The holder of a certificate of occupation was 
prohibited from letting, subletting and transferring his dwelling without the written 
permission of the superintendent.114 The superintendent was empowered to, in addition 
to abovementioned forms of tenure, issue entry-,115 accommodation-,116 hostel-117 and 
lodger’s118 permits119 that granted the holders short periods of entry into a black 
residential area. 
The abovementioned forms of tenure could be cancelled by the superintendent, after 
a 30 day notice period, if the holder of such permit or certificate was unemployed,120 
failed to execute certain building works,121 committed a crime122 or if he no longer 
complied with the conditions of his occupation.123 In the case of a residential permit, the 
permit could additionally be cancelled if the holder ceased to fall within the sub-
economic group defined in terms of section 20(1)bis of the Black (Urban Areas) 
                                                 
111 The certificate of occupation had to specify the number of the allotted dwelling and include a 
description of the site (regulation 7(4)(b)); the date on which it was issued (regulation 8(4)(e)); the name, 
identity number and ethnic group of the holder (regulation 8(4)(c)) and all other occupiers (regulation 
8(4)(d)) of the site. 
112 Regulation 8(2). 
113 Regulation 8(4)(a). 
114 Regulation 10. 
115 Regulation 19(1). 
116 Regulation 19(2). 
117 Regulation 19(3). 
118 Regulation 20(1). 
119 According to Regulation 19(6) the following people did not require any permit to enter a black 
residential area: (a) employees of the local authority in the exercise of their duties; (b) members of the 
South African Police and South African Railways and Harbours Police in the exercise of their duties; (c) 
ministers of religion, registered medical practitioners, nurses and midwives and missionaries; (d) public 
servants, sheriffs and messengers of the court in the discharge of their duties; and (e) a person who fell 
within the purview of regulation 20(12). 
120 Regulation 15(1)(a) and (b). 
121 Regulation 15(1)(c) and (d). 
122 Regulation 15(1)(h) and (i). 
123 Regulation 15(1)(e)-(g) and (j)-(n). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
50 
Consolidation Act 25 of 1945.124 Any person who contravened these regulations or the 
social behaviour regulations125 would be guilty of an offence.126 Any person who was 
convicted of an offence in terms of Regulation 47(1)(i), (j), (k) or (l) could also be evicted 
from the dwelling, site or black residential area.127 
The South African economy experienced a period of growth at the beginning of the 
1980s that forced a shift from capital to labour intensive operations. This shift created a 
demand for skilled and unskilled workers that the supply of white and coloured workers 
could not satisfy.128 This unsatisfied demand for workers led to the rapid urbanisation of 
black workers into white urban areas in an effort to stay closer to employment 
opportunities.129 Initially these black workers obtained the requisite permits to stay in the 
white areas, but over time these permits either expired or were not renewed by a 
superintendent. This resulted in a flood of arrests for contraventions of the Black (Urban 
Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 and the regulations promulgated in terms of that 
Act. The resulting circle of lawlessness, violence and civil unrest130 forced a change in 
the urbanisation strategy of the government that would allow more black people to 
reside in urban areas in order to maintain the workforce that the growing economy 
required. 
This change in the national urbanisation strategy led to the enactment of the Black 
Communities Development Act 4 of 1984 (‘BCDA’). The purpose of the BCDA was “to 
provide for the purposeful development of Black communities outside the national 
states.”131 To this end the Minister of Co-operation and Development was empowered 
                                                 
124 Regulation 15(2)(b). 
125 These included prohibitions that related to the organisation of public meetings, assemblies and 
entertainment (Regulation 26); disturbing the public peace (Regulation 27); obstructing the work of 
officers of the local authority (Regulation 28); obstructing the flow of traffic and pedestrians (Regulation 
29); public indecency (Regulation 30); solicitation for the purpose of prostitution or mendicancy 
(Regulation 31); defecating or urinating in the street (Regulation 32); scaling fences to enter or exit a 
black residential area (Regulation 33); the slaughtering of stock (Regulation 34); damaging trees and 
council property (Regulation 35); the control of games and entertainment (Regulation 36); the sinking of 
wells and excavations (Regulation 37); washing facilities (Regulation 38); the use of refuse receptacles 
(Regulation 39); the provision of water and health services (Regulation 40) and the reporting of infectious 
diseases to the superintendent (Regulation 41).  
126 Regulation 47(1). 
127 Regulation 47(2). 
128 Terreblache History of Inequality 329-332. 
129 Terreblache History of Inequality 75. 
130 Terreblache History of Inequality 404. 
131 Long title of the BCDA. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
51 
to declare certain areas to be development board areas132 and to establish a 
development board for each of those areas.133 The objects of these boards were to (a) 
promote the viability, development and autonomy of black communities; (b) promote the 
welfare of those communities and people; (c) take steps to prevent the economic and 
social decline of those communities and people; and (d) take steps to rehabilitate those 
communities and people.134 Pursuant to these objectives the boards were bestowed 
with certain local government;135 housing and development;136 and agency functions.137 
Significantly, the BCDA empowered the board138 and the local authority or the 
township developer139 to grant a competent person140 a leasehold for a period of 99 
years141 on certain conditions142 and against payment or the furnishing of security for 
that right.143 Upon registration144 of this leasehold in terms of the Deeds Registries Act 
47 of 1937, the holder of this real right would obtain a certificate145 that served as proof 
of the registration, her right to occupy the leasehold site and the fact that certain rights 
have vested146 in her. 
These provisions paved the way for the enactment of the Conversion of Certain 
Rights into Leasehold or Ownership Act 81 of 1988147 as part of the range of legislative 
provisions, enacted during President FW de Klerk’s term in office, which started 
                                                 
132 Section 3(1)(a) of the BCDA. 
133 Section 3(1)(c) of the BCDA. 
134 Section 16 of the BCDA. 
135 See chapter 3 of the BCDA. 
136 See chapter 4 of the BCDA. 
137 See chapter 5 of the BCDA. 
138 Section 52(1)(a)(i) of the BCDA. 
139 Section 52(1)(a)(ii) of the BCDA. 
140 Section 52(2) of the BCDA provides that a leasehold may be acquired by (a) a black male as defined 
in section 10(1)(a) or (b) of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945; (b) the wife or partner 
in a customary union of the person in (a); (c) a descendant of the person in (a); (d) an approved township 
developer; (e) an approved association or a person; and (f) an approved category of persons. 
141 Section 52(1)(a) of the BCDA. 
142 Section 52(3)(a) of the BCDA provided that the Minister for Co-operation and Development could 
impose such conditions as he saw fit for purposes of section 52(2)(d)-(f). According to section 52(3)(b) of 
the BCDA these conditions encompassed the fact that his approval would “be valid only for a particular 
purpose or for a specified period or until the taking place of a particular event.” 
143 Section 52(4)(a) and (b) of the BCDA. 
144 Section 52(10) of the BCDA. 
145 Section 53(3)(a)-(c) of the BCDA. 
146 Section 53(5) of the BCDA afforded the holder of the leasehold the right to (a) erect and improve 
buildings or to alter and demolish buildings or structures; (b) occupy the buildings or structures and the 
site; (c) encumber the leasehold; and (d) dispose of the leasehold to another competent person. 
147 Section 24 of the General Law Second Amendment Act 108 of 1993 amended the short title of this Act 
which was formerly the Conversion of Certain Rights to Leasehold Act. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
52 
dismantling apartheid land law.148 The purpose of this Act is “to provide for the 
conversion of certain rights of occupation into leasehold or ownership.”149 
The Act empowers the Director-General150 to conduct an investigation151 to 
determine which of the “affected sites”152 within her province have been granted a right 
of leasehold or ownership.153 At the close of this inquiry the Director-General must 
publish a notice154 that states to whom she intends to grant a right of leasehold or 
ownership.155 The Director-General must then, upon expiration of the period specified 
for the lodging of an appeal against this notice or upon “confirmation, variation or 
substitution” of the determination,156 lodge the declaration, the title deed and any other 
documents with the Registrar of Deeds.157 
 
 
 
                                                 
148 Other pieces of legislation included the Abolition of Influx Control Act 68 of 1986, the Land Affairs Act 
101 of 1987, the Abolition of Development Bodies Amendment Act 81 of 1990, the Abolition of Racially 
Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991, the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Amendment Act 
133 of 1992, the Regional and Land Affairs General Amendment Act 89 of 1993 and the Land Reform: 
Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993. 
149 Long title of the Act. Section 1 of the BCDA defined “right of leasehold” as “a right of leasehold 
contemplated in section 52, and includes a right in respect of a sectional leasehold unit as contemplated 
in section 55, and ‘leasehold’ has a corresponding meaning.” 
150 Section 1 of the Act defines “Director-General” as “the director-general of the provincial administration 
in question.” 
151 Section 7(1) of the Act reads: 
“For the purposes of the application of this Act a Director-General may, after due notice, at 
all reasonable times enter such premises where any record, book or document which relates 
to or is suspected to relate to matters dealt with in this Act by any local authority, is kept, an 
may examine or make copies of or extracts from any such record, book or document and 
require from any person who has control over such record, book or document an explanation 
of any entry in any such record, book or document.” 
The Director-General may delegate this power of investigation to another official in terms of section 10 of 
the Act. Any person who obstructs the Director-General or a delegated official during the investigation 
envisaged by section 7(1) will be guilty of an offence in terms of section 7(2) and liable to pay a maximum 
fine of R 500 or incarceration for a maximum period of six months. 
152 Section 1 of the Act defines an “affected site” as  
“a site which is or purports to be occupied by virtue of a site permit, a certificate, a trading 
site permit, or a permit issued by the local authority concerned conferring upon the holder 
thereof rights which in the opinion of the Director-General concerned are similar to the rights 
which are held by the holder of a site permit, certificate or trading site permit.” 
153 Section 2(1), read with section 2(3), of the Act. 
154 Section 2(5) of the Act. 
155 Section 2(4) of the Act. 
156 Section 4(1), read with section 3, of the Act. 
157 Section 5(1), read with section 5(1A), of the Act. 
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2 2 4 Conclusion 
The rural land tenure provisions severely limited the livelihood strategies of black 
farmers when it dispossessed them of their land and limited their free movement by 
restricting their occupation to certain restricted areas, where they could occupy land 
lawfully.158 National policies exacerbated this situation by ensuring that there was no 
guarantee that these restricted areas would bear any resemblance to the needs of black 
farmers.159 The only way for black farmers to sustain a family in rural areas was to enter 
into a temporary labour tenant contract with a white farmer because all the other forms 
of tenure were legislated out of existence. The combination of having to leave white 
areas upon termination of a labour tenant contract, the uncertainty of obtaining further 
employment as a labour tenant on another farm and the prospect of having to return to 
overcrowded traditional or released areas caused black people to seek employment in 
urban areas.160 The period of intense urbanisation that followed forced government to 
enact strict influx control policies to keep black people at the periphery of urban 
areas.161 These policies prohibited black people from living in any other area than in 
locations, native villages and native hostels or in certain proclaimed areas if they were 
employed in the mining and industrial sector. Every aspect of their daily lives was 
meticulously regulated and recorded so that it could be checked at a moment’s notice 
for compliance. The tenure of black people in these areas was always regarded as 
temporary, despite the illusion of permanency that was created by inspections to 
ascertain whether there were any factors that impeded their general well-being and 
required improvement. However, black people started occupying vacant land and 
buildings closer to work because they could not afford the daily commute from the 
periphery, nor could they risk the possibility of losing their jobs on account of being late 
for work on a regular basis. Government subsequently criminalised the tenure of black 
                                                 
158 See Robertson MK “Dividing the land: An introduction to apartheid land law” in Murray C and O’Regan 
C (eds) No Place to Rest - Forced Removals and the Law in South Africa (1990) 122–136 123. 
159 See Sutcliffe M, Todes A and Walker N “Managing the cities: An examination of state urbanization 
policies since 1986” in Murray C and O’Regan C (eds) No Place to Rest - Forced Removals and the Law 
in South Africa (1990) 86-106. 
160 See Van der Merwe D “‘Not slavery but a gentle stimulus’: Labour-inducing legislation in the South 
African Republic” 1989 TSAR 353-369. 
161 See Schoombee JT and Davis DM “Abolishing influx control - Fundamental or cosmetic change?” 
(1986) 2 SAJHR 208-219. 
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people in white areas in terms of the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966162 and the Prevention 
of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951. 
 
2 3 The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 
2 3 1 Introduction 
In 1944, Parliament enacted a War Measure163 in terms of the War Measures Act 13 of 
1940. The War Measure enabled a magistrate to issue an order first, for the immediate 
removal of people living on land or in buildings without the permission of the 
owner/lawful occupier; and second, for the demolition of any buildings/structures that 
threatened the health and safety of the general public or the maintenance of peace and 
good order. The War Measure was inadequate because it was premised on the hope 
that, once evicted, these people “would go back to where they came from”.164 However, 
with nowhere else to go the evictees merely moved to another piece of land nearby and 
waited for the process to start again. The city councils were forced to use a range of 
measures, mostly unsuccessful, to stem the influx of black people who flocked to the 
cities in search of employment opportunities. It was soon realised that a single measure 
would not solve the problem of urban squatting and that a co-ordinated legislative 
framework was required.165 
Three years after the National Party achieved election victory in 1948, parliament 
enacted the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 (‘PISA’) with the aim of 
making good on the Party’s promise to “take vigorous and effective steps to care for the 
safety of … as well as property and the peaceful lives” of white people.166 The purpose 
of PISA was to prevent and control illegal squatting on public or private land.167 This 
was achieved by criminalising the entering and remaining on land or in 
buildings/structures without any lawful reason.168 PISA further contained provisions that 
                                                 
162 See Dodson A “The Group Areas Act: Changing patterns of enforcement” in Murray C and O’Regan C 
(eds) No Place to Rest - Forced Removals and the Law in South Africa (1990) 137-161. 
163 Proclamation 76 in GG Extraordinary 3325 of 6 April 1944. 
164 Fagan HA Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances at Moroka, Johannesburg, on 
the 30th August 1947 (1948) 25. 
165 Fagan HA, Smit HP and Welsh AS Report of the Native Law Commission (1948). 
166 National Party Election Manifesto (1948). 
167 Long title of PISA. 
168 Section 1, read with section 2, of PISA. 
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firstly, enabled a court to order the eviction of squatters and authorised the demolition of 
any buildings/structures that were erected on the land without the permission of the 
owner/lawful occupier;169 secondly, prohibited the collection of fees or the exercising of 
authority with regard to the organisation of illegal squatting;170 thirdly, afforded 
administrative powers to magistrates and native commissioners to effect the removal of 
squatters;171 fourthly, afforded local authorities the power to establish emergency 
camps;172 and finally, criminalised any obstruction of police and other authorised 
officials that were “acting under the authority of an instruction or order issued” by a 
court.173 The peremptory nature of these provisions obliged owners to evict unlawful 
occupiers and therefore significantly extended “the scope of evictions based on the 
stronger right to possession” under apartheid land law.174 
In 1952 the National Party complemented PISA with a package of laws aimed at 
implementing its influx control policy. The Black Laws Amendment Act 54 of 1952 
amended section 10 of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 so as to 
provide that black people may only be in urban areas for 72 hours without a permit, 
except when they were born or had been continuously employed in the area. The 
Blacks (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act 67 of 1952 
consolidated the pass laws and introduced a uniform reference book which all black 
men had to carry on their person at all times, while the Black Service Levy Act 64 of 
1952 introduced a scheme of employer taxation which would finance the provision of 
housing and services in the townships.175 
The South African government continued to enforce its policy of influx control during 
the 1960s and 1970s. However, as the economy changed its focus from agriculture to 
mining, a change of policy was required to stem the tide of people streaming to cities in 
an effort to satisfy the demand for low-income employment under a capitalist driven 
economy. This forced a change in government policy, which coincided with various 
amendments to PISA. 
                                                 
169 Section 3 of PISA. 
170 Section 4 of PISA. 
171 Section 5, read with section 8, of PISA 
172 Section 6 of PISA. 
173 Section 7 of PISA. 
174 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 413. 
175 O’Regan “No more forced removals” 369. 
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The 1976 amendment to PISA176 followed after the judgment in S v Peter.177 It was 
argued that the continuous surge of people into urban areas and the epidemic erection 
of shacks necessitated a departure from normal legal procedures to show that effective 
action was being taken to address a problem that was assuming serious proportions.178 
The amendment inserted section 3B, which enabled landowners and local authorities to 
effect summary demolition of squatter shacks after a seven day notice period. The 
provision further deterred landowners from allowing squatters to live on their land by 
making it a criminal offence that was punishable with a fine, imprisonment or both. 
The judgment in Fredericks v Stellenbosch Divisional Council179 (‘Fredericks’) 
resulted in the 1977 amendment of PISA.180 The seven day notice period181 was 
removed and substituted with an ouster clause. The aim of the ouster clause was to 
prevent squatters from approaching the court and obtaining an order that would prevent 
their removal, unless they could show that they had title or a right to the land. O’Regan 
observed that this amendment reflected the determination of the government to counter 
the resolve that squatters demonstrated in pursuing legal strategies that enabled them 
to resist removal.182 
The government realised that the demand for low-income labour required a change 
in the strict influx control policy. As a result the Riekert Commission of Inquiry into 
                                                 
176 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 92 of 1976. 
177 1976 (2) SA 513 (C). In this case the Bantu Affairs Administration Board, acting in terms of section 12 
of the Black Affairs Administration Act 45 of 1971, actively pursued the prosecution of 6000 squatters that 
moved onto a piece of land known as Cross Roads during April and August of 1975 in contravention of 
section 1, read with sections 2 and 3, of PISA. Van Winsen AJP found that the Cape Provincial Council 
owned the property; that section 12 of the Act did not apply because the property was never used for 
Bantu accommodation; that there was no evidence supporting the alleged contravention of PISA and 
accordingly held that the magistrate erred in granting the order for eviction from the property and 
demolition of the shanties. 
178 O’Regan “No more forced removals” 370-371. 
179 1977 (3) SA 113 (C). 
180 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 72 of 1977. 
181 Blecher MD “Spoliation and the demolition of legal rights” (1978) 97 SALJ 8-16 refers to the notice 
period in terms of section 3B(2) as a safety device on a machine. Where the safety device fails to ensure 
that no one gets hurt, the unwillingness and incompetence of the operators of the machine should warrant 
their replacement rather than result in the scrapping of the safety device. The author argues that the 
safety device was scrapped by the rapid and harsh legislative response to this decision which resulted in 
severe hardship for squatters who were no longer afforded the opportunity to remove their valuables or to 
find alternative accommodation. 
182 O’Regan “No more forced removals” 372-373. 
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Manpower Utilization183 was established and assigned the duty to investigate and report 
on the participation of black people in the urban labour market. The Commission 
recommended that black urban labourers be afforded the freedom to move and work in 
any urban area, provided that suitable accommodation was available for them.184 The 
1980 amendment of PISA185 reflected this recommendation with an alteration to the 
summary demolition powers of local authorities. 
Shortly after the South African government conceded that its influx control strategy 
for urbanisation had failed, the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the President’s 
Council was required to develop a new strategy for urbanisation. The Committee 
acknowledged that influx resulted in increased urban population, a decrease in available 
land stock and ultimately urban squatting. The new strategy would thus have to absorb 
inevitable urbanisation, the resultant overcrowding and the fact that the acquisition of 
formal housing was unattainable for most black people.  
The Committee accordingly created the notion of “orderly urbanisation”, which would 
focus on development and the accommodation of and planning for urban growth. The 
notion of “orderly urbanisation” was premised on the operation of market forces, while 
its purpose was to accomplish spatial ordering. This would be achieved through direct 
measures, such as legislation, ordinances and by-laws, and indirect measures, like 
incentives and restrictive conditions. These recommendations ultimately paved the 
wave for the enactment of the Abolition of Influx Control Act 68 of 1986. 
However, the 1988 amendment of PISA186 not only amplified its application to 
include rural areas, but also introduced comprehensive provisions to regulate rural 
squatting. It extended the powers of local authorities to remove squatters and summarily 
demolish their homes, and it eroded judicial powers and common law principles 
pertaining to the rights of accused.187 
 
                                                 
183 Established in terms of GN 1673 GG 5720 of 26 August 1977. 
184 O’Regan “No more forced removals” 373. 
185 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 33 of 1980. 
186 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 104 of 1988. 
187 O’Regan “No more forced removals” 376. 
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2 3 2 Powers to remove188 
2 3 2 1 Criminal provision - section 1 
Section 1(1)(a) of PISA provided that it would be a criminal offence for any person to 
enter upon land without lawful reason or to remain on that land without the permission 
of the owner or lawful occupier, irrespective of whether the land is enclosed or not.189 
This provision remained untouched on the whole, despite criticism for criminalising 
activities that extend far beyond the implied scope of the long title of PISA.190  
However, until 1988 the comprehensive criminal prosecution of squatters anticipated 
by this provision had not materialised because it proved to be an ineffective technique 
for forcibly removing entire communities.191 O’Regan observed that this could be 
attributed to the reluctance of government to undertake a large scale prosecution 
programme, fearing that it might result in the criminal justice system being extended 
beyond its means.192 This coincided with the inability of government to prove the 
elements of the crime because it had no means of showing firstly, that the land in 
question fell within the scope of PISA;193 secondly, that the entry upon the land was 
unlawful;194 and thirdly, who the owner of the land was; which negated any effort to 
prove that the occupation was without the consent of the owner.195 In the unlikely event 
that government overcame all these obstacles and obtained a conviction, it still had to 
convince the magistrate to exercise his discretion to order eviction in terms of section 3.  
The purpose of the 1988 amendment of PISA196 was to address the problems that 
government experienced in successfully prosecuting squatters in terms of this provision. 
The first step in that direction was taken with the introduction of two rebuttable 
presumptions that shifted the burden of proof onto the squatters to show that there was 
                                                 
188 The headings of the following three sections are based on the categorisation that O’Regan used in 
O’Regan “No more forced removals”. 
189 See R v Zulu 1959 (1) SA 263 (A) and R v Malika 1958 (4) SA 663 (T) for an interpretation where 
section 1 of PISA is seen as creating two separate offences. 
190 R v Phiri 1954 (4) SA 708 (T) at 710A. 
191 O’Regan “No more forced removals” 378. 
192 O’Regan “No more forced removals” 378. 
193 R v Mailula 1960 (1) SA 413 (A), R v Matsabe 1957 (3) SA 210 (T), R v Nompanza 1957 (2) SA 184 
(E) and S v Mchunu 1976 (1) SA 320 (N). 
194 S v Mampura 1964 (3) SA 477 (T). 
195 S v Peter 1976 (2) SA 513 (C), S v Sikwane 1976 (2) SA 896 (T) and R v Ndabambi 1959 (2) SA 454 
(A). 
196 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 104 of 1988. 
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lawful reason and consent for their occupation of the land and/or building.197 Section 
1(2) of PISA consequently provided that, once it had been proved that a person entered 
land or a building of another and remained on that land or in that building for purposes 
of section 1(1) of PISA, it would be presumed that this person did so without lawful 
reason and without the consent of that other person. In addition, section 3(1) of PISA 
revoked the discretion a magistrate had to grant an eviction order and replaced it with a 
directive to order eviction upon conviction in terms of section 1 of PISA. The 
government was further aided by section 11B of PISA that provided for the execution of 
the eviction despite the launching of appeal proceedings. 
Before 1977, when section 3B(4)(a) of PISA ousted the courts’ jurisdiction to grant 
any relief, the problems that government experienced in prosecuting squatters in terms 
of section 1 of PISA sometimes caused owners, lawful occupiers and local authorities to 
take the law into their own hands, which enabled squatters to rely on the mandament 
van spolie with some success.198 
The mandament van spolie199 is a possessory remedy that only affords the applicant 
temporary relief in terms of a possessory suit, whereby possession is temporarily 
restored until the merits of the case could be considered in a subsequent case. The 
purpose of the mandament van spolie is to protect the public order against breaches of 
the peace200 by restoring possession ante omnia to the possessor who was unlawfully 
deprived of her peaceful and undisturbed possession.201 This reflects the fundamental 
                                                 
197 See Lewis CH “The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act: The promotion of homelessness?” (1989) 5 
SAJHR 233-239 235 (‘Lewis “The promotion of homelessness”’) where this development is criticised for 
being contrary to established authorities in common law. 
198 These cases are discussed at 2 3 3 below. 
199 This remedy originated in canon law with the condictio ex canone redintegranda that flowed from the 
famous canon redintegranda in the Decretum Gratiani. Originally the condictio enabled a bishop who was 
removed from his office by a worldly authority, to insist on being restored to this office in terms of the 
maxim spoliatus ante omnia restituendus est before the merits of his dismissal could be discussed. The 
condictio was subsequently received in French law (réintégrande), German law (actio spolii) and in 
Roman-Dutch law (mandament van spolie). See Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (2006) 287 (‘Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of 
Property’); Kleyn DG Die Mandament van Spolie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1986) Unpublished LLD 
dissertation University of Pretoria and Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (1989) 118 (‘Van der Merwe 
Sakereg’). 
200 See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of Property 288-292 and Van der Merwe Sakereg 119-
122. 
201 See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of Property 292-296 and Van der Merwe Sakereg 129-
133. 
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principle in South African law that no one is allowed to take the law into their own 
hands.202 The threat of the spoliation order serves as a warning to any person who can 
assert a real right in terms of a particular thing to rather take recourse to the courts of 
law and not to succumb to the allure of self-help. 
With the ouster clause in section 3B(4)(a) of PISA in place, landowners and local 
authorities could demolish the buildings or structures and remove the building material 
without a court order, knowing that the squatters would be unable to approach the court 
for temporary relief in terms of the mandament van spolie. This significantly increased 
the power to evict and ensured that the safety and security of white people was 
enforced through swift government action. 
 
2 3 2 2 Administrative provision - section 5 
When the health and safety of the public in general was endangered a magistrate, after 
hearing representations by the squatters,203 was entrusted with the power to order their 
eviction and the demolition of any buildings or structures erected upon that land in terms 
of section 5.204 
The 1988 amendment of PISA205 restricted the discretion of the magistrate by 
removing the requirement that he must be satisfied that the public in general will be 
exposed to health and safety dangers. The magistrate would subsequently only have to 
                                                 
202 See Yeko v Qana 1973 (4) SA 735 (A) at 739G where Van Blerk JA stated that “[t]he fundamental 
principle of the remedy is that no one is allowed to take the law into his own hands” and Shoprite 
Checkers Ltd v Pangbourne Properties Ltd 1994 (1) SA 616 (W) at 619H where Zulman J stated that “[a]ll 
this is of course based upon the fundamental principle that no man is allowed to take the law into his own 
hands and that no one is permitted to dispossess another forcibly or wrongfully and against his consent of 
the possession of property, whether movable or immovable”. 
203 Section 5(1)(aa) provided for three days’ notice to be given to the squatters that afforded them some 
time to obtain legal assistance and the opportunity to be heard prior to the order being made. Before 
Mofokeng v Minister of Native Affairs 1949 (3) SA 784 (T) subsection (b) of the 1944 War Measure, upon 
which section 5 is founded, did not provide for notice to be given to the squatters prior to an eviction order 
being granted.  
204 In Thubela v Pretorius NO 1961 (4) SA 506 (T) the court considered whether an application for an 
inspection in loco could be refused where the magistrate had knowledge of the prevailing conditions in 
Sieten Polla, a Bantu village, which enabled him to order the eviction from the land and demolition of the 
buildings or structures without having regard to the conflicting accounts of these conditions presented to 
him in affidavits. Claassen J found that the knowledge the magistrate obtained in the capacities of Bantu 
Commissioner and Controller of Census placed him in a unique position to evaluate the facts and did not 
amount to a gross irregularity because the attorney for the applicant was timeously informed of this fact. 
See also Zungu v Acting Magistrate, Umlazi 1962 (3) SA 782 (D) and Kayamandi Town Committee v 
Mkhwaso and Others 1991 (2) SA 630 (C). 
205 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 104 of 1988. 
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be satisfied by the owner, lawful occupier, administrator or local authority of the fact that 
squatters have entered the land without consent, that they were congregating there and 
that they were refusing to move. Any review of this administrative decision would not 
affect the operation of the decision in terms of section 11B of PISA. 
The effect was that section 5 of PISA afforded magistrates a wide discretion to order 
the eviction and removal of squatters from land or buildings/structures and the 
demolition of any buildings, without any guidance as to which factors to take into 
consideration in exercising the discretion.206 Some guidance could be gleaned from the 
general policy with regard to the prevention of illegal squatting that the Minister of 
Constitutional Development and Planning could publish in the Gazette in terms of 
section 11A of PISA.207 However, Budlender argued that any guidance from the Minister 
would not improve the position because the general policy that underpinned PISA was 
not apparent from its wording and that the failure to define “squatting” only exacerbated 
this.208 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
206 In S v Govender 1986 (3) SA 969 (T) Goldstone J identified a number of circumstances that may be 
relevant for a court when exercising its discretion to evict someone in terms of section 46(2) of the Group 
Areas Act 36 of 1966 after that person was found to be in contravention of section 26(1) of the Act. In this 
case an Indian woman was found guilty of an offence in terms of section 26(1) of the Act and sentenced 
to a fine of R 50 or fifteen days’ imprisonment. The court a quo added an eviction order mero motu to this 
sentence in terms of section 46(2) of the Act. Goldstone J found that the court a quo erred when it added 
the eviction order to the sentence. He pointed out that section 46(2) of the Act was amended so as to 
afford a court a discretion to add an eviction order to a sentence for the contravention of section 26(1) of 
the Act. In this regard Goldstone J (at 971I) stated that inter alia the following circumstances will be 
relevant in exercising the discretion: 
“the nature of the area concerned; the attitude of the neighbours; the policy and views of the 
Department of Community Development or any other interested Department of State; the 
attitude of the landlord; the prospects of a permit being issued for continued lawful 
occupation of the premises; the personal hardship which such an order may cause and the 
availability of alternative accommodation.” 
Goldstone J found that the court a quo made the eviction order as a result of an incorrect application of 
the law and therefore set the eviction order aside as requested by the appellant. 
207 See Lewis “The promotion of homelessness” 239 where it is noted that according to Mathebe v 
Regering van die RSA 1988 (3) SA 688 (A) ministerial policy is not usually given the force of law. 
208 Budlender G “Urban land issues in the 1980s: The view from Weiler’s Farm” in Murray C and O’Regan 
C (eds) No Place to Rest - Forced Removals and the Law in South Africa (1990) 66-85. 
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2 3 2 3 Administrative provision – section 6F 
Section 6F was enacted to fill the void created by the repeal of the provisions in chapter 
4 of the DTLA by the Abolition of Influx Control Act 68 of 1986.209 Section 6F afforded 
local authorities the power to evict black people from a farm outside their jurisdiction 
where these black people had permission to stay on that farm but were not in a direct 
employment relationship with the owner or lawful occupier. It has been argued that 
increased support for the erstwhile Conservative Party in the rural areas, together with 
the rapidly increasing black population on white farms and the dwindling white 
population, may have resulted in the creation of an instrument whereby unemployed 
residents on these farms could be evicted.210 
The eviction in terms of section 6F was triggered by an investigation211 into the 
status of the occupation of a farm where there were reasonable grounds to believe that 
the farm was occupied by black people who were not in the direct employ of the owner 
or lawful occupier. In the case where the belief was confirmed, the owner or lawful 
occupier had to be informed of the finding through service of a notice that directed the 
owner or lawful occupier to evict the black people within 30 days after receipt of the 
notice.212 It has been argued that, according to section 6F(6)(a), an owner or lawful 
occupier should merely have directed a request that these black people had to vacate 
the farm. Failure on their side to comply with this request of the owner or lawful occupier 
would then result in the issue of an eviction order by the local committee that was 
subject to the same procedural requirements enforced under section 5 of PISA. 
 
 
                                                 
209 See Lewis “The promotion of homelessness” 238, where she takes issue with the meaning of the 
terms “legal occupier” and “lawful occupation of the land” for purposes of section 6F of PISA. 
210 O’Regan “No more forced removals” 384. 
211 These investigations were ordered by local committees that were established in terms of section 6E of 
PISA. See Lewis “The promotion of homelessness” 237, where this extension of the scope of PISA to 
include rural areas that fell outside the jurisdiction of local authorities was regarded as an “important 
innovation” for the promotion of homelessness. 
212 Section 6F(2) of PISA. See Lewis “The promotion of homelessness” 239, where it is noted that the 
question whether a local committee could be compelled to conduct this investigation was up for debate.  
The owner or lawful occupier could thereafter submit written objections to the local committee within 14 
days after receipt of the notice to the finding in terms of section 6F(3). The local committee had to 
consider these objections and make a final decision in terms of section 6F(4). Failure to adhere to the 
final decision of the local committee would constitute a criminal offence that was punishable with a fine of 
R10 000, five years imprisonment or both. 
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2 3 3 Powers to demolish  
Section 3B afforded landowners, local authorities and provincial officials the power of 
summary213 demolition of any building or structure214 that was erected on a piece of 
land without the consent of the owner or lawful occupier.215 It is important to note that 
these summary powers did not extend to the eviction of squatters who, in terms of 
section 1, could have possession of a building or structure (residing in) and the land 
(residing on).216 
Until 1977 squatters successfully relied on the mandament van spolie to restore 
possession to them of the building materials that they used to erect the buildings or 
structures which they occupied. However, according to traditional doctrine, the 
mandament van spolie loses its force when it is objectively impossible to restore 
possession. This will occur when the spoliated thing has, on the one hand, been 
purchased by a third party or, on the other hand, been destroyed, irreparably damaged 
or lost.217 Local authorities accordingly adopted the practice of destroying the 
corrugated iron, plastic, wood and other materials used by the squatters to erect their 
shacks. The effect was that the squatters could not use the mandament van spolie to 
regain possession of their valuables. This position was legislatively enhanced with the 
introduction of section 3B(4)(a), which ousted the courts’ jurisdiction to grant any relief 
to any person in civil proceedings that sought to prevent an intended or actual eviction 
                                                 
213 PISA originally provided for a 7 day notice period before a building or structure could be demolished. 
This notice period, which afforded squatters time to make representations to the magistrate and/or to 
remove valuable possessions from the building or structure, was abolished after the Fredericks case with 
the enactment of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 72 of 1977. The summary demolition 
powers were confirmed in section 3B(2), which expressly provided that no prior notice of the demolition 
was required. 
214 Section 3B(5) provided, prior to its abrogation by Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 104 
of 1988, that for purposes of section 3B(1)(a) the term “building or structure” included “any shack, hut, 
tent or similar structure”. Berman J discussed the meaning of the term “building or structure” for purposes 
of section 3B(1)(b) in Port Nolloth Municipality v Xhalisa and Others; Luwalala and Others v Port Nolloth 
Municipality 1991 (3) SA 98 (C). 
215 See George Municipality v Vena and Another 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) where Milne JA found that consent 
can be afforded expressly, tacitly or by implication. See the discussion of consent for purposes of the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 18 of 1998 in section 3 2 2 of 
chapter 3. 
216 O’Regan “No more forced removals” 387. 
217 See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of Property 304; Van der Merwe Sakereg  134-135 
and Administrator, Cape, and Another v Ntshwaqela and Others 1990 (1) SA 705 (A). 
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or demolition unless that person could first satisfy the court that the action, or intended 
action, was conducted mala fide. 
In Fredericks the Stellenbosch Divisional Council demolished the shacks that the 
applicants erected for their families. Both applicants stated in their affidavits that they 
received no notice from the Council prior to the demolition218 and that they had to brave 
the rain during the weekend without any form of shelter to seek refuge under.219 As a 
result the applicants sought an order that directed the Council to restore the building 
materials, to re-erect the shacks and to abstain from demolishing the shacks after re-
erection.220 In their opposing affidavit the Council conceded that they had not given 
written notice of their intention to demolish the applicants’ shacks and that it would 
“return these materials to the site where the houses had stood.”221 However, counsel for 
the respondent contended that the applicants had acted unlawfully because they 
occupied the land and erected structures on it without the permission of the Council in 
its respective capacities of owner and local authority.222 Diemont J held that “it ill 
behove[d] the respondent to accuse the applicants of unlawfulness”223 after it acted “in 
flagrant contempt of the law” without expressing any “word of regret or apology”224 in the 
ensuing legal proceedings. Diemont J further held that the respondents’ objections to 
the relief sought were without substance225 because in Zinman v Miller226 the court 
                                                 
218 Section 3B(2) of PISA stated that  
“[a] building or structure referred to in sub-sec. (1) may be demolished only after at least 
seven days’ written notice of the intention to demolish has been given to the person who 
erected the building or structure or who caused it to be erected, if he and his whereabouts 
are known, and such period has expired.” 
219 Fredericks at 114F-G. 
220 Fredericks at 115B-C. 
221 Fredericks at 115F-G. 
222 Fredericks at 116A-B. 
223 Fredericks at 116C. 
224 Fredericks at 116H. 
225 Fredericks at 117E. 
226 1956 (3) SA 8 (T). In this case the appellant, an electrical engineer, removed the main panel from the 
electrical meter chamber and cut the electrical wiring so that there was no flow of electrical current in the 
respondent’s, the owner of the property, house. The court a quo found that it had no jurisdiction to decide 
the case in terms of section 46(2)(c)(ii) of the Magistrate’s Courts Act 32 of 1944, which provides that “[a] 
court shall have no jurisdiction in matters (c) in which is sought specific performance without an 
alternative payment of damages except in (ii) the delivery or transfer of property, movable or immovable, 
not exceeding two hundred pounds in value …” (emphasis added). On appeal Rumpff J found that 
section 46(2)(c)(ii) of the Act did not limit the jurisdiction of the magistrate to grant the extraordinary 
remedies of a temporary nature provided for in section 30(1) of the Act. Section 30(1) provides that 
“[s]ubject to the limits of jurisdiction prescribed by this Act, the Court may grant against persons and 
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ordered restoration ante omnia. Diemont J therefore stated that “[i]f the original sheets 
or corrugated iron cannot be found or if they have been so damaged by the bulldozer 
that they cannot now be used there is no reason why other sheets of iron of similar size 
and quality should not be used.”227 
In Rikhotso v Northcliff Ceramics (Pty) Ltd and Others228 (‘Rikhotso’) the court 
considered the question whether it could grant relief to the applicants with the 
mandament van spolie by ordering the respondents to re-erect, with new materials, the 
shacks which were originally built with a combination of combustible materials, iron 
sheeting and wood before it was dismantled, removed from the premises and set 
alight.229 Nugent J emphasised that the underlying assumption of the mandament van 
spolie is “that the property exists and may be awarded in due course to the party who 
establishes an entitlement thereto.”230 Nugent J accordingly found that the nature of the 
mandament van spolie rendered its application inappropriate in instances where the 
property has been destroyed because “[t]here is nothing upon which the order can 
operate, and no possessory entitlement left to be adjudicated upon.”231 Nugent J 
nonetheless confirmed that it was an established principle that “a spoliator is required to 
restore the property in the state it was at the time of the spoliation” if the property has 
not been destroyed and that this “may require him to do something to place it in its 
former condition.”232 However, Nugent J found that this obligation to restore possession 
ante omnia could not be extended to “the rendering of a substitute when the property 
has been destroyed”233 because “[w]hatever the nature of the remedy may have been in 
                                                                                                                                                             
things orders for arrest tanquam suspectus de fuga, attachments, interdicts and mandamenten van 
spolie.” Rumpff J (at 12) confirmed that the purpose of the mandament van spolie was to restore 
possession ante omnia and therefore could include an order for “something to be done in addition to the 
mere putting of the spoliated back in possession of the thing spoliated.” In this case the mandament van 
spolie required the replacement of the main panel and the reconnection of the electrical wires. 
227 Fredericks at 117H. 
228 1997 (1) SA 526 (W).  
229 Rikhotso at 532C. 
230 Rikhotso at 532I. 
231 Rikhotso at 532J. See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of Property 304; De Waal MJ 
“Naidoo v Moodley 1982 4 SA 82 (T) - Mandament van Spolie” (1984) 47 THRHR 115-118; Kleyn DG 
“Die mandament van spolie as besitsremedie” (1986) 19 De Jure 1-16 and Van der Merwe Sakereg 119. 
232 Rikhotso at 533B-C. See Jones v Claremont Municipality (1908) 25 SC 651 where the respondent was 
ordered to rebuild a fence; Zinman v Miller 1956 (3) SA 8 (T) and Tshabalala v West Rand Administration 
Board and Another 1980 (2) SA 520 (W), where the respondent was ordered to restore a ceiling. 
233 Rikhotso at 533G. Blecher MD “Spoliation and the demolition of legal rights” (1978) 97 SALJ 8-16; Van 
der Walt AJ “Naidoo v Moodley: Mandament van spolie” (1983) 46 THRHR 237-240; Van der Walt AJ 
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ancient law, it was received into the law of this country as a possessory remedy and not 
as a general remedy against unlawfulness.”234  
Nugent J conceded that “[a] remedy providing summary reparation for unlawful loss 
of or damage to property, irrespective of the possessor’s rights in the property, would be 
a most powerful one.”235 However, Nugent J held that Fredericks could not be regarded 
as authority for the development of the mandament van spolie for this purpose because, 
according to his reading, Diemont J merely replied “to the practicality of restoring the 
dwellings” and could not have intended “to hold that it was competent to order that 
possession be restored by substitution.”236 In Tswelopele Non-Profit Organisation and 
Others v City of Tswane Metropolitan Municipality and Others237 the Supreme Court of 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Nog eens Naidoo v Moodley - ‘n repliek” (1984) 47 THRHR 429-439 argues that the mandament van 
spolie could be applied outside of its traditional restorative framework in the specific circumstances where 
the property was destroyed on purpose to frustrate a restoration order and where the destroyed property 
was fungible. Where an owner or local authority has taken the law into their own hands by demolishing 
and destroying the property of squatters the mandament van spolie should be used to order them 
summarily to restore possession given the general policy function of preventing breaches of the peace. 
234 Rikhotso at 533I-J. Van der Walt AJ “Squatting, spoliation and the new constitutional order” (1997) 60 
THRHR 522-529 criticised Nugent J for justifying his refusal to apply the mandament van spolie by 
arguing that it was not a general remedy for the protection of law and order. Van der Walt argues that the 
strict interpretation of the requirements of the mandament van spolie should not thwart the development 
of an otherwise robust remedy that is uniquely equipped to respond to the self-help of government with 
unparalleled urgency. See also Blumberg M “Mandament van spolie - Restoration of the status quo ante 
revisted” (1997) 60 THRHR 529-533. 
235 Rikhotso at 534A-B. 
236 Rikhotso at 534D.  
237 2007 (6) SA 511 (SCA). In this case the court considered the question whether the appellants were 
entitled to relief at all after a perfectly orchestrated operation “to eradicate alien vegetation”; “to identify 
non-documented illegal immigrants” and to fight crime in Garsfontein resulted in the burning of shacks 
which left 100 unlawful occupiers exposed to the elements. At the outset Cameron JA (as he then was) 
clearly expressed his inclination, much like Diemont J (Fredericks at 118D) and Nugent J (Rikhotso at 
532F) did, to order relief for the flagrant disregard the defendants expressed for the law and for their 
violation of various constitutional rights of the unlawful occupiers (paras 15-16). He conceded that there 
was no remedy at common law that simultaneously presented a disincentive for self-help and that 
required the substitution of unlawfully destroyed property. He further conceded that this “could create a 
perverse incentive for those taking the law into their own hands to destroy the disputed property, rather 
than leaving it substantially intact” (par 25). However, he cautioned that this “does not mean that where a 
remedy for a constitutional infraction is required, a common law figure with an analogous operation must 
be seized upon for its development” (par 20). He accordingly stated that “it may sometimes be best to 
leave a common-law institution untouched, and to craft a new constitutional remedy entirely” (par 20). He 
noted that this new constitutional remedy not only had to vindicate the claims of the occupiers, but also 
had to vindicate the Constitution (par 26). He subsequently ordered the respondents, jointly and severally, 
to re-erect temporary habitable dwellings that afforded the unlawful occupiers shelter, privacy and 
amenities equivalent to that which they enjoyed prior to the demolition of their original shacks (par 28). He 
made this order after he clearly cautioned against the formulation of a constitutional remedy that is 
couched in similar terms to that of an existing common law analogy (par 26). See Van der Walt AJ 
“Developing the law on unlawful squatting and spoliation” (2008) 125 SALJ 24-36 for a critical discussion 
of this judgment. 
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Appeal confirmed Rikhotso and avoided the constitutional imperative to develop the common 
law by constitutional remedy to discourage self-help which bears resemblance to the 
relief sought in terms of the mandament van spolie. 
However, Nugent J left the door open for the application of the mandament van 
spolie in cases where “there has been only partial destruction, leaving a substantial part 
of the property intact” because in those instances “[d]ifferent considerations may 
arise”238 that would require consideration. 
Rikhotso removed the last option that squatters could have recourse to for relief in 
those instances where the land owners or local authorities destroyed the building 
materials of their buildings or structures. As a result, Rikhotso implicitly gave owners 
and local authorities the licence to destroy the building materials that squatters used to 
erect their buildings or structures. This strengthened the power to demolish unlawfully 
erected buildings or structures and proved to be a very useful complement for the power 
to evict squatters. 
 
2 3 4 Powers to approve informal settlement areas  
Local authorities had the power to relocate the squatters whom they evicted, or had 
caused to be evicted, and whose buildings or structures they demolished, or had 
caused to be demolished, to certain approved informal settlement areas.239 Since the 
1944 War Measure and until the 1988 amendment of PISA,240 these settlement areas 
were known as “emergency camps”. The purpose of these emergency camps was to 
accommodate homeless people241 and, once established,242 their use and occupation 
were governed by regulations.243 
                                                 
238 Rikhotso at 535D. 
239 Lewis “The promotion of homelessness” 237. 
240 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 104 of 1988. 
241 In Makama and Others v Administrator, Transvaal 1992 (2) SA 278 (T) the court considered the 
meaning of “homeless” for purposes of establishing an emergency camp in terms of section 6. The local 
authority adopted a policy during 1953 whereby the Oukasie township near Brits, which was established 
in 1928, would cease to exist as such and that the residents should be moved to the Lethlabile township 
near Motutlung, which was established in 1979. After about 10 000 of the residents voluntarily moved a 
further policy was adopted whereby vacant sites or houses in Oukasie would not be allocated to those 
residents that did not move voluntarily in order to force them to move to Lethlabile. Some residents 
remained in Oukasie and continued to pay their site rent despite the fact that the township had been 
deproclaimed in terms of section 37(2) of the BCDA. The area was declared an emergency camp 
because the local authority had stopped rendering services to it, which resulted in living conditions that 
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In 1988 the concept of emergency camps was replaced244 with a similar form of 
temporary accommodation known as “transit areas”.245 Local authorities could use land 
they owned246 or, alternatively, expropriate land for the purpose of establishing these 
transit areas.247 
                                                                                                                                                             
posed serious health threats. Van Dijkhorst J found that the residents could not be regarded as 
“homeless” for purposes of section 6 of PISA because they lived in homes of a permanent or semi-
permanent nature which sheltered them from the elements and provided some of the comforts of life.  
242 Before 1976 all regulations issued by the local authority for the administration of these “emergency 
camps” had to be approved by either the Minister of Justice or the Minister of Native Affairs (section 6(1)) 
and then published in the Government Gazette (section 6(3)). This position changed with the 1976 
amendment of PISA so that only the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards would have the powers to 
establish “emergency camps” for the occupation of black people. The 1986 amendment of PISA returned 
the power to establish “emergency camps” to the local authorities and granted the Minister of 
Constitutional Development and Planning the power to direct them to do so. See O’Regan “No more 
forced removals” 391-392. 
243 In S v Lutu 1989 (2) SA 279 (T) the court considered the question when duly promulgated regulations 
became effective within the ambit and meaning of section 6(3) of PISA as read with the specific 
regulation. In the present case the appellant was convicted for a contravention of regulation 25(1)(a) of 
Board Notice 85 of 1987 for failing to pay the requisite charges of R35 per month for the accommodation 
and services rendered to her site in the Weiler’s Farm emergency camp from March 1988 to May 1988. 
Kirk-Cohen J found that the inhabitants did not become aware of the regulation before 18 April 1988 
because it had been displayed until then in a small room where the general public did not have access to 
it. The appellant could as a result not have contravened the regulation which, according to the period of 
grace allowed for the inhabitants to arrange their financial affairs, only came into operation on 18 July 
1988. 
244 All “emergency camps” established under the previous provision are considered to be “transit areas” in 
terms of section 6(11). 
245 In terms of section 6(5) a local authority could make regulations for the establishment of “transit areas” 
which, in terms of section 6(3) had to be published in the Official Gazette of each province. In Executive 
Suite (Pty) Ltd and Others v Pietermaritzburg-Msunduzi Transitional Local Council 1997 (4) SA 695 (N) at 
710F-H the court commended the local authority for attempting to alleviate the plight of homeless people 
by adopting a policy whereby no steps would be taken to prevent further land invasions on “transit areas” 
where they had both the knowledge of intended unlawful erection and occupation of buildings or 
structures. However, Booysen J directed the local authority to ensure that structures were erected under 
supervision once the “transit area” had been properly proclaimed and regulations issued. 
246 In Africa v Boothan 1958 (2) SA 459 (A) the court considered whether the Durban City Council had the 
power to establish an emergency camp which included the respondent’s property. The appellant, a 
licensed native trader within the Cato Manor Native Emergency Camp, alleged that the respondent, a 
registered owner of immovable property that fell within the perimeter of the emergency camp, was 
conducting a business that competed with his in contravention of inter alia regulation 4 in chapter 4 of the 
regulations governing the emergency camp. Schreiner JA rejected all the arguments of counsel for the 
appellant and found that although notice was given to the respondent, none of the ordinary steps towards 
expropriation were carried out and thus could not result in private property within the bounds of an 
emergency camp being regarded as expropriated as soon as the boundaries of the camp are fixed. 
247 Section 6(2) read with section 6(4) provided that where land was occupied by homeless people a local 
authority could expropriate that land without paying compensation for it unless the owner or lawful 
occupier could prove that the occupation of these destitute people was without their consent. The 
purpose of this provision was without a doubt to discourage landowners from allowing squatters to live on 
their land. See O’Regan “No more forced removals” 393. 
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Section 6A, the result of an amendment to PISA made by the Abolition of Influx 
Control Act 68 of 1986, introduced a second type of informal settlement known as 
“designated areas”. The provision enabled the Minister of Constitutional Development 
and Planning to designate a portion of land that was owned by the local authority or 
which could be expropriated,248 to people to settle and reside on if they were unable to 
find alternative accommodation.249 Unlike transit areas, the establishment250 of these 
designated areas would amount to permanent accommodation for the otherwise 
destitute people. 
A decision by parliament to exclude the operation of the Group Areas Act 36 of 
1966,251 the Slums Act 76 of 1979252 and ordinary town planning rules253 in both transit 
areas and designated areas provided a “flexible tool for managing urbanisation” to local 
authorities and proved to be an alternative to forced removals for vulnerable 
communities.254 
  
2 3 5 Conclusion 
PISA was a dynamic piece of legislation that was progressively tailored through 
repeated amendments to minimise the prospect of resisting forced evictions. The 
gradual erosion of the rights of squatters and the limitation of judicial powers to 
intervene in cases where government departed from normal legal procedures, afforded 
land owners and the government draconian powers to evict squatters and demolish the 
buildings or structures that they occupied. The insecure tenure of squatters was 
perpetuated by the fact that they could be relocated to another piece of land where they 
                                                 
248 In terms of section 6A(2) of PISA. 
249 In Kayamandi Town Committee v Mkwaso and Others 1991 (2) SA 630 (C) the court considered 
whether a local authority first had to think about what is to become of squatters after the eviction. In this 
case the local authority approached the court to obtain an eviction order, without there being any 
obligation to do so in terms of its summary powers, to evict 150 people from land that has been 
earmarked for residential development. The court held that availability of alternative accommodation 
would remain a relevant consideration for the reasonable and fair administration of section 3(1)(c) in 
these circumstances. Conradie J found that in the particular case a failure to do think about what would 
happen to the squatters posed a serious threat to the stability of a community that has already rejected 
the squatters for a lack of living space and subsequently pushed their tolerance to breaking point. 
250 Provincial administrators had the authority to establish these “designated areas” and to issue 
regulations for their administration in terms of sections 6A(3) and 6A(10). 
251 Section 6A(4) of PISA. 
252 Section 6A(5) of PISA. 
253 Section 6A(9) and (10) of PISA. 
254 O’Regan “No more forced removals” 393. 
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would be subjected to further eviction proceedings by the owner of that land or the local 
authority in whose jurisdiction that land was located. PISA was used by the government 
as part of its normal police powers to evict people for health, safety and public interest 
reasons in terms of the Slums Act 53 of 1934, the Trespass Act 6 of 1959, the Physical 
Planning Act 88 of 1967 and the Health Act 63 of 1977. As a result PISA entrenched an 
absolute right for owners and the government to evict squatters from both private and 
public land without any regard for their personal circumstances or housing needs. PISA 
remained in force for four years post-1994 and was eventually repealed by section 
11(1), read with schedule 1, of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. 
 
2 4 Conclusion 
The law of evictions underwent a dramatic transformation throughout apartheid. During 
this period government abused its normal police powers to evict them under the veil of 
ensuring their health, safety and security. This normal exercise of regulatory powers 
was in actual fact undertaken to further the government’s “less wholesome and far more 
contentious ideological goals” of racial segregation and the systemic oppression of 
black people.255 Van der Walt argues that evictions during apartheid could not be 
characterised as remarkable for their political motivation but was in fact extraordinary 
“for the particular politics relied upon in and served by the evictions.”256 In the process a 
negative link was established between the regulatory powers of government and 
property law because the requirements of the rei vindicatio accommodated the eviction 
of squatters “through its supposedly neutral and scientific application.”257 Adherence to 
the strictly legal requirements of the rei vindicatio made it impossible for a court to 
refuse an eviction application based on the personal circumstances of the occupiers or 
other general policy considerations based on the housing needs or circumstances of the 
occupiers. The legislation discussed above 
“created a situation in which Black occupiers and users of land were legally 
classified as unlawful occupiers (or ‘squatters’) – who could therefore be evicted 
without any conceivable defence – by the very legislation that allowed and regulated 
                                                 
255 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 60 (‘Van der Walt Property in the Margins’). 
256 Van der Walt Property in the Margins 62. 
257 Van der Walt Property in the Margins 63. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
71 
eviction of unlawful occupiers in the first place or, even worse, by the same 
authorities who had established and housed them in a particular location.”258 
 
The rural and urban land tenure measures discussed in this chapter extended the scope 
of the rei vindicatio far beyond its traditional application, where it protected the stronger 
of competing rights “in an objective, neutral and legitimate fashion.”259 This broadened 
scope of the rei vindicatio transformed an already powerful remedy into an even 
stronger remedy whereby an individual owner could vindicate her property from unlawful 
occupiers and the government could “uphold a socially engineered, state-sponsored 
and state-enforced system of racially segregated land use.”260 
In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers261 the Constitutional Court 
observed that apartheid land law resulted in the creation of “large, well-established and 
affluent” white neighbourhoods that co-existed alongside “crammed pockets of 
impoverishment and insecure” black ones.262 The spatial separation that Sachs J 
described above was not only premised on racial differentiation, but served as a 
constant reminder of the grave assaults on the equality, human dignity and freedom of 
those living in intolerable conditions and abject poverty. It is against this background 
that the exploration of the process to “transform our society into one in which there will 
be human dignity, freedom and equality”263 must begin so that we can appreciate and 
understand the social and historical context of the Bill of Rights in general and the right 
of access to adequate housing in particular. A renewed appreciation of the legal-
historical context of forced evictions will enable courts to understand the social and 
historical context of section 26 of the Constitution and to develop a substantive meaning 
for the right of access to adequate housing. 
 
                                                 
258 Van der Walt Property in the Margins 65. 
259 Van der Walt Property in the Margins 60. 
260 Van der Walt Property in the Margins 66. 
261 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
262 Par 10. 
263 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) par 8. 
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3 
An Analysis of the Legal Framework of Evictions 
 
3 1 Introduction 
In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers1 (‘PE Municipality’), Sachs J 
explained that the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act 19 of 1998 (‘PIE’), the Act that repealed the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 
19512 (‘PISA’), must be understood and applied within “a defined and carefully 
calibrated constitutional matrix.”3 While the purpose of PIE is, in part, to excise all that is 
racist from the common law of evictions and to promote compassion for those living in 
abject poverty, it is also to affirm the inherent human dignity, equality and freedom of 
the people who were deprived of these rights during apartheid.4 These rights also form 
the foundational values upon which the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (‘Constitution’) is built5 and must therefore serve as a guide to define the special 
relationship that exists between land owners and unlawful occupiers.  
On the one hand, the property rights of land owners must be respected and 
protected against any arbitrary deprivation of that property that the government may 
cause. However, Sachs J added that the property rights of the owner must also be 
understood against the social and historical background of forced evictions that created 
a need for the establishment of secure property rights for those that were either denied 
access to land or who were deprived of such rights during apartheid.6 On the other 
hand, the Constitution affords unlawful occupiers a right of access to adequate housing 
that requires courts to consider all the relevant circumstances before it grants an 
                                                 
1 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
2 See section 3 in chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the Act and the powers that it conferred on private 
land owners and the government to eviction squatters, demolish their buildings/structures and relocate 
them to distant patches of land on the fringes of society. 
3 PE Municipality par 14. 
4 PE Municipality par 14. 
5 Section 1(a) of the Constitution. See Roederer C “Founding provisions” in Woolman S, Bishop M and 
Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd edition (Original Service, June 2008) chapter 13. 
6 PE Municipality par 15. See section 2 in chapter 2 for an overview of the urban and rural land tenure 
measures that deprived people of their land during apartheid. 
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eviction order. The right of access to adequate housing demonstrates that special 
regard must be had for a person’s place of abode because, beyond providing shelter for 
its inhabitants against the elements, it is often the only place where individuals have 
some privacy in an otherwise unsympathetic world.7 It is against this background that it 
becomes clear that judicial control and oversight is needed of evictions because it is an 
exceptionally traumatic social process and has the potential to lead to situations of 
severe conflict.8 
Sachs J explained further that the conflicting interests of land owners and unlawful 
occupiers should not be characterised as diametrically opposed because the special 
cluster of relationships that flow from these rights shows that they are in fact closely 
linked.9 Both sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution place an obligation on the 
government to take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources to, on the one hand, “foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to 
land on an equitable basis”,10 and on the other hand, “achieve the progressive 
realisation” of the right of access to adequate housing.11 The Constitution adds that 
people who currently have insecure tenure as a result of past racially discriminatory 
laws of practices are entitled to legally secure tenure or comparable redress.12 The 
Constitution also states that people who were dispossessed of their property as a result 
of past racially discriminatory laws or practices are entitled to restitution of that property 
or to equitable redress.13 Sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution create a broad overlap 
between the rights of access to land and access to adequate housing that the 
government must seek to achieve on a progressive basis.14 
It is against this background that Sachs J identifies three significant features of the 
way in which evictions must be approached in terms of the Constitution. Firstly, the 
rights of access to land and access to adequate housing are not cast in unqualified 
terms. The result is that these rights cannot give rise to arbitrary seizures of land or to 
                                                 
7 PE Municipality par 17. 
8 PE Municipality par 18. 
9 PE Municipality par 19. 
10 Section 25(5) of the Constitution. 
11 Section 26(2) of the Constitution. 
12 Section 25(6) of the Constitution. 
13 Section 25(7) of the Constitution. 
14 PE Municipality par 19. 
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claims of access to these rights immediately on demand. Government must ensure that 
both the rights in sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution are achieved progressively, in 
an orderly manner and within its available resources.15 Secondly, section 26(3) of the 
Constitution acknowledges that evictions from overcrowded informal settlements and 
dilapidated inner city buildings will continue even though it may lead to homelessness.16 
However, courts must be reluctant to evict relatively settled occupiers unless they are  
satisfied that temporary alternative accommodation will be made available upon 
eviction.17 Finally, the phrase in section 26(3) of the Constitution that requires courts to 
consider all relevant circumstances emphasises that courts must consciously seek 
specific solutions for each individual eviction case and the intricacies that it presents in 
a manner that broadens the range of circumstances that a court can have regard to for 
purposes of considering whether it is just and equitable to evict the unlawful occupiers.18 
Sachs J explained the cumulative effect of these features as follows: 
 
“In sum, the Constitution imposes new obligations on the court concerning rights 
relating to property not previously recognised by the common law. It counterposes to 
the normal ownership rights of possession, use and occupation, a new and equally 
relevant right not to be deprived of a home. The expectations that ordinarily go with 
title could clash head-on with the genuine despair of people in dire need of 
accommodation. The judicial function in these circumstances is not to establish a 
hierarchical arrangement between the different interests involved, privileging in an 
abstract and mechanical way the rights of ownership over the right not to be 
dispossessed of a home, or vice versa. Rather, it is to balance out and reconcile the 
opposed claims in as just a manner as possible, taking account of all the interests 
involved and the specific factors relevant in each particular case.”19 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the impact of section 26 of the 
Constitution and PIE to show how the law of evictions has changed since the advent of 
democracy. The first part of the chapter is divided into sections for each of the three 
subsections of section 26 of the Constitution. In the first of these sections a theoretical 
concept of “home” is developed in an effort to build on the normative foundation created 
for the right of access to adequate housing in Government of the Republic of South 
                                                 
15 PE Municipality par 20. 
16 PE Municipality par 21. 
17 PE Municipality par 28. 
18 PE Municipality par 22. 
19 PE Municipality par 23. 
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Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others20 (‘Grootboom’) when the Constitutional 
Court stated that the right amounts to “more than bricks and mortar”. 21 The second 
section provides a brief overview of the positive obligations that government must take 
to ensure the realisation of the right of access to adequate housing. The third section is 
devoted to a discussion of the negative obligation in section 26(3) of the Constitution 
and the prohibition against arbitrary evictions. The second part of the chapter provides a 
detailed analysis of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of 
Land Act 19 of 1998 with reference to its drafting history, the concept of unlawful 
occupation, the notice requirement for imminent eviction proceedings; the requirement 
that courts must be satisfied that evictions from private land, urgent evictions and 
evictions from public land must be “just and equitable”, and the form of the eviction 
order and ancillary matters thereto. 
 
3 2 The right of access to adequate housing 
3 2 1 Section 26(1) - Access to adequate housing 
3 2 1 1 Introduction 
Section 26(1) of the Constitution states that everyone has a right of access to have 
adequate housing. In Grootboom the Constitutional Court found that this right was 
distinct22 from article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights23 (‘ICESCR’). The Court found it to be significant that section 26(1) only 
provides for the right of access to adequate housing, while article 11(1)24 of the ICESCR 
                                                 
20 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
21 Grootboom par 35. 
22 Grootboom par 35. 
23 993 UNTS 3. The Covenant was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 
December 1966 and came into force on 3 January 1976. As at 18 March 2011, the Covenant has been 
ratified by 160 countries. South Africa signed the Covenant on 4 October 1994 but has not yet ratified it. 
The result is that the Covenant only serves as an interpretive guide for South African courts in interpreting 
the Bill of Rights through section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
24 Article 11(1) of the ICESCR reads: 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, 
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take 
appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential 
importance of international co-operation based on free consent.” 
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provides for the right to adequate housing.25 The Court explained that section 26(1) of 
the Constitution amounted to “more than bricks and mortar” because it also required the 
acquisition of land, the actual construction of the house and the provision of municipal 
services.26 Sadly, in the eleven years since the Grootboom judgment the Constitutional 
Court has not engaged with what it considered to be more than bricks and mortar. This 
can be attributed to the fact that the Constitutional Court has not given content to the 
right of access to adequate housing. In turn, this can be attributed to the interpretive 
approach that that the Constitutional Court has followed for considering the positive 
obligations that section 26 of the Constitution imposes on government. According to this 
approach sections 26(1) and (2) must be read together, with the emphasis falling on the 
reasonableness of the measures that the government has taken for purposes of 
progressively realising the right within its available resources. The result is that we have 
no idea what the scope this right in section 26(1) of the Constitution is against which the 
reasonableness of the government’s measures must be tested.27 
However, Fox recently developed the foundations upon which a legal concept of 
“home” could be constructed for South Africa by relying on theoretical findings in the 
social sciences of the affective value of a home.28 It is instructive to use the concept of 
home that Fox developed in the eviction context because it captures the range of 
interests that unlawful occupiers have in their home. These home interests open up a 
whole new set of considerations that courts can have regard to in determining the 
justice and equity of an eviction. These home interests can also play a role in the 
crafting of innovative remedies with regard to the rights and needs of those people who 
stand to be affected by eviction and relocation to alternative accommodation.  
                                                 
25 Grootboom par 28. Liebenberg S “The interpretation of socio-economic rights” in Woolman S, Bishop M 
and Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd edition (Original Service, December 2003) 
(‘Liebenberg “Interpretation”’) 33-22 argues that this distinction “is more apparent than real.” 
26 Grootboom par 35. 
27 Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic 
Rights (2007) 135-177 and Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative 
Constitution (2010) 173-186. 
28 Fox L “The meaning of home: A chimerical concept or a legal challenge?” (2002) 9 Journal of Law and 
Society 580-610 (‘Fox “The meaning of home”’), Fox L “The idea of home in law” (2005) 2 Home Cultures 
1-25 and Fox L Conceptualising Home - Theories, Laws and Policies (2007) (‘Fox Conceptualising 
Home’). Fox developed the concept of home in the context of the United Kingdom to show how courts 
could weigh the tangible, monetary interests of creditors against the intangible, affective interests of 
occupiers who face eviction claims from the creditors. 
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3 2 1 2 Conceptualising home 
Fox developed this concept of home in the specific context of disputes that arise 
between creditors, who want to reclaim possession of a house or sell the house in 
execution of a mortgage bond, and occupiers, who are either completely innocent or 
have defaulted on their rental or mortgage repayments. Fox argues that the 
creditor/occupier context is a good basis from which to analyse the theories, laws and 
policies about the home interests of occupiers because the particular interests 
concerned come into conflict with each other in an unique way in these cases.29 
Creditors, on the one hand, have a commercial interest in realising the capital asset 
represented by a house, while occupiers, on the other hand, have an interest in the 
continued use and occupation of the house as a home. In Re Citro,30 Nourse LJ noted 
that it was by no means an easy task to weigh the financial interests of the creditors 
against the personal and human interests of the occupiers because they were in no way 
commensurable. He added that the only way in which these interests could be weighed 
against each other would have to involve a value judgment of some kind by the court.31 
Courts can determine the value of the creditor’s financial interest with ease because 
it is tangible, measurable, rational and objective.32 Courts can similarly appreciate what 
the consequences would be if the credit supply market contracted or collapsed.33 The 
home interests of occupiers, on the other hand, are inherently subjective and intangible 
because they are premised on the sentimental and emotive value that the property 
acquired through its use as a home. Lawrence argues that a home transcends 
quantitative measureable dimensions because it includes qualitative subjective 
dimensions which make it difficult to define and comprehend.34 
Courts, that traditionally pride themselves on rigorous and objective legal analysis,35 
are understandably hesitant to engage with this vague concept of home.36 Courts 
                                                 
29 Fox Conceptualising Home 11. 
30 [1991] Ch 142. 
31 150. 
32 Fox Conceptualising Home 133. 
33 See Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) par 38. 
See also Fox Conceptualising Home 79-108 where she considers the economic arguments that have 
been canvassed in support of the prioritisation of the commercial interests of creditors. 
34 Lawrence RJ “Deciphering home: An integrative historical perspective” in Benjamin DN (ed) The Home: 
Words, Interpretations, Meanings and Environments (1995) 53-68 58. 
35 Fox Conceptualising Home 132. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
78 
therefore invariably find that the commercial interests of creditors outweigh the home 
interests of occupiers. However, this predisposition of courts to favour the commercial 
interests of a creditor cannot be wholly attributed to an inherent bias in legal 
reasoning.37 Fox notes that courts have struggled to find sufficient grounds on which to 
hold that the home interests of occupiers outweigh the commercial interests of creditors 
because there is no framework of values against which the home interests of an 
occupier can be delineated.38 As a result, legal representatives find it challenging to 
conceptualise and canvas a persuasive argument in favour of the interests of occupiers 
without a central organising framework within which to locate the home interest of the 
occupiers.39 
Rapoport recommended that home should be conceptualised in terms of the 
mathematical equation home = house + x.40 This equation distinguishes between the 
fact that a home is valued, on the one hand, as a physical structure, and on the other 
hand, for the social, psychological, and cultural significance that it acquires through use 
as a home.41 Fox acknowledges that the emotional connection between occupiers and 
their homes are inherently subjective and that the same connectedness may not be held 
by all occupiers in the same way. Fox argues that the unique link that is fostered 
between occupiers and their homes must be divided into the following value-types: 
firstly, home as a physical structure; secondly, home as territory; thirdly, home as 
identity; and finally, home as a social and cultural unit. 
Home, as a physical structure, provides its occupiers with the requisite shelter from 
the elements and the facilities that sustain and support them.42 It is impossible to 
understate the importance of a home as a physical structure because the most 
immediate need after losing a home is to obtain any form of shelter to take refuge in or 
                                                                                                                                                             
36 Rapoport J “A critical look at the concept ‘home’” in Benjamin DN (ed) The Home: Words, 
Interpretations, Meanings and Environments (1995) 25-52 29 (‘Rapoport “A critical look”’). 
37 Fox Conceptualising Home 132. 
38 Fox Conceptualising Home 132. 
39 Fox Conceptualising Home 12. See Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha 
Homes and Others (Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions and Another, Amici Curiae) (‘Residents of 
Joe Slovo’) 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) par 113. 
40 Rapoport “A critical look” 38. 
41 Fox “Meaning of home” 590. 
42 Altman I and Werner CM (eds) Home Environments (1985) xix. 
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under.43 However, the absence of a physical structure to take shelter in or under does 
not encapsulate the magnitude of being homeless.44 It is important to recognise that a 
house also provides its occupiers with a space to experience the intangible values of 
their home. Fox notes that the physical structure of a home provides occupiers with the 
basis from which they can experience all the attributes of a home.45 The house as a 
physical structure is an important starting point in the conceptualisation of the home 
because it is the physical presence of the home that acts in combination with the x 
factor to create the phenomenon of a home.46 
Home, as territory, is closely linked to the physical structure because it affords the 
occupiers of the home the opportunity to exercise control over the space in the home 
and the activities within it.47 This territory provides the occupiers of a home with a locus 
in space where they can build family relationships, express themselves and feel 
secure.48 The sense of belonging, rootedness and continuity that this locus in space 
fosters fulfils a range of social and psychological needs which are beneficial and 
necessary for the psychological well-being of the occupiers.49 Fox acknowledges that 
the occupiers of a home can build family relationships, express themselves and feel 
secure in other types of territory that cannot be described as home. However, she 
argues that the home presents a unique setting that is significant not only because it 
represents the very intimate values of family, privacy and security, but also because it 
foster a sense of belonging and rootedness.50 
Home, as identity, embraces the adage “home is where the heart is” and reveals the 
fact that occupiers forge strong emotional connotations with their homes through the 
                                                 
43 Fox Conceptualising Home 155.  
44 See Somerville P “Homelessness and the meaning of home: Rooflessness or rootlessness?” (1992) 16 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 529-539. 
45 Fox Conceptualising Home 157. In PE Municiplaity, Sachs J (par 17) stated that 
“[s]ection 26(3) [of the Constitution] evinces special constitutional regard for a person’s place 
of abode. It acknowledges that a home is more than just a shelter from the elements. It is a 
zone of personal intimacy and family security. Often it will be the only relatively secure space 
of privacy and tranquillity in what (for poor people) is a turbulent and hostile world.” 
46 Fox Conceptualising Home 157. 
47 Sebba R and Churchman A "The uniqueness of home" (1986) 3 Architecture and Behaviour 7-24 21 
(‘Sebba and Churchman “The uniqueness of home”’). 
48 Rapoport “A critical look” 30 and Sebba and Churchman "The uniqueness of home" 21. 
49 Porteous JD "Home: The territorial core" (1976) 66 Geographical Review 383-390. 
50 Fox “Meaning of home” 598. 
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experience of living in a particular place over a period of time.51 These emotional 
connotations ensure that the phenomenon of the home is more than the experience of 
being oriented within a familiar order. The home also creates a direct link between the 
occupiers of a home and the place in which they dwell.52 The symbolic significance of a 
home as identity is accentuated by the fact that a home is often perceived to be, on the 
one hand, an extension of an occupier’s self-identity53 and, on the other hand, a central 
component of the occupier’s social identity.54 
A home, as a social and cultural unit, creates an intimate link between the family and 
their place of residence55 that is sustained through a complex process of social 
interaction between members of the household.56 The central importance and role of the 
family in these interactions provide the gateway through which occupiers can 
experience their home.57 
 
3 2 1 3 Conclusion 
Using the home interests of unlawful occupiers to flesh out the dictum that the right of 
access to adequate housing is more than bricks and mortar adds richness and texture 
to the way in which the right is understood. This also shows a unique development of 
the law of evictions from a position where evictions were conducted during apartheid 
without any regard for the personal circumstances of the squatters to a position in the 
constitutional dispensation where the personal circumstances of the unlawful occupiers 
are relevant circumstances to consider before granting an eviction order. This 
development in terms of the Constitution accords with the interpretive approach that the 
Constitutional Court laid down in Grootboom for the interpretation of section 26 because 
                                                 
51 Fox Conceptualising Home 168. 
52 Dovey K “Home and homelessness” in Altman I and Werner CM (eds) Home Environments (1985) 33-
64 39. 
53 See Csikszentmihalyi M and Rochberg-Halton E “The home as symbolic environment” in 
Csikszentmihalyi M and Rochberg-Halton E The Meaning of Things - Domestic Symbols and the Self 
(1981) 121-145 123 for the significance of the home as part of an individual’s identity. 
54 See Fichten J "When toxic chemicals pollute residential environments: The cultural meanings of home 
and home ownership" (1989) 48 Human Organisation 313-324 317 for a description of the social 
significance of a home. 
55 Fox L Conceptualising Home 175. 
56 Perkins HC and Thorns DC “House and home and their interaction with changes in New Zealand’s 
urban system, households and family structures” (1999) 16 Housing, Theory and Society 124-135 133. 
57 Dovey K “HOME: An ordering principle in SPACE” (1978) 22 Landscape 27-30 27. 
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it acknowledges the fact that the forced evictions conducted during apartheid did not 
afford those affected the requisite respect for their human dignity, freedom and right to 
receive equal treatment before the law. Such treatment of individuals and communities 
in the constitutional dispensation would be grossly at odds with the foundational values 
of the Constitution and their rights to equality, human dignity and freedom and security 
of the person.  
This development further emphasises the fact that the right of access to adequate 
housing is an enforceable human right like all the other rights in the Bill of Rights. 
Liebenberg argues that the right of access to adequate housing is more than a mere 
commodity to meet the basic material needs of people because it enables people to 
reach their potential as human beings and afford them the opportunity to participate in 
society as equals.58 Liebenberg adds the following crisp observation about the value of 
the home interest: 
 
“The significance of the concept of a home will also vary for differently placed 
groups and this must also be taken into account in developing the meaning and 
purpose of housing as a human right. Similarly, an understanding of the significance 
of housing as right requires a detailed and nuanced appreciation of the historical 
and social context of housing in South Africa.”59 
 
The challenge then is how to use this developed understanding of the normative 
underpinnings of the right of access to adequate housing to give substantive content to 
the right of access to adequate housing.60 It is important to give substantive content to 
the right of access to adequate housing because individuals and communities need to 
know what they can claim from government in terms of this right. Giving substantive 
content to the right serves the dual purpose of providing government with a clear 
benchmark towards which it can progressively realise the right of access to adequate 
housing within its available resources and it will act as a standard against which 
government can be held accountable. 
                                                 
58 Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 177 
(‘Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights’). 
59 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 177. 
60 See chapter 4 for a detailed analysis of how the South African courts can give content to the right of 
access to adequate housing through section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution by having regard to the ICESCR 
and the jurisprudence generated in terms of the European, Inter-American and African regional human 
rights systems. 
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3 2 2 Section 26(2) - Positive obligation 
3 2 2 1 Introduction 
Section 26(2) of the Constitution imposes a positive obligation on the government to 
adopt reasonable legislative and other measures to achieve the progressive realisation 
of the right of access to adequate housing and to do so within its available resources. In 
Grootboom the Constitutional Court made it clear that this subsection must always be 
read with section 26(1) of the Constitution because it delineates the scope of the right.61 
Together sections 26(1) and (2) form the positive obligations that are imposed on 
government to provide access to adequate housing. In PE Municipality and in Residents 
of Joe Slovo the Constitutional Court made it clear that this positive obligation also 
included a negative obligation to the effect that government should be reluctant to 
institute eviction proceedings against unlawful occupiers of public land in instances 
where that eviction will lead to homelessness.62 In Grootboom the Constitutional Court 
made it clear that this obligation also applied to the eviction of unlawful occupiers form 
private land. This construction of section 26 of the Constitution makes it clear that there 
is a definite link between negative obligations to desist from preventing people from 
enjoying their current access to housing and the positive obligations to provide access 
to adequate housing. In this regard Grootboom is not only the first Constitutional Court 
case to deal with the interpretation of section 26 of the Constitution, but it also explained 
in detail the extent of the positive obligation in section 26(2) of the Constitution. 
In Grootboom, Mrs Irene Grootboom and the majority of the other respondents 
initially lived at the Wallacedene informal settlement with relatives in small shacks. 
Some of the shacks had electricity but there were no water, sewage or refuse removal 
services and the area was partially waterlogged. Several of the respondents had been 
on a waiting list for nearly seven years after their initial application for subsidised low-
cost housing to the Oostenberg municipality. After numerous enquiries and no definite 
answers as to when they could expect the much needed help from the municipality, they 
could no longer face the prospect of continuing to live in these appalling conditions. The 
respondents subsequently moved onto vacant land that was privately owned and was 
                                                 
61 Grootboom par 34. 
62 PE Municipality par 28 and Residents of Joe Slovo par 148. 
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designated for low-cost housing. Since they did not have the owner’s consent to stay on 
the property a magistrate’s court granted an eviction order. The respondents realised 
that they could not return to their former sites because those had been filled by others. 
Almost four months passed before renewed eviction proceedings were instituted against 
the occupiers for refusing to vacate the property. When they did not vacate the land, the 
respondents were forcibly evicted in an apartheid-style fashion after the municipality 
refused to mediate with the purpose of finding alternative land for their occupation. With 
no, or very little possessions, the occupiers sought refuge on the Wallacedene sports 
field under such temporary structures as they could assemble. An urgent application 
was launched when the municipality once again refused to meet its constitutional 
obligations and provide temporary accommodation to the respondents. 
The respondents sought an order in the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town that 
directed the appellants to provide adequate basic shelter or housing of a temporary 
nature for them and their children in terms of section 26 of the Constitution. In the 
alternative the respondents sought relief against the appellants in the form of the 
provision of sufficient basic nutrition, shelter, health care and social services to all of the 
applicants and their children in terms of section 28 of the Constitution. In support of the 
relief sought the respondents contended that the inability of the state to provide 
immediate access to adequate housing did not justify failure to take any steps to provide 
some form of housing or shelter (however inadequate) during the time in which it 
implemented its programme to provide access to adequate housing. Davis J dismissed 
the application for the primary relief sought, but made a declaratory order in terms of the 
alternative relief sought that the children of the community were entitled to shelter and 
that the their parents were entitled to be accommodated with their children until such 
time as the parents were able to provide shelter to their own children.63  
On appeal to the Constitutional Court, Yacoob J stated that the positive obligation in 
section 26(2) of the Constitution did not impose an absolute or unqualified obligation on 
government to provide access to adequate housing.64 Yacoob J emphasised that this 
positive obligation was limited by the fact that firstly, government only had to take 
                                                 
63 Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality and Others 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C) at 293I-J. 
64 Grootboom par 38. 
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reasonable legislative and other measures that, secondly, had to enable the progressive 
realisation of the right and that, finally, this should be done only to the extent that its 
available resources allowed it.65 What follows is a brief overview of how the 
Constitutional Court described this positive obligation and the academic debate around 
it. 
 
3 2 2 2 Reasonable legislative and other measures 
The wording of this qualifying phrase implies that there should be some standard 
against which government’s social programmes can be measured. In Grootboom the 
amici curiae encouraged the Court to approve the notion of a minimum core obligation 
for this purpose.66 The Court rejected this notion of a minimum core obligation because 
it would be a complex task to define in the abstract what the minimum core should be 
for access to adequate housing. The court further stated that the opportunities for 
fulfilling this right varied considerably and the needs were diverse in the South African 
context.67  
Instead, the Court stated that the core inquiry should be whether the measures taken 
by the government to realise section 26 of the Constitution are reasonable.68 The 
central question flowing from this inquiry is whether the means chosen by the 
government are reasonably possible of facilitating the realisation of section 26 of the 
Constitution. The Court emphasised that it was the prerogative of the legislature and the 
executive to decide on the precise contours of the measures that had to be adopted to 
fulfil the rights in sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution. The Court added that a wide 
range of possible measures could be adopted by the legislature and the executive to 
                                                 
65 Grootboom par 38. 
66 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights developed this notion in General Comment No 
3 The nature of State parties’ obligations (art 2(1) of the Covenant), UN Doc E/1991/23. The purpose of 
this document is to give interpretative direction to the scope and application of article 2(1) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 993 UNTS 3. In paragraph 10 of General 
Comment No 3 the Committee states that every State Party to the Covenant incurs a minimum core 
obligation to ensure that the minimum essential levels of each right contained in the Covenant is satisfied. 
According to the Committee any State Party would prima facie be in violation of its obligations if any 
significant number of individuals were deprived of an essential level of any of the rights contained in the 
Covenant. The Committee further stated that the Covenant would be deprived of its raison d'être if it was 
interpreted in a way that did not establish such a minimum core obligation. 
67 Grootboom paras 32-33. 
68 Grootboom par 33. 
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meet this obligation.69 In this regard the Court added that the government should be 
afforded a margin of discretion in developing and implementing these legislative and 
other measures. The Court emphasised that it was not the place of a court to question 
whether a better measure could have been adopted or whether public funds could have 
been expended more effectively. The sole enquiry must be whether the measures that 
have been adopted are reasonable.70 
The Court proceeded to flesh out this standard of “reasonableness review” by 
enumerating a few factors that would be relevant when reviewing the reasonableness of 
a programme that government adopted to give effect to a socio-economic right in the 
Constitution. In summary, a reasonable programme must firstly, be comprehensive and 
co-ordinated in the sense that it clearly allocates responsibilities and tasks to all the 
spheres of government and ensures that appropriate financial and human resources are 
available;71 secondly, be capable of facilitating the realisation of the right;72 thirdly, be 
reasonable both in its conception and its implementation;73 fourthly, it must be balanced 
and flexible in the sense that it makes provision for short, medium and long term 
needs;74 and finally, must include a component that answers to the exigencies of those 
in desperate need.75 
However, the Court cautioned that in some instances it may not be enough to show 
that the legislative and other measures that have been adopted are merely capable of 
facilitating statistical access to the rights in sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution.76 
                                                 
69 Grootboom par 41. 
70 Grootboom par 41. 
71 Grootboom paras 39-40. See sections 3, 7 and 9 of the Housing Act 107 of 1997, which clearly states 
what the statutory obligations of national, provincial and local government are respectively. See chapter 5 
for a discussion of how these obligations come into play in a specific eviction case with reference to the 
necessary joinder of local government due to its direct and substantial interest in the matter, the 
obligation to engage meaningfully with unlawful occupiers and the obligation to provide alternative 
accommodation. 
72 Grootboom par 41.  
73 Grootboom par 42. See section 2 2 in chapter 5 for a discussion of why meaningful engagement, which 
is squarely grounded in section 26(2) of the Constitution, transcends procedural fairness in terms of 
sections 3 and 4 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, which focuses only on the 
moment of decision making and not on the preceding and subsequent process of interaction between the 
parties. 
74 Grootboom par 43.  
75 Grootboom par 44. 
76 Grootboom par 44. 
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Yacoob J explained that legislative and other measures that only achieve this would be 
grossly at odds with the animating values of equality77 and human dignity.78 
The Court concluded that the programme which was in place in the Cape Metro at 
the time that eviction proceedings were launched was not reasonable in that it failed to 
provide any form of relief for those in desperate need of access to adequate housing.79 
The Court therefore made a declaratory order that required the government to fulfil the 
obligations imposed on it by section 26(2) of the Constitution and to do that by devising, 
funding, implementing and supervising measures to provide relief for those in desperate 
need of housing.80 
As a direct result of this judgment the government adopted Chapter 12 of the 
National Housing Code, entitled Housing Assistance in Emergency Housing Situations. 
This chapter creates rules to assist people who find themselves in an emergency 
situation as a result of reasons beyond their control. The chapter foresees that such 
emergency situations may flow from the damaging or destruction of current shelter; the 
immediate threat that prevailing living circumstances may pose to their life, health and 
safety; or the threat of imminent eviction proceedings. The chapter establishes a fund 
from which municipalities can obtain grants to provide basic services and shelter in the 
interim while land is being developed. The relief that this chapter provides falls short of 
access to formal housing that people may get access to in the medium or long term as 
provided for in terms of the housing subsidy scheme. 
The Court’s rejection of the notion of a minimum core obligation has been criticised 
by many commentators for characterising the notion as involving complex questions, for 
its failure to engage in priority-setting and for arguing that it is impossible to fulfil such 
an obligation.81 In turn, the model of reasonableness review that the Constitutional 
                                                 
77 Grootboom par 44. See also PE Municipality par 29. 
78 See PE Municipality paras 12, 18 and 41-41. 
79 Grootboom par 95. 
80 Grootboom par 96 and par 99, Order 2. 
81 See S Liebenberg “Interpretation” 33-27 for a summary of these arguments. See also Young KG “The 
minimum core of economic and social rights: A concept in search on content” (2008) 33 The Yale Journal 
of International Law 112-175 138-140; Lehman K “In defense of the Constitutional Court: Litigating socio-
economic rights and the myth of the minimum core” (2006) 22 American University International Law 
Review 163-197; Porter B “The crisis on economic, social and cultural rights and strategies for addressing 
it” in Squires J, Langford M and Thiele B (eds) The Road to a Remedy: Current Issues in the Litigation of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2005) 43-69 48-55; Wesson M “Grootboom and beyond: 
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Court developed in Grootboom and subsequently applied in Minister of Health and 
Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2),82 Khosa and Others v Minister 
of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and Others v Minister of Social 
Development and Others,83 and Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and 
Others84 has also attracted criticism. The discussion below will focus only on 
Liebenberg’s critique of the model of reasonableness review to make the point that the 
adjudication of the right of access to adequate housing is dominated by the enquiry into 
the reasonableness of the legislative and other measures which government has 
adopted. 
Liebenberg explains that some authors have argued that the model of 
reasonableness review amounts to an administrative law model because it fails to 
engage in a substantive analysis of the content of the right of access to adequate 
housing and the obligations that flow from this right.85 The vagueness and open-ended 
nature of the model allow courts to avoid giving content to the right of access to 
adequate housing.86 To this extent the model may be described as weak because it is at 
risk of being highly deferential to the state.87 This could explain why the allure of the 
minimum core is so strong because it responds to this weakness by carving out a clear 
                                                                                                                                                             
Reassessing the socio-economic rights jurisprudence on the South African Constitutional Court” (2004) 
20 SAJHR 284-308; Sachs A “The judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2003) 56 Current Legal 
Problems 579-601; Kende MS “The South African Constitutional Court’s construction of socio-economic 
rights: A response to the critics” (2003-2004) 19 Conn J Int’l L 617-629; Kende MS “The South African 
Constitutional Court’s embrace of socio-economic rights: A comparative perspective” (2003) 6 Chap L 
Review 137-160 153-154; Liebenberg S “South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights: 
An effective tool in challenging poverty?” (2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 159-191; Roux T 
“Understanding Grootboom - A response to Cass R Sunstein” (2002) 12 Constitutional Forum 41-51 47; 
Scott C and Alston P “Adjudication constitutional priorities in a transnational context: A comment on 
Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s promise” (2000) 16 SAJHR 206-268 244-245, 250-252 and De 
Vos P “Pious wishes or directly enforceable human rights?: Social and economic rights in South Africa’s 
1996 Constitution” (1997) 13 SAJHR 67-101 97. 
82 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
83 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC). 
84 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
85 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 173. See Brand D “The proceduralisation of South African socio-
economic rights jurisprudence or ‘What are socio-economic rights for?’” in Botha H, Van der Walt AJ and 
Van der Walt J (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 33-56. 
86 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 173. See Pieterse M “Coming to terms with the judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2004) 20 SAJHR 383-417 410-411. 
87 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 173. See Davis DM “Adjudicating the socio-economic rights in the 
South African Constitution: Towards ‘deference lite’?” (2006) 22 SAJHR 301-327 311 and Davis DM 
“Socio-economic rights in South Africa: The record of the Constitutional Court after ten years” (2004) 5(5) 
ESR Review 3-7 5 
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normative content for the right of access to adequate housing.88 Liebenberg notes that, 
on the other hand, some authors are convinced that the model enables courts to attain 
a skilful balance between judgments that dictate how government should set its 
priorities and abdicating the role of the judiciary in enforcing socio-economic rights.89 To 
this extent these authors argue that government acquires a burden to justify or explain 
its actions.90 
Liebenberg agrees that the model provides courts with a tool that is both flexible and 
allows context-sensitive engagement with the socio-economic rights claims of people 
because it ensures that government has the space to conceptualise and implement 
legislation, policies and programmes.91 The model ensures that these measures are 
reasonable, inclusive and caters for the emergency needs of those living in abject 
poverty.92 She notes further that the stringency of the review standard adopted in the 
model could vary according to the position of the claimant group, the nature of the 
resource or service that is claimed, and what the impact would be on the claimant group 
if access to the resource or service is denied.93 However, she identifies the following 
problems with the model. 
Firstly, the fact that the Constitutional Court has persistently held that sections 26(1) 
and (2) must be read together has ensured that both the initial determination of the 
content of the right and the consideration of the possible reasons why the right is limited 
are conflated into one single enquiry into the reasonableness of the measures taken by 
government.94 The result is that there is no clear distinction between what the scope of 
the right is, whether it has been infringed, and the weight of the reasons that 
                                                 
88 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 173. See Bilchitz D Poverty and Fundamental Rights (2007) 135-
237; Bilchitz D “Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: Laying the foundations for future 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence” (2003) 19 SAJHR 1-26 and Bilchitz D “Giving socio-economic rights 
teeth: The minimum core and its importance” (2002) 118 SALJ 484-501. 
89 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 173. See Sunstein CR “Social and economic rights? Lessons from 
South Africa” (2000-2001) 11 (4) Constitutional Forum 123-131. 
90 Mureinik E “”A bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31-48 
introduced the concept of a culture of justification. 
91 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 174. 
92 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 174. See Steinberg C “Can reasonableness protect the poor? A 
review of South Africa’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence” (2006) 123 SALJ 264-284. 
93 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 174. 
94 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 175. 
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government advanced in justifying any limitation of the right.95 She argues that this 
allows the courts to elide an initial principled engagement with the purpose and 
underlying values of the rights and the impact of the deprivations on those people 
before the court.96 The result is that the model focuses exclusively on the justifiability of 
the reasons advanced for limiting the right of access to adequate housing, without first 
engaging with the purpose and underlying values of the right of access to adequate 
housing.97  
This links up with the second problem of the model, namely that the analysis of 
whether the legislation and other measures taken are capable of facilitating the 
progressive realisation of the right of access to adequate housing takes place in a 
normative vacuum.98 Put differently, without any clear indication on what it means to 
have access to adequate housing, the government has no benchmark or goal to 
progressively realise towards. Thirdly, the result of this failure to engage with the 
content of the right of access to adequate housing has narrowed the dialogic space in 
the adjudication of the right and precludes the people claiming the benefit and 
protection of the right from articulating their needs.99 This places a significant limitation 
on the ability of South African courts to function as forums for deliberation on the 
meaning of constitutional rights and the values that underpin them.100 This links up with 
the fourth problem of the model, namely that the failure to develop an independent 
content of the right of access to adequate housing and engagement with its underlying 
values precludes the assignment of an appropriate weight to it in the evaluation of the 
reasonableness of the measures that the government has taken. Put differently, it is 
impossible to really determine the reasonableness of the measures that government 
has taken without knowing what it means to have access to more than bricks and 
mortar.101 Finally, the Constitutional Court has consistently neglected – perhaps even 
                                                 
95 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 175. 
96 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 175. 
97 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 175. 
98 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 176. 
99 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 176. 
100 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 176. See Pieterse M “On ‘dialogue’, ‘translation’ and ‘voice’: A 
reply to Sandra Liebenberg” in Woolman S and Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Conversations (2008) 331-
347 343-347. 
101 See section 3 2 above for a discussion of the affective value of the home and how the home interests 
of occupiers can be used to develop the normative content of the right of access to adequate housing 
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refused – to consider international law.102 Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution places an 
explicit obligation on courts to consider international law when it interprets any right 
contained in the Bill of Rights. The burgeoning jurisprudence on the right to housing in 
international law provides a wealth of material that the Constitutional Court should 
consider in terms of section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution for purposes of developing the 
content of the right of access to adequate housing and for considering how persuasive 
arguments based on the ability of measures to progressively realise the right and 
scarcity of resources are. This obligation to consider international law is complemented 
by the obligation in section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution which requires courts to promote 
the values of human dignity, equality and freedom when it interprets any right contained 
in the Bill of Rights. Taken together, sections 39(1)(a) and (b) requires courts to 
interpret the right of access to adequate housing in a purposive, value-orientated103 
manner that is informed by an international law understanding of the content of the right. 
 
3 2 2 3 Progressive realisation 
The concept of progressive realisation in section 26(2) is derived104 from article 2(1) of 
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’). Article 
2(1) reads: 
 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by 
all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” 
 
In General Comment No 3 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(‘CESCR’) explained that progressive realisation is used to describe the intent of article 
2.105 The concept of progressive realisation appreciates the fact that the full realisation 
                                                                                                                                                             
from merely being “more than bricks and mortar” to the place where people can find the peace, privacy 
and intimacy to forge strong family ties, to recuperate after a long day, to discover their identify and to 
practice their culture and religion. 
102 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 178. 
103 See section 2 1 2 above for the arguments that Fox make about the values that underpin the 
phenomenon of the home. 
104 Grootboom par 45. 
105 General Comment No 3 par 9. 
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of socio-economic rights will not be achieved immediately.106 However, the concept 
must not be interpreted in a manner that deprives it of its meaning.107 The concept is a 
flexible device that reflects the realities of the world and which appreciates the 
difficulties that State Parties may face in ensuring the full realisation of the rights in the 
ICESCR. Progressive realisation should therefore be interpreted in accordance with the 
raison d'être of the Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States Parties in 
respect of the full realisation of the rights in the ICESCR.108 In Grootboom the 
Constitutional Court echoed this approach to the interpretation of progressive realisation 
when it stated that the government must take steps to provide for the basic needs of 
everyone in society.109 This duty to take steps requires States Parties to adopt 
legislative and other measures that are deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as 
possible towards the achievement of the full realisation of the rights in the ICESCR.110 
The CESCR explained that while enacting legislation is desirable,111 such enactments 
will not be exhaustive of the obligations of States Parties.112 Each State Party is 
encouraged to decide which means are most appropriate for the circumstances that 
prevail in its context and to then report to the CESCR what measures have been taken 
and on what basis it has been taken.113 In addition, the CESCR has stated that the 
obligation to realise rights progressively contains a general prohibition against adopting 
retrogressive measures which would undermine the existing provision of economic, 
social and cultural rights.114 
 
3 2 2 4 Available resources 
The concept of available resources similarly has its origin in article 2 of the ICESCR. 
Under this obligation States Parties must make a conscious effort to ensure that as 
many people as possible enjoy the benefits flowing from the rights in the ICESCR under 
                                                 
106 General Comment No 3 par 9. 
107 General Comment No 3 par 9. 
108 General Comment No 3 par 9. 
109 Grootboom par 45. 
110 General Comment No 3 par 2. 
111 General Comment No 3 par 3. 
112 General Comment No 3 par 4. 
113 General Comment No 3 par 4. 
114 General Comment No 3 par 9. 
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the prevailing circumstances of that particular State Party.115  The obligation further 
requires States Parties to ensure that the most vulnerable in society are protected in 
terms of programmes that do not require major capital outlay in instances where the 
resources are demonstrably inadequate.116 McLean argues that the margin of 
appreciation that States Parties have to allocate resources must be restricted so as not 
to undermine the rationale behind the obligation.117 
 
3 2 2 5 Conclusion 
Section 26(2) of the Constitution imposes an obligation on government to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources to provide 
access to adequate housing for those people that currently do not have such access. 
The Constitutional Court has developed a model of reasonableness review under this 
subsection to evaluate whether the measures that the government has taken are 
reasonably capable of facilitating the progressive realisation of the right of access to 
adequate housing. In this regard the Court will have regard to inter alia the fact that 
many people in South Africa currently live in intolerable conditions. This obligation to 
pay attention to the immediate needs of those living in abject poverty ensures that the 
legal-historical social significance of section 26 is highlighted with reference to the 
constitutional and statutory obligations that government now have to provide access to 
adequate housing. However, the weakness of the model of reasonableness review is 
that it conflates the two stages of constitutional adjudication and thereby precludes the 
development of an independent substantive content for the right of access to adequate 
housing. The result is that the Constitutional Court focuses disproportionally on the 
reasons advanced for limiting access to the right. The corollary of this focus is that 
courts have failed to appreciate properly the fact that evictions more often than not lead 
to homelessness, which undermines the right of access to adequate housing. 
 
 
                                                 
115 General Comment No 3 par 11. 
116 General Comment No 3 par 12. 
117 McLean K “Housing” in Woolman S, Bishop M and Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
2nd edition (Original Service, July 2006) 55-38. 
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3 2 3 Section 26(3) - Eviction 
3 2 3 1 Negative obligation 
In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court held that section 26(1) of the Constitution places 
a negative obligation on the government, organs of state and private individuals to 
“desist from preventing or impairing” the right of access to adequate housing.118 Yacoob 
J noted that this negative obligation is further spelt out in section 26(3) of the 
Constitution. Section 26(3) of the Constitution states that “[n]o one may be evicted from 
their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after 
considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary 
evictions.” Liebenberg notes that the Court does not explain what actions would amount 
to a prevention or impairment of the right of access to adequate housing.119 She adds 
that the terminology that the Court used to describe this negative obligation is broad 
enough to argue that a prevention or an impairment of the right of access to adequate 
housing could flow from a lack of positive action from the government.120 
In Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others121 (‘Jaftha’) the 
Constitutional Court developed the meaning of this negative obligation to desist from 
preventing or impairing the right of access to adequate housing. In this case the 
appellants, two poor and disadvantaged women from Prince Albert, lost their homes in 
sales-in-execution proceedings to satisfy extraneous debts.122 The appellants sought an 
order setting aside the sales-in-execution and an order that interdicted certain of the 
respondents from taking transfer of the properties that were sold in execution.123 Ms van 
Rooyen sought a further order that interdicted inter alia the Sheriff of Prince Albert from 
evicting previously disadvantaged residents of Prince Albert who acquired homes since 
the advent of democracy with the assistance of low cost housing subsidies from the 
government.124 All the respondents, except for the Minister for Justice and 
                                                 
118 Grootboom par 34. The Constitutional Court recalled that in Certification Judgment, Ex parte 
Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) par 78 it held that socio-economic rights could at the very least be 
“negatively protected from improper invasion.” 
119 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 214. 
120 214. 
121 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC). 
122 Jaftha par 3-5. 
123 Jaftha par 6. 
124 Jaftha par 6. 
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Constitutional Development, indicated that they would abide by the order of the court.125 
The appellants and the respondents furthermore reached agreement on the relief 
sought by the appellants. The Constitutional Court therefore only had to engage with the 
constitutional validity of the provisions that were used to sell the properties of the 
appellants in execution in the magistrates’ court. 
Section 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944 instructs the Sheriff of a 
magistrates’ court to execute a court order for the payment of money or the payment of 
money in instalments against the moveable property of a debtor if that debtor fails to 
pay the money without delay. The clerk of the magistrates’ court is obliged126 to issue a 
warrant of execution against the immovable property of the debtor if the Sheriff issues a 
nulla bona return to indicate that there is insufficient moveable property to satisfy the 
debt. This warrant of execution may be set aside if the debtor can show good cause for 
this to be done127 or if the debtor is willing to pay the debt in instalments.128 If the 
warrant of execution is not set aside and the debtor does not enter an appearance to 
defend, the clerk of the magistrates’ court may enter judgment in favour of the creditor 
of the liquidated debt. The result is that the entire execution process can occur without 
any judicial oversight. The appellants argued that this makes section 66(1)(a) of the Act 
unconstitutional to the extent that it is overbroad, because it permits the violation of a 
person’s right to have access to adequate housing in circumstances where it may not 
be justified.129 The unconstitutionality of the execution process in the magistrates’ court 
is exacerbated by the fact that section 67 of the Act does not shield the home of the 
debtor from being attached and sold in execution.130 The appellants argued that this 
                                                 
125 Jaftha paras 7 and 9. 
126 See Rule 36 of the Magistrates’ Courts Rules of Court, Government Notice R1108 (21 June 1968). 
127 See section 62 of the Act for the powers of magistrates’ courts to grant or set aside a warrant. 
128 See section 73 of the Act for the powers of magistrates’ courts to make orders for payment by 
installments. 
129 Jaftha par 17. 
130 Section 67 of the Act reads: 
“In respect of any process of execution issued out of any court the following property shall be 
protected from seizure and shall not be attached or sold, namely: (a) the necessary beds, 
bedding and wearing apparel of the execution debtor and of his family; (b) the necessary 
furniture (other than beds) and household utensils in so far as they do not exceed [R 2000]; 
(c) stock, tools and agricultural implements of a farmer in so far as they do not exceed [R 
2000]; (d) the supply of food and drink in the house sufficient for the needs of such debtor 
and of his family during one month; (e) tools and implements of trade, in so far as they do 
not exceed [R 2000]; (f) professional books, documents or instruments necessarily used by 
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violates their right to have access to adequate housing in terms of section 26(1) of the 
Constitution. 
Mokgoro J observed that this case was different from all the other socio-economic 
rights cases that had come before the Constitutional Court. The appellants did not seek 
relief against the government that would require it to take positive measures to realise 
the right of access to adequate housing.131 Instead the appellants alleged that the 
negative aspects of section 26 of the Constitution were violated through the operation of 
sections 66(1)(a) and 67 of the Act which prevented and impaired their current access 
to adequate housing. Mokgoro J noted that the appellants already had access to 
adequate housing that required protection against the government, in the form of the 
Sheriff of the magistrates’ court, and against private individuals such as the respondents 
who purchased the properties of the appellants during sales-in-execution.132 This 
protection was required because it was common cause that the appellants would firstly, 
not qualify for another low cost housing subsidy from the government if they lost their 
homes; and secondly, not be provided with suitable alternative accommodation upon 
eviction from their homes.133 While she did not find it necessary to enumerate all the 
circumstance that may lead to a violation of the negative obligations of the right of 
access to adequate housing, she held that any measure which permitted a person to be 
deprived of existing access to adequate housing would limit the rights protected in 
section 26(1) of the Constitution.134 She added that such a limitation would have to be 
justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.135 
In considering the nature of section 26 of the Constitution Mokgoro J emphasised the 
link between the right of access to adequate housing and the inherent dignity of all 
                                                                                                                                                             
such debtor in his profession, in so far as they do not exceed [R 2000]; (g) such arms and 
ammunition as such debtor is required by law, regulation or disciplinary order to have in his 
possession as part of his equipment ….” 
131 Jaftha par 31. 
132 Jaftha par 32. 
133 Jaftha par 12. 
134 Jaftha par 34. 
135 Section 36 of the Constitution reads: 
“The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including - (a) the nature of the rights; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) 
the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; 
and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose” (emphasis added). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
96 
people. She explained that the ability to call a place a home had the potential of being 
the “most empowering and dignifying human experience.”136 Sections 66(1)(a) of the 
Act posed a serious threat to this experience because these provisions placed the 
appellants in a position where they would never again be able to obtain a housing 
subsidy from the government.137 While she conceded that it was important to have a 
framework for debt recovery in place, it was difficult to see how the need for collection of 
extraneous debts could be compelling enough to allow the permanent termination of the 
right of access to adequate housing in circumstances where there are alternative means 
to recover debts. She added that her finding did not mean that every sale in execution 
to satisfy an extraneous debt would be unreasonable and unjustifiable.138 There will be 
instances where it will be reasonable and justifiable to allow the sale in execution to 
recover extraneous debts because the creditor’s interests outweigh the harm caused to 
the debtor.139 However, section 66(1)(a) of the Act was sufficiently broad to allow sales-
in-execution against indigent debtors to proceed where it would not be reasonable and 
justifiable.140 She therefore held that section 66(1)(a) of the Act was unconstitutional to 
this extent. 
Mokgoro J held that an appropriate remedy in the circumstances would have to be 
sufficiently flexible to ensure that, on the one hand, the interests of the debtors in 
keeping their homes, and on the other hand, the interests of the creditors in recovering 
the debt owed to them, is taken into consideration.141 She held that peremptory judicial 
oversight of the execution process, as opposed to the judicial oversight upon which a 
debtor can insist in terms of sections 62 and 73 of the Act, would satisfy the need for 
flexibility in remedying the constitutional defect in section 66(1)(a) of the Act.142 She 
added that magistrates should, when exercising their discretion to issue a warrant of 
execution, have regard to inter alia whether the interests of the creditor in obtaining 
payment of the judgment debt is significantly less than the interests of the debtor in 
                                                 
136 Jaftha par 39. 
137 Jaftha par 39. 
138 Jaftha par 40. 
139 Jaftha par 42. 
140 Jaftha par 44. 
141 Jaftha par 53. 
142 Jaftha par 55. 
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retaining security of tenure of her home,143 what the size of the debt is,144 what the 
circumstances were in which the debt arose,145 and whether there are alternative 
measures available of ensuring debt recovery.146 She concluded that the most precise 
way of remedying the lack of judicial oversight in section 66(1)(a) of the Act would be to 
add the phrase “a court, after consideration of all the relevant circumstances, may order 
execution” immediately before the words “against the immovable property of the 
party”.147 
In Gundwana v Steko Development and Others148 (‘Gundwana’) the Constitutional 
Court had the opportunity to grapple with the constitutional validity of sale in execution 
proceedings that are conducted in the High Court. In Gundwana the applicant 
purchased land in George for R 52 000 during 1995. R 25 000 of the purchase price 
was financed by registering a mortgage bond against the property. Ms Gundwana fell in 
arrears with her bond repayments during 2003 and default judgment was obtained 
against her by Nedcor Bank Limited in terms of Rule 31(5)(b) of the Uniform Rules of 
Court.149 Between November 2003 and August 2007 the bank took no action in relation 
to the execution while the applicant continued to make infrequent payments of variable 
amounts. The property was sold in execution on 15 August 2007 to Steko Development 
CC which then instituted eviction proceedings against the applicant after she failed to 
vacate the property. The applicant failed in her attempts to obtain leave to appeal 
against the eviction order to the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal. The applicant subsequently launched proceedings to obtain 
direct access to the Constitutional Court to challenge the constitutional validity of Rule 
31(5)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court. In the latter application she sought a declaratory 
order to the effect that the power of the Registrar to order default judgment in terms of 
                                                 
143 Jaftha par 56. 
144 Jaftha par 57. 
145 Jaftha par 58. 
146 Jaftha par 59. 
147 Jaftha par 64. 
148 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC). 
149 Rule 31(5)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court reads: 
“The registrar may - (i) grant judgment as requested; (ii) grant judgment for part of the claim 
only or on amended terms; (iii) refuse judgment wholly or in part; (iv) postpone the 
application for judgment on such terms as he may consider just; (v) request or receive oral or 
written submission; (vi) require that the matter be set down for hearing in open court.” 
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Rule 31(5)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court is unconstitutional. The applicant further 
sought an order rescinding the default judgment and an order setting aside the eviction 
order. 
Froneman J recalled that the Constitutional Court stated in Chief Lesapo v North 
West Agricultural Bank and Another150 and Jaftha that sales in execution of claims that 
sound in money may only follow upon a court order. He noted further that judicial 
oversight over the execution process was required if the execution was against the 
homes of indigent debtors who ran the risk of losing their security of tenure.151 The bank 
did not dispute the necessity of judicial oversight in these circumstances, but sough to 
argue that the applicant’s case was different. First, the bank argued that the applicant 
and her property did not attract the protection that Jaftha afforded. Froneman J held that 
this argument was flawed because the constitutional validity of Rule 31(1)(5)(b) could 
not depend on the subjective position of a particular applicant. He further held that the 
fact-based nature of each case required an evaluation of the specific circumstances of 
the case which fell beyond the executive functions of the Registrar.152 Secondly, the 
bank argued that mortgaged property is a type of property that did not fall within Jaftha’s 
reach. Fronemen J accepted that a mortgagor willingly provided her immovable property 
as security for the mortgage bond and that she thereby consents that the immovable 
property may be executed upon in order to satisfy the debt.153 However, he could not 
accept that the mortgagor also provided consent to firstly, enforce the mortgage bond 
without a court order; secondly, the waiver of her rights in terms of section 26(1) and 
26(3) of the Constitution; and finally, mala fide enforcement of mortgage bond 
repayments.154 
Froneman J found that the fact that mortgagors willingly place homes at risk by 
registering a mortgage over them did not put it beyond the reach of Jaftha. He explained 
that the specific circumstances of each case required a determination of whether the 
hypothecated property constituted a mortgagors home before it could be declared 
specially executable. This kind of evaluation must be done by a judicial officer. He 
                                                 
150 2000 (1) SA 409 (CC). 
151 Gundwana par 41. 
152 Gundwana par 43. 
153 Gundwana par 44. 
154 Gundwana par 44. 
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therefore found that Rule 31(5)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court was unconstitutional to 
the extent that it allowed the registrar to make this determination.155 He further set aside 
the eviction order and referred both the application for eviction and the finalisation of the 
rescission application back to the magistrates’ court in George.156 
The case discussions of Jaftha and Gundwana above illustrate that the interests of 
poor people in the protection of their homes are important considerations in a judicial 
process which was previously solely concerned with the rights and interests of 
creditors.157 Prior to these decisions a judgment creditor was entitled to a writ of 
execution against the immovable property of the judgment debtor once the Sheriff of the 
court issued a nulla bona return. Neither the clerk, in the magistrates’ court, nor the 
Registrar, in the High Court, had a discretion to refuse this writ. Jaftha and Gundwana 
confirm that judicial oversight of sale in execution proceedings is required if the property 
to be executed against is the home of the judgment debtor. These judgments enjoin 
judicial officers to weigh the interests of the creditor in securing payment of the 
judgment debt against the interests of the debtor in retaining the tenure security that her 
home provides her. This balancing requires more than the mechanical application of 
legal rules to objective facts. It requires engagement with all the relevant circumstances 
of the case - crucially, whether current access to adequate housing will be impaired or 
prevented. In Jaftha the appellants would not only be left without any alternative 
accommodation upon eviction, but would also be disqualified from securing a low cost 
housing subsidy from the government. In Gundwana the applicant would also be left 
without any alternative accommodation upon eviction and would arguably find it very 
difficult in the future to obtain financing from a bank for purposes of purchasing a home. 
 
3 2 3 2 Relevant circumstances 
The obligation to consider all relevant circumstances is significant in the context of 
evictions because it represents a drastic departure from the common law position where 
eviction was dealt with as, on the one hand, an abstract or absolute remedy for a private 
land owner without regard for the personal circumstances of the occupiers and, on the 
                                                 
155 Gundwana par 49. 
156 Gundwana par 65, Order F and G. 
157 See section 2 1 2 above for an analysis of the home interests of occupiers. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
100 
other hand, an instrument of state-sponsored eviction from either public or private land 
with little or no court intervention and no regard for the harsh consequences that the 
eviction may have on the occupiers. The impact of section 26(3) of the Constitution lies 
in the fact that courts are required to consider the personal circumstances of the 
unlawful occupiers to satisfy themselves of the justice and equity of the eviction. 
To succeed with the rei vindicatio the owner merely had to allege and prove that she 
was the owner of the land (registered owner on the title deed) and that the land was in 
possession of the defendant.158 The onus then shifted onto the defendant to establish 
any right to occupy the land (for example in terms of a lease). If the defendant 
succeeded with this or the owner acknowledged this fact, the onus shifted back onto the 
owner to prove that the right to occupy no longer existed or was no longer 
enforceable.159 Once the owner discharged her onus a court had no discretion to refuse 
the eviction order based on the personal circumstances of the unlawful occupiers, the 
factors that contributed to their vulnerability and weakness or by counter-weighting the 
values underpinning housing as a fundamental right. 
In Ross v South Peninsula Municipality (‘Ross’) the Western Cape High Court, Cape 
Town considered the question of how these relevant circumstances should be placed 
before a court.160 Josman AJ found, with reference to how evidence is placed before a 
court in an adversarial system, that section 26(3) of the Constitution amended the 
common law to the extent that it now requires an owner to allege circumstances that will 
be relevant for a court to issue an eviction order.161 The decision in Ross was strongly 
criticised in subsequent High Court cases.162 The High Courts argued, in summary, that 
it would be impossible for an owner to place the personal circumstances of the 
                                                 
158 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) at 20A. 
159 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) at 21. See Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (2006) 243 (‘Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of 
Property’) and Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 410-411 (‘Van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law’). 
160 2000 (1) SA 589 (C) at 595I. 
161 Ross at 596H. 
162 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-Epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) at 475F-I; Ellis v Viljoen 2001 (5) BCLR 
487 (C) at 497B-H. These cases are discussed in Roux T “Continuity and change in a transforming legal 
order: The impact of section 26(3) of the Constitution on South African law” (2004) 121 SALJ 466-
492 478-484 (‘Roux “Continuity and change”’). See also Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East 
Squatters 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) at 392B-F and Transnet t/a Spoornet v Informal Settlers of Good Hope 
and Others [2001] 4 All SA 516 (W) at 522G. 
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defendant before a court because it was within the exclusive knowledge of the 
defendant. It would thus be impossible for an owner to obtain an eviction order if the 
defendant did not place her personal circumstances before the court. The landowner 
would consequently be arbitrarily deprived of her property in terms of section 25(1) of 
the Constitution until the occupier decided to leave. 
In Brisley v Drotsky163 (‘Brisley’), dealing with the impact of section 26 of the 
Constitution on the common law, the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that an 
eviction order could only be granted once all the relevant circumstances have been 
considered. However, the court qualified this by stating that, in the absence of explicit 
statutory provisions, the personal circumstances of the occupier do not constitute 
relevant circumstances.164 As a result the impact of section 26(3) of the Constitution on 
the common law of ownership remained limited165 and the owner therefore only had to 
satisfy the requirements of the rei vindicatio. In Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v 
Jika166 (‘Ndlovu’), dealing with the impact of PIE on the common law, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal adopted an approach that appeared to be different from that of Brisley 
when it held that PIE explicitly overrides the common law and that the personal 
circumstances of occupiers are relevant circumstances.167 However, the court seemed 
to echo all the previous case law on onus when it found that the burden was on the 
owner to prove that she was owner and that the occupier was in unlawful occupation of 
the land. This would shift the burden onto the shoulders of the occupier to present the 
court with special circumstances for her occupation.168 This looks like an amended 
version of the requirements for the rei vindicatio requiring, in addition, that the owner 
must prove unlawful occupation, whilst leaving the occupier to prove a ground for lawful 
occupation.169 Van der Walt argues that the courts have interpreted Ndlovu as if it left 
the burden of proof unchanged despite the fact that PIE clearly overrides the common 
                                                 
163 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
164 Brisley paras 42-46. 
165 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 423. 
166 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA). 
167 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 423. 
168 Ndlovu par 19. 
169 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 330. 
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law170 by requiring courts to grant an eviction order when it is just and equitable to do so 
after it has considered all the relevant circumstances. The onus of the owner was thus 
incrementally increased to the extent that she would have to allege that the procedural 
protections of PIE have been complied with in addition to the requirements of the rei 
vindicatio.171 However, the onus also imposes a further obligation on the owner in terms 
of section 26(3) and PIE to show that the eviction is just and equitable in the 
circumstances. 
In PE Municipality the Constitutional Court emphasised the fact that a technical issue 
such as onus should not play a significant role where a court is asked to deprive people 
of their homes. On the other hand, Sachs J stressed that a court may not be able to fulfil 
its statutory duty of having regard to all relevant circumstances if the parties do not 
place the requisite information before it.172 In these cases it may be necessary for a 
court to obtain the requisite information through extraordinary means such as “active 
judicial management”.173 Sachs J duly noted that this would have significant implications 
for the manner in which courts would deal with cases in terms of allowing evidence to 
be submitted, exercising its powers and the range of orders it might make.174 
In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter175 Horn AJ 
found that a court, with all the relevant information at its disposal, must balance the 
opposing interests concerned in an eviction application.176 These interests represent, on 
the one hand, the applicant owner who seeks to protect her constitutional right to 
property by evicting the unlawful occupiers from the land and as a result reserving 
                                                 
170 Section 4(1) of PIE states that “[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or the 
common law, the provisions of this section apply to proceedings by an owner or person in charge of land 
for the eviction of an unlawful occupier”. See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of Property 653; 
Carey Miller DL (with Pope A) Land Title in South Africa (2000) 519 (‘Carey Miller Land Title in South 
Africa’) and Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 419-424. 
171 Confirmed in Wormald NO and Others v Kambule [2005] JOL 15547 (SCA) par 11. See also Roux 
“Continuity and change” 492. 
172 PE Municipality par 32. 
173 PE Municipality par 36. 
174 PE Municipality par 36. In recent case law the courts have held that is insufficient for municipalities to 
merely allege that they do not have suitable alternative accommodation or land available to resettle 
unlawful occupiers. As a result the courts have postponed applications sine die and ordered the joinder of 
the municipalities with the instruction to compile individualised reports on the availability of alternative 
accommodation. See section 2 1 2 in chapter 5 for an exhaustive overview of the case law on joinder of 
local authorities to eviction proceedings. 
175 2000 (2) SA 1074 (SECLD). 
176 1081D-E. 
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exclusive use of the land for herself and, on the other hand, the respondent unlawful 
occupiers who are in desperate need of alternative accommodation as a result of a 
dispensation where they were marginalised by exclusion and prosecution. This 
balancing exercise breaks away from “a purely legalistic approach” and equips a court 
with the discretion to refuse an eviction order based on equitable principles like 
“morality, fairness, social values and implications”.177 
PIE was enacted to give effect to abovementioned principles of section 26(3) of the 
Constitution and as a result it forms the primary source of protection for unlawful 
occupiers of land against the abuse of power and arbitrary evictions.178 
 
3 3 The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act 19 of 1998 
3 3 1 Introduction 
The overarching purpose of PIE can be ascertained from the title, the long title and the 
preamble.179 It is easy to derive from the title that PIE seeks to prevent both illegal 
evictions from land and unlawful occupation of land. According to the long title the 
purpose of PIE is to provide for the prohibition of illegal eviction; provide for procedures 
for the eviction of unlawful occupiers; repeal PISA180 and other obsolete laws; and 
provide for matters incidental thereto. The memorandum on the objects of the 
Prevention of Illegal Evictions from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Bill181 fleshed out 
the second purpose of the long title by stating that one of the main objects of PIE is to 
include procedural protections for occupiers who occupy land without the permission of 
                                                 
177 Although the Supreme Court of Appeal in Brisley decided that section 26(3) of the Constitution did not 
grant courts the discretion to deprive owners of something that they were entitled to in terms of common 
law, it later held in Ndlovu that PIE indeed equipped courts with such a discretion. See Liebenberg Socio-
Economic Rights 311-313 and Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 422-423. 
178 Other statutory enactments that give effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution are the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, the Interim Protection of 
Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 and the Rental 
Housing Act 50 of 1999.   
179 Pienaar JM and Mostert H “Uitsettings onder die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet: Die verhouding tussen 
artikel 25(1), artikel 26(3) en die uitsettingswet (deel 1)” 2006 TSAR 277-299 283. The authors (at 285-
298) conducted a detailed analysis of case law where the courts grappled with the purpose of PIE and 
deduced ten aims of PIE from these cases. 
180 See section 3 in chapter 2 for an overview of the powers that PISA afforded both private owners and 
local authorities to forcibly remove squatters from land, demolish the buildings/structures that they 
erected and to approve informal settlement areas on the fringes of society. 
181 B 89B-97. 
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an owner or the person in charge of such land.182 The preamble finally foresees that the 
purposes of PIE are closely linked to the two competing interests that present 
themselves in eviction case - the property rights of the landowner and the housing rights 
of the unlawful occupiers. 
In this sense PIE fits in neatly with one of the land reform programmes provided for 
in the Constitution.183 Land tenure reform has been described as the reform of the legal 
basis of landholding that is usually directed towards the implementation of social 
change.184 The eviction context calls for social change through the establishment of a 
land use system that, as a minimum requirement, is not segregated along racial lines. 
The mere abolition of discriminatory apartheid land law legislation, in this case PISA in 
particular, is insufficient and simply signalled the start of a process which requires 
further legislative enactment to stabilise and strengthen weak and vulnerable rights and 
interests in land.185  
Since PIE applies to unlawful occupiers, who do not have any rights to occupy, the 
purpose is limited to stabilising existing unlawful occupation of land so as to guarantee 
that eviction only takes place when it is just and equitable and then only in a fair, 
equitable and controlled manner.186 This departure from the common law position, 
where the right of ownership entitled an owner and statutory powers entitled the state to 
demand eviction regardless of contextual or personal circumstances, has been 
described as a deliberate reaction to the role of arbitrary evictions under apartheid and 
the current housing crisis.187 Ownership and statutory powers of the state will therefore 
no longer triumph automatically or by default over the housing interests of unlawful 
                                                 
182 B 89B-97 at 18. 
183 The three land reform programmes in section 25 of the Constitution are: the land redistribution 
programme (section 25(5)); the land tenure reform programme (section 25(6)) and the restitution 
programme (section 25(7)). 
184 Carey Miller Land Title in South Africa 456. 
185 Carey Miller Land Title in South Africa 556-557. See section 3 1 in chapter 4 for a discussion of the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights on the obligations that article 8 of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 UNTS 221 placed on the United 
Kingdom to change its land use system to more accommodating of the personal circumstances of 
gypsies/travellers in awarding planning permission to station caravans on land. 
186 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 327. 
187 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 327. See section 2 3 in chapter 1 for statistics on the 
housing crisis in South Africa and how this explains the fact that service delivery protests have become 
more frequent and violent in the past seven years. 
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occupiers, nor is it discarded wholesale. Instead the eviction enquiry is subjected to 
substantive fairness and strict due process requirements.188 
The objective of PISA was to reinforce common law remedies for landowners while 
reducing the common law protections at the disposal of the unlawful occupiers. PIE has 
effectively reversed this position, replacing the common law remedies with strong 
procedural protections and substantive safeguards.189 These safety measures establish 
a threshold of requirements for eviction in accordance with the principles laid down in 
section 26(3) of the Constitution. 
In this regard it should first be determined whether the occupiers are unlawful 
occupiers for purposes of PIE. Once this is established the unlawful occupiers must be 
informed of the fact that eviction proceedings are being instituted against them. The 
court may then, after considering all the relevant circumstances, order the eviction and 
has the power to make certain ancillary orders if it is satisfied that it would be just and 
equitable to do so. 
 
3 3 2 Unlawful occupation 
3 3 2 1 Occupier 
An unlawful occupier is a person who occupies land without the express or tacit consent 
of the owner or person in charge,190 or without any other right in law to occupy.191 
Eviction proceedings may therefore be instituted as soon as it is realised or it comes to 
the attention of the owner, person in charge or the municipality within whose jurisdiction 
the land in question falls.192 The early case law that grappled with the application of PIE 
stumbled over this threshold requirement of unlawful occupation. 
                                                 
188 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 419. 
189 PE Municipality par 12. 
190 Section 1(x) of PIE defines a “person in charge” as “a person who has or at the relevant time had legal 
authority to give permission to a person to enter or reside upon the land in question”. 
191 Section 1(xi) of PIE. However, all persons who qualify as occupiers for purposes of the Extension of 
Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 and persons whose informal rights to land would normally be protected 
by the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 are excluded from this definition of 
“unlawful occupier”. 
192 Pienaar JM and Muller A “The impact of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 on homelessness and unlawful occupation within the present statutory 
framework” (1999) 10 Stell LR 370-396 380. See also Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of 
Property 652 and Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 328. 
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Early case law focussed on the overarching function of PIE and interpretation of the 
term “unlawful occupier”. This gave rise to divergent opinions and reasons for 
construing the application of PIE narrowly (classical squatting) or broadly (all instances 
of unlawful occupation). In Absa Bank Ltd v Amod193 (‘Absa’) the former Witwatersrand 
Local Division of the High Court held that PIE only applied to vacant land, and not to 
formalised housing or landlord and tenant cases, where there was occupation of 
structures that were erected in conflict with building laws and regulations and where 
there has never been consent.194 Although this position was followed in subsequent 
decisions of the High Court,195 some clarity was brought to the matter in Ndlovu. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that PIE applied to all cases where there was no 
consent196 to occupy the property when the proceedings were instituted and where the 
buildings or structures were used as a home or to obtain some form of shelter.197 As a 
result PIE currently applies to all instances of unlawful occupation (land invasions, 
squatting, holding over and former mortgagors),198 in both rural and urban areas, where 
the property is used for residential purposes,199 but does not apply if the property is 
used for business or commercial purposes.200 
                                                 
193 [1999] 2 All SA 423 (W). 
194 Absa at 429J. See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of Property 653 and Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 328. 
195 Ross, Betta Eiendomme v Ekple-Epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) and Ellis v Viljoen 2001 (5) BCLR 487 (C). 
196 Section 1 of PIE defines “consent” as “the express or tacit consent, whether in writing or otherwise, of 
the owner or person in charge to the occupation by the occupier of the land in question.” 
197 Ndlovu paras 11-16. See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of Property 653 and Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 330. 
198 See Ridgway v Janse van Rensburg 2002 (4) SA 186 (C) at 190B-C. 
199 In Barnett and Others v Minister of Land Affairs and Others 2007 (6) SA 1 (SCA) the Supreme Court of 
Appeal found that the holiday cottages that the appellants erected on the Transkei Wild Coast in 
contravention of a Decree promulgated by the former President of the Transkei did not qualify as homes 
and could therefore not attract the protection afforded to unlawful occupiers in terms of PIE. Van der Walt 
AJ Constitutional Property Law 2007 (4) JQR 2.3 argues for a different approach in terms of which PIE 
would apply to the unlawful occupation of holiday homes that are occupied intermittently, and that a court 
should then decide on the justice and equity of the eviction after considering all the relevant 
circumstances.  
200 See also Ross at 596A-B; Ndlovu par 20; Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Jardim 2004 (1) SA 502 (O) 
par 14 and Manguang Local Municipality v Mashale and Another 2006 (1) SA 269 (O) paras 6 and 7. With 
the exception of the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 which does not override the common law, this is the 
only area of the law where evictions will still occur in terms of the rei vindicatio because the Extension of 
Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 covers lawful occupation of land used for residential purposes in rural 
areas; the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 affords protection to labour tenants that occupy 
land lawfully in rural areas; and the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 provides for 
the temporary protection of certain rights to and interests in land that are not otherwise adequately 
protected in law. 
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3 3 2 2 Consent 
The meaning of consent was considered for the first time by the Constitutional Court in 
Residents of Joe Slovo Community. In this case the applicants alleged that the City of 
Cape Town tacitly consented to their occupation of the publicly owned land which 
comprised the Joe Slovo informal settlement. The applicant argued that the City never 
sought to evict them since their occupation commenced in 1990 and the fact that the 
City started rendering services to the settlement acknowledged the lawfulness of their 
occupation.201 This, so the argument went, afforded the residents a defensible right of 
occupation for purposes of PIE which could only be terminated with reasonable notice 
and upon good cause shown. The key issue that the Court had to determine was 
whether the residents of the Joe Slovo informal settlement had the consent of the local 
authority to occupy the land when the eviction proceedings were launched in terms of 
PIE.202 This issue was approached differently in each of the five separate judgments 
that Yacoob J,203 Moseneke DCJ,204 Ngcobo J (as he then was),205 O’Regan J and 
Sachs J206 prepared in supporting the order of the Court that the residents were 
unlawful occupiers.207 
Yacoob J commenced his analysis of consent by drawing a distinction between 
actual authority and ostensible authority. Actual authority comprises express and tacit 
consent while ostensible authority is based on the doctrine of estoppel.208 The definition 
of unlawful occupier only refers to the former species of authority and therefore 
excludes the latter.209 The residents therefore had to prove that they acquired a 
defensible right of occupation210 in the sense that there was a bilateral,211 voluntary 
                                                 
201 See Rademeyer and Others v Western Districts Council and Others 1998 (3) SA 1011 (SE). 
202 Residents of Joe Slovo par 4. 
203 Langa CJ and Van der Westhuizen J concurred in the judgment of Yacoob J. 
204 Sachs J concurred in the judgment of Moseneke DCJ. 
205 Moseneke DCJ and Sachs J concurred in the judgment of Ngcobo J. 
206 Moseneke DCJ and Mokgoro J concurred in the judgment of Sachs J. 
207 Section 1 of PIE defines an “unlawful occupier” as  
“a person who occupies land without the express or tacit consent of the owner or person in 
charge, or without any other right in law to occupy such land, excluding a person who is an 
occupier in terms of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act [62 of] 1997, and excluding a 
person whose informal right to land, but for the provisions of this Act, would be protected by 
the provisions of the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act [31 of] 1996.” 
208 Residents of Joe Slovo par 49. 
209 Residents of Joe Slovo par 50. 
210 Residents of Joe Slovo par 51. 
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agreement212 between them and the City of Cape Town. In the absence of a written or 
verbal agreement that afforded the residents a right of occupation, the residents had to 
provide the Court with evidence that fell short of establishing the existence of an 
express agreement.213 Yacoob J reasoned that the residents simply could not provide 
proof of such tacit consent because it is impossible for a local authority to give consent 
without adopting an authorised resolution to that effect.214 
 He proceeded to consider the argument advanced by the residents that the Court 
had to give a broad meaning to tacit consent. He held that there was no room to assign 
a broad meaning to tacit consent because it had to be assumed that the legislature 
deliberately used the phrase “express or tacit consent of the owner” and that it fully 
understood that courts would interpret these terms to mean what has always been 
ascribed to them.215 He also held that any other interpretation of tacit consent would be 
inconsistent with the purpose of section 26(3) of the Constitution216 and PIE.217 He 
further held that a broad interpretation of tacit consent would disturb the balancing of 
interests required by PIE itself.218 Yacoob J accordingly found that it had to be 
accepted219 that the City intervened on account of humanitarian reasons.220 It was 
reasonably plausible that the City helped to rebuild burnt down shacks and started 
rendering services to the settlement because its constitutional obligations required it to 
do so.221 He explained that he could not accede to an argument that would find that a 
local authority conceded a right of occupation simply because the peremptory nature of 
the City’s constitutional obligations required it to provide certain municipal service.222 He 
furthermore found that, even if the City consented to the occupation, it would have been 
                                                                                                                                                             
211 See Landbounavorsingsraad v Klaasen 2005 (3) SA 410 (LCC) par 24. 
212 See Tsaperas and Others v Boland Bank Ltd 1996 (1) SA 719 (A) at 724G-H. 
213 Residents of Joe Slovo par 58. In Joel Melamed and Hurwitz v Cleveland Estates (Pty) Ltd; Joel 
Melamed and Hurwitz v Vorner Investments (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 155 (A) Corbett JA stated “that a court 
may hold that a tacit contract has been established where, by a process of inference, it concludes that the 
most plausible probable conclusion from all the proved facts and circumstances is that a contract came 
into existence” (at 165B-C). 
214 Residents of Joe Slovo paras 59 and 77. 
215 Residents of Joe Slovo par 60. 
216 Residents of Joe Slovo par 63. 
217 Residents of Joe Slovo par 64. 
218 Residents of Joe Slovo par 68. 
219 Residents of Joe Slovo par 74. 
220 Residents of Joe Slovo par 46. 
221 Residents of Joe Slovo par 75. 
222 Residents of Joe Slovo par 79. 
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highly improbable to do so without requiring them to pay rent or service charges.223 He 
accordingly held that the residents never enjoyed any right of occupation and that it was 
therefore unnecessary for the City to terminate something that never existed.224 
Moseneke DCJ found that both the definitions of unlawful occupier and consent in 
PIE are “cast in wide language with an explicitly broad tenor.”225 Courts are therefore 
under an obligation to interpret consent in a manner that affords unlawful occupiers the 
broadest possible protection against evictions.226 He found that this approach to the 
interpretation of consent was consistent with section 39(2) of the Constitution and did 
not rely on “a mechanic application of legal rules of private law in a terrain which is 
clearly intended to give fulsome protection derived from the Bill of Rights.”227 This 
approach furthermore acknowledges the historical and current patterns of land 
occupation where many homeless and landless people are forced to occupy land 
without proof of the right to be on the land.228 
Against this background Moseneke DCJ found that he was able to draw a 
reasonable inference from the facts that the City tacitly gave the residents consent to 
occupy the site. He supported his reasoning by pointing out that the City took a number 
of positive steps that included the provision of essential services to the settlement and 
guidance on where to locate their shacks to ensure the safety of its inhabitants.229 
Conversely, the City did not evict the residents, nor did it inform them that they had to 
vacate the site.230 He therefore reasoned that the proper position would be to 
acknowledge that occupiers in these circumstances have a temporary right of 
occupation in respect of that land which, in turn, is subject to the right of the organ of 
state to give notice of its intention to terminate that right on good cause.231 He found it 
unnecessary to determine firstly, whether this right of occupation took the form of 
                                                 
223 Residents of Joe Slovo par 82. 
224 Residents of Joe Slovo par 85. 
225 Residents of Joe Slovo par 145. 
226 Residents of Joe Slovo par 145. 
227 Residents of Joe Slovo par 146. 
228 Residents of Joe Slovo par 147. 
229 Residents of Joe Slovo par 151. 
230 Residents of Joe Slovo par 152. 
231 Residents of Joe Slovo par 154. 
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precarium or commodatum232 and, secondly, what would constitute good cause for 
purposes of terminating the right of occupation.233 However, he did find that the 
residents must have ascertained from their negotiations with the government that they 
would have to vacate their homes at some stage so that the area could be developed 
and that this tacitly terminated their tacitly obtained right of occupation.234 
Ngcobo J grounded his reasoning on the rendering of services to the settlement and 
the failure to evict the residents within the framework of constitutional obligations that 
require government to take reasonable measures to provide everyone living in 
deplorable conditions with access to adequate housing.235 He, like Yacoob J, stated that 
he was unable to accede to an argument that construed the performance of 
constitutional duties as conferring consent to occupy land. He found that such a 
construction would have a “chilling effect” on the willingness of local authorities to fulfil 
their constitutional and statutory obligations in relation to the people that stand to benefit 
from these obligations.236 This would be inconsistent with the Constitution’s commitment 
to promote orderly land reform237 and the further obligation of local authorities to be 
reluctant to evict relatively settled occupiers unless it can provide them with alternative 
accommodation.238  
He reasoned that the central issue to be determined in this case was whether it was 
in the public interest to relocate the residents of the Joe Slovo settlement given that the 
                                                 
232 Residents of Joe Slovo par 157. At common law both precarium and commodatum are based on 
bilateral and bona fide contracts. Precarium consisted of a gratuitous grant of the use and enjoyment of 
land or a moveable while commodatum consisted of a gratuitous loan of a corporeal thing for use. 
Precarium was generally not entered into for any fixed period of time and conferred a general right to use 
and enjoy the thing and its fruits. Commodatum was usually entered into for a specific period and 
purpose. In the event that the period was not fixed the borrower could keep the thing for a reasonable 
period of time considering the purpose of the loan. The grantee took possession of the thing in terms of 
precarium while the lender only took custody of the thing. The grantor in precarium could terminate the 
contract with the interdict de precario while the lender in commodatum could enforce the duties of the 
borrower with the action commodati. See Borkowski A Textbook on Roman Law (1997) 305-307 316; 
Zimmerman R The Law of Obligations - Roman Foundations of the Civil Tradition (1990) 188-205; Sohm 
R The Institute - A Textbook of the History and System of Roman Private Law translated by Ledlie JC 
(1907) 334-337 376; and Hunter WA A Systematic and Historical Exposition of Roman Law in the Order 
of a Code (1885) 380-383 411-412. Compare this with Sachs J’s reasoning in Residents of Joe Slovo par 
343. 
233 Residents of Joe Slovo par 158. 
234 Residents of Joe Slovo par 160. 
235 Residents of Joe Slovo par 209. 
236 Residents of Joe Slovo par 211. 
237 Residents of Joe Slovo par 212. 
238 Residents of Joe Slovo par 214. 
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purpose of the relocation was to upgrade the area and to then resettle them in the same 
area afterwards. However, he noted that this approach to the question was immediately 
undermined by the phrasing of section 6(1) of PIE which requires an unlawful occupier 
to trigger the provisions of section 6(1)(b) of PIE.239 He accordingly emphasised that he 
had serious reservations about whether section 6(1) of PIE was the appropriate vehicle 
to address the situation of the residents in this case because it was inimical to their 
human dignity to first be branded as unlawful occupiers before they could be 
relocated.240 However, he conceded that PIE had to be given effect to241 and therefore 
found that the residents must have known for some time prior to the eviction 
proceedings that they had to relocate to Delft.242 
O’Regan J concurred with Yacoob J that the City did not give the residents tacit 
consent to occupy the site when it starting providing essential services to the site in 
terms of its constitutional and statutory obligations.243 She reasoned that the only 
factually correct inference that could be drawn from the provision of basic municipal 
services was that the City had constitutional and statutory obligations to provide these 
services.244 She further agreed with Moseneke DCJ that the City went beyond the mere 
provision of essential services when it established a database of residents, created 
residential blocks that were surrounded by paths to act as firebreaks, and embarked on 
extensive upgrading of the site after a fire swept through the settlement during 2002.245 
Under these factual circumstances she was prepared to accept that the City gave the 
residents tacit consent to occupy the site, but noted that this consent was neither 
permanent nor indefinite.246 She therefore found that residents became precarious 
tenants of the site and that this right to occupy could be terminated by the City on good 
cause at any time.247 However, she explicitly left open, as Moseneke DCJ did, the 
question of what would in general constitute good cause for the termination of such a 
                                                 
239 Residents of Joe Slovo par 217. 
240 Residents of Joe Slovo par 218. 
241 Residents of Joe Slovo par 219. 
242 Residents of Joe Slovo par 222. 
243 Residents of Joe Slovo par 276. 
244 Residents of Joe Slovo par 277. 
245 Residents of Joe Slovo par 278. 
246 Residents of Joe Slovo par 280. 
247 Residents of Joe Slovo par 282. Compare this with Sachs J’s reasoning in Residents of Joe Slovo par 
343. 
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right of occupation. She did indicate her willingness to accept that relocating the 
occupiers in order to construct low-cost housing would constitute such good cause.248 
On the question whether the City had to give the residents reasonable notice of the 
termination, she concurred with Moseneke DCJ that the announcement of the Project 
must have alerted the residents to the fact that their right of occupation would come to 
an end as soon as the development of the site got under way.249  
Sachs J positioned his discussion on the nature of the occupation in the context of 
the special cluster of legal relationships that the Constitution and the Housing Act 107 of 
1997 established between local authorities and occupiers.250 He found that these 
relationships were different from common law relationships because it flowed from “an 
articulation of public responsibilities in relation to the achievement of guaranteed social 
and economic rights.”251 He explained that these relationships had multiple dimensions 
which involved clusters of reciprocal rights and duties that possessed an ongoing, 
organic and dynamic character which would evolve over time.252 Against this 
background he reasoned that the reasonable measures that government were obliged 
to take began with the initial tolerance of the settlement on the land, proceeded to the 
devising of the Project, followed with the programme of actual implementation, and only 
concluded with the ultimate decision to institute eviction proceedings.253 He found that 
the City accepted the presence of the occupiers and negotiated with them about the 
provision of basic municipal services. The occupation could therefore not be 
“consensual and non-consensual at the same time; the consent was there, and the 
occupation was lawful.”254 
However, Sachs J found that this consent was neither unqualified nor irrevocable 
because its purpose was to establish a point of stability from where further development 
in realisation of the right of access to adequate housing could begin.255 The lawfulness 
                                                 
248 Residents of Joe Slovo par 282. 
249 Residents of Joe Slovo par 286. 
250 Residents of Joe Slovo par 343. 
251 Residents of Joe Slovo par 343. 
252 Residents of Joe Slovo par 343. 
253 Residents of Joe Slovo par 353. 
254 Residents of Joe Slovo par 356. 
255 Residents of Joe Slovo par 359. 
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of the occupation was therefore always premised on the understanding that the consent 
would be terminated once the land was needed for a legitimate purpose.256 
These judgments suggest that courts cannot resort to the common law definition of 
consent to determine the meaning of consent for purposes of PIE, because the common 
law definition of consent limits the definition of unlawful occupation. The existence of 
consent for purposes of PIE must rather be determined with reference to the facts of 
each case. In this regard it will be particularly important whether the landowner is a local 
authority because organs of state, unlike private owners, are under a constitutional and 
statutory obligation to provide those living in deplorable conditions with access to 
adequate housing and essential services. Furthermore, the fact that a local authority 
fulfilled its obligations cannot be construed as giving tacit consent to those occupying 
the land because such a construction would firstly, fail to appreciate the peremptory 
nature of these obligations; secondly, discourage local authorities from fulfilling their 
obligations; thirdly, deprive those living in intolerable conditions of essential services; 
and fourthly, fall foul of the general obligation to interpret legislation in a manner that 
promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. A local authority, unlike a 
private owner, must have done more than simply fulfil its obligations before it can be 
held to have consented to the occupation. It is unclear what the exact scope of this 
additional positive action is, but it will definitely include the compilation of a report on the 
demography of the settlement;257 active engagement from the local authority in the 
planning of the settlement to make it safer and more habitable;258 the provision of 
services of a semi-permanent nature; and the rebuilding of homes after natural 
disasters like fires and floods. In these circumstances the occupiers will acquire a 
defensible right of occupation that flows from the special cluster of relationships that the 
Constitution and the Housing Act 107 of 1998 establishes between unlawful occupiers, 
land owners and organs of state. This right of occupation can be terminated if the 
people who stand to be relocated as a result of the eviction for development purposes 
                                                 
256 Residents of Joe Slovo par 359. 
257 See sections 2 1 2 6 in chapter 5 for a discussion of Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v 
Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and Others 2009 (1) SA 470 (W) par 66 where Masipa J ordered the City 
of Johannesburg to submit a report that provided the court with information on inter alia the availability of 
alternative accommodation for the relocation of the unlawful occupiers. 
258 See section 2 2 in chapter 5 for a discussion of meaningful engagement. 
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will benefit from the eviction through the provision of housing opportunities. Finally, 
termination of this right of occupation does not have to occur in terms of formal notice 
because any eviction that follows upon such termination must in any event comply with 
the notice requirements of PIE. 
 
3 3 3 Notice 
Written and effective notice of eviction proceedings must be given to the unlawful 
occupiers and the local authority within whose jurisdiction the land falls259  by way of a 
court order260 at least 14 days before the contemplated hearing of the application. The 
rules of the Magistrate’s Court will normally regulate the manner of and procedure for 
the serving and filing of notices. If the court deems this procedure unacceptable for 
specific reasons the court may prescribe an alternative manner of service.261 The 
purpose of the notice is to provide the occupiers with protection by notifying them of the 
threat to their occupation, to inform them of the provisions of PIE and to inform them of 
their rights.262 As a result the unlawful occupiers must receive information regarding the 
nature of the proceedings; the date and time of the hearing; the grounds for the 
proposed eviction; their right to appear and defend the case; and that they may request 
legal aid.263 
However, the notices are often defective because they either fail to identify the 
unlawful occupiers properly264 or because the manner in which they are served is 
defective. Identification is often difficult because informal settlements fluctuate due to 
the fact that unlawful occupiers are itinerant.265 The manner in which the notice is 
                                                 
259 Section 4(2) of PIE. Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of Property 654 and Carey Miller Land 
Title in South Africa 520. 
260 In Cape Killarney Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba and Others 2001 (4) SA 1222 (SCA) par 
11 Brand AJA found that the provision intended the notice to be “authorised and directed by an order of 
the court concerned”. 
261 Pienaar JM and Muller A “The impact of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 on homelessness and unlawful occupation within the present statutory 
framework” (1999) 10 Stell LR 370-396 379. 
262 Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of Property 655. 
263 Section 4(5) of PIE. Similar requirements apply to urgent proceedings for evictions in terms of section 
5(3) of PIE and for eviction at the instance of an organ of state in terms of section 6(6) of PIE. 
264 See Illegal Occupiers of Various Erven, Philippi v Monwood Investment Trust Company (Pty) Ltd and 
others [2002] 1 All SA 115 (C) at 121, where Ngwenya J emphasised the pivotal role that audi alteram 
partem rule plays in preventing the vulnerable and poor to remain faceless in these proceedings. 
265 Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of Property 654. 
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served is further hindered by the fact that these unlawful occupiers are usually illiterate 
and can only speak an African language.266 As a result it has to be determined in each 
instance whether, despite the defects, the object of the statutory provision had been 
achieved.267 A further requirement is that a notice of motion is served on the unlawful 
occupier in terms of Rule 4 of the Uniform Rules of the High Court.268 The purpose of 
this notice is to afford the unlawful occupiers a further opportunity to place their personal 
circumstances before the court. 
 
3 3 4 Justice and equity 
3 3 4 1 Introduction 
PIE makes provision for three types of eviction applications. Firstly, section 4 permits a 
private landowner or person in charge of land to institute eviction proceedings against 
unlawful occupiers “[n]otwithstansing anything to the contrary contained in any law or 
the common law”.269 If the duration of the unlawful occupation was less than six months 
at the time when the owner or person in charge of the land instituted the eviction 
proceedings, the court must have regard to the rights and needs of the elderly, children, 
disabled persons and female-headed households.270 If the duration of the unlawful 
occupation was for longer than six months at the time when the owner or person in 
charge of the land instituted the eviction proceedings, the court must, additionally, have 
regard to “whether land has been made available or can reasonably be made available 
                                                 
266 In Cape Killarney Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba and Others 2000 (2) SA 67 (C) the notice 
was served in English on a community of which a substantial proportion was illiterate. Hlophe DJP held 
that this notice was not effective because it was not accompanied by a Xhosa translation of the notice 
and should have been conveyed by a loudhailer throughout the community in Xhosa. In Unlawful 
Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 (4) SA 199 (SCA) par 28 Brand JA stated that “[i]t is 
obviously desirable that, where practicable, the s 4(2) notice should be in a language and through a 
medium of communication which is most likely to be understood by its intended audience”. Brand AJA 
also found the question whether effective notices had been served to be a question of fact that “would be 
capable of determination only after the event”. 
267 Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 (4) SA 199 (SCA) par 22. See also 
Moela v Shoniwe [2005] JOL 14049 (SCA) par 7. 
268 Section 4(3) and (4) of PIE. In Cape Killarney Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba and others 
2001 (4) SA 1222 (SCA) par 12 the Supreme Court of Appeal found that this notice must be served in 
addition to the section 4(2) of PIE notice because “[a]ny other construction will render the requirements of 
section 4(3) meaningless”. See also Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 (4) SA 
199 (SCA) par 17. 
269 Section 4(1) of PIE. 
270 Section 4(6) of PIE. 
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by a municipality or other organ of state or another land owner” for the relocation of the 
unlawful occupiers.271 
Secondly, section 5(1) of PIE permits a private land owner or person in charge of 
land, notwithstanding the provisions of section 4 of PIE, to institute urgent eviction 
proceedings pending the outcome of proceedings for a final eviction order if a court can 
be satisfied of the fact that 
“(a) there is a real and imminent danger of substantial injury or damage to any 
person or property if the unlawful occupier is not forthwith evicted from the land; (b) 
the likely hardship to the owner or any other affected person if an order for eviction 
is not granted, exceeds the likely hardship to the unlawful occupier against whom 
the order is sought, if an order for eviction is granted; and (c) there is no other 
effective remedy available.”272 
 
Finally, section 6(1) of PIE permits an organ of state to institute proceedings to evict 
unlawful occupiers that are occupying land that falls within its jurisdiction. However, the 
organ of state may only do so if those unlawful occupiers are occupying a building or 
structure on that land that had been erected without the consent of the organ of state or 
when it is in the public interest.273 A court is then enjoined to consider (a) the 
circumstances under which the unlawful occupier occupied the land and erected the 
buildings/structures; (b) the period the unlawful occupiers resided on the property; and 
(c) the availability of suitable alternative accommodation or land in determining whether 
it would be just and equitable to evict the unlawful occupiers.274 
In all three types of eviction applications a court must satisfy itself, after considering 
all the relevant circumstances, that granting the eviction order will be “just and 
equitable”. In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and 
Others,275 Horn AJ stated that the term just and equitable related to both the property 
interests of the land owner and the housing interests of the unlawful occupiers.276 He 
stated further that the term implied that courts are obliged to break away from a purely 
legalistic approach to evictions and that courts must “have regard to extraneous factors 
                                                 
271 Section 4(7) of PIE. 
272 Section 5(1) of PIE. 
273 Section 6(2) of PIE states that “[f]or the purposes of this section, ‘public interest’ includes the interest 
of the health and safety of those occupying the land and the public in general.” 
274 Section 6(3) of PIE. 
275 2000 (2) SA 1074 (SE). 
276 At 1081E. 
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such as morality, fairness, social values and the implications and circumstances which 
would necessitate bringing out an equitably principled judgment.”277  
In PE Municipality, the leading judgment on the interpretation of PIE, Sachs J 
endorsed this interpretation because it underlined the central philosophical and strategic 
objective of PIE which is to strike a balance between the property rights of land owners 
and the housing rights of unlawful occupiers.278 He explained that this required courts to 
“go beyond their normal functions, and to engage in active judicial management 
according to equitable principles of an ongoing, stressful and law-governed social 
process.”279 Sachs J added that this would have major implications for the way in which 
courts have to exercise their adjudicative powers and go about crafting eviction 
orders.280 PIE explicitly requires courts to infuse the law of evictions with elements of 
grace and compassion and to balance the competing interests of land owners and 
unlawful occupiers in a principled way so as to “promote the constitutional vision of a 
caring society based on good neighbourliness and shared concern.”281 This represents 
a decisive break from the position under apartheid, where the requirements of the rei 
vindicatio and the particular politics that underlined the police powers of the state 
allowed private land owners and the state to evict squatters without any regard for their 
personal circumstances or what will become of them after the relocation. It is against 
this background that the three types of eviction applications are discussed in turn below 
to show how the courts have grappled with the “justice and equity” requirement in given 
cases. 
 
3 3 4 2 Evictions from private land 
3 3 4 2 1 Modderklip 
During May 2000 approximately 400 people invaded the applicant’s farm without his 
consent after they were evicted by the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality from the 
Chris Hani informal settlement. The applicant refused to comply with the request from 
                                                 
277 At 1081F-G. 
278 PE Municipality par 35. 
279 PE Municipality par 36. 
280 PE Municipality par 36. 
281 PE Municipality par 37. 
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the second respondent282 to institute eviction proceedings against the unlawful 
occupiers because he thought that the local authority should institute eviction 
proceedings. When the local authority did not institute eviction proceedings the 
applicant laid charges of trespassing against the unlawful occupiers and many were 
successfully prosecuted in terms of the Trespass Act 6 of 1959,283 but ultimately they 
returned to the applicant’s farm upon discharge with a warning. The applicant then 
unsuccessfully sought assistance from various organs of state  and even offered to sell 
two portions of the farm at a negotiable price of R 10 000 per hectare. When nothing 
came of the local authorities’ initial interest to purchase these two portions the applicant 
instituted eviction proceedings in terms of section 4(6) of PIE in the South Gauteng High 
Court, Johannesburg.284 The number of people on the applicant’s farm subsequently 
mushroomed to approximately 10 000 by the time eviction proceedings were instituted 
during October 2000 and increased further after that to about 15 000 by the time oral 
argument was heard during March 2001.  
Marais J found that the first respondents deliberately invaded the applicant’s farm 
without his consent and set up a squatter camp that not only damaged the economic 
interests of the applicant and infringed its property rights but also threatened to do so 
indefinitely without paying any compensation to the applicant.285 Marais J accordingly 
ordered the first respondents to vacate the applicant’s farm within two months of the 
order286 and authorised the sheriff to evict the first respondents upon effluxion of that 
period.287 The unlawful occupiers did not vacate the applicant’s farm and accordingly a 
warrant was issued which directed the sheriff to execute the eviction. However, the 
sheriff noted that she required the assistance of private contractors at a cost of R 1.8 
million because the South African Police Service regarded the matter as a civil one and 
therefore refused to assist her with the execution of the eviction order. The applicant 
                                                 
282 Section 6(4) of PIE reads: “An organ of state contemplated in subsection (1) may, before instituting 
such proceedings, give not less than 14 days’ written notice to the owner or person in charge of the land 
to institute proceedings for the eviction of the unlawful occupier.” 
283 See section 3 5 in chapter 2 for an overview of how the government used PISA in conjunction with this 
Act, the Slums Act 53 of 1934, the Physical Planning Act 88 of 1967 and the Health Act 63 of 1977 to 
enhance its legislative competence to forcibly evict squatters during apartheid. 
284 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W). 
285 395D-E. 
286 396D, Order 2. 
287 396E, Order 3. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
119 
argued that this cost was more than the estimated value of the land that the unlawful 
occupiers, at that stage approximately 36 000 people, occupied and therefore sought a 
declaratory order from the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria288 that directed the 
President of the Republic of South Africa, the Minister of Safety and Security, the 
Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs and the National Commissioner of Police to take 
immediate steps to execute the eviction order. 
De Villiers J found that the sheriff was not in a position to ensure the efficient 
execution of the eviction order because a massive land invasion had taken place.289 
However, he found that the respondents, when properly coordinated, collectively 
possessed the powers to ensure the effective execution of the eviction order.290 He 
furthermore found that the respondents’ refusal to exercise their respective powers 
collectively threatened the preservation of the democratic dispensation and undermined 
the Constitution because it in effect prevented the provision of appropriate relief to the 
applicant to vindicate the violation of its property rights.291 He accordingly ordered the 
respondents to formulate a comprehensive plan that ensured firstly, that the 
interference with the applicants’ property rights was brought to an end either by way of 
expropriating the farm or in terms of other measures; secondly, compliance with the 
government’s obligations in terms of section 165(4) of the Constitution;292 thirdly, 
compliance with the government’s obligations in terms of section 25(5)293 read with 
sections 26(1) and (2) of the Constitution; fourthly, the urgent development of a scheme 
for the provision of either land or housing to the unlawful occupiers; fifthly, the removal 
of the unlawful occupiers from the applicant’s farm and, finally, effective monitoring of 
                                                 
288 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika en Andere 2003 (6) 
BCLR 638 (T). 
289 Par 51. 
290 Par 51. 
291 Par 51. See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 47 where it is argued that “[t]oo much should 
not be read into the unsubstantiated and probably largely unconsidered statement” of De Villiers J that 
section 25(1) of the Constitution operates horizontally. 
292 Section 165(4) of the Constitution reads: “Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, 
must assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and 
effectiveness of the courts.” 
293 Section 25(5) of the Constitution reads: “The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land 
on an equitable basis.” 
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this plan and of its preservation.294 The government took this enforcement order on 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.295 
Harms JA (as he then was) found that the invasion amounted to a de facto 
expropriation of the applicant’s farm because it was precluded from securing the 
execution of the eviction order.296 He found that this could partly be attributed to the 
sheriff’s inability to execute the eviction order effectively without assistance from a 
private security company. It was clear that the eviction order could not be executed 
“humanely or otherwise” by the sheriff unless the local authority provided land for the 
resettlement of the unlawful occupiers.297 This appeared unlikely because the local 
authority did not have an emergency housing programme or medium- and long-term 
housing programme in place.298 This explained why the unlawful occupiers had no 
choice but to invade the applicant’s farm after they were evicted from the Chris Hani 
informal settlement to which they moved because the Daveyton Township was 
overcrowded.299 He accordingly found that this amounted to a violation of the unlawful 
occupiers’ right of access to adequate housing.300 
To this extent Harms JA was prepared to accept that the government was in violation 
of section 165(4) of the Constitution because it forced the private landowner to shoulder 
the burden of the occupiers’ housing need.301 It would only be acceptable for a private 
owner to carry this constitutional burden if the government compensated it in the 
circumstances where the execution of an eviction order was impossible. He therefore 
found that constitutional damages were the only remedy that would provide appropriate 
relief in the circumstances.302 He accordingly upheld the appeal in part,303 set aside 
                                                 
294 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika en Andere 2003 (6) 
BCLR 638 (T) Order 2. 
295 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and 
Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae); President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2004 (6) SA 40 
(SCA) (‘Modderklip SCA’). 
296 Modderklip SCA par 21. 
297 Modderklip SCA par 26. 
298 Modderklip SCA par 22. See 2 2 2 above for a discussion of this as part of the model of 
reasonableness review. 
299 Modderklip SCA par 25. 
300 Modderklip SCA par 22. 
301 Modderklip SCA par 30. 
302 In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) par 19, Ackermann J explained that 
“appropriate relief” would protect and enforce the rights in the Constitution. He added that courts may, 
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paragraphs 1 to 5 of De Villiers J’s order,304 and replaced it with an order that declared 
firstly, that the State violated inter alia sections 25(1) and 26(1) of the Constitution for 
failing to provide land that the occupiers could occupy;305 secondly, that the applicant 
was entitled to receive payment of constitutional damages from the Department of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs;306 and thirdly, that the unlawful occupiers could occupy the 
land until alternative land was made available to them.307 The government took the 
matter on appeal to the Constitutional Court.308 
Langa ACJ (as he then was) found it unnecessary to decide the case in terms of 
either section 25 or 26 of the Constitution.309 Instead he focused on the fact that section 
1(c)310 of the Constitution places an obligation of the State to provide the necessary 
mechanisms for citizens to resolve disputes that arise between them.311 Associated with 
this value is the right of access to courts in section 34 of the Constitution.312 He 
explained that when the case is framed in terms of these provisions it becomes clear 
that the government was instrumental313 to the resolution of the dispute between the 
landowner and the unlawful occupiers because it was responsible for setting up the 
legislative framework, the mechanisms and institutions, and the infrastructure necessary 
to facilitate the effective execution of court orders.314 He reasoned further that the 
government additionally had to ensure that the execution of court orders did not result in 
large-scale disruptions in the social fabric because that, too, would undermine the rule 
                                                                                                                                                             
depending on the circumstances, be required to fashion new constitutional remedies if a declaration of 
rights, an interdict or a mandamus was insufficient. 
303 Modderklip SCA par 52, Order (a). 
304 Modderklip SCA par 52, Order (b). 
305 Modderklip SCA par 52, Order (b)(i). 
306 Modderklip SCA par 52, Order (b)(ii). 
307 Modderklip SCA par 52, Order (b)(iii). 
308 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and 
Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) (‘Modderklip CC’). 
309 Modderklip CC par 26. 
310 Section 1 of the Constitution states that “[t]he Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic 
state founded on the following values: … (c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.” 
311 Modderklip CC par 39. 
312 Section 34 of the Constitution states that “[e]veryone has the right to have any dispute that can be 
resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, 
another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.” 
313 Modderklip CC par 42. 
314 Modderklip CC par 41. 
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of law.315 The precise nature of the obligation will therefore be determined with 
reference to “the nature of the right or interest that is at risk as well as on the 
circumstances of each case.”316 
Langa ACJ found that this case was principally about a private landowner that 
sought relief from the government for the burden it was carrying on behalf of the 
government as a result of a massive land invasion. Langa ACJ explained that 
government had to respond appropriately in these circumstances because a failure to 
do so would approve future invasions of private property on a massive scale and that 
would lead to anarchy.317 Conversely, to simply evict a large community without 
providing it with alternative accommodation would cause extreme hardship for the 
unlawful occupiers.318 
Against this background he found that the local authority acted unreasonably when it 
stood idly by and watched how the landowner actively explored all possible avenues to 
ameliorate the impact of the invasion on its rights and interests.319 He noted that he 
appreciated the problems that local authorities faced in progressively providing access 
to adequate housing and land in terms of sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution.320 
However, it may be necessary to respond appropriately if the plans that the government 
adopted did not respond to the evolving social circumstances of unlawful occupiers.321 
He therefore found that the Supreme Court of Appeal correctly held that constitutional 
damages were the only appropriate remedy to provide effective relief to the 
landowner.322 He accordingly dismissed the appeal323 and substantially upheld the order 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal.324 
All four judgments in this case confirm that the government cannot abdicate its 
responsibility to respect, protect, promote and fulfil rights when a dispute arises 
                                                 
315 Modderklip CC par 42. See Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another 2000 (1) SA 409 
(CC) par 22 for the importance of the right of access to courts. 
316 Modderklip CC par 43. 
317 Modderklip CC par 45. 
318 Modderklip CC par 47. 
319 Modderklip CC par 48. 
320 Modderklip CC par 49. 
321 Modderklip CC par 49. 
322 Modderklip CC paras 60 and 65. 
323 Modderklip CC par 68, Order 2. 
324 Modderklip CC par 68, Order 3(a). 
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between private parties because the government may often hold the key to resolving 
the dispute.325 Liebenberg notes that it is unfortunate that the Constitutional Court did 
not decide the case in terms of sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution.326 She argues 
that while it was important to acknowledge the principle of the rule of law and the right of 
access to courts, it was similarly important to affirm that the government’s abdication of 
its responsibility towards both the landowner and the unlawful occupiers directly 
affected their respective property and housing rights.327 However, both the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court affirmed that the dispute could not be 
resolved without the government providing temporary alternative accommodation 
pending the eventual provision of a permanent housing solution. Liebenberg notes that 
this represents a specific manifestation of the principle laid down in Grootboom that a 
reasonable housing programme should provide immediate relief “for people who have 
no access to land, no roof over their heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions 
or crisis situations.”328  
In the specific circumstances of this case the immediate relief came in the form of an 
order that the unlawful occupiers could remain on the farm while a further order 
instructed the government to pay the landowner constitutional damages. Van der Walt 
explains that constitutional damages was appropriate in this case because, unlike the 
normal regulatory limitations imposed on ownership, the regulatory framework for the 
execution of eviction orders deprived an individual landowner of the opportunity to do so 
and therefore resulted in it bearing the resulting burden by itself for a substantial period 
of time.329 If the government stood by idly in these circumstances, the principle that 
flows from this case is that the private landowner may have a claim for constitutional 
                                                 
325 Van der Walt AJ “The State’s duty to protect property owners v the State’s duty to provide housing: 
Thoughts on the Modderklip case” (2005) 21 SAJHR 144-161 159 argues that the Supreme Court of 
Appeal ingeniously portrayed the failure to protect the right of access to adequate housing as the direct 
cause of the failure to protect the right to property and that this portrayal reflected “a fundamentally post-
1994 perspective on ownership and on the problems surrounding access to housing.” 
326 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 285. 
327 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 285. 
328 Grootboom par 99. 
329 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 136. Van der Walt notes that the constitutional damages 
awarded to the landowner in this case is similar to the equalisation payments paid to landowners in 
France and Germany when they bear the burden of “a quite legitimate regulatory action that has an 
unacceptably heavy impact on just one or a small number of property owners.” See Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 221-230 for an overview of such instances. 
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damages against the government.330 Liebenberg adds that the order for constitutional 
damages was intended to stimulate negotiations between the government, the 
landowner and the unlawful occupiers in order to find a solution that would protect both 
the property rights of the landowner and the housing rights of the unlawful occupiers.331 
Both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court recognised that the 
most obvious solution to the dispute would be for the government simply to expropriate 
the farm and to then formalise the informal settlement accordingly.332 Langa ACJ noted 
that the owner was willing and eager to sell his farm to the government.333 However, he 
found it unnecessary to determine whether it would be appropriate to order the 
government to expropriate the land because there was insufficient information before 
the court.  
The Modderklip cases demonstrate in a unique way how courts are required to 
balance the property rights of the landowner and the housing rights of the unlawful 
occupiers in terms of the constitutionally defined relationship that exists between them 
and the government. Courts are no longer limited to granting an eviction order without 
more or refusing an application for an eviction order because section 172(1)(b) of the 
Constitution empowers a court to make “any order that is just and equitable” in the 
circumstances. Two recent decisions of the South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg 
dealt with exactly this issue – namely, the limits of orders that can be made against local 
authorities to alleviate the plight of people living in desperate need on private land.  
 
3 3 4 2 3 Dada 
In Dada and Others NNO v Unlawful Occupiers of Portion 41 of the Farm Rooikop and 
Another334 (‘Dada’) the trustees of a religious trust sought the eviction of 214 
households living on portion 41 of the farm Rooikop. The Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality was joined to the proceedings as a matter of necessity because the recent 
flooding triggered its constitutional and statutory obligations to provide access to 
adequate housing and services. To this end a counter application was launched that 
                                                 
330 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 333. 
331 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 442. 
332 Modderklip SCA par 43 and Modderklip CC par 62. 
333 Modderklip CC par 62. 
334 2009 (2) SA 492 (W). 
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requested the court to declare that the local authority had an obligation to formulate a 
housing policy which made provision for the short term housing needs of people living in 
crisis situations and afforded adequate priority to those people seeking a place to live 
without the threat of further eviction. The counter application further sought an order that 
interdicted the trust from evicting the households until the local authority provided 
alternative accommodation.335 
Cassim AJ found that the local authority was not directing enough attention to the 
urgent improvement of the intolerable living conditions of the households on the farm. 
The local authority had not conducted an investigation to determine whether the farm, 
once purchased or expropriated, could be integrated into the nearby Buhle Park 
informal settlement. The local authority had not visited the farm in an effort to find 
practical solutions for the plight of the households, it appeared to be indifferent to the 
urgency of the crisis situation, and it used other legal impediments as an excuse not to 
find a solution.336 The indecisiveness of the local authority further precluded it from 
exploring opportunities that provided tangible relief for the households on the farm in a 
manner that would minimize disruption and preserve the community.337 
He found that the local authority placed no evidence before him to show that it was 
doing something to address the plight of the households living on the farm. The failure 
of the local authority to do so was contrary to the obligations that the Housing Act 107 of 
1997 imposed on it and neglected to explore the possibility of obtaining financial 
assistance from provincial and national government to provide emergency housing in 
terms of chapter 12 of the National Housing Code.338 He conceded that the local 
authority did in fact have a housing policy in place that set out to provide housing to 
homeless people within its jurisdiction by 2025. However, this policy did not contain any 
plan to provide emergency relief for the households of the farm.339 He held that it would 
be inappropriate to postpone the matter to allow both national and provincial 
government to be joined to the proceedings.340 He accordingly ordered the local 
                                                 
335 Dada par 5. 
336 Dada par 27. 
337 Dada par 29. 
338 Dada paras 45 and 46. 
339 Dada par 48. 
340 Dada par 49. 
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authority to accept the offer of the trust to sell the property at R 250 000 and further 
directed it to provide essential services to the households on the property.341 
On appeal the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v 
Dada NO and Others342 (‘Dada SCA’) held that Cassim AJ correctly held that the local 
authority did not deal with the problems of the informal settlement on the property with 
the enthusiasm which could reasonably be expected of it.343 However, Hurt AJA found 
that Cassim AJ failed to have regard to the principles of the Constitution,344 
misinterpreted the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court,345 and even neglected the 
rule346 that the judiciary is constrained by the law347 when he formulated his order in an 
attempt “to get things moving.”348 Hurt AJA accordingly upheld the appeal and set aside 
the order of Cassim AJ that the local authority should purchase the property from the 
trust.349 
Dada can correctly be criticised for misunderstanding the constitutional mandate 
contained in section 172 of the Constitution to make any order that is just and equitable 
because it is clearly not just and equitable to force government to expropriate a farm to 
provide access to adequate housing. Such an order ignores the fact that the right of 
access to adequate housing must be achieved on a progressive basis and that it was 
not the order which the parties sought from the court.350 While courts may be frustrated 
- perhaps correctly so - with the slow pace at which the government is fulfilling its 
constitutional and statutory obligations in the face of severe housing shortages, courts 
cannot disregard the limits that are placed upon their powers or what would be an 
appropriate remedy in the circumstances of the case.351 In this regard courts too must 
re-appreciate their role in the adjudication of eviction case because the special matrix of 
relationships that exist between landowners, unlawful occupiers and the government 
                                                 
341 Dada par 50. 
342 2009 (4) SA 463 (SCA). 
343 Dada SCA par 14. 
344 Dada SCA par 5. 
345 Dada SCA par 10. 
346 Dada SCA par 1. 
347 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) par 15. 
348 Dada SCA par 13. 
349 Dada SCA par 15. 
350 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 292. 
351 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 292. 
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provide more than enough room for courts to show the appropriate measure of 
deference to the executive. It is still possible for courts to craft innovative remedies that 
are based on the constitutional and statutory obligations of government to provide 
access to adequate housing without venturing into the sphere of executive decision 
making by ordering the government to expropriate property. 
 
3 3 3 2 4 Blue Moonlight Properties 
In Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and 
Another352 (‘Blue Moonlight Properties’) the applicant instituted eviction proceedings 
against the occupiers in terms of section 4(7) of PIE in the South Gauteng High Court, 
Johannesburg.  The matter initially came before Masipa J, who instructed the 
municipality to investigate the circumstances of the case and to consult the interested 
parties so as to provide the court with a report on the housing situation that prevailed in 
its area of jurisdiction. She postponed the proceedings sine die and ordered the City to 
report back to the court on the steps that it has taken and what could be done in future 
to provide the respondents with emergency shelter.353 The municipality filed this report 
five months later under the threat of contempt proceedings. This report indicated that it 
only provided temporary alternative accommodation for the occupiers that stood to be 
evicted from publicly owned land and buildings. 
In Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue & 
Another354 (‘Blue Moonlight Properties II’), Spilg J found that this report failed to 
appreciate the constitutional and statutory obligations that local government has in 
providing access to adequate housing355 for the people in desperate need of emergency 
housing.356 He found that the municipality failed to explain properly why it sought to 
exclude the unlawful occupiers of privately owned land from its relief programmes.357 
He, unlike Cassim AJ in Dada, acknowledged that he was limited to determining 
                                                 
352 2009 (1) SA 470 (W). 
353 Blue Moonlight Properties paras 75 and 78. See section 2 1 2 6 in chapter 5 for a discussion of Masipa 
J’s reasoning on the joinder of the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality. 
354 [2010] JOL 25031 (GSJ). 
355 Blue Moonlight Properties II paras 128-130. 
356 Blue Moonlight Properties II paras 114-127. 
357 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 140. 
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whether the measures that have been adopted were reasonable.358 He found that the 
answer to this question had to sound in the negative because the unlawful occupiers of 
privately owned land were not only denied equal protection and benefit of the law but 
were also precluded from the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms in 
terms of section 9 of the Constitution.  
He added that this failure of the municipality amounted to an abdication of its 
obligations in the private sphere because it in effect required private land landowners to 
provide housing indefinitely without any compensation. In this regard he found that he 
was bound by Modderklip SCA to craft an order that afforded the private landowner 
appropriate relief for the breach of its property rights. While he could not direct the local 
authority to expropriate the land, he held that there was a sufficiently close causal link 
between the deprivation of the land owner’s use and exploitation of its property and the 
failure of the municipality to formulate a reasonable housing policy that accommodated 
all unlawful occupiers within its jurisdiction to make an order for constitutional 
damages.359 
He found that it would be just and equitable to evict the unlawful occupiers in the 
circumstances360 and ordered them to vacate the property in question by no later than 
31 March 2010.361 He also ordered the municipality to pay constitutional damages to the 
applicant for the occupation of the property by the unlawful occupiers in the form of a 
monthly rental for the period between 1 July 2009 and 31 March 2010.362 He further 
declared the municipality’s housing policy unconstitutional to the extent that it excluded 
all persons within its jurisdiction who faced the threat of eviction from privately owned 
land.  
In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 
(Pty) Ltd and Another363 (‘Blue Moonlight Properties SCA’) the Supreme Court of 
Appeal commenced its judgment by setting out the constitutional and legislative 
                                                 
358 See Grootboom par 33. 
359 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 162. 
360 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 196, Order 1. 
361 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 196, Order 2. 
362 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 196, Order 3. 
363 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA). 
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framework against which the issues raised on appeal should be determined.364 In this 
regard the Court emphasised that the primary source of the government’s obligations to 
provide access to adequate housing can be found in sections 26(1) and (2) of the 
Constitution.365 The Court explained that this obligation is then fleshed out in sections 3, 
7 and 9 of the Housing Act 107 of 1997, which details the precise obligations of 
national, provincial and local government respectively.366 These obligations are then 
supplemented by sections 4(1)367 and (2),368 11(3) and 23(1)369 of the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 and Chapter 12 of the National Housing 
Code. The Court explained that these obligations taken together created a framework 
that sets out the obligations of each sphere of government in great detail.370 Within this 
framework all the spheres of government are required to work together371 in a 
coordinated way372 to achieve the progressive realisation of the right of access to 
adequate housing. The Court therefore endorsed Spilg’s view in Blue Moonlight 
Properties II, that the City of Johannesburg was empowered to develop, fund and 
administer its own housing programme from its own resources and funding obtained 
from both provincial and national government.373 The City erred in portraying its role as 
that of a passive role player because it is empowered and constitutionally obliged to 
                                                 
364 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 25. 
365 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA paras 26 and 27. 
366 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA paras 28-31. See section 1 in chapter 5 for an overview of these 
provisions. 
367 Section 4(1) of the Act states that a Municipal Council has the right to - 
“(a) govern on its own initiative the local government affairs of the local community; (b) 
exercise the municipality’s executive and legislative authority, and to do so without improper 
interference; and (c) finance the affairs of the municipality by – (i) charging fees for services; 
and (ii) imposing surcharges on fees, rates on property and, to the extent authorized by 
national legislation, other taxes, levies and duties." 
368 Section 4(2) of the Act states that a Municipal Council has the duty, within its financial and 
administrative capacity, to - “exercise the municipality’s executive and legislative authority and use the 
resources of the municipality in the best interests of the local community; ….” 
369 Section 23(1) of the Act reads: 
“A municipality must undertake developmentally-orientated planning so as to ensure that it – 
(a) strives to achieve the objects of local government set out in section 152 of the 
Constitution; (b) gives effect to its developmental duties as required by section 153 of the 
Constitution; and (c) together with other organs of state contribute to the progressive 
realisation of the fundamental rights contained in sections 24, 25, 26, 27 and 29 of the 
Constitution” (emphasis added). 
370 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 40. 
371 See sections 40(2) and 41(1)(h) of the Constitution in particular. 
372 See 2 2 2 above for a discussion of the co-ordination required between the three spheres of 
government as one of the criteria in the reasonableness model of review. 
373 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 40. 
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take legislative and other measures to progressively realise the right of access to 
adequate housing within its area of jurisdiction.374 
The Court proceeded to consider the related question of whether the City was able, 
in the circumstances of the case, to meet the needs of the unlawful occupiers within its 
area of jurisdiction from its own resources. The Court paused to note that the 
respondents only requested access to temporary accommodation while they awaited 
access to permanent housing in terms of the City’s housing policy.375 In this regard 
Navsa JA and Plasket AJA observed that the City’s affidavits failed to provide 
information on the relief sought by the respondents because it contained vague 
statements about the affordability and cost of providing permanent accommodation in 
the Inner City.376 They found that the City would have been able to adopt a viable long 
term strategy with support from provincial and national government to respond to the 
exigencies of those living in desperate need in the Inner City, had it not adopted such a 
firm position on providing assistance to people like the respondents.377 
On the question whether the City’s housing policy was discriminatory the court found 
that Spilg J erred in the following respects: firstly, the differentiation in treatment did not 
flow from a distinction between unlawful occupiers being evicted from public land by the 
government and unlawful occupiers being evicted from private land by a private owner. 
The difference was rather one between unlawful occupiers being evicted from private 
land by the government in terms of section 12(6) of the National Building Regulations 
and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 and unlawful occupiers evicted from private 
land by private owners in terms of section 4 of PIE.378 Secondly, there was no 
differentiation in terms of a ground listed in section 9(3)379 of the Constitution, with the 
result that the differentiation stands to be considered against section 9(1)380 of the 
                                                 
374 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 48. 
375 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 49. 
376 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 50. 
377 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 51. 
378 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 57. 
379 Section 9(3) of the Constitution states that “[t]he state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly 
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and 
birth.” 
380 Section 9(1) of the Constitution states that “[e]veryone is equal before the law and has the right to 
equal protection and benefit of the law.” 
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Constitution.381 In this regard the court found that the City’s housing policy is 
inflexible,382 irrational383 and arbitrary384 because it rendered the City blind to the plight 
of unlawful occupiers of private land that happen to reside on land or in buildings that 
are not considered to be dangerous.385 
The final issue that the Court considered was the award of constitutional damages to 
Blue Moonlight Properties. The court found that this order was far-reaching, given the 
fact that the constitutional damages remedy was developed in the unique set of 
circumstances that presented itself in Modderklip SCA. To that extent the award of 
constitutional damages would not always be available as an appropriate remedy 
wherever a fundamental right has been breached.386 The court pointed out that firstly, 
the constitutional damages in Modderklip SCA was only awarded after an eviction order 
was ignored; secondly, the purpose of the constitutional damages was to compensate 
the owner for the government’s failure to assist it in executing an eviction order; thirdly, 
constitutional damages was the only appropriate remedy in the peculiar circumstance of 
the Modderklip cases because the owner was deprived of the use and enjoyment of its 
land; and finally, the unlawful occupiers in the Modderklip cases invaded the owner’s 
farm, who in turn acted swiftly to safeguard his interests.387 The award of constitutional 
damages was inappropriate because none of these considerations were present in this 
case.388 
Navsa JA and Plasket AJA accordingly found that it would be just and equitable to 
evict the unlawful occupiers389 and ordered them to vacate the property on or before 1 
June 2011.390 The Court added, crucially, that the City had to provide the unlawful 
occupiers with temporary emergency accommodation in a location as near as feasibly 
possible to the area where the property is situated.391 
                                                 
381 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 58. 
382 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA paras 59 and 60. 
383 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 61. 
384 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA paras 62 and 63. 
385 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 65. 
386 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 70. 
387 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 71. 
388 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 72. 
389 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 77, Order 5(1). 
390 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 77, Order 5(2). 
391 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 77, Order 5(4). 
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3 3 4 2 5 Conclusion 
Section 4 of PIE creates a framework in which a private landowner can institute eviction 
proceedings against unlawful occupiers and obtain the relief that she sought from the 
court. Within this framework courts must determine whether it is just and equitable to 
evict the unlawful occupiers with reference to the rights and needs of vulnerable people 
and the availability of alternative accommodation or land. The case law discussed in this 
section show that invasions of private property for whatever reason will not be tolerated 
by the courts because private individuals cannot be expected to bear the burden of 
providing housing to tens of thousands of people – even the government only has to do 
so within its available resources. 
The Constitutional Court was undoubtedly correct in Modderklip CC when it found 
that land invasions chipped away at the core of the rule of law because the magnitude 
of these events often make the effective execution of eviction orders nearly impossible. 
When this happens the government cannot be a passive bystander because it has 
constitutional and statutory obligations to fulfil. As such, the government will be the 
player that breaks the stalemate between the landowner who has asserted her property 
rights and the unlawful occupiers who have established their right of access to adequate 
housing. If, then, a private landowner is expected to be vigilant in protecting her 
property rights by swiftly instituting eviction proceedings against unlawful occupiers, so 
too must the government be decisive about formulating its housing programmes to 
provide relief for those living in intolerable conditions.392 It may therefore be just and 
equitable to evict the unlawful occupiers and to ask the private landowner to be patient 
while the government develops its programmes. In the meantime the private landowner 
may be entitled to constitutional damages for shouldering the burden. It is clear that a 
court may not order the government to expropriate the private landowner’s land 
because that would encroach upon the functions of the executive, nor can it award 
constitutional damages unless a specific set of circumstances presents itself. The key 
point to be observed in the Modderklip, Dada NO and Blue Moonlight Properties cases 
is that section 4 requires courts to find case-specific solutions for complex cases by 
striking the appropriate balance between the conflicting property rights of the land 
                                                 
392 See 2 2 2 above for a discussion of this as part of the model of reasonableness review. 
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owner and the housing rights of the unlawful occupiers by crafting innovative remedies 
that remain within its powers. 
 
3 3 4 3 Urgent evictions 
Groengras Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd and Others v Elandsfontein Unlawful Occupants and 
Others393 (‘Groengras Eiendomme’) provides an unique example to illustrate the 
operation of section 5 of PIE and also serves as an example of, on the one hand, the 
type of relief that the landowner in the Modderklip cases could have received had it 
instituted eviction proceedings under this section, and, on the other hand, how health 
and safety considerations are evaluated outside the context of section 6 of PIE. 
The applicants instituted urgent eviction proceedings in the South Gauteng High 
Court, Johannesburg for the eviction of the first respondents, who co-ordinated a large 
scale land invasion of the first applicant’s farm just north of Benoni. The first 
respondents invaded a piece of the farm over which Transnet Ltd, the second applicant, 
had a rural praedial servitude in the form of a right of way to access its railway reserve 
and railway line with a service road. Transnet also had an urban praedial servitude in 
the form of a right to run a fuel pipeline across the first applicant’s farm. Eskom, the 
fourth applicant, similarly had an urban praedial servitude in the form of a right to run 
high voltage electrical cables over the first applicant’s farm. The first respondents, who 
used the service road to transport their belongings and building materials to the farm, 
removed the fence next to the railway line and started erecting shacks on top of the fuel 
line and directly under the high voltage electrical cables. In less than a month from the 
invasion the size of the population mushroomed to in excess of 20 000 people. 
Rabie J found that the part of the farm on which the first respondents settled was 
unfit for human habitation because it had no infrastructure, running water, sanitary 
facilities or facilities for garbage and waste disposal.394 He explained that there was a 
high probability that disease would break out under these living conditions and that the 
resulting risk of contamination would have widespread effects for those living 
                                                 
393 2002 (1) SA 125 (T). 
394 Groengras Eiendomme at 140H. 
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downstream along the way to the Rietvlei dam.395 The constant influx of people onto the 
farm posed a very real threat for the business and personal interests of the tenant 
because the unlawful occupiers were on the verge of moving on to the arable land of 
the property.396 
He noted that the first respondents ran the risk of either igniting the highly flammable 
fuel in the pipeline by creating a spark or of contaminating the groundwater on the farm 
by damaging the pipeline in the process of digging trenches. This posed a very real and 
imminent threat to their health and safety.397 The first respondents erected their shacks 
and were living inside the free range radius of eight to eleven metres that the 
regulations permitted which put them directly at risk of being electrocuted seeing that 
the shacks could serve as conductors.398  
He accepted that it was in the interests of justice and of the public to uphold the rule 
of law by firmly condemning any land invasions.399 He accordingly found that the 
applicants satisfied all the requirements of section 5(1) of PIE and that they were 
entitled to the relief sought.400 He issued an interim order401 that evicted the first 
respondents from the first respondent’s farm; directed them to vacate the farm within 48 
hours of the order; and instructed the sheriff to execute the eviction order if the first 
respondents failed to vacate the farm as directed. The first respondents did not vacate 
the farm as ordered and the sheriff executed the eviction order on Friday, 13 July 2001, 
a mere eight days after the urgent eviction proceedings were instituted. 
The fact that this case was brought as an urgent proceeding in terms of section 5 of 
PIE allowed Rabie J to focus on the health and safety concerns raised by the facts.402 
This allowed him to emphasise, like the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional 
Court in Modderklip, that the obligations of government to provide access to adequate 
housing could not be shifted onto the shoulders of a private landowner because to do so 
                                                 
395 Groengras Eiendomme at 140H-I. 
396 Groengras Eiendomme at 141A. 
397 Groengras Eiendomme at 141B-C. 
398 Groengras Eiendomme at 141E-F. 
399 Groengras Eiendomme at 142C. 
400 Groengras Eiendomme at 142G. 
401 Groengras Eiendomme at 145C. 
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would be “nothing less than an expropriation of the owner’s property.”403 This case is 
unique not only as a result of the exceptional conjuncture of truly life-threatening 
circumstances, but also because it is the only reported case to date that has been 
decided exclusively in terms of section 5(1) of PIE. This simultaneously confirms the 
exclusivity of urgent evictions in terms of section 5 and the normality of courts engaging 
in a substantive analysis of the rights and needs of vulnerable people in terms of 
sections 4 and 6. 
 
3 3 4 4 Evictions from public land 
In 2004 the government adopted the Breaking New Ground Policy: Comprehensive 
Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements404 (‘BNG Policy’). The 
BNG Policy sets out a comprehensive plan for the eradication and urban development 
of informal settlements throughout South Africa. To this end the BNG Policy aims to 
integrate informal settlements with the surrounding residential areas by preventing the 
continued growth of informal settlements through the construction of adequate housing. 
As such the BNG Policy envisaged that all the people living in intolerable conditions 
would be accommodated in these developments. The N2 Gateway Project (‘Project’) 
was the first of nine pilot projects to be rolled out in each of the provinces of South 
Africa in terms of the BNG Policy. The purpose of the Project was to upgrade all the 
informal settlements along the N2 highway from Cape Town International Airport into 
Cape Town and to provide housing opportunities for approximately 15 000 households.  
The Joe Slovo informal settlement became the starting point for the Project because 
it was vulnerable to fires sweeping through the settlement which made the living 
conditions precarious. The occupiers initially embraced the idea that they would be able 
to return from Delft – which is located approximately 15 kilometres away from Joe Slovo 
towards the northern suburbs of Cape Town - to low income housing that would be 
leased to them at rentals of between R 150 per month for a single unit to R 600 per 
month for a double unit. However, Phase 1 of the Project provided flats that could be 
                                                 
403 Groengras Eiendomme at 137H. 
404 Available online at www.capegateway.gov.za/Text/2007/10/bng.pdf (accessed on 18 March 2011). 
See McLean K “Housing” in Woolman S, Bishop M and Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
2nd edition (Original Service, July 2006) 55-26 - 55-29 for an overview of this policy. 
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leased for between R 300 per month for a single unit and R 1 050 per month for a 
double unit. The enthusiastic support for the Project quickly dwindled when the 
occupiers were informed that they would not be accommodated in Phase 2 either with 
its focus on bonded housing for those households that earned more than R 3 500 per 
month. The occupiers that were left on the Joe Slovo site subsequently refused to 
relocate to Delft because they feared that they would not be able to return to Joe Slovo. 
All the residents of Joe Slovo marched to parliament during 2006 and again in 2007 to 
demand that the government honour its commitment that ensured the occupiers a right 
of return to Joe Slovo. Roughly a month later the residents blocked the N2 highway 
during the early hours of the morning in an attempt to force the government to comply 
with their demand. Nine days later the government instituted eviction proceedings in the 
Western Cape High Court, Cape Town and obtained an order from Hlophe JP to that 
effect on 10 March 2008.405 
On appeal to the Constitutional Court the appeal was upheld in part and dismissed in 
part.406 The Court agreed with Hlophe JP that the eviction was just and equitable and 
therefore issued an order that carried the unanimous support of all the members of the 
Court. This order was followed by five separate judgments in which the justices set out 
their respective reasons for supporting the order of the Court. 
The order evicted the occupiers from the Joe Slovo informal settlement and ordered 
them to vacate the site according to a proposed timetable that envisaged the complete 
relocation of the occupiers from Joe Slovo to Delft over a period of 45 weeks, starting 
on 17 August 2009 and ending on 21 June 2010.407 The order also directed the parties 
to engage with each other on the date on which the relocation would begin, the 
timetable for the relocation, and “any other relevant matter upon which they agree to 
                                                 
405 Thubelisha Homes and Others v Various Occupants and Others [2008] JOL 21559 (C). 
406 See Residents of Joe Slovo par 5 where the Court explained that its order differed from the order that 
Hlophe JP issued in the following respects: first, 70% of the low-income housing to be built on the 
upgraded Joe Slovo site must be allocated to the people who were residents of the Joe Slovo informal 
settlement at the time when the N2 Gateway Project was launched; secondly, the temporary residential 
units in Delft had to be of a certain quality; and thirdly, Thubelisha Homes, the Minister for Human 
Settlements and the MEC responsible for Local Government and Housing in the Western Cape had to 
initiated and maintain a process of meaningful engagement with the residents of the Joe Slovo informal 
settlement.  
407 The timetable is attached as “Annexure A” to the order of the Court. 
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engage.”408 The order further directed the parties to engage with each other about each 
relocation to determine inter alia the names and personal circumstances of those who 
would be affected by the specific relocation, the precise procedure for and conditions of 
the relocation, the need for transport to the temporary residential units (‘TRUs’) and to 
local amenities, and the possibility of obtaining permanent housing.409 If the 
engagement resulted in the parties reaching an agreement, this agreement had to be 
submitted to the Court before 7 July 2009 for consideration and possible approval.410 
The Court specifically made the order conditional upon and subject to the provision of 
the TRUs at Delft “or another appropriate location”411 which had to comply with certain 
minimum requirements.412 The order, crucially, directed the respondents to allocate 
70% of the 1500 houses that stood to be built on the upgraded Joe Slovo site413 to both 
current and former residents of Joe Slovo who applied and qualified for this housing.414 
The order additionally interdicted the occupiers from returning to the Joe Slovo site once 
they had been relocated to the TRUs in Delft.415 Finally, the order directed the parties to 
report back to the Court on or before 1 December 2009 about the implementation of the 
order416 and afforded the parties the opportunity to approach the Court “for an 
amendment, supplementation or variation of this order” in the event that any part of the 
order was not complied with or if its implementation presented “unforeseen 
difficulties.”417 
All the Justices of the court found that the residents of the Joe Slovo settlement were 
unlawful occupiers for purposes of PIE418 when the eviction proceedings were instituted 
in the High Court. Moseneke DCJ,419 Ngcobo J420 and especially Sachs J421 made it 
clear that the unlawfulness of the occupation had to be decided on the basis of a 
                                                 
408 Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Order 5. 
409 Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Order 11. 
410 Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Order 7. 
411 Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Orders 4 and 8. 
412 Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Order 10.  
413 Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Order 18. 
414 Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Order 17. 
415 Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Order 13. 
416 Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Order 16. 
417 Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Order 21. 
418 Residents of Joe Slovo par 4. See discussion on consent at 3 2 2 above. 
419 Residents of Joe Slovo paras 146-147. 
420 Residents of Joe Slovo paras 217-218. 
421 Residents of Joe Slovo para 343. 
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complex set of constitutional and statutory obligations and not according to the strict 
private law reading of the doctrine of authority that Yacoob J proposed.422 What 
remained for the justices to grapple with was whether the respondents acted reasonably 
in seeking to evict the occupiers and if so whether the eviction would be just and 
equitable.423 It is important to note that the dicta by Moseneke DCJ, Ngcobo J and 
Sachs J regarding the determination of the unlawfulness of the occupation also 
materially influenced the starting point for the determination of the reasonableness 
analysis. 
The Court found that the respondents did act reasonably when it instituted eviction 
proceedings against the occupiers424 and that the eviction was just and equitable. What 
follows is a summary of the collective reasoning of the respective judgments on these 
remaining issues. 
Moseneke DCJ made a concerted effort to place the dispute between the occupiers 
and the respondents in its social and historical context. He reasoned that it was 
important to consider all the circumstances that gave rise to the housing crisis that 
prevails in the Western Cape.425 Yacoob J noted that the problem of overcrowding was 
particularly acute in all the informal settlements that are located along the N2 highway 
and it was therefore apt to launch the pilot project of the BNG Policy in this area 
because it promised to provide access to adequate housing in a sustainable manner for 
those that were living in intolerable conditions.426 Ngcobo J explained that the objective 
of the BNG Policy was to halt the growth of informal settlements and to upgrade these 
settlements with the construction of adequate housing in appropriate instances.427 In this 
regard Yacoob J held that a wide margin of discretion had to be afforded to the 
respondents in conceptualising the Project.428 O’Regan J emphasised that the details of 
the plan should be left to government and that “[c]ourts should be slow to interfere in the 
                                                 
422 Residents of Joe Slovo paras 49-71. 
423 Residents of Joe Slovo par 3. 
424 Residents of Joe Slovo par 6. 
425 Residents of Joe Slovo par 163. See Residents of Joe Slovo par 202 where Ngcobo J provides some 
statistics to illustrate the severity of the housing crisis in the Western Cape. 
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legitimate policy choices made by government in determining the plan.”429 While Sachs 
J agreed with this reasoning he added that any policy should ensure that the 
government deals “with the people most affected in a fair manner that invites their 
participation and respects their dignity.”430 All the judgments therefore agreed that the 
Project was reasonable in its conception, but added that the Project still required 
reasonable implementation.431 
All the judgments confirmed the central importance of meaningful engagement for 
purposes of determining whether the government acted reasonably in implementing the 
BNG Policy in terms of section 26(2) of the Constitution. All the judgments furthermore 
agreed that there was some engagement between the occupiers and the respondents. 
However, O’Regan J found it deplorable that the respondents openly admitted that their 
efforts to engage the occupiers could not be described as coherent or comprehensive 
and that their efforts were misleading at times.432 Sachs J reasoned that the lack of 
clear and coherent communication could also be attributed to the fact that there were 
simply too many protagonists on the side of the government, so that it resulted in a 
surplus of acts of engagement.433 O’Regan J accordingly held that what had to be 
determined was “whether the failure to have a coherent and meaningful strategy of 
engagement renders the implementation of the plan unreasonable.”434 She emphasised 
that the Project was the first attempt to implement the BNG Policy and that it was 
therefore not surprising to see that its implementation resulted in some controversy 
given the severity of the housing crisis in the Western Cape.435 
Moseneke DCJ added that the respondents openly admitted that they did not give 
the occupiers notice of the fact that they were about to launch urgent eviction 
proceedings.436 While Yacoob J agreed that the government should have taken more 
time to appreciate the severe hardship that would flow from the eviction and that a more 
                                                 
429 Residents of Joe Slovo par 295. 
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coordinated engagement process could have prevented the impasse that resulted,437 he 
found that reasonableness also involved “realism and practicality.”438 In this regard the 
Project promised not only to improve the precarious living conditions that prevailed in 
the informal settlements but also to provide housing for a wider range of people.439 
O’Regan J agreed that the court should not overlook the interests of the people that 
were not involved in the case.440 Besides the provision of housing that would benefit 
thousands of people, the Project promised to bring about vast improvements to the 
general infrastructure of and service delivery to the area.441 Moseneke DCJ observed 
that the installation of basic services would be the catalyst for the gradual improvement 
of informal settlements until it became a settled part of the town or city.442 
However, all the judgments acknowledged that the human cost of the development 
was significant and that the relocation to Delft would cause considerable inconvenience 
and bring about immeasurable suffering for the occupiers. Moseneke DCJ explained 
that the consequences of the “trauma, frustration, grief, dull dragging apathy and [the] 
surrender of the will to live”443 caused by evictions traversed multiple areas of social life. 
Evictions frequently severed the support structures of families and rendered other social 
amenities inaccessible to them in addition to the very real possibility that they may be 
left to fend for themselves in the streets of a strange place.444 Yacoob J added that he 
had considerable sympathy with the applicants because “[t]he human price to be paid 
for this relocation and reconstruction is immeasurable.”445 O’Regan J too had no 
misgivings about the fact that the occupiers would suffer hardship upon eviction from 
Joe Slovo. The settlement provided them with a place where they felt at home and this 
fact was worthy of respect.446 Yacoob J added that the intricacies of the case presented 
the Court with circumstances in which it had no choice but to face the fact that hardship 
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can only be mitigated by the fact that things will be much better later.447 Sachs J found 
that far greater inconvenience would be caused if the court ordered the government to 
start the Project all over again.448 He added that the occupiers should find comfort in the 
fact that the order specifically provides that the details of the relocation would be open 
to amelioration through court order failing attempts at engagement.449 The sacrifice that 
the respondents required the occupiers to make could therefore not be viewed as 
unreasonable. With that the judgments shifted focus to determine whether it would be 
just and equitable to evict the occupiers. 
Yacoob J explained that the surge of people to the Joe Slovo informal settlement 
during the 1990s forced them to live increasingly closer to each other. In turn this lead 
to the rapid deterioration of the site to a point where it was simply too dangerous and 
unhygienic to be living in Joe Slovo.450 O’Regan J took this point further by holding that 
the justice and equity of any eviction depended on the order that the court crafted and to 
that extent she held that any eviction order that ordered an eviction without making 
provision for alternative accommodation would not pass constitutional muster.451 
All the judgments accordingly agreed that this case was unique because the 
respondents offered to provide alternative accommodation in Delft at their expense. 
Yacoob J and Sachs J respectively observed that the unlawful occupiers would not be 
left out in the cold452 nor would they have to fend for themselves on the streets.453 
Yacoob J added further that the TRUs in Delft would be better than the current 
accommodation at Joe Slovo and that it would be more hygienic and less dangerous.454 
Moseneke DCJ explained that he would have had great difficulty finding an eviction to 
be just and equitable if the unlawful occupiers would be left without any prospect of 
realising their own desire of obtaining access to adequate housing.455 In these 
circumstances unlawful occupiers would be “sacrificial lambs” in the process of ending 
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the formation of informal settlements.456 Sachs J concluded that an eviction order which 
ensured the provision of alternative accommodation satisfied the requirements of justice 
and equity because it amplified and embraced the concerns of the unlawful 
occupiers.457 The Court therefore concluded - “not without considerable hesitation”458 - 
that it was just and equitable to evict the occupiers and order their relocation to Delft. 
The Court must be lauded for giving specific content to the obligation to provide 
alternative accommodation in this order because it is the “strongest affirmation to date 
of suitable alternative accommodation as a critical factor in evaluating the justice and 
equity of evicting a large settled community.”459 However, the focus of the order was still 
very much on the “bricks and mortar” side of the right of access to adequate housing 
and therefore failed to appreciate that the relocation to Delft might not appropriately 
respond to the rights and needs of the unlawful occupiers. The reality of an eviction for 
the residents of the Joe Slovo informal settlement is that the evictees are unable to take 
the physical site and its intangible elements as a home with them to Delft. The eviction 
order would thus break the strong emotional ties between the Joe Slovo community and 
the place that they called home since the early 1990s.460 The eviction would furthermore 
cause many of the residents to lose the support structure that they have established 
both for themselves as well as for others in the community who have come to rely 
thereon. The eviction would furthermore, perhaps most dramatically, destroy the 
livelihoods of individuals and their families because relocation to Delft brings with it 
various uncertainties which include, but are not limited to, their ability to earn an income 
as informal traders or take up other unskilled employment461 that depends on living in 
                                                 
456 Residents of Joe Slovo par 138. See Chenwi L and Tissington K “’Sacrificial lambs’ in the quest to 
eradicate informal settlements” (2009) 10(3) ESR Review 18-24. 
457 Residents of Joe Slovo par 409. 
458 Residents of Joe Slovo par 133 (Moseneke DCJ) and par 409 (Sachs J). 
459 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 311. 
460 See 2 1 2 for a discussion of the intangible elements of the right to housing. 
461 The Presidency Development Indicators 2009 (2010) 20 indicates that 2,109 million or 15,78% of the 
population in South Africa have employment in the informal sector and that 1,194 million or 8,93% of the 
population have employment as domestic workers. In contrast, 23,6% (official, narrow definition) and 
32,5% (unofficial, broad definition) of the population were unemployed during June 2009. The indicators 
are available online at www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/12720.PDF (accessed on 7 March 
2010) 
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close proximity to those employment opportunities;462 the general safety of the area and 
the prevalence of gang related violence; the closeness of health care facilities, 
recreational facilities, religious institutions and schools; infrastructure; and service 
delivery. While the Court was receptive to the submissions that the amici curiae made in 
this regard, it held that these factors were insufficient to tilt the scale against evictions 
and relocation.463  
Since the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Residents of Joe Slovo on 10 June 
2009 the parties have been unable to reach agreement through engagement with each 
other on the date on which the relocation will commence or on an alternative timetable 
for the relocation process. In the report that the parties filed with the Court on 4 August 
2009 the MEC for housing and local government expressed grave concerns about the 
costs and timing of the construction of the TRU’s in Delft. The MEC was furthermore 
concerned about the impact of the eviction and relocation order on the residents of the 
Joe Slovo informal settlement. The Court subsequently granted extensions to report on 
the results of the engagement process on 24 August 2009, 30 September 2009, 30 
October 2009 and again on 17 November 2009. All of these extensions did not bear any 
fruit. On 24 May 2010 the Court issued directions that required the respondents to lodge 
affidavits with the Court by 25 June 2010 that firstly, indicated whether the respondents 
would be providing the residents of the Joe Slovo informal settlement access to 
adequate housing through a process of in situ upgrading of the site; and secondly, 
explained why the initial eviction order was still necessary. The MEC indicated that the 
provincial government had not taken a final decision on whether an in situ upgrade 
would be undertaken and stated that further engagement with the Joe Slovo community 
was necessary. This caused the Court to issue further directions that required the MEC 
and the Minister of Human Settlements to show cause on affidavit why the initial 
eviction order should not be discharged. 
Nearly 21 months later the Constitutional Court handed down judgment in Residents 
of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others (Centre on 
                                                 
462 See the arguments of the occupiers in City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 
2007 (1) SA 78 (W) par 20 and the submissions of the amicus curiae in Residents of Joe Slovo available 
online at www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/12720.PDF (accessed on 7 March 2010). 
463 Residents of Joe Slovo par 113. 
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Housing Rights and Evictions and Another as Amici Curiae)464 (‘Residents of Joe Slovo 
II’) on the sole question of whether the order in Residents of Joe Slovo “can or should 
be rescinded or discharged in the light of the changed circumstances.”465 In this regard 
the Court emphasised that the prerequisite of the eviction order in Residents of Joe 
Slovo was that it was just and equitable.466 The Court added that it probably would not 
have made the relocation order had it not found that the relocation was necessary to 
facilitate the housing development.467 The Court emphasised that the change in 
circumstances since the judgment in Residents of Joe Slovo made it impossible to 
comply with various aspects of the order in that judgment.468 The Court therefore 
concluded that, save for the cost order contained in Order 22 of Residents of Joe Slovo, 
Orders 4-21 of Residents of Joe Slovo should be discharged for the following reasons: 
firstly, the government had failed to take adequate steps to carry out the supervised 
eviction order that the Court made on 10 June 2009; secondly, the respondents 
indicated that they had no intention of proceeding with the supervised eviction order 
because they had made alternative plans for an in situ upgrade of the site; thirdly, it 
would be impossible to execute the eviction order in the absence of an agreement 
between the parties or a complex amendment of the initial order; fourthly, the eviction 
and relocation order pertained to thousands of people; fifthly, the circumstances that 
underpinned the Court’s reasoning to grant the eviction order had since fallen away; 
and finally, the plans for the in situ upgrade of the Joe Slovo situ posed no threat to the 
appellants.469 
Section 6 of PIE creates a framework in which an organ of state can institute eviction 
proceedings against unlawful occupiers of land within its jurisdiction and obtain the relief 
that it sought from the court. Within this framework courts must determine whether it is 
just and equitable to evict the unlawful occupiers with reference to inter alia the 
circumstances under which they started occupying the land. This is a decisive break 
from the position under apartheid, where this consideration simply did not matter. 
                                                 
464 2011 (7) BCLR 723 (CC). 
465 Residents of Joe Slovo II par 1. 
466 Residents of Joe Slovo II par 29. 
467 Residents of Joe Slovo II par 29. 
468 Residents of Joe Slovo II paras 30-36. 
469 Residents of Joe Slovo II par 37. 
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Courts are enjoined to consider the reasonableness of the measures taken by the 
government to improve the living conditions of those living in deplorable conditions. In 
Residents of Joe Slovo the Court confirmed that those who stand to benefit must be 
able to participate actively in the development of these measures through a process of 
meaningful engagement. However, in Residents of Joe Slovo the Court appeared to 
retreat from the very high standards it set for the process of meaningful engagement in 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v 
City of Johannesburg and Others470 (‘Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road’) because it 
condoned serious deficiencies in the implementation of the Project. The Court 
concluded that this by itself could not render the Project unreasonable because many 
people stood to benefit from the Project. However, the Court must be lauded for its 
strong affirmation of alternative accommodation as a critical factor for the determination 
of the justice and equity of an eviction in Residents of Joe Slovo. 
 
3 3 5 Order and execution 
Once the court is satisfied that all the procedural requirements have been complied with 
and that it would be just and equitable to evict the unlawful occupiers, it must grant an 
eviction order.471 Since unlawful occupiers have no rights to occupy they will not be able 
to raise any defence to the unlawfulness of their occupation.472  
In its order a court must determine, with reference to inter alia the duration of the 
unlawful occupation,473 a just and equitable date on which the land must be vacated.474 
In the event that the unlawful occupiers fail to vacate the land voluntarily the court must 
also determine a date on which the eviction order may be carried out.475 The sheriff, the 
                                                 
470 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC). 
471 Section 4(8) of PIE. Rule 6(2) of the Uniform Rules of the High Court also requires a notice of motion 
to be served on inter alia the registrar of the High Court when relief is claimed against any person. 
472 Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of Property 659. 
473 Section 4(9) of PIE. 
474 Section 4(8)(a) of PIE. See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of Property 659 and Carey 
Miller Land Title in South Africa 521. 
475 Section 4(8)(b) of PIE. See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of Property 659 and Carey 
Miller Land Title in South Africa 521. 
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South African Police Service or any person assisting them476 may not be obstructed or 
interfered with when executing of a court order.477  
A court may also order the demolition and removal of any buildings or structures that 
were occupied or erected on the land.478 The court may also subject the order for the 
eviction, demolition or removal to any conditions that it deems reasonable. Section 6(6) 
of PIE state that all the procedural protections provided for in section 4 of PIE will apply, 
with the necessary changes, to all proceedings instituted in terms of section 6(1) of PIE. 
 
3 4 Evictions in terms of the National Building Regulations and Building 
Standards Act 103 of 1977 
The City of Johannesburg adopted its Inner City Regeneration Strategy in 2003. One of 
the pillars upon which this regeneration strategy rests is a project to address 
“sinkholes”. Sinkholes are properties that are slummed, abandoned, overcrowded, 
poorly maintained, often owned and neglected by the public sector. In terms of the 
Better Buildings Programme the City of Johannesburg offers to write off a portion of the 
municipal debt of these property owners and provide assistance with the eviction of 
unlawful occupiers if they upgrade the buildings at their own cost, maintain the buildings 
and lease it for residential purposes.479  
In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road the City of Johannesburg sought to evict 
approximately 400 people from six buildings in terms of the fire bylaws of the city, 
section 20 of the Health Act 63 of 1977 and section 12(4)(b) of the National Building 
Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (‘NBRSA’). Section 12(4)(b) of the 
NBRSA empowers a local authority to “order any person occupying or working or being 
for any other purpose in any building, to vacate such building immediately or within a 
period specified” in a notice if it considers it necessary for the safety of that person. 
Section 12(6) of the NBRSA further provides that failure to comply with such a notice 
will constitute a criminal offence and any offender will be fined a maximum of R 100 for 
                                                 
476 Section 4(11) of PIE. 
477 Section 8(2), read with section 8(3), of PIE which makes obstruction and interference an offence.  
478 Section 4(10) of PIE. See Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The Law of Property 659 and Carey Miller 
Land Title in South Africa 521. 
479 See City of Johannesburg Johannesburg Inner City Regeneration Strategy Business Plan: Business 
Plan, Financial Years 2004 -2007 (2004) available online at www.joburg-archive.co.za/udz /04.doc 
(accessed on 7 March 2010). 
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each day of the contravention. The occupiers opposed the application because an 
eviction and relocation to an informal settlement on the outskirts of the city would 
destroy their livelihood strategies that depended on being able to conduct informal 
trading, domestic work and recycling in the inner city of Johannesburg. 
In the South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg480 (‘Rand Properties’), Jajbhay J 
found that that there was no guarantee that a court would grant an eviction order once a 
local authority established the existence of health and safety concerns in a building 
because these concerns merely triggered the discretion of the Court.481 He noted that a 
court had to enquire further as to the extent of the emergency and desperation of the 
people, the duration of their occupation and the extent to which the local authority 
observed due process in bringing the application.482 He explained that section 12(4)(b) 
had to be read subject to section 26(3) of the Constitution and therefore deemed it 
unnecessary to consider the constitutional challenge lodged against this provision.483 
Instead he focussed on the constitutional and statutory obligations – specifically to 
provide emergency housing in terms of chapter 12 of the National Housing Code – 
which local authorities have in providing access to adequate housing.484 In this regard 
he found that the City had no emergency housing programme in place that would be 
able to accommodate the occupiers if they were evicted.485 This would undoubtedly 
place the occupiers in a much more precarious position since they did not have the 
means to obtain alternative accommodation within the inner city. An outcome of this 
nature would fly in the face of the principles of Ubuntu that serve as a guide in the 
interpretation of the Constitution as a whole but also the right to housing and the 
eviction of unlawful occupiers specifically.486 
                                                 
480 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 (1) SA 78 (W). 
481 Rand Properties par 29. 
482 Rand Properties paras 29 and 36. 
483 Rand Properties par 36. 
484 Rand Properties paras 37-46. 
485 Rand Properties par 47. 
486 Rand Properties paras 62-63. See S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) par 308; PE 
Municipality par 37; Dikiko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) paras 68-69 and 113-121; English R 
“Ubuntu, the quest for an indigenous jurisprudence” (1996) 12 SAJHR 641-648; Mokgoro Y “Ubuntu and 
the law in South Africa” (1998) 4 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 15-23; and Mokgoro Y “Ubuntu, the 
Constitution and the rights of non-citizens” (2010) 21 Stell LR 221-229 on the meaning and use of ubuntu 
as an interpretive guide. 
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He accordingly held that the Inner City Regeneration Strategy failed to comply with 
the constitutional and statutory obligations of the City487 and that the City failed to 
prioritise the rights and needs of the people living in the inner city of Johannesburg.488 
He directed the City to devise a comprehensive and co-ordinated housing programme 
that would enable the progressive realisation of the right to adequate housing for the 
people in the inner city of Johannesburg489 and interdicted the City from evicting the 
occupiers pending the implementation of such a programme or until the City could 
provide the occupiers with alternative accommodation.490 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal491 (‘Rand Properties II’) the City 
submitted that Jajbhay J’s reasons for refusing the eviction order and the order itself 
“were marred by normative confusion” because he failed to determine whether PIE was 
applicable in the circumstances and then also failed to set aside the notices despite 
finding that it amounted to an arbitrary eviction that was contrary to section 26(3) of the 
Constitution.492 Against this background Harms ADP concluded that Jajbhay J erred in 
holding that courts have a discretion to refuse an eviction order on grounds other than 
those which are legally relevant. It was furthermore incorrect and contrary to the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court to hold that the government could not obtain 
an eviction order unless it provided the occupiers with alternative accommodation.493 
There was no evidence to suggest that the City was failing in its efforts to provide 
access to adequate housing on a progressive basis and within its available 
resources.494 The City was under an obligation to provide emergency housing upon 
eviction and the suitability of this type of accommodation could indeed be considered by 
a court in determining whether it would be just and equitable to evict the occupiers.495 
                                                 
487 Rand Properties at 98G. 
488 Rand Properties at 98H. 
489 Rand Properties at 98I. 
490 Rand Properties at 98J-99A. 
491 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 (6) SA 404 (SCA). 
492 Rand Properties II par 17. 
493 See PE Municipality par 28 where Sachs J stated that there was “no unqualified constitutional duty on 
local authorities to ensure that in no circumstances should a home be destroyed unless alternative 
accommodation or land is made available.” 
494 Rand Properties II par 45. 
495 Rand Properties II paras 47-48. 
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On the constitutionality of the section 12(4)(b) notice, he found that the notice was 
administrative in nature and that it therefore had to comply with the requirements of just 
administrative action.496 As such the notice amounted to an administrative order which 
would be transformed into a criminal sanction in the case of non-compliance and could 
therefore not be construed as constituting self-help.497 He also dismissed the argument 
that the notice permitted an eviction without considering all the relevant circumstances 
in terms of section 26(3) of the Constitution because it was based on the flawed 
assumption that the notice could be equated with a court order.498 
Harms ADP dismissed the application to review the City’s decision to issue the 
notices for the following reasons: firstly, the audi alteram partem rule does not apply in 
emergency situations where it is necessary to vacate buildings to ensure the safety of 
any person in that buildings;499 secondly, the argument that the City failed to consider 
the availability of alternative accommodation in the inner city was based on an 
assumption that “presupposes that the right to act under s 12(4)(b) and the right to 
access to adequate housing are reciprocal and that the former is dependent or 
conditional on the latter;”500 and finally,  any inquiry into the sincerity of the City’s 
concerns for the safety and well-being of the occupiers was entirely beside the point 
because the evidence indicated that it was indeed necessary for the City to issue the 
notices.501 
Despite holding that PIE did not apply to instances where section 12(4)(b) notices 
have been issued, he noted that a court “would be remiss” if it ignored the 
                                                 
496 Rand Properties II paras 52 and 56. 
497 Rand Properties II par 53. 
498 Rand Properties II par 54. Quinot G “An administrative law perspective on ‘bad building’ evictions in 
the Johannesburg inner city” (2008) 9(1) ESR Review 25-28 26 (‘Quinot “An administrative law 
perspective”’) argues that this argument of Harms ADP harks back to the narrow common law 
construction of audi alteram partem that fell by the way side with the adoption of section 33(1) of the 
Constitution. 
499 Rand Properties II par 63. Quinot “An administrative law perspective” 27 argues that the principal 
objection against this point is the fact that the Supreme Court of Appeal failed to seriously engage with 
procedural fairness requirements listed in section 3(4)(b) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 
of 2000. 
500 Rand Properties II par 64. 
501 Rand Properties II par 65. Quinot “An administrative law perspective” 28 observes that the Supreme 
Court of Appeal was able to avoid an analysis of section 26 of the Constitution by focusing on the 
reasonableness of the necessity to evict the unlawful occupiers for health and safety reasons. 
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consequences that followed from an eviction.502 In this regard Harms ADP attributed the 
City’s inability to provide the occupiers with emergency housing for longer than a 
fortnight immediately following the eviction to the fact that it did not pursue the 
application for funding for emergency housing with any vigour.503 He nonetheless 
upheld the appeal against the order of the High Court504 and interdicted the occupiers 
from occupying the buildings until the City gave written approval that the buildings may 
be occupied or used again.505 The eviction order was combined with a further order that 
the City offer and provide temporary alternative accommodation for the occupiers who 
were evicted and were in desperate need of housing assistance.506 The temporary 
accommodation had to provide the occupiers with a place where they could stay without 
the threat of further evictions. This place also had to provide a waterproof structure with 
access to basic sanitation, water and refuse services.507 The location of the temporary 
alternative accommodation had to be determined after consultation with the 
occupiers.508 
On appeal in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road the Constitutional Court issued an interim 
order509 after hearing oral argument that directed the parties “to engage with each other 
meaningfully”.510 The purpose of this engagement was to determine whether firstly, the 
values of the Constitution, the constitutional and statutory duties of the municipality and 
the rights of the applicants could direct the parties to resolve the difficulties of the 
application amicably;511 and secondly, the applicants’ plight would be alleviated if the 
                                                 
502 Rand Properties II par 76. 
503 Rand Properties II par 77. 
504 Rand Properties II par 78. 
505 Rand Properties II at 441E-F. This order gives effect to section 12(5) of the NBRSA which states that: 
“No person shall occupy or use or permit the occupation or use of any building in respect of 
which a notice was served or delivered in terms of this section or steps were taken by the 
local authority in question in terms of subsection (1), unless such local authority has granted 
permission in writing that such building may again be occupied or used.” 
506 Rand Properties II at 441H-I. 
507 Rand Properties II at 441I-J. 
508 Rand Properties II at 442B. 
509 The interim order was issued on 30 August 2007 (Interim order Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road) available 
online at www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/10731.PDF (accessed on 7 March 2010). 
510 Interim order Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Order 1. See section 2 2 in chapter 5 for a detailed analysis 
of the concept of meaningful engagement and the argument that it transcends procedural fairness in 
terms of sections 3 and 4 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
511 Interim order Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Order 1. 
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dangerous and ailing buildings they occupied could be upgraded.512 The interim order 
also directed the parties to report back to the Court on the results of the engagement 
between them.513 This engagement process resulted in the parties reaching an 
agreement514 on the measures that would be taken by the City in the interim to improve 
the conditions of the properties515 and the eviction application.516 The Court 
subsequently endorsed this agreement.517 
The remaining issues that required determination by the Court were firstly, whether 
the occupiers and similarly placed people in the inner city of Johannesburg were entitled 
to relief that would make permanent housing solutions available to them in the inner 
city; secondly, what the scope and application of section 26 of the Constitution was in 
the circumstances; thirdly, whether PIE was applicable in the circumstances; fourthly, 
                                                 
512 Interim order Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Order 2. 
513 Interim order Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Order 3. 
514 The parties reached the agreement on 29 October 2007. The agreement is available online at 
http://web.wits.ac.za/NR/rdonlyres/4B183D1D-C77A-493C-9CEF-526A5076438C/0/197MainStreet51 
OliviaRoadAgreement.pdf (accessed on 7 March 2010) (‘Agreement Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road’). 
515 Agreement Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road clause 1.1.1. Clause 2 stipulated that the City of 
Johannesburg would, at its own expense, erect a standpipe with 6 taps to supply potable water; provide 
10 chemical toilets; provide 2 skips for the disposal of residential waste at the rear of the property; deliver 
refuse bags to the occupiers each week; close the lift doors on the ground floor to secure the lift shaft and 
conduct a once-off cleaning and sanitation operation of the property. Clause 3 contains provisions in 
similar terms to be provided in an alley next to the property, but adds that the City of Johannesburg 
would, at its own expense, remove certain panels from windows to improve the ventilation in the buildings 
and that it would open up the bricked up door at the back of the property. 
516 Agreement Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road clause 1.1.2. Clause 5, read with clause 18, of the agreement 
stipulated that the City of Johannesburg would provide temporary alternative accommodation to the 
occupiers of the property in the “Old Perm” Building and/or Phase 1 of the “MBV Hospital” Building and/or 
the “BG Alexander” Building or “in another building renovated in compliance with the provisions of this 
agreement located within the Urban Development Zone (UDZ) for the inner city of Johannesburg.” The 
City of Johannesburg had to, in terms of clause 6 of the agreement, ensure that these properties provided 
the occupiers with “security against eviction; access to sanitation; access to potable water; access to 
electricity for heating, lighting and cooking.” Clause 8 of the agreement further, crucially, provided that no 
occupier would be required to pay rental that was “in excess of 25% of his or her household’s monthly 
income, or his or her individual income if he or she lives alone.” 
517 The order was issued on 5 November 2007 and is available online at 
www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/11584.PDF (accessed on 7 March 2010). However, In 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Yacoob J emphasised that it will not always be appropriate for a court to 
approve agreements that flowed from a process of engagement because “[i]t is always for the 
municipality to ensure that its response to the process of engagement is reasonable” (par 30). See 
Tissington K “Challenging inner city evictions before the Constitutional Court of South Africa: The 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road case in Johannesburg, South Africa” (2008) 5(2) Housing and ESC Rights 
Law Quarterly 1-6. 
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the constitutionality of section 12(4)(b) of the NBRSA; and finally, whether the Court 
should review the decision of the City to issues the notices.518 
Yacoob J found it unnecessary to consider whether the occupiers should be 
provided with permanent accommodation in the inner city because the City agreed to 
develop permanent housing solutions in consultation with the occupiers and there was 
“every reason to believe that negotiations will continue in good faith.”519 He equally 
found it unnecessary to consider whether similarly placed people in the inner city should 
be provided with permanent accommodation because there was no reason to believe 
that the City would not engage meaningfully with other occupants whose evictions might 
become necessary or desirable in future.520 He also declined to elaborate further on the 
applicability of section 26 of the Constitution for purposes of eviction applications on the 
grounds of health and safety considerations.521 He specifically declined to consider 
whether PIE applied in the circumstances because the question might never arise again 
if the City continued to engage meaningfully with the people who would become 
homeless if they were evicted.522 He reasoned that it was likely that other local 
authorities would use section 12(4)(b) notices in future and therefore deemed it 
appropriate to provide guidance on the considerations that a city should have regard to 
when issuing these notices.523 
Yacoob J conceded that Harms ADP was correct in holding that the right to act in 
terms of section 12(4)(b) and the right of access to adequate housing are not reciprocal 
and that the former is neither dependent nor conditional on the latter.524 He accordingly 
held that these two provisions should be read together because the alternative would 
result in a disastrous position where one department made a decision on whether 
someone should be evicted and some other department determined whether housing 
                                                 
518 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 31. 
519 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 34. 
520 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 35. 
521 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 37. 
522 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 38. Chenwi L and Liebenberg S “The constitutional protection of those 
facing eviction from ‘bad buildings’” (2008) 9 ESR Review 12-17 16 (‘Chenwi and Liebenberg 
“Constitutional protection”) argues that the Constitutional Court missed an opportunity to establish a clear 
legal framework which would govern all future evictions on grounds of health and safety concerns. 
523 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 39. 
524 Rand Properties II par 64. 
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should be provided.525 It was therefore unfortunate that Harms ADP characterised the 
dispute between the City and the occupiers as “only peripherally about the constitutional 
duty of organs of State towards those who are evicted from their homes and are in a 
desperate condition”526 because that laid the foundation for the Supreme Court of 
Appeal to incorrectly hold that the City was under no obligation to consider the 
availability of alternative accommodation before it issued the notices.527 
Yacoob J finally took issue with the fact that Harms ADP found nothing objectionable 
about the fact that the failure to comply with an administrative order to vacate a building 
could be penalised with a criminal sanction.528 Yacoob J explained that 
“[t]he provisions of section 26(3) would be virtually nugatory and would amount to 
little protection if people who were in occupation of their homes could be 
constitutionally compelled to leave by the exertion of the pressure of a criminal 
sanction without a court order. It follows that any provision that compels people to 
leave their homes on pain of criminal sanction in the absence of a court order is 
contrary to the provisions of section 26(3) of the Constitution. Section 12(6) provides 
for this criminal compulsion and is not consistent with the Constitution. Continued 
occupation of the property should not be a criminal offence absent a court order for 
eviction.”529 
 
Yacoob J found that this was not a case in which there were countless ways in which 
the legislature could remedy the provision and therefore held that the following should 
be read into section 12(6) of the NBRSA to make it constitutionally compliant: “This 
subsection applies only to people who, after service upon them of an order of court for 
their eviction, continue to occupy the property concerned.”530 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road must be lauded for affirming the participatory nature of 
the right of access to adequate housing with the creation of the obligation that 
government must engage meaningfully with the unlawful occupiers that it wants to evict.  
On a substantive level this obligation to engage meaningfully with unlawful occupiers 
                                                 
525 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 44. 
526 Rand Properties II par 4. Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303 argues that the context of a specific 
case should guide the formulation of an appropriate order where a local authority seeks an eviction order 
for health and safety reasons. 
527 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 46. Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303 describes this part of the 
judgment as “perhaps the most significant” because it explicitly holds that courts must take, not only 
legally relevant circumstance but, all relevant circumstances into consideration for purposes of section 
26(3) of the Constitution.  
528 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 48. 
529 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 49. 
530 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 51. 
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also created an express link between sections 26(1) and 26(3) of the Constitution 
because meaningful engagement has the potential to lead to immediate benefits for 
people living in abject poverty through an agreement with the City to either upgrade 
their current living conditions or to relocate to emergency accommodation pending the 
provision of permanent accommodation. Meaningful engagement further establishes a 
link between sections 26(2) and 26(3) of the Constitution because it also has the 
potential to lead to a change in the way the government perceives its constitutional and 
statutory obligations to provide access to adequate housing on a progressive basis and 
within its available resources. 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road must be criticised for leaving the question of whether 
PIE will apply to evictions instituted in terms of the NBRSA or the Health Act 63 of 1971 
open in the wake of Rand Properties II where Harms ADP found that PIE would not 
apply. This is an opportunity that the Constitutional Court missed to clarify what the 
position would be of unlawful occupiers who faced imminent eviction proceedings for 
health and safety reasons.531 
 
3 5 Conclusion 
The inclusion of the right of access to adequate housing in the Constitution marked a 
decisive break with the past.532 The law of evictions experienced a paradigm shift from a 
position where forced evictions were conducted without any regard for the personal 
circumstances of the unlawful occupiers or the severe hardship that may flow from the 
eviction to a position where these factors stand at the forefront of the enquiry into the 
justice and equity of the eviction. Put differently, courts must exercise their discretion to 
grant or refuse eviction orders in terms of the specific circumstances of each case. 
Courts can no longer apply the legal rules of eviction to the facts of a case in a 
mechanical fashion without any further enquiry as to what the rights and needs of the 
people are that stand to be affected by the eviction. This is a major impact of the right to 
have access to adequate housing. 
                                                 
531 See section 4 in chapter 2 for a brief overview of how the Slums Act 53 of 1934, the Trespass Act 6 of 
1959, the Physical Planning Act 88 of 1967 and the Health Act 63 of 1977 was used by the government in 
the exercise of its police powers to remove people from land and buildings for health and safety reasons 
during apartheid. 
532 Jaftha par 29. 
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In PE Municipality, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the traditional enquiry into 
evictions had been recast into a new “constitutional matrix” of relationships that flow 
from the intersection of sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution. In this constitutional 
matrix the question of eviction will not be approached from the position where the 
property rights of the owner and the housing rights of the unlawful occupiers are 
characterised as diametrically opposed interests. Instead the question of eviction will be 
approached in a manner that tries to reconcile the interests of the landowner and the 
unlawful occupiers by engaging with the specific circumstances of the case so as to 
reach a just and equitable solution.533 Liebenberg observes that this balancing of 
conflicting constitutional rights in a manner that seeks to afford the most protection to 
both owners and unlawful occupiers at the same time is consistent with the deliberative 
spirit of the Constitution.534 
During apartheid the government used its police power to evict people for health, 
safety and public interests reasons because it wanted to establish and maintain a land-
use system that was segregated along racial lines.535 Section 26 of the Constitution 
envisages that the government will become involved in housing and eviction cases in a 
manner that is markedly different. Section 26(2) of the Constitution imposes positive 
obligations on the government to adopt reasonable legislative and other measures 
within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of the right of 
access to adequate housing. In Grootboom the Constitutional Court developed the 
model of reasonableness review which it uses to determine whether the measures 
taken by the government to realise section 26 of the Constitution are reasonable. The 
Court emphasised that it was not its prerogative to question whether better measures 
could have been adopted or whether public funds could have been better spent. The 
Court would focus on whether the measures that the government adopted could 
contribute to the realisation of the right of access to adequate housing. In this regard the 
Court will focus on whether the measures firstly, are comprehensive and coordinated; 
secondly, are capable of facilitating the progressive realisation of the right; thirdly, 
reasonable in their conception and implementation; fourthly, are balanced and flexible; 
                                                 
533 PE Municipality par 23. 
534 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 312. 
535 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 66. 
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and finally, includes components for short-, medium- and long-term relief. The 
imposition of positive obligations on government to provide access to adequate housing 
is a significant impact of section 26 of the Constitution. 
However, the government also has negative obligations to desist from impairing or 
preventing the right of access to adequate housing. In Jaftha and Gundwana the 
Constitutional Court confirmed that judicial oversight was required of all sales in 
execution proceedings if the property to be executed against is the home of the 
judgment debtor. These judgments enjoin judicial officers to weigh the interests of the 
creditor in securing payment of the judgment debt against the interests of the debtor in 
retaining the tenure security that her home provides her. This balancing requires more 
than the mechanical application of legal rules to objective facts. It requires engagement 
with all the relevant circumstances of the case. The fact that the rights and interests of 
poor and otherwise destitute people must be taken into consideration in legal 
proceedings that threaten to deprive them of their current access to adequate housing, 
however basic, is a substantial addition to the law of evictions. 
PIE was enacted to give effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution. With its 
enactment there was a shift in the focus of evictions - away from preventing squatting to 
preventing illegal eviction. This shift in focus coincided with the provision of procedural 
protections and substantive safeguards against illegal evictions. In Residents of Joe 
Slovo the Constitutional Court emphasised that courts cannot resort to the common law 
definition of consent to determine the meaning of consent for purposes of PIE because 
the common law definition of consent limits the definition of unlawful occupation and 
through that the application of PIE. Once it is clear that unlawful occupiers meet this 
threshold requirement they must receive notice of eviction proceedings that have been 
instituted against them. This notice must identify them as unlawful occupiers of the 
property, be properly served upon them and be in a language that they will be able to 
understand. Furthermore, this notice must contain information regarding the nature of 
the proceedings; the date and time of the hearing; the grounds for the proposed 
eviction; their right to appear and defend the case; and that they may request legal aid. 
Once a court is satisfied that the proposed eviction is just and equitable it must 
determine a date upon which the unlawful occupiers must vacate the property and a 
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date upon which the eviction order can be executed should the unlawful occupiers not 
vacate the property voluntarily. These procedural protections are significant because 
during apartheid the local authority officials did not give the squatters notice of pending 
eviction proceedings nor did they wait for a just and equitable day or time to execute the 
eviction order. 
The substantive safeguards that PIE affords unlawful occupiers are animated by the 
overarching requirement that all evictions must be just and equitable - to both the 
unlawful occupiers and the landowner. This requires careful consideration of the rights 
and needs of the unlawful occupiers in general, but specifically the rights and needs of 
the elderly, people with disabilities, children and female-headed households. Courts are 
further required to ascertain whether land or alternative accommodation is available or 
can reasonably be made available to the unlawful occupiers upon their eviction. Finally, 
courts are also required to consider whether the local authority with jurisdiction over the 
area in which the property is situated made any mediation attempts to resolve disputes 
between the unlawful occupiers and the private landowners. These substantive 
safeguards to the eviction of unlawful occupiers arguably represent the most significant 
development in the law of evictions. 
It is clear from the analysis of the legal framework of evictions in this chapter that 
firstly, unlawful occupiers cannot make demands for the immediate provision of access 
to adequate housing; secondly, evictions can occur if it is just and equitable in the 
circumstances; and finally, courts have an obligation to consider all relevant 
circumstances in order to craft the case-specific solutions that Sachs J called for in PE 
Municipality. In general courts have discharged their obligation to grapple with the 
conflicting interests of unlawful occupiers and landowners in any effort to find case 
specific solutions admirably. However, to date the Constitutional Court has refused to 
build on the normative foundations of the right of access to adequate housing which it 
laid in Grootboom when it stated that the right amounted to “more than bricks and 
mortar”. This chapter has shown that it is possible to do so with reference to the home 
interests of the unlawful occupiers. This development is uncontroversial and easy to 
accept as compelling for logical reasons. It therefore remains to show how it is possible 
to give substantive content to the right without defining a minimum core obligation.
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4 
International and Regional Norms 
 
4 1 Introduction 
Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘Constitution’) 
places an obligation on courts to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights and therefore creates a gateway through which the courts have access to a rich 
body of international law on human rights. In S v Makwanyane and Another1 
(‘Makwanyane’) the Constitutional Court found that the ambit of international law, 
envisaged as an interpretive guide, included both binding and non-binding international 
law.2 This is significant because many of the provisions in the Bill of Rights were 
inspired by and closely resemble the structure and language used in the formulation of 
comparable provisions in international law instruments. Section 39(1)(b) consequently 
creates a framework within which the Bill of Rights can be evaluated and interpreted.3 
The inclusion of an explicit provision that mandates the consideration of international 
law acknowledges that the Constitution functions within an international context that is 
                                                 
1 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
2 Makwanyane  par 35, followed in S v Williams and Five Similar Cases 1994 (4) SA 126 (C) at 139G-H; 
S v Lombard 1994 (4) SA 776 (T) at 782F-G; S v Shuma 1994 (4) SA 583 (E) at 590E; S v Vermaas 1994 
(3) BCLR 18 (T) at 28C; Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order 1994 (3) SA 625 (E) at 643D; Government 
of the Republic of South Africa v ‘Sunday Times’ Newspaper 1995 (2) SA 221 (T) at 227D-E and S v 
Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at 662. It is important to note that the Constitutional Court relied on section 
35(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 in formulating this framework 
with reference to the view of Dugard J “The role of international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights” 
(1994) 10 SAJHR 208-215 212 and Dugard J “International law and the final Constitution” (1995) 11 
SAJHR 241-251 243 who construes the ambit of international law sources foreseen by section 35(1) of 
the Interim Constitution as including all the sources recognised by article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice 33 UNTS 993, namely: (a) international conventions (both general or 
particular) which establish rules that contesting states recognize; (b) international custom; (c) the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and (d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations. The development of the Constitutional Court’s reliance 
on international law in constitutional interpretation is discussed in Du Plessis LM “International law and 
the evolution of (domestic) human-rights law in post-1994 South Africa” in Nijman JE and Nollkaemper A 
(eds) New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law (2007) 309-340 319-335 
and Du Plessis LM “Interpretation” in Woolman S, Bishop M and Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2nd edition (Original Service, June 2008) 32-171 - 32-183. 
3 Makwanyane par 35. 
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committed to international norms and standards.4 This receptiveness to “influences from 
outside”5 will help to realise the Constitutional commitment of building a united and 
democratic South Africa.6 Liebenberg notes that this commitment articulates South 
Africa’s ambition of being part of the international community of nations after apartheid 
and to abide by its normative standards.7 She adds that South Africa has a strong 
history of involvement with human rights and domestic transformation that can 
contribute to the development of international law.8 
The deliberative nature of the South African constitutional dispensation was weaved 
into the fibre of the Constitution through section 39(1)(b), which opened South African 
constitutional law up to a human rights dialogue that extends beyond the South African 
context to the broader international community.9 By opening itself up to such a human 
rights dialogue, the drafters of the South African Constitution ensured that the 
foundation of its young democracy stood on firm ground and provided the courts with an 
opportunity to interpret the rights in the Bill of Rights in a manner that is influenced by 
multicultural dialogue on human rights that extended beyond national boundaries.10 
This human rights dialogue is particularly useful in the housing context because it 
provides South African courts with the opportunity to engage with the jurisprudence of 
international adjudicative or supervisory bodies that have had to grapple with the rights 
of vulnerable groups like gypsies/travellers and Roma in terms of a range of 
international and regional human rights instruments. It is instructive to consider the 
jurisprudence generated by these bodies because the gypsies/travellers and Roma 
have historically also been pushed to the periphery of society, with the aid of racial 
profiling and numerous instances of police brutality, to live in squalid conditions. 
                                                 
4 Dugard J “International law and the ‘final’ Constitution” (1995) 11 SAJHR 241-251 241 and Du Plessis 
LM “International law and the evolution of (domestic) human-rights law in post-1994 South Africa” in 
Nijman JE and Nollkaemper A (eds) New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International 
Law (2007) 309-340 316. 
5 Botha N “The role of international law in the development of South African common law” (2001) 26 
SAYIL 253-260. 
6 Preamble of the Constitution. 
7 Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 101 
(‘Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights’). 
8 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 101. 
9 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 101. 
10 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 101. 
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The aim of this chapter is to identify international instruments that can be considered 
by South African courts in their effort to develop a more substantive understanding of 
the scope and content of the related concepts of “adequacy” and “home” in section 26 
of the Constitution. Developing such an understanding is important for purposes of 
contextualising the law of evictions in post-apartheid South African law, with its firm 
move away from the common law and apartheid ways of construing the entitlement and 
power to evict squatters without any regard to their personal circumstances or what will 
become of them after the eviction. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part 
develops an organising framework for giving substantive content to the right of access 
to adequate housing with reference to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.11 The second part of the chapter shows that South African courts 
can receive interpretive guidance from the jurisprudence of regional human rights 
systems to give content to what it means to have access to adequate housing. The 
second part provides an overview of the case law generated in terms of article 8 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms,12 articles 16, 30 and 31 of the Revised European Social Charter,13 the 
implied right to housing in the American Convention on Human Rights,14 and the implied 
right to housing in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.15 
 
4 2 Developing an organising framework 
4 2 1 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
4 2 1 1 Introduction 
After World War II, the international community committed itself to the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United Nations adopted the International 
Bill of Rights, which consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights16 (‘UDHR’), 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights17 (‘ICCPR’) and the International 
                                                 
11 993 UNTS 3. 
12 213 UNTS 221. 
13 CETS No 35. 
14 OASTS No 36. 
15 1520 UNTS 217. 
16 UN General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III). 
17 999 UNTS 171. The Covenant was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 
December 1966 and came into force on 3 January 1976. As on 15 July 2011 the Covenant has 69 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
161 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights18 (‘ICESCR’). The UDHR remains an 
important standard of reference even though the ICCPR and the ICESCR have 
transcended the UDHR in terms of their specific provisions and the establishment of 
legal obligations to which States Parties bind themselves. In this regard the ICESCR is 
significant because it is one of the earliest and foremost international law treaties 
dealing specifically with economic, social and cultural rights.19  
The guiding international norm in the context of housing and evictions is contained in 
article 11(1) of the ICESCR, which provides everyone with the right to an adequate 
standard of living. Article 11(1) of the ICESCR reads: 
 
“The States Parties to the Present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The 
States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, 
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation 
based on free consent.” 
 
The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights20 (‘CESCR’) is 
responsible for developing authoritative interpretations of what the obligations of States 
Parties are in terms of the ICESCR through its concluding observations21 and general 
                                                                                                                                                             
signatories and 160 parties. South Africa signed the Covenant on 3 October 1994. See the United 
Nations Treaty Collection database for the status of the Covenant. Available online at 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsaspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en 
(accessed on 15 July 2011). 
18 993 UNTS 3. See Craven MCR The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - 
A Perspective on its Development (1995) 16-22 for the drafting history of the ICESCR (‘Craven The 
ICESCR’). 
19 Craven The ICESCR 24. The rights included in the ICESCR are the right to work (article 6); the right to 
fair conditions of employment (article 7); the right to join and form trade unions (article 8); the right to 
social security (article 9); the right to protection of the family (article 10); the right to an adequate standard 
of living (article 11); the right to health (article 12); the right to education (article 13) and the right to 
culture (article 15). 
20 The Committee consists of 18 experts with internationally recognised competence in the field of human 
rights who serve in their personal capacity for a renewable four year term. The primary task of the 
Committee is to assist the Economic and Social Council with its consideration of the reports that States 
Parties submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (article 16(2) of the ICSECR).  
21 See Langford M and King JA “Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - Past, present and 
future” in Langford M (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence - Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law (2008) 477-516 479 (‘Langford and King “CESCR”’) for a discussion of how the CESCR 
makes its concluding observations. 
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comments.22 The CESCR has adopted two general comments that explain the 
obligations of States Parties in the context of the right to housing and forced evictions. 
 
4 2 1 2 General Comments No 4 and No 7 
In General Comment 423 the CESCR stated that the article 11(1) of the ICESCR is the 
most comprehensive provision on the right to adequate housing and posited that it was 
the most important provision on the right contained in international human rights 
instruments.24 The CESCR noted that the need for a general comment on the right to 
housing arose from the fact that it was receiving insufficient information from States 
Parties on the standards of living that prevailed in the respective countries and therefore 
set out to identify some of the principal issues that are important in relation to the right 
to housing.25 
The CESCR stated that the right applied to everyone and that it should not be 
construed in any way to exclude anyone from enjoying its protection.26 The right to 
housing must be interpreted as having “the right to live somewhere in security, peace 
and dignity.”27 Any interpretation that purports to reduce it to the mere fact of having a 
roof over your head should be avoided because such an interpretation would fail to 
appreciate the interconnected nature of all human rights28 and would specifically 
preclude any substantive evaluation of the adequacy of housing for human habitation.29  
                                                 
22 General comments are considered to be soft international law because they have not crystallised into 
treaty provisions or norms of customary international law. See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 102 
where she explains that soft international law can include: firstly, resolutions that have been adopted at 
international conferences that were organised under the auspices of the United Nations or any of the 
regional human rights bodies in the European, Inter-American and African systems; secondly, guidelines 
adopted by international organisations; or thirdly, reports and guidelines issued by special rapporteurs, 
working groups and other non-treaty based international mechanisms. While these sources of 
international law are not binding on South Africa, they serve as interpretive tools for South African courts 
to have regard to for purposes of section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. Langford and King “CESCR” 480 
notes that general comments are not comparable to ordinary judgments because it is based on the 
experience of the CESCR in reviewing State Party reports. 
23 General Comment No 4 The right to adequate housing, UN Doc E/1992/23 (‘General Comment No 4’). 
24 General Comment No 4 par 3. 
25 General Comment No 4 par 5. 
26 General Comment No 4 par 6. 
27 General Comment No 4 par 7. 
28 General Comment No 4 par 9. 
29 General Comment No 4 par 7. 
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In this regard the CESCR found that housing will be considered adequate if it 
provides security of tenure and certain services; is affordable, habitable and accessible; 
is located in close proximity to social facilities; and is culturally adequate.30 To this end 
all States Parties must take steps,31 on their own and through international 
cooperation,32 to ensure the full realisation of the right to housing for every individual in 
the shortest possible time in accordance with the maximum of available resources.33  
These steps must include the provision of domestic remedies for violations of the 
right to housing and can include, but are not limited to, procedures for lodging appeals 
against evictions that stand to be carried out without a court order; seeking 
compensation for an illegal eviction; to lodge complaints about illegal actions that are 
taken or supported by landlords; to lodge complaints about any form of discrimination in 
the allocation of housing; and to lodge complaints against landlords about unhealthy 
and unsafe living conditions.34 In conclusion, the CESCR stated that it considered all 
instances of forced eviction to be prima facie incompatible with the provisions of the 
ICESCR. The CESCR further stated that forced evictions could only be justified in 
exceptional circumstances and that even then the evictions should only be carried out in 
in accordance with the relevant principles of international law.35 
Six years later, the CESCR adopted General Comment 736 to clarify the implications 
of forced evictions on the obligations of States Parties in terms of the ICESCR.  It 
defined forced evictions as “the permanent or temporary removal against their will of 
individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, 
                                                 
30 General Comment No 4 par 8. See section 2 1 2 in chapter 3 for a discussion of the intangible aspects 
of the right to housing for purposes of developing a substantive interpretation of the right of access to 
adequate housing in section 26(1) of the Constitution. 
31 General Comment No 4 paras 10-13. 
32 Article 23 of the ICESCR reads: 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant agree that international action for the 
achievement of the rights recognized in the present Covenant includes such methods as the 
conclusion of conventions, the adoption of recommendations, the furnishing of technical 
assistance and the holding of regional meetings and technical meetings for the purpose of 
consultation and study organized in conjunction with the Governments concerned.” 
33 General Comment No 4 par 14. 
34 General Comment No 4 par 17. 
35 General Comment No 4 par 18. 
36 General Comment No 7 The right to adequate housing: forced evictions, UN Doc E/1998/22 (‘General 
Comment No 7’). 
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without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection.”37 
The CESCR emphasised that forced evictions were not limited to overpopulated urban 
areas because such practices also took place when people were internally displaced; 
during armed conflict and mass exoduses; as a response to refugee movements; and 
often in the name of development.38 The CESCR stated that children, ethnic minorities 
and other minorities, indigenous people, the elderly, women and other vulnerable 
groups suffered disproportionately in all these instances of forced evictions because 
they are subjected to some form of discrimination in violation of article 2(2) of the 
ICESCR.39 
The CESCR stated that the obligations of States Parties in terms of article 11(1) had 
to be read in conjunction with article 2(1) of the ICESCR. On the one hand, this 
provision places an obligation on States Parties and its agents to refrain from 
conducting forced evictions and to ensure that third parties who bring about forced 
evictions are prosecuted to the full extent of the law.40 Conversely, the CESCR found 
that the most effective foundation upon which to build a system of effective protection 
against forced evictions was to enact legislation that provides strong security of tenure 
rights to occupiers of houses and land; requires conformity with the ICESCR; and 
controls the circumstances under which evictions can be carried out.41 
In this regard States Parties must ensure that they explore all possible alternatives to 
eviction in consultation with those persons that stand to be affected by the eviction in an 
effort to avoid or minimise the need for the use of force.42 States Parties must further 
ensure that evictions are carried out in compliance with the provisions of international 
law and the general principles of reasonableness and proportionality.43 
                                                 
37 General Comment No 7 par 3. 
38 General Comment No 7 paras 5 and 7. 
39 General Comment No 7 par 10. Article 2(2) of the ICESCR reads: 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights 
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.” 
40 General Comment No 7 par 8. 
41 General Comment No 7 par 9. 
42 General Comment No 7 par 13. 
43 General Comment No 7 par 14. 
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The CESCR stated that States Parties must ensure that appropriate procedural 
protection was available to those that stood to be affected because the observance of 
due process was pertinent in instances of forced evictions. States Parties are under an 
obligation to engage in genuine consultation with those that stand to be affected and 
must give them notice of and information on the proposed eviction before the eviction is 
conducted. States Parties must ensure that evictions are not carried out in inclement 
weather, at night or without the presence of government officials. States Parties must 
then ensure that legal assistance is available to persons who seek redress from the 
courts and that the remedies granted by the courts are respected.44 In conclusion, the 
CESCR stated that States Parties must ensure that evictions do not result in individuals 
being rendered homeless or vulnerable to the violation of other human rights.45 
In 2007 the then Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the 
right to an adequate standard of living, Miloon Kothari,46 presented the Human Rights 
Council of the United Nations with a document containing certain principles and 
guidelines for development-based evictions. The United Nations subsequently adopted 
the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and 
Displacement47 (‘Basic Principles’). The Basic Principles represent a further 
development of the Comprehensive Human Rights Guidelines on Development-Based 
Displacements48 and is consistent with General Comment 4 and General Comment 7.49 
The Basic Principles aims to assist States Parties in developing policies and legislation 
to prevent forced evictions50 that are pursued in the name of development.51 In addition 
                                                 
44 General Comment No 7 par 15. 
45 General Comment No 7 par 16. 
46 Mr Kothari was the first person to be appointed in this capacity in 2000 and served as such until 2008 
when his mandate ended. For more information on Mr Kothari see http://www.ohchr.org 
/EN/Issues/Housing/Pages/MiloonKothari.aspx (accessed on 18 March 2011). Mr Kothari was succeeded 
by Ms Raquel Rolnik who is currently the Special Rapporteur. For more information on Ms Rolnik see 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Housing/Pages/RaquelRolnik.aspx (accessed on 18 March 2011). 
47 UN doc A/HRC/4/18. 
48 UN doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/7, annex. 
49 Basic Principles par 3. 
50 Basic Principles par 4 defines “forced evictions” as 
“acts and/or omissions involving the coerced or involuntary displacement of individuals, 
groups and communities from homes and/or lands and common property resources that 
were occupied or depended upon, thus eliminating or limiting the ability of an individual, 
group or community to reside or work in a particular dwelling, residence or location, without 
the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection.” 
51 Basic Principles par 8. 
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to identifying certain general obligations,52 the Basic Principles also included detailed 
obligations on what should happen prior to,53 during54 and immediately after55 
development-based evictions. 
 
4 2 1 3 Conclusion 
Article 11(1) of the ICESCR, together with General Comment 4 and General Comment 
7, provide the normative framework within which the right to housing must be 
understood and interpreted. Together they emphasise that there is a fundamental link 
between the right to housing and all other human rights and that a violation of the 
former will inevitably involve violations of the latter. It is therefore inappropriate to limit 
the meaning of the right to housing because it affects so many areas of human 
existence. The scope of the right to housing should therefore be comprehensive enough 
for certain elements of its adequacy to be identified and to serve as a benchmark for 
evaluating the measures States Parties have adopted in fulfilment of their obligations. 
The Basic Principles constitute soft international law and could develop into binding 
customary international law obligations for South Africa. It is clear that States Parties 
must adopt a national housing policy which caters specifically for vulnerable members 
and groups in society. Such a policy must be concretised in legislation that gives effect 
to the right to housing and provides adequate procedural and substantive safeguards 
against abuses of power and forced evictions. In this regard the reasons for forced 
evictions must satisfy a high level of justification and should only be carried out in strict 
compliance with the abovementioned safeguards and under close supervision of 
government functionaries. 
 
4 2 2 The organising framework 
The Constitutional Court has an obligation to develop the normative and substantive 
content of the right of access to adequate housing. This obligation flows firstly, from the 
fact that the Constitutional Court may only hear constitutional matters and issues that 
                                                 
52 Basic Principles paras 11-36. 
53 Basic Principles paras 37-44. 
54 Basic Principles paras 45-51. 
55 Basic Principles paras 52-58. 
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are connected with those constitutional matters.56 Whether people have access to 
adequate housing and whether they will suffer hardship as a result of an eviction are 
manifestly constitutional issues. Secondly, all courts are instructed to interpret the rights 
in the Bill of Rights in a manner that will promote the values of human dignity, equality 
and freedom.57 To my mind any eviction order in terms of which people are evicted from 
their homes and relocated to a distant place that is granted without engagement with 
what it means to those people to have a place that they can call home will be less likely 
be just and equitable. In Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and 
Others58 (‘Jaftha’), Mokgoro J held that the ability to call a place home had the potential 
to be “the most empowering and dignifying human experience” even under the most 
basic circumstances.59 
It is instructive to consider that the interpretive approach for section 26 of the 
Constitution requires courts to interpret the right in its textual setting.60 This requires 
courts to acknowledge the interrelated nature of all the rights in the Bill of Rights, but 
also to consider the relationship of section 26 with other provisions in the remainder of 
the Constitution. The discussion below will show that all the constitutional, legislative, 
policy and jurisprudential foundations for giving substantive content to the right of 
access to adequate housing are in place. All that is required to actually give substantive 
content to the right is to identify and appropriately describe an organising framework for 
bringing all these pieces together under section 26(1) of the Constitution. 
The White Paper on Housing61 (‘White Paper’) confirmed that such an organising 
framework could form the basis from which substantive content can be given to the right 
of access to adequate housing. The White Paper describes the national housing vision 
as follows: 
 
                                                 
56 Section 167(3)(b) of the Constitution. 
57 Section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
58 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC). 
59 Jaftha par 39. See also Chaskalson A “Human dignity as a foundational value of our constitutional 
order” (2000) 16 SAJHR 193-205 and Liebenberg S “The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-
economic rights” (2005) 21 SAJHR 1-31. 
60 Grootboom par 23. 
61 GG 354 GN 1376 of 23 December 1994. 
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“Housing is defined as a variety of processes through which habitable, stable and 
sustainable public and private residential environments are created for viable 
households and communities. This recognises that the environment within which a 
house is situated is as important as the house itself in satisfying the needs and 
requirements of the occupants. Government strives for the establishment of viable, 
socially and economically integrated communities, situated in areas allowing 
convenient access to economic opportunities as well as health, educational and 
social amenities, within which all South Africa’s people will have access on a 
progressive basis to: A permanent residential structure with secure tenure, ensuring 
privacy and providing adequate protection against the elements; and potable water, 
adequate sanitary facilities including waste disposal and domestic electricity 
supply.”62 
 
The best way to give substantive content to the right of access to adequate housing 
would be to use abovementioned characteristics that the CESCR identifies in General 
Comment 4 as an interpretive guide. Housing would then be “adequate” if it provides 
security of tenure and certain services; is affordable, habitable and accessible; is 
located in close proximity to social facilities; and is culturally adequate.63 The following 
paragraphs will show that it is possible to give substantive content to the right in this 
manner by simply adopting the characteristics that the Committee identified as an 
organising framework. 
Security of tenure, the first characteristic of adequate housing, is underpinned by 
section 25(6) of the Constitution.64 This characteristic is flexible because it provides for 
various types of security of tenure65 that range from community care and emergency 
housing66 on the weaker side to social housing67 and ownership on the stronger side. In 
between these options there is shelter care, transitional housing and communal 
housing. Giving content to the right by identifying security of tenure as a characteristic 
                                                 
62 White Paper 21. 
63 General Comment No 4 par 8. 
64 Section 25(6) of the Constitution states that “[a] person or community whose tenure of land is legally 
insecure as a result of past discriminatory laws of practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.” 
65 Development Action Group “Housing ladder for vulnerable people” (2010) 7(1) Urban Land Matters 8 
provides a graphic illustration of the range of tenure option that is available. 
66 See section 2 2 2 in chapter 3 for a discussion of Chapter 12 of the National Housing Code. 
67 The legislature recently enacted the Social Housing Act 16 of 2008. The preamble of this Act 
acknowledges that “there is a dire need for affordable rental housing for low to medium income 
households which cannot access rental housing in the open market.” The preamble further states that the 
roles and responsibilities of all three spheres of government are to “promote the establishment, 
development and maintenance of socially and economically viable communities and of safe and healthy 
living conditions” which will ensure, interestingly, “the elimination and prevention of slums and slum 
conditions.” 
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would not be a rigid or inflexible approach as it provides a court with a wide range of 
tenure options to have regard to when considering the current living conditions of the 
unlawful occupiers compared to what they may be subjected to in the event of an 
eviction. 
Access to basic municipal services, the second characteristic of adequate housing, 
is underpinned by sections 27(1)(b)68 and 152(1)(b),69 read with schedule 4B70 and 
5B,71 of the Constitution. This characteristic too is flexible because it merely identifies a 
number of basic municipal services that local government must provide without 
specifying the precise quantity or quality of the service to be provided. Giving content to 
the right by identifying the basic municipal services that local government must provide 
as a characteristic would provide a court with a wide menu of service options from 
which to choose when considering the current living conditions of the unlawful occupiers 
compared to what they may be subjected to in the event of an eviction. 
Accessibility, the third characteristic of adequate housing, is underpinned by section 
152(1)(d) of the Constitution.72 It can be argued that this characteristic requires that 
housing should be financially accessible. This creates a link with affordability, the fourth 
characteristic of adequate housing, which is underpinned by section 26(2) of the 
Constitution. It can be argued further that accessibility also incorporates the requirement 
that housing be physically accessible. This creates a link with habitability, the fifth 
characteristic of adequate housing, which is also underpinned by section 152(1)(d) of 
the Constitution. Habitability as a characteristic of adequate housing is supported by 
                                                 
68 Section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution affords everyone the right to have access to “sufficient food and 
water” (emphasis added). 
69 Section 152(1)(b) of the Constitution states that it is one of the objects of local government “to ensure 
the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner”. 
70 The range of basic municipal services that a municipality should provide includes, in terms of schedule 
4B of the Constitution, electricity and gas reticulation; municipal health services; municipal public 
transport; municipal public works; stormwater management systems in built-up areas; and water and 
sanitation services limited to potable water supply systems and domestic waste-water and sewage 
disposal systems. 
71 Schedule 5B of the Constitution adds cleansing; local amenities; municipal parks and recreation; 
municipal roads; refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal; and street lighting. 
72 Section 152(1)(d) of the Constitution states that it is an object of local government “to promote a safe 
and healthy environment”. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
170 
section 20(1) of the Health Act 63 of 197773 and sections 1274 and 17(1)75 of the 
National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977. 
Location, the sixth characteristic of adequate housing, has no direct constitutional or 
statutory provision counterpart. However, it can be argued that section 26 itself 
incorporates this characteristic because the history of forced evictions in South Africa 
requires courts to redress the spatial apartheid that the plethora of discriminatory 
legislation created.76 Location as a characteristic of adequate housing has featured in a 
number of recent eviction cases.77 While it appears clear that this characteristic will not 
allow unlawful occupiers to dictate where they want to live, it affords courts the 
possibility to engage with the proximity of housing to employment opportunities, 
educational facilities, recreational facilities and other social amenities. Culturally 
appropriate housing, the seventh characteristic of adequate housing, is underpinned by 
sections 3078 and 3179 of the Constitution. This characteristic of adequate housing 
                                                 
73 Section 20(1) of the Health Act 63 of 1977 reads: 
“Every local authority shall take all lawful, necessary and reasonably practicable measures - 
(a) to maintain its district at all times in a hygienic and clean conditions; (b) to prevent the 
occurrence within its district of - (i) any nuisance; (ii) any unhygienic conditions; (iii) any 
offensive condition; or (iv) any other condition which will or could be harmful or dangerous to 
the health of any person within its district or the district of any other local authority, or, where 
a nuisance or condition referred to in subparagraphs (i) to (iv), inclusive has so occurred, to 
abate, or cause to be abated, such nuisance, or remedy, or cause to be remedied, such 
condition, as the case may be; ….” 
74 Section 12 of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 empowers a 
local authority to issue a notice to the owner of a building, land or earthwork to demolish or alter it in a 
manner that it will no longer be dilapidated or in a state of disrepair; or to secure the building, land or 
earthwork in a manner that it will no longer show signs of being dangerous or of becoming dangerous. 
75 Section 17(1) of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 empowers 
the Minister to make regulations that provide detailed guidelines about the minimum requirements that a 
building or structure must meet during its construction. 
76 See section 2 2 in chapter 2 for a discussion of the rural land tenure measures that systematically 
deprived black people from acquiring land and forced them into oppressive labour relationships on white 
farms. See section 2 3 in chapter 3 for a discussion of the urban land measures that regulated the access 
of black people to white urban areas. 
77 See City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) par 20; 
Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 (3) SA 454 
(CC) par 254; and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd and Another 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA) par 77, Order 5(4). 
78 Section 30 of the Constitution states that “[e]veryone has the right to use the language and to 
participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner 
inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.” 
79 Section 31 of the Constitution reads: 
“(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the 
right, with other members of that community - (a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion 
and use their language; and (b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic 
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affords courts the possibility to engage with the intangible aspects of the right of access 
to adequate housing and the affective value a house has as a home. 
All the South African courts will be able to have an initial principled engagement with 
the purpose and underlying values of the right of access to adequate housing if the 
Constitutional Court adopted abovementioned organising framework to give substantive 
content to section 26(1) of the Constitution. This will enable courts to follow the classic 
model of constitutional adjudication where they first delineate the scope of the right 
concerned and establish whether the right has been infringed before they consider 
whether the limitation of the right can be justified. This will ensure that the adjudication 
of the right of access to adequate housing does not occur in a normative vacuum.80 All 
courts in South Africa will furthermore be in a position to satisfy their obligation to 
consider international law when interpreting the right of access to adequate housing 
because they will be able to draw on the international human rights dialogue on the 
adequacy of housing. 
In practice the organising framework for giving substantive content to section 26(1) 
of the Constitution will afford people who seek the protection of the right of access to 
adequate housing an opportunity to articulate their housing needs in terms of the 
specific characteristics that are indicative of adequacy. Courts will be able to use this 
organising framework to evaluate the reasonableness of legislative and other measures 
in terms of the model of reasonableness review. Put differently, courts will be better 
placed to evaluate whether the government is succeeding in its goal of facilitating the 
progressive realisation of the right of access to adequate housing because they will 
have a clear indication of what it means to have access to adequate housing.  
Unlawful occupiers will furthermore be able to use this organising framework to 
argue that an eviction will be unjust and inequitable. The unlawful occupiers would be 
able to argue that the emergency or temporary alternative accommodation that the 
government proposes to make available will provide them with less security of tenure, 
access to fewer services, is relatively more inappropriate for human habitation, 
inaccessible, unaffordable and far removed from their livelihood strategies. This is a 
                                                                                                                                                             
associations and other organs of civil society. (2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be 
exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.” 
80 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 175. 
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dramatic change from the position under the common law of evictions where an owner 
could evict squatters in terms of the rei vindicatio without any regard for the personal 
circumstances of the squatters or the severe hardship that accompanied a forced 
eviction. 
While the characteristics that underpin the organising framework for giving 
substantive content to the right of access to adequate housing originate in international 
law, the elements that sustain its transplantation into South African law flow from the 
Constitution and the statutory obligations of local government. The Constitution and the 
statutory obligations of local government stand at the centre of three further 
developments in the law of evictions that require further elaboration. 
What remains is to see what interpretive guidance South African courts can get from 
the three regional human rights systems on the meaning and content of adequate 
housing. 
 
4 3 Interpretive guidance on the adequacy of housing 
4 3 1 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
4 3 1 1 Introduction 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms81 (‘ECHR’) was adopted by the Council of Europe to respond to the atrocities 
committed in Europe during World War II; to instil common values through regional 
integration; and to ensure the unity of and bring the non-Communist countries of Europe 
together within a common ideological framework against the Communist threat.82  
Article 8 of the ECHR provides everyone with a right to respect for their private and 
family life, their home and correspondence and is the foundational provision to be 
considered in the context of the right to housing and evictions. Article 8 of the ECHR 
reads: 
 
                                                 
81 213 UNTS 221. The Convention was adopted on 4 November 1950 and came into force on 3 
September 1953. As on 15 July 2011 the Covenant had 47 ratifications. See 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3b04.html (accessed on 15 July 2011). 
82 Steiner HJ, Alston P and Goodman R International Human Rights in Context - Law, Politics, Morals 
(2008) 933. 
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“(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.” 
 
The European Court of Human Rights83 (‘ECtHR’) has had the opportunity to interpret 
the scope of this right in a number of cases where it was alleged that the United 
Kingdom84 had unfairly discriminated against gypsies/travellers85 by making it nearly 
impossible to obtain planning permission for the stationing of a caravan on land in terms 
of the regulatory framework for land use. In all these cases the ECtHR found that the 
home and/or the private and family life of the gypsies/travellers were at issue and that 
the current regulatory framework constituted an interference that was in accordance 
with the law. All the cases therefore turned on the ECtHR’s interpretation of whether this 
interference was necessary in a democratic society. In this regard the ECtHR recalled 
that  
                                                 
83 The European Court of Human Rights, in its current guise, replaced and superceded the two former 
supervisory bodies, the European Court of Human Rights that was established in 1959 and the European 
Commission of Human Rights, of the ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights consists of 47 judges 
(article 20 of the ECHR) of high moral character who serve in their personal capacity (section 21 of the 
ECHR) for a six year term and may be re-elected (article 23 of the ECHR). Appeals can be lodged within 
the ECtHR from a Committee (court of three judges), to a Chamber (court of seven judges) and to the 
Grand Chamber (court of seventeen judges). 
84 The United Kingdom incorporated the ECHR into its legal system with the adoption of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (royally assented to on 9 November 1998 and came into force on 2 October 2000). 
Where it is not possible for judges to interpret Acts of Parliament in conformity with the ECHR (section 
3(1) of the Act), a declaration of incompatibility must be issued by the court which states the nature of the 
incompatibility (section 4 of the Act). However, this does not invalidate the Act of Parliament, but permits 
its amendment in terms of a fast-track procedure (section 10 of the Act). 
85 Section 16 of the Caravan Sites Act 1960 defines gypsies as “persons of nomadic habit of life, 
whatever their race or origin, but does not include members of an organised group of travelling showmen, 
or of persons in travelling circuses, travelling together as such.” Home R “Gypsies and travellers in the 
United Kingdom: Planning, housing and human rights in a changing legal regulatory framework” (2009) 
20 Stell LR 533-550 537 (‘Home “Gypsies and travellers”’) explains that judicial interpretations of the 
definition has significantly reduced its scope with the effect that it has become very difficult to claim Gypsy 
status for the purpose of getting planning permission. He adds that these interpretations have resulted in 
complex judicial reasoning to differentiate between “new age” travellers, Irish travellers, travelling show 
people and “settled” gypsies/travellers. Currently Planning Circular 01/06 defines “gypsies and travellers” 
as “[p]ersons of nomadic habit of life whatever their race or origin, including such persons who on 
grounds only of their own of their family’s or dependant’s educational or health needs or old age have 
ceased to travel temporarily or permanently, but excluding members of an organised group of travelling 
show people or circus people travelling together as such.” 
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“[a]n interference will be considered ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for a 
legitimate aim if it answers a ‘pressing social need’ and, in particular, if it is 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. While it is for the national authorities to 
make the initial assessment of necessity, the final evaluation as to whether the 
reasons cited for the interference are relevant and sufficient remains subject to 
review by the Court for conformity with the requirements of the Convention.”86 
 
The ECtHR conceded that a margin of appreciation must be afforded to the United 
Kingdom because principle dictates that it is better placed to evaluate the local needs 
and conditions.87 However, the ECtHR noted that this margin of appreciation will vary 
according to the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the individual 
and the nature of the activities restricted, as well as the nature of the aim pursued by 
the restrictions.88 The ECtHR explained that it had to accord the United Kingdom a wide 
margin of appreciation in cases concerning the implementation of planning policies 
because it required the weighing of multitude local factors89 which it was not well 
equipped to challenge. However, the ECtHR added that the availability of procedural 
protections to individuals would be determinative in evaluating whether a State Party 
remained within its margin of appreciation when it established the regulatory framework 
that is capable of interfering with the enjoyment of a right in the Convention.90 
The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (‘Planning Act’) establishes the regulatory 
framework for the granting of planning permission in the United Kingdom. The Planning 
Act requires gypsies/travellers to apply for planning permission to station their caravans 
on land that they purchased.91 The local authority within whose area of jurisdiction the 
                                                 
86 See Lustig-Prean and Beckett v United Kingdom (2000) 39 EHRR 548 paras 80-81; Leander v Sweden 
(1987) 9 EHRR 433 par 59; Miaihle v France (1993) 16 EHRR 332 par 36; Buckley v United Kingdom 
(1997) 23 EHRR 101 par 74 (‘Buckley’); Chapman v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 18 par 90 
(‘Chapman’); and Connors v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 9 par 81 (‘Connors’). 
87 See Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149 par 52; Gillow v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 
335 par 55; Chapman par 91; and Connors par 82. 
88 See Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149 par 52; Gillow v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 
335 par 55; Chapman par 91; and Connors par 82. 
89 See Buckley par 75; Chapman par 92; and Connors par 82. 
90 See McMichael v United Kingdom (1995) 20 EHRR 205 par 87; Buckley par 76; Chapman par 92; and 
Connors par 83. 
91 Section 57(1) of the Planning Act requires anyone to obtain planning permission if they want to carry 
out any development of land. Section 55(1) of the Planning Act defines “development” as “the carrying out 
of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any 
material change in the use of any buildings or other land.” Restormel Borough Council v Secretary of 
State for the Environment and Rabey [1982] JPL 785 and John Davies v Secretary of State for the 
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land falls is empowered to grant or refuse planning permission92 with reference to the 
development plan of the area and “any other material considerations.”93 The local 
authority regularly refuses to grant planning permission because the land is situated in a 
Green Belt area that is sensitive to development. 
The Planning Act empowers the gypsies to take this decision on appeal to the 
Secretary of State for the Environment,94 who is empowered to consider the application 
as if it had been made to him in the first instance.95 The Secretary is empowered to 
appoint an Inspector to hear arguments from both the gypsies/travellers and the local 
authority on the merits of the application for planning permission.96 The Inspector will 
also visit the site to determine whether, in general, the aesthetic impact of granting 
planning permission to station caravans on the land can be ameliorated by planting 
hedges or erecting screens and, specifically, whether it would be appropriate to grant 
the planning permission given the designation and sensitivity of an area for 
development. In this regard the inspector must consider the policy guidance97 contained 
in Circular 28/77,98 Circular 1/9499 and Circular 18/94.100  
                                                                                                                                                             
Environment and South Hertfordshire District Council [1989] JPL 601 confirmed that a change in the use 
of land for the stationing of a caravan can constitute a development. 
92 Section 58(1) of the Planning Act envisages that planning permission may be granted (a) by a 
development order or (b) by the local authority (or, in the cases provided in this Part, by the Secretary of 
State) on application to the authority in accordance with a development order. 
93 Section 70(2) of the Planning Act. Home “Gypsies and travellers” 546 notes that gypsies/travellers have 
gradually been accorded special policy consideration for planning permission. He ascribes this to the fact 
that planning decisions are primarily being based on the policies in the development plan rather than 
other material considerations. 
94 Section 78(1) of the Planning Act. 
95 Section 79(1) of the Planning Act. 
96 Section 79(2) of the Planning Act. 
97 Home “Gypsies and travellers” 547 notes that these policy guidance documents encourages local 
authorities to employ criterion-based policies that take into consideration the proximity of facilities and 
services, whether the development will have a minimal impact on amenities, whether the site has 
acceptable access for vehicles, whether it is possible to erect screens or to landscape the development in 
a manner that ameliorates the aesthetic impact of the development, whether the site can be provided with 
municipal services, whether the site is located in a protected areas and what the impact of the 
development will be on the environment and countryside. 
98 Dated 25 March 1977. 
99 Dated 5 January 1994. This circular was issued to provide policy guidance on whether the special 
accommodation needs of gypsies needs to be taken into account as a material consideration of planning 
decisions after the repeal of Circular 57/78 (dated 15 August 1978) which provided policy guidance on 
Part II of the Caravan Sites Act 1968. Section 6(1) of this Act required local authorities “to exercise their 
powers under section 24 of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 (provision of caravan 
sites) so far as may be necessary to provide adequate accommodation for gipsies residing in or resorting 
to their area.” 
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The Inspector will make a recommendation to the Secretary on whether planning 
permission should be granted or refused. The Secretary often adopts the 
recommendation made by the Inspector and frequently refuses to grant planning 
permission for the stationing of caravans on the site. In that event the gypsies/travellers 
may make a final appeal to the High Court for review of the decision of the Secretary.101 
In the cases discussed below the complainants alleged that the current regulatory 
framework unfairly discriminates against gypsies/travellers because it does not provide 
for appropriate consideration of their rights, given the shortage of caravan sites and the 
apparent lack of responsiveness by the United Kingdom to this need.102 The 
complainants accepted the need for the regulation of land use but asserted that this 
legitimate State action has had a disproportionate socio-economic impact upon them 
and that either the regulatory framework should be reconfigured to enable them to 
accommodate themselves or that the ECHR should oblige the United Kingdom to 
provide them with accommodation.103 
 
4 3 1 2 Case law 
4 3 1 2 1 Buckley 
During 1988 the applicant in Buckley moved with her two small children onto a site 
where her sister was granted temporary planning permission for two caravans.104 The 
                                                                                                                                                             
100 Dated 23 November 1994. This circular instructed local authorities to tolerate unauthorised gypsy 
encampments by taking steps to control unbearable levels of nuisance (par 6) and to prevent 
encampments becoming a health hazard (par 8). 
101 Section 288(1) of the Planning Act. 
102 Home “Gypsies and travellers” 544-545 notes that the need for additional residential caravan pitches 
and transit place were conservatively estimated during 2003 at 2000 and 2500 respectively. This would 
require the provisioning of approximately 900 additional plots per annum for five consecutive years. 
Between 2003 and 2005 the United Kingdom could only deliver an additional 140 plots per year. The 
Department of Communities and Local Government has therefore injected £ 56m for the financial years of 
2006-2008 and a further £ 97m for the financial years of 2008-2011 to achieve this goal. 
103 Clements L and Simmons A “European Court of Human Rights - Sympathetic unease” in Langford M 
(ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence - Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 409-
427 414 (‘Clements and Simmons “European Court of Human Rights”’). Similar developments have 
occurred in the area of landlord and tenant law. See Harrow London Borough Council v Qazi [2003] 
UKHL 43; Kay and Others v Lambeth London Borough Council, Leeds City Council v Price and Others 
[2006] UKHL 10 (HL) and McCann v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 42. The cases are discussed in 
Bright S Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (2007) 272-284, 610-613 and 670-672; Fox L 
Conceptualising Home - Theories, Laws and Policies (2007) 481-517; and Gray K and Gray SF Elements 
of Land Law (2009) 125-131 (‘Gray and Gray Elements’). 
104 Section 91 of the Planning Act. 
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applicant decided to abandon the itinerant lifestyle105 that she had maintained until then 
because she found it difficult being on the move constantly while she was expecting her 
third child. Later that year, the applicant acquired a small piece of land toward the back 
of her sister’s land with a view to establishing a home so that the two eldest children 
could start attending school. The applicant then applied, retrospectively, for planning 
permission to station three caravans on the land. On two occasions, in 1989 and in 
1994, the Secretary refused to grant the applicant planning permission106 because the 
Inspector found that the applicant’s site extended further into the open countryside than 
was permitted and therefore constituted a violation of the local development plan to 
protect the countryside from any avoidable development.107 After each refusal the 
applicant was informed in writing, during 1992 and 1994, that caravan pitches were 
available at the County Council’s official gypsy caravan park approximately 700 metres 
from her land in Meadow Drove.108 The caravan park consisted of 15 pitches each with 
a brick building on it. The buildings contained a kitchen and sanitary facilities and could 
accommodate two caravans and two vehicles each.109 
The applicant argued that the planning measures had a disproportionate effect on 
her lifestyle as a gypsy because it prohibited her from providing a safe and stable 
environment for her children while they were attending school.110 The applicant argued 
further that she would much rather plant vegetation in front of her well-kept site to 
maintain the aesthetics of the countryside111 than consider moving to the official 
caravan park where the safety of her family would be in danger on account of various 
                                                 
105 In Wrexham County Borough v National Assembly of Wales, Michael Berry and Florence Berry [2004] 
JPL 65 the court held that a gypsy would lose her gypsy status if she no longer maintained a “nomadic 
habit of life” by retiring from travelling for reasons that include ill health, old age or a desire to abandon 
the itinerant way of life. The court further held that the test for regaining the gypsy status would be to have 
“an honest and realistically realisable intention” of taking up an itinerant way of life in the near future. 
Home “Gypsies and travellers” 540 notes that in the subsequent case of O’Connor v SSTLG and Bath & 
North East Somerset Council [2002] EWHC 2649 the court found that the specific history of travelling and 
the preference of living in a house would be determinative of whether the gypsy way of life had been 
surrendered in a particular case. 
106 Buckley paras 17 and 23. 
107 Buckley paras 16 and 22. 
108 Buckley par 25. 
109 Buckley par 24. 
110 Buckley par 64. 
111 Buckley par 65. 
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instances of breaches of the peace, crime and violence.112 The applicant added that she 
would not be able to afford a pitch at a private caravan site.113 
The majority of the ECtHR found that the applicant was entitled to the protection 
afforded by article 8 because she had established a home114 for her children on the land 
that she acquired lawfully.115 According to the majority the enforcement measures taken 
in terms of the Planning Act116 were in accordance with the law117 and pursued the 
legitimate aims listed in article 8(2) of the ECHR.118 The case therefore turned on the 
question whether there were adequate procedural safeguards available to the applicant 
to challenge the decision not to grant her planning permission. In this regard the 
majority held that the regulatory framework for planning permission provided 
comprehensively for appeals to the Secretary and for judicial review by a High Court 
when local authorities refuse to grant planning permission.119 The majority also held that 
the reasonable concerns of the applicant about the suitability of the official caravan park 
could not force a construction of article 8 that would allow for an individual to express a 
preference about the location of her place of residence and for that preference to 
override the general interest of the public120 in preserving the rural landscape. In 
conclusion, the majority held that the applicant’s predicament was properly considered 
in terms of the regulatory framework.121 
In a partially dissenting opinion Judge Repik found that the majority erred in holding 
that there was no violation of article 8. Judge Repik noted that the majority failed to 
appreciate that the government disputed whether the applicant legally established a 
home that could attract the protection of article 8.122 The fact that the government did 
not consider the applicant’s home worthy of protection made it impossible for the 
Inspectors to consider her interests in any real terms when they considered the 
                                                 
112 Buckley par 65. 
113 Buckley par 66. 
114 Gillow v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 335 paras 46 and 55. 
115 Buckley par 54. 
116 See section 172 of the Planning Act. 
117 Buckley par 61. 
118 Buckley par 62. 
119 Buckley par 79. 
120 Buckley par 81. 
121 Buckley par 84. 
122 Buckley page 134. 
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guidelines for the application of planning policy to gypsies.123 As such, the Inspectors 
could not have considered adequately the importance of article 8; the impact that the 
subsequent eviction would have on the applicant’s family; or the fact that the applicant’s 
land was not situated in unspoilt countryside or on land that was subject to special 
protection.124 In another partially dissenting opinion Judge Lohmus also found that the 
majority erred in holding that there was no violation of article 8 because it failed to 
appreciate that there was a need to protect the cultural heritage and identity of 
gypsies/travellers125 and that this need could warrant different treatment to preserve 
their heritage and identity.126 
In a further dissenting opinion Judge Pettiti found that the majority erred in holding 
that there was no violation of article 8 or article 14.127 Judge Pettiti noted that the 
majority failed to appreciate the fact that the cumulative effect of the administrative rules 
that gypsies/travellers had to comply with before they could apply for planning 
permission to station a caravan on land made it impossible for an itinerant family to 
make arrangements for its accommodation and social integration.128 As a result, any 
attempt to comply with the requirements of the local authority or circulars forced families 
to contravene other rules. Judge Pettiti accordingly found that the majority erroneously 
limited the scope of their analysis to places that could attract the protection of a home in 
terms of article 8 of the ECHR.129 He further held that the majority erroneously accepted 
that the government pursued legitimate purposes through the strict application of its 
planning policy.130 This acceptance extended the scope of the margin of appreciation 
                                                 
123 Buckley page 135. 
124 Buckley page 136. 
125 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Resolution (75) 13. 
126 Buckley page 136. 
127 Article 14 of the ECHR reads: 
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or 
other status.” 
128 Buckley page 137.  
129 Buckley page 139. 
130 Buckley page 139. 
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too far in this case.131 Finally, he also found that the official caravan park was not a 
viable alternative for the applicant.132  
 
4 3 1 2 2 Chapman 
On 18 January 2001 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR handed down five judgments 
that concerned planning and enforcement measures that were taken against gypsies. In 
all five judgments the ECtHR held that there was no violation of articles 6,133 14 or 1 of 
Protocol 1;134 with the majority135 further holding that there was no violation of article 8. 
In all five cases the minority136 held that there was a violation of article 8 because they 
found no reason why the interference with the respective applicants’ homes was 
necessary in a democratic society. Chapman is considered to be the leading judgment 
in this series because in each of the other four judgments that were delivered on the 
same day the minority simply refers to their joint dissenting opinion in Chapman. The 
discussion below will therefore only engage with the Chapman judgment because the 
                                                 
131 Buckley page 141. 
132 Buckley page 139. 
133 Article 6(1) of the ECHR provides: 
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the 
press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public 
order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the 
protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of 
justice.” 
134 Article 1 of Protocol 1 provides that: 
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The 
preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce 
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or others contributions or penalties.” 
135 The majority comprised the following judges: Mr Wildhaber (president), Mr Costa, Mr Küris, Mr 
Türmen, Mr Butkevych, Mrs Greve, Mr Baka, Mrs Botoucharova, Mr Ugrekhelidze and Lord Justice 
Schiemann. 
136 The minority comprised the following judges: Mr Pastor Rodruejo, Mr Bonello, Mrs Tulkens, Mrs 
Stráznická, Mr Lorenzen, Mr Fishbach and Mr Casadevall. In all five cases Judge Bonello wrote a 
separate concurring judgment in which he took issue with whether the interference with article 8, which he 
“grudgingly accepted”, was in accordance with the law. As such Judge Bonello found that the 
constitutional principle of “clean hands” precluded the United Kingdom from claiming the protection of the 
law. 
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facts in Beard v United Kingdom,137 Coster v United Kingdom,138 Lee v United 
Kingdom139 and Smith v United Kingdom140 are the same in all material terms. 
In Chapman the applicant, a married gypsy woman with four children, purchased a 
piece of land with the intention of living on it in her caravans. In 1986 the Three Rivers 
District Council refused her application for retrospective planning permission to station 
her caravans on the land and served her with enforcement notices.141 On appeal to the 
Secretary an Inspector found that the national and local planning policies must override 
the applicant’s interest because her land fell within a metropolitan Green Belt area that 
was particularly vulnerable to development pressure. However, the Inspector 
recommended that the applicant be afforded fifteen months to relocate to another site 
since there were no official or private caravan parks in the District.142 The applicant 
remained on her land upon the effluxion of this period because she had nowhere else to 
go and subsequently applied for planning permission for a bungalow.143 This was again 
refused and the applicant received fines of £ 150 and £ 550 for failure to comply with 
the enforcement order.144 This forced the applicant and her family to resume an itinerant 
lifestyle145 while another application for planning permission for a bungalow was lodged 
and then refused.146 On another appeal to the Secretary the Inspector concluded that 
the proposed developments did not fall within one of the categories of appropriate 
development in the Green Belt area and that there were no special circumstances in 
this case that could outweigh the strong presumption against unsuitable development in 
the Green Belt area.147 The Inspector added that, even if special circumstances existed, 
                                                 
137 (2001) 33 EHRR 19. 
138 (2001) 33 EHRR 20. 
139 (2001) 33 EHRR 29. 
140 (2001) 33 EHRR 33. 
141 Chapman par 13. 
142 Chapman par 14. 
143 Chapman par 15. 
144 Section 179(1) of the Planning Act makes it an offence to ignore the instructions contained in an 
enforcement order and section 179(2) makes any person that was convicted in terms of subsection (1) 
liable to pay a fine. 
145 Chapman par 15. 
146 Chapman par 16. 
147 It is for this reason that PPG 2 creates, in addition to the general development policies, a general 
presumption against inappropriate development within green belt areas (par 3.1) that can only be 
rebutted when the applicant can show that other considerations outweigh the harm that the environment 
will suffer if planning permission is granted (par 3.2). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
182 
the granting of planning permission would create a precedent for similar schemes that 
would be difficult to refuse in future.148 
The ECtHR held that the planning and enforcement measures taken against the 
applicant in terms of the Planning Act 1990 constituted an interference149 that was in 
accordance with the law150 and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of 
others through preservation of the environment.151 However, the ECtHR acknowledged 
that the interference with her home had widespread implications for the applicants 
because the occupation of her caravan formed an integral part of her culture and 
identity as a gypsy/traveller. Many gypsies/travellers increasingly settle on a specific 
place for extended periods of time under the pressure of development or of their own 
volition despite retaining the desire to maintain an itinerant lifestyle. An interference with 
the home of a gypsy/traveller therefore has a wider impact on her ability to continue 
conducting her private and family life according to the traditions of an itinerant 
minority.152 
The majority therefore acknowledged that the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities153 was indicative of an emerging international 
consensus amongst the contracting States of the Council of Europe. This consensus 
required the recognition of the special needs of minorities so that their security, identity 
and lifestyle could be protected in a manner that would ensure the preservation of a 
diverse cultural heritage for the whole community.154 However, the majority noted that 
the failure to reach agreement on the implementation of the Framework Convention 
showed that the consensus was not sufficiently concrete155 for it to overturn the 
precedent set in Buckley in accordance with its duty to be responsive to the changing 
conditions in Contracting States.156 The impact of the Framework Convention is 
                                                 
148 Chapman par 17. 
149 Chapman par 78. 
150 Chapman par 79. 
151 Chapman par 82. 
152 Chapman par 73. 
153 CETS no. 157. The Framework Convention was adopted on 1 February 1996 and came into force on 1 
February 1998. 
154 Chapman par 93. 
155 Chapman par 94. 
156 Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 622 par 35. However, the minority disputed the authority of 
this case because it was decided before the reforms brought about by Protocol 11 came into operation. 
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therefore limited by Buckley to giving special consideration to the needs and demands 
of an itinerant lifestyle in the regulatory planning framework.157 The majority therefore 
found that it was limited to an analysis of whether the particular circumstances of the 
case, and not the general situation in the United Kingdom, constituted a violation of 
article 8.158 
Against this background the majority found that the applicant did not lead a 
traditional itinerant gypsy lifestyle because she became sedentary when she settled on 
her land without the requisite planning permission to station caravans.159 They also 
found that the applicant had the opportunity to make representations to the Inspectors 
about her particular personal circumstances.160 The Inspectors furthermore gave special 
consideration to whether, when weighed against the need to protect the countryside 
from unnecessary encroachment, the location of her land and the efforts she made to 
mitigate the visual intrusion of her caravans on the quiet rural character of the area 
could be regarded as an exceptional circumstance.161  
The majority noted that the applicant could take these decisions on judicial review to 
the High Court if she believed that the Inspectors did not take all the relevant 
circumstances into consideration or if they founded their decisions on irrelevant 
considerations.162 Finally, the ECtHR found that the applicant failed to provide the court 
with information that would have enabled it to consider whether the alternative sites that 
periodically became available in neighbouring counties would be suitable for her 
family.163 The majority found that the regulatory planning framework provided the 
applicant with sufficient procedural safeguards164 and that there was no violation of 
article 8.165 
                                                                                                                                                             
This case therefore was not authority for the impact of the Framework Convention on the current 
conditions in the United Kingdom. See Chapman par O-I1. 
157 Chapman par 96.  
158 Chapman par 100. 
159 Chapman par 105. 
160 Chapman par 106. 
161 Chapman paras 108 and 109. 
162 Chapman par 110. 
163 Chapman par 111 and 112. 
164 Chapman par 114. 
165 Chapman par 116. 
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The minority held that the majority’s characterisation of the obligations imposed by 
article 8 failed to appreciate that States may, through inaction, still be in violation of 
fundamental rights because the interferences caused by merely respecting a right was 
just as severe as those caused by inadequate measures to protect, promote and fulfil 
the right.166 When determining whether an interference is “necessary in a democratic 
society” it would then be more appropriate to afford States a margin of appreciation 
which is curbed, especially in cases where a balance has to be struck between the 
individual interest of a gypsy and the collective interests of the community, by the 
current circumstances in a specific State.167 The margin of appreciation of the United 
Kingdom should be restricted according to the emerging consensus contained in the 
Framework Convention to the extent that, in addition to refraining from discrimination, it 
may be necessary to require positive steps to be taken that will improve the lives of 
gypsies.168  
The minority also held that it was misguided to question, as the majority did, the 
applicant’s commitment to a traditional itinerant gypsy lifestyle. The applicant, in 
accordance with established planning policy,169 acquired a piece of land to station her 
caravans because, due to the legislatively reduced gypsy sites, it was impossible for her 
to obtain lawful accommodation on an official gypsy site.170 The applicant’s position was 
exacerbated by the fact that she faced the overwhelming task of persuading the local 
authority that her personal circumstances warranted special consideration in order to 
rebut the presumption against inappropriate development of the countryside. The result 
is that the regulatory framework is unable to afford any substantial weight to the housing 
interests of the applicant or her vested interest in preserving her cultural heritage and 
identity.171 It was therefore imprudent to hold that a narrow margin of appreciation in the 
discretionary enforcement of planning permission for environmental concerns would 
exclude gypsies from the planning framework. In the United Kingdom the systemic 
failure in the provision of authorised gypsy sites has already been patched up with 
                                                 
166 Chapman par O-I2. 
167 Chapman par O-I4. 
168 Chapman par O-I4. 
169 Chapman par O-I7. 
170 Chapman par O-I6. 
171 Chapman par O-I10. 
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official policy that required sympathetic application of planning policy with regard to 
gypsies.172 This claim loses further credence when compared to the reality that gypsies 
are often precluded, either through outright refusal or indirectly through exorbitant 
admission costs, from entering private residential sites - even on a seasonal or 
temporary basis.173 It is furthermore inappropriate to misrepresent the housing interests 
of gypsies/travellers as a specific preference to stay at a location of their choosing 
without any regard to the resources at their disposal.174 It is equally incongruous to hold 
that affording protection to a gypsy for establishing a home in the face of arduous 
planning bureaucracy would be discriminatory towards non-gypsies who are barred 
from building houses on their land in the same area.175 The minority accordingly held 
that there was a violation of article 8 in this case because the local authority failed to 
ensure that gypsies/travellers had a practical and effective way of asserting their article 
8 rights in accordance with their traditional lifestyle.176 
 
4 2 1 2 3 Connors 
In Connors the applicant, a married gypsy man, occupied a plot in Cottingley Springs 
with his family in terms of a contractual licence177 with the Leeds City Council. At the 
beginning of 2000 the applicant and his daughter, who also had a contractual licence to 
occupy a plot adjacent to that of the applicant with her husband, received notice to 
quit178 as a result of various instances of anti-social behaviour in breach of their licence 
conditions.179 The County Court granted an order for summary possession of the plots 
on the basis that the applicant and his daughter were trespassing.180 Approximately one 
                                                 
172 Chapman par O-I11. 
173 Chapman par O-I12. 
174 Chapman par O-I12. 
175 Chapman par O-I14. 
176 Chapman par O-I15. 
177 Clause 18 of the licence stated:  
“No nuisance is to be caused by the occupier, his guests, nor any member of his family to 
any other person, including employees of the Council, the occupiers of any other plots on the 
Site, or occupiers of any land or buildings in the vicinity of the Site.” 
See Gray and Gay Elements 1304-1316 on contractual licences. 
178 See Gray and Gray Elements 406-413. A notice to quit is a method terminating a lease or tenancy. 
179 Connors paras 14-16. 
180 Connors paras 18, 22 and 25. See Gray and Gray Elements 1260-1287 on trespass and privacy. 
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month later the Council obtained a warrant for possession181 which it executed a 
fortnight thereafter, during the early hours of the morning, with the assistance of officers 
of the police and the sheriff’s office.182 The applicant then obtained permission to 
occupy a piece of land at Cottingley Drive where he was evicted alongside a group of 
unidentified gypsies.183 The Council also applied for an injunction184 against the 
applicant to prevent further trespassing at Cottingley Springs185 which eventually 
brought about the dissolution of his marriage due to the stress caused by their insecure 
existence.186 
The United Kingdom argued that local authority gypsy sites required exemption from 
the provisions which afforded security of tenure to occupiers of other accommodation. 
The government argued that it needed a measure of flexibility to manage local authority 
sites if local authorities were required to cater for the special housing needs of 
gypsies/travellers.187 The government argued that the power of summary eviction was a 
vital management tool which facilitated the speedy removal of troublemakers from the 
site and enabled other occupiers to cope with anti-social behaviour.188 
At the outset the ECtHR distinguished Chapman from this case because here the 
applicant was in lawful occupation of the plot and simply sought the procedural 
protections afforded to the occupiers of privately owned land and official local authority 
gypsy sites.189 The applicant, like many other gypsies who are becoming ever more 
sedentary,190 enjoyed this protection for thirteen years before he received a contractual 
                                                 
181 Connors par 27. A warrant for possession is an eviction order that is based on the applicant’s stronger 
right to possession. 
182 Connors par 28. 
183 Connors paras 31 and 32. 
184 See Gray and Gray Elements 1283 for the circumstances under which it may be appropriate to obtain 
injunctive relief. 
185 Connors par 34. 
186 Connors par 35. 
187 Connors par 87. 
188 Connors par 87. 
189 Connors par 86. 
190 Later in the judgment the ECtHR acknowledged the challenges that the apparent change in lifestyle of 
gypsies presented to local authorities when it stated that it 
“would not underestimate the difficulties of the task facing the authorities in finding workable 
accommodation solutions for the gypsy and traveller population and accepts that this is an 
area in which national authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation in adopting and pursuing 
their social and housing policies. The complexity of the situation has, if anything, been 
enhanced by the apparent shift in habit in the gypsy population which remains nomadic in 
spirit if not in actual or constant practice. The authorities are being required to give special 
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licence to occupy the plot at Cottingley Springs. Local authority sites are therefore 
increasingly accommodating gypsies who are, perhaps uncharacteristically, settling 
down due to various reasons.  
The ECtHR was not persuaded that local authorities used eviction by summary 
procedure as a means of ensuring that sites often became vacant or of deterring 
families from becoming long term occupants.191 The ECtHR noted that summary eviction 
proceedings were rarely used to control anti-social behaviour on local authority sites 
and that local authorities relied on a different range of powers to regulate it at other 
forms of accommodation because, in fact, they could only proceed to evict subject to 
independent court review of the justification for the measure.192 The ECtHR was not 
convinced that it would make the management of local authority gypsy sites unworkable 
if local authorities were required to establish reasons for evicting long-standing 
applicants as they were required to do in other instances.193 The ECtHR also noted that 
the courts in the United Kingdom had, when they considered the professed lack of 
security of tenure by gypsies at local authority sites, found no violation of articles 8 or 14 
of the Convention. The ECtHR found that the domestic courts reached these findings, 
despite articulating serious concerns about the current regime of evicting gypsies, 
because they did not want to encroach upon the functions of the legislature in seeking 
to resolve the complex issues surrounding the housing interests of gypsies/travellers.194 
The domestic courts furthermore accepted that the procedural protections that were in 
place could mitigate the impact of summary eviction proceedings.195  
However, the ECtHR found that the domestic courts failed to appreciate that a 
factual dispute - whether the applicant caused and could subsequently be held 
responsible for the nuisance caused by others at Cottingley Springs - existed between 
the applicant and the local authority. The ECtHR found that the procedural protections 
were inadequate because the local authority was not required to provide any 
substantive reasons for evicting the applicant.  In the absence of any reasons for 
                                                                                                                                                             
consideration to a sector of the population which is no longer easy to define in terms of the 
nomadism which is the raison d'être of that special treatment” (par 93). 
191 Connors par 88. 
192 Connors par 89. 
193 Connors par 89. 
194 Connors par 91. 
195 Connors par 91. 
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evicting the applicant, judicial review would serve no purpose because it would not 
provide any opportunity for the examination of the facts in dispute between the 
parties.196  
 
4 3 1 3 Conclusion 
The structure of the rights in the ECHR follow a classic theoretical understanding of 
fundamental rights, namely that there is a distinction between, on the one hand, the 
definition or scope of the right and, on the other hand, the justification for limiting the 
right. Article 8 of the ECHR is no exception to this understanding and therefore clearly 
states the right in subparagraph 1, while the reasons that may serve as legitimate 
limitations to this right are listed in subparagraph 2. The ECtHR generally follows this 
theoretical distinction between scope and limitation in its reasoning. However, in certain 
cases the ECtHR either ignores the definitional stage completely and proceeds to the 
limitation analysis or merges the two stages.197 This is similar to the position in South 
Africa, where the Constitutional Court has consistently held that sections 26(1) and (2) 
of the Constitution must be read together and then proceeded to focus exclusively on 
the reasonableness of the measures that government adopted to give effect to the right 
of access to adequate housing. 
The case law of the ECtHR discussed above is an example of how the court initially 
failed to pay sufficient attention to the definitional stage by simply accepting that article 
8 was engaged. To a large extent this explains why its approach to the adjudication of 
these cases has focussed on the formalities of a proportionality review and a 
consideration of the extent of the State’s margin of appreciation.198  
Chapman marked the beginning of a gradual change in the approach of the ECtHR 
because it explicitly recognised the need to afford special consideration to the rights and 
needs of gypsies/travellers in the regulatory framework for land use. The ECtHR 
recognised that the right to respect the home of gypsies/travellers requires positive 
action from the United Kingdom in awarding planning permission to station a caravan on 
                                                 
196 Connors par 92. 
197 Gerards J and Senden H “The structure of fundamental rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights” (2009) 7 I Con 619-653 621. 
198 Clements and Simmons “European Court of Human Rights” 414. 
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the land that they lawfully acquired. The margin of appreciation that is accorded to 
States Parties has subsequently narrowed to take into account the emerging consensus 
amongst contracting States Parties that the rights and needs of gypsies/travellers 
require special protection. 
However, local authorities have been slow to accord this special consideration to 
gypsies/travellers due to a lack of explicit policy guidance. Gypsies/travellers remain 
caught in a vicious circle of administrative bureaucracy from which it is difficult to 
escape because any attempt to do so involves either enduring the physical and 
psychological trauma of living in a confined space or undertaking protracted legal 
proceedings against a local authority. Home explains that 
“[t]he process involves tactical manoeuvring by both sides, with the occupiers trying 
to achieve security on their land and improve their living conditions, and the council 
usually seeking to prevent the creation of new residential use rights in the 
countryside, or at least to circumscribe such rights as tightly as possible.”199 
 
The only way that gypsies/travellers will be able to escape this circle is for the ECtHR to 
develop the scope of the right to a home in the context of gypsies/travellers and to add 
depth to that determination with reference to the non-discrimination provision in article 
14 of the ECHR.200 A close reading of the case law discussed above suggests that this 
development has already started. The ECtHR has already recognised that the right to a 
home includes the fact that a home must provide security of tenure201 and that the home 
must be affordable.202 The ECtHR has further recognised that a home must be 
habitable,203 accessible204 and located in a safe and healthy environment.205 Article 14 
has similarly been developed in the context of the rights of gypsies/travellers to a home 
that accords with their social and cultural heritage.206 
                                                 
199 Home “Gypsies and Travellers” 546. 
200 See Sandland R “Developing a jurisprudence of difference: The protection of the human rights of 
travelling peoples by the European Court of Human Rights” (2008) 8 HRLR 475-516. 
201 See Buckley page 135 and Connors par 91. See also Somerset CC v Frederick Isaacs [2002] EWHC 
1014; R (Smith) v Barking and Dagenheim LB [2002] EWHC 2400; and Sheffield City Council v Smart 
[2002] EWCA Civ 4. 
202 See Buckley page 135 and Chapman par 112. 
203 See Moldovan and Others v Romania (No 2) (2007) 44 EHRR 16, Marzari v Italy (1999) 28 EHRR 
175, O’Rourke v United Kingdom Application No 39022/97, Lee par 21 and Chapman par 112. 
204 See Chapman par 97. 
205 See Buckley page 135 and Chapman par 112. 
206 See Buckley pages 135-136. 
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However, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR would be that much richer if it developed 
these characteristics of the right to a home under article 8(1) by engaging with its 
normative and substantive content in a systematic way, instead of simply accepting that 
the right is engaged before it probes the legitimacy of the reasons advanced to limit the 
right. South African courts can learn a great deal about the interpretation of the right to 
housing from the ECtHR’s gradual development of article 8 by infusing a greater 
contextual dimension into the case law affecting the housing rights and interests of 
gypsies/travellers. 
 
4 3 2 The Revised European Social Charter 
4 3 2 1 Introduction 
The European Social Charter207 (‘ESC’) was intended to be the counterpart, in the area 
of economic and social rights, of the ECHR.208 However, the ESC was overshadowed 
by the ECHR and largely ignored until the mid-1990s.209 De Schutter attributes this to 
the fact that firstly, the conclusions that the Committee of Independent Experts210 
adopted after examining country reports for compliance with the ESC were relatively 
obscure and hardly publicised; secondly, the subordinate role of the Committee of 
Independent Experts to both the Governmental Committee and the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe resulted in an ambiguous mechanism for control 
which was neither fully judicial nor purely political; thirdly, the ESC did not provide for an 
individual or collective complaints mechanism; fourthly, its application was limited to 
                                                 
207 CETS no 35. The European Social Charter was concluded by thirteen Member States of the Council of 
Europe on 18 October 1961 in Turin and entered into force when it attained its fifth ratification on 26 
February 1965. 
208 In International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v France Complaint No 14/2003 
(Decision on the merits, 8 September 2004) the European Committee of Social Rights stated that the 
ESC was a living human rights instrument that drew inspiration from the values of human dignity, 
autonomy, equality and solidarity. Viewed from this perspective the envisaged purpose of the ESC was to 
compliment the ECHR by adding a full set of economic, social and cultural rights to complete the rights 
enshrined the ECHR. See also Khaliq U and Churchill R “The European Committee of Social Rights - 
Putting flesh on the bare bones of the European Social Charter” in Langford M (ed) Social Rights 
Jurisprudence - Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 428-452 428 (‘Khaliq and 
Churchill “Putting flesh on bare bones”’) and De Schutter O “The European Social Charter” in Krause C 
and Scheinin M (eds) International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (2009) 425-442 425 (‘De 
Schutter “The European Social Charter”’). 
209 De Schutter “The European Social Charter” 425. 
210 During 1998 this body decided to rename itself the European Committee of Social Rights in order to 
mark its development into a quasi-judicial human rights body. 
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nationals of the States Parties to the ESC; fifthly, its à la carte approach allowed States 
Parties, within certain limitations, to select the provisions which it would be bound by 
upon accession to the ESC; and finally, certain guarantees in the ESC were considered 
to be satisfied if the majority of its intended beneficiaries were protected.211  
The ensuing revitalisation212 of the ESC resulted in the clarification of the role of the 
Committee of Independent Experts;213 the adoption of a collective complaints 
mechanism214 and the revision of the ESC.215 The Revised ESC is comprised of the 
nineteen rights contained in the original ESC,216 the four rights contained in the 
Additional Protocol,217 and seven new rights.218 
                                                 
211 De Schutter “The European Social Charter” 425. 
212 De Schutter “The European Social Charter” 426 notes that the Committee of Ministers launched this 
revitalisation process at the Ministerial Conference on Human Rights which were held in Rome during 
November 1990. The objectives of the revitalisation process were to breathe new life into the ESC and to 
re-establish the Council of Europe as a preeminent authority in setting human rights standards for the 
European continent. For a more detailed account of this process, see Harris D “A fresh impetus for the 
European Social Charter” (1992) 41 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 659-676 and Harris D 
and D’Arcy J The European Social Charter (2001) 12-14. 
213 De Schutter “The European Social Charter” 426 notes that the Protocol Amending the European 
Social Charter CETS no 142, although it never came into force, brought about an understanding between 
the Committee of Independent Experts and the Governmental Committee that the Committee of 
Independent Experts would have the exclusive competence to interpret and apply the ESC. 
214 The Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective 
Complaints CETS no 158 was adopted on 9 November 1995 and entered into force on 1 July 1998. The 
collective complaints mechanism allowed non-governmental organisations to challenge legislation and 
policies of States Parties for violating the commitments it made under the ESC without first exhausting the 
local remedies that may be available to the victims of these alleged violations. See Brillat R “A new 
protocol to the European Social Charter providing for collective complaints” (1996) 1 EHRLR 53-62 and 
Churchill R and Khaliq U “The collective complaints system of the European Social Charter: An effective 
mechanism for ensuring compliance with economic and social rights?” (2004) 15 EJIL 417-456. 
215 CETS no 163. The Revised ESC was adopted on 3 May 1996 in Strasbourg and entered into force 
when it attained its third ratification on 1 July 1999. 
216 These rights, in their reformulated guise, are: the right to work (article 1); the right to just conditions of 
work (article 2); the right to safe and healthy working conditions (article 3); the right to fair remuneration 
(article 4); the right to organise (article 5); the right to bargain collectively (article 6); the right of children 
and young persons to protection (article 7); the right of employed women to protection of maternity (article 
8); the right to vocational guidance (article 9); the right to vocational training (article 10); the right to 
protection of health (article 11); the right to social security (article 12); the right to social and medical 
assistance (article 13); the right to benefit from social welfare services (article 14); the right of persons 
with disabilities to independence, social integration and participation in the life of the community (article 
15); the right of the family to social, legal and economic protection (article 16); the right of children and 
young persons to social, legal and economic protection (article 17); the right to engage in a gainful 
occupation in the territory of other Parties (article 18); and the right of migrant workers and their families 
to protection and assistance (article 19). 
217 CETS no 128. The Additional Protocol was adopted on 5 May 1988 and entered into force on 4 
September 1992. These rights are: the right to equal opportunities and equal treatment in matters of 
employment and occupation without discrimination on the grounds of sex (article 20); the right to 
information and consultation (article 21); the right to take part in the determination and improvement of 
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The European Committee of Social Rights219 (‘ECSR’) is subordinate to the 
Committee of Ministers (‘CoM’), the political organ of the Council of Europe, which is the 
only body that may make recommendations to States Parties. However, in theory, the 
ECSR is the only body that is competent to give an authoritative interpretation of the 
broadly phrased provisions of the Revised ESC. As such, the ECSR's interpretation of 
provisions in the Revised ESC, along with its views on how that Revised ESC is to be 
applied in the context of a national report220 or a collective complaint,221 constitutes its 
“jurisprudence”. The ECSR considers the Revised ESC to be a living instrument that 
must be interpreted according to the realities that prevail in the jurisdictions of member 
states of the Council of Europe as well as relevant international instruments.222 Any 
limitations of these social rights must therefore be read restrictively so as to preserve 
the essence of the right and to achieve the overall purpose of the Revised ESC.223 This 
approach to the interpretation of the Revised ESC has empowered the ECSR to 
develop a dynamic understanding of the essence of each right, which has subsequently 
enabled it to clarify the obligations of States Parties.224 
Some of the most influential decisions of the ECSR have been in the context of 
housing.225 These decisions grappled with discrimination against, social exclusion of 
                                                                                                                                                             
the working conditions and working environment (article 22); and the right of elderly persons to social 
protection (article 23). 
218 These rights are: the right to protection in cases of termination of employment (article 24); the right of 
workers to the protection of their claims in the event of the insolvency of their employer (article 25); the 
right to dignity at work (article 26); the right of workers with family responsibilities to equal opportunities 
and equal treatment (article 27); the right of workers’ representatives to protection in the undertaking and 
facilities to be accorded to them (article 28); the right to information and consultation in collective 
redundancy procedures (article 29); the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion (article 
30); and the right to housing (article 31). 
219 The ECSR consists of 15 members who serve in their personal capacity as experts in social policy and 
law for a period of 6 years with may be renewed once. 
220 See Khaliq and Churchill “Putting flesh on the bare bones” 430-432 and De Schutter “The European 
Social Charter” 430-433. 
221 Khaliq and Churchill “Putting flesh on bare bones” 432 and De Schutter “The European Social Charter” 
433-436. 
222 World Organisation against Torture v Ireland Complaint No 18/2003 (Decision on the merits, 26 
January 2005) par 63. 
223 International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v France Complaint No 14/2003 (Decision 
on the merits, 8 September 2004) paras 26-29. 
224 Khaliq and Churchill “Putting flesh on the bare bones” 434. 
225 Article 31 of the Revised ESC reads: 
"With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to housing, the Parties undertake 
to take measures designed: (1) to promote access to housing of an adequate standard; (2) 
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and apathy expressed by many States Parties towards the rights and needs of the 
Roma226 and their families. 
 
4 3 2 2 Case law 
4 3 2 2 1 Greece 
In European Roma Rights Center v Greece227 (‘ERRC v Greece’) the complainant 
argued that the Greek government was denying the Roma an effective right to housing 
in violation of article 16228 of the Revised ESC because the Sanitary Provision for the 
Organized Relocation of Itinerant Persons (Nomadic Travellers)229 (‘1983 Ministerial 
Decision’) discriminated against them in housing matters.230 The 1983 Ministerial 
Decision prohibited the unchecked encampment of wandering nomads, commonly 
referred to as Athinganoi, in all areas,231 particularly near archaeological sites, beaches, 
landscapes of natural beauty or in areas which could affect the public health.232 The 
1983 Ministerial Decision further required any organised encampment of Athinganoi to 
remain outside inhabited areas and, significantly, to be “a good distance from the 
                                                                                                                                                             
to prevent and reduce homelessness with a view to its gradual elimination; (3) to make the 
price of housing accessible to those without adequate resources." 
226 Roma, a group of people common in Eastern Europe and Central Italy, is a subgroup of an ethnic 
minority called Romani, who trace their origins to the Indian subcontinent, more specifically the province 
of Rajasthan, during the 11th century. Romani people commonly adopt the dominant religion of their 
country of residence, which ranges from Christianity to Islam, and their social behaviour is regulated and 
enforced through patriarchal lineage. Romani people have suffered enduring discrimination since their 
arrival in the Romanian state of Moldovia during the 14th century. Contemporary forms of discrimination 
include criminal profiling, inadequate housing in ghettos on the periphery of urban centres, police 
brutality, lack of access to schools and employment opportunities. Other subgroups include Iberian Kale 
(found in Spain, Portugal and Southern France); Finnish Kale (found in Finland and Sweden); Welsh 
Kale; Romanichal (found in the United Kingdom); Sinti (found in German-speaking areas of Central 
Europe and their neighbouring countries); Manush (found in French-speaking areas of Central Europe) 
and Romanisæl (found in Sweden and Norway). See Weyrauch WO Gypsy Law: Romani Legal Traditions 
and Culture (2001). 
227 Complaint No 15/2003 (Decision on the merits, 8 December 2004). 
228 Article 16 of the Revised ESC reads: 
“With a view to ensuring the necessary conditions for the full development of the family, 
which is a fundamental unit of society, the Parties undertake to promote the economic, legal 
and social protection of family life by such means as social and family benefits, fiscal 
arrangements, provision of family housing, benefits for the newly married and other 
appropriate means.” 
229 Ministerial Decision No A5/696/25.4.83. 
230 ERRC v Greece par 11. 
231 Article 1 of the 1983 Ministerial Decision. 
232 Article 3(3) of the 1983 Ministerial Decision. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
194 
approved urban plan or the last contiguous houses.”233 The complainant submitted that 
the 1983 Ministerial Decision discriminated against the Roma by referring to them as 
Athinganoi and that it intensified the practice of discrimination against the Roma by 
enacting their residential segregation.234 The Greek government stated that the 
complaint was unfounded because the 1983 Ministerial Decision was amended235 
(‘2003 Ministerial Decision’) so as to provide for the establishment of temporary 
settlement areas for itinerant persons pending the establishment of permanent 
settlement areas.236 Appropriate public, municipal or private locations would be selected 
for the establishment of these temporary settlement areas after extensive consultations 
with various bureaucratic institutions were conducted.237 Once established, these 
temporary settlement areas would only be tolerated238 if they maintained the 
infrastructure that would provide safe drinking water, electricity, sanitation facilities and 
refuse removal services.239 This, the complainant argued,240 only exacerbated the 
already vulnerable position of Roma by subjecting them to the threat of continuous 
forced evictions and other penalties.241 
The ECSR stated that member States had a duty to respect difference and to ensure 
social arrangements did not lead to or reinforce social exclusion. This duty flowed from 
the underlying purposes of the Revised ESC to express solidarity and promote social 
inclusion.242 In this regard the right to housing - as the key to exercising civil, political 
and other social rights - must be viewed as being of central importance to the family.243 
Article 16 therefore requires States Parties to ensure that there is an adequate supply of 
housing that catered for the housing needs of families. Article 16 further requires States 
Parties to ensure that the housing is of an adequate standard and that it includes the 
                                                 
233 Article 3(1) of the 1983 Ministerial Decision.  
234 ERRC v Greece par 11. See European Roma Rights Center Greek Helsinki Monitor Cleaning 
Operations - Excluding Roma in Greece Country Report Series No 12 (2003) 44-49 available online at 
www.greekhelsinki.gr/bhr/english/organizations/ghm/greeceE_2003.rtf (accessed on 26 August 2010) 
(‘ERRC Cleaning Operations’). 
235 Joint Ministerial Decision No 23641/3.7.2003. 
236 Article 1(2) of the 2003 Ministerial Decision. 
237 Article 2(1) of the 2003 Ministerial Decision. 
238 Article 5 of the 2003 Ministerial Decision. 
239 Article 3(3) of the 2003 Ministerial Decision. 
240 ERRC v Greece par 11. 
241 Article 6(2) of the 2003 Ministerial Decision. 
242 ERRC v Greece par 19. 
243 ERRC v Greece par 24. 
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provision of essential services.244 The ECSR recalled that it previously held that 
adequate housing would constitute a dwelling of suitable size considering the 
composition of the family.245 The ECSR therefore found that, when these characteristics 
of adequate housing were applied to the traditional lifestyle of itinerant Roma, article 16 
required the provision of adequate stopping places.246 
In this regard the complainant submitted that at least 100 000 Roma were living in 
settlements that posed serious risks to their health and safety247 because the sites had 
scant infrastructure248 and were located at isolated places249 far from urban areas.250 
The Greek government highlighted that it had adopted the Integrated Action Plan for the 
Social Integration of the Roma People,251 which sought to address the housing 
concerns of Roma by developing new settlements; improving existing residences and 
settlements; and arranging housing for the nomadic populations in Greece;252 and to 
introduce a programme that would enable Roma families to obtain loans for housing.253 
However, the ECSR found that the Greek government had failed to take sufficient 
measures that could achieve any material improvement in the living conditions of the 
                                                 
244 ERRC v Greece par 24. 
245 Conclusions XIII-2 43-44. 
246 ERRC v Greece par 25. 
247 See ERRC Cleaning Operations 94-99 for an account of the disastrous health implications that the 
winter of 2001 had on the Roma living in inadequate housing. 
248 The Public Enterprise for Town Planning conducted a study during 1999 on the availability of 
infrastructure in “genuine” settlements (where the living quarters are makeshift), “mixed” settlements (that 
included makeshift and permanent dwellings) and “neighbourhoods” (constellations of houses that 
essentially formed part of a city of village). The study found that 50% of the “genuine” settlements were 
uninhabitable because 15% were more than 1 kilometre away from an urban area; 84% had inadequate 
water supply; 80% had no connection to a sewage system; more than 50% did not receive garbage 
removal services and there was no connection to electricity in any of these settlements. See DEPOS 
Meleti Sxediou Programmatos gia tin antimetopisi ton ameson oikistikon provlimaton ton Ellinon 
Tsinganon (1999) 6-9. 
249 See ERRC Cleaning Operations 82-94 for an account of the tactics employed by municipalities to 
isolated and segregate Roma from other groups in a community. 
250 ERRC v Greece par 31. 
251 See Appendix 3 of case document 4 of this complaint which is available online at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Complaints/CC15CaseDoc4_en.pdf (accessed on 18 
March 2011) 
252 The Third EU Structural Fund and the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and 
Decentralisation granted € 180 million for this purpose. The Greek government estimated that this would 
enable it to purchase 1500 acres of land for the building of 100 new settlements, 4000 new homes and 
the establishment of 60 organised camping sites for itinerant Roma. See ERRC v Greece par 36. 
253 The Third EU Structural Fund and the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and 
Decentralisation granted € 120 million for this purpose. When the ECSR delivered its decision on the 
merits 4797 loans of € 60 000 each had been awarded to the 14151 applicants that applied for loans. See 
ERRC Cleaning Operations 199-202. 
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Roma. This, the ECSR found, could be attributed principally to the fact that there were 
inadequate means which could be used to compel local authorities to improve the living 
conditions of the Roma when they routinely adopted an obstinate attitude towards the 
rights and needs of Roma by only effecting rudimentary improvements to existing 
housing stock and stalling new building projects.254  
The ECSR found that the Greek government failed to appreciate its obligations in 
fulfilment of the overarching aim of social inclusion.255 The resolute reluctance of local 
authorities to identify appropriate sites, over and above their unwillingness to provide 
the appropriate infrastructure, exacerbated the strict circumstances under which the 
2003 Ministerial Decision condoned temporary encampment.256 The Greek government 
failed to provide information that contradicted the submissions made by the complainant 
about how Roma are evicted and prosecuted for living in structures that do not comply 
with building regulations.257 The ECSR therefore held that Greece violated article 16 
because it did not provide sufficient permanent dwellings or temporary camping sites for 
Roma and did not provide adequate protection to Roma against forced evictions and the 
imposition of further penalties for the unlawful occupation of land. 
The ECSR transmitted its report on the merits of the complaint to the CoM on 7 
February 2005. The CoM adopted a resolution258 where it noted that: firstly, the 
implementation of the Integrated Action Plan for the Social Integration of the Roma 
People was in progress and that this plan was continuously evaluated and reformed to 
ensure more effective coordination between all the interested parties; secondly, the 
housing loans programme for Roma in Greece were being revised and extended to 
reach more beneficiaries; and finally, a Commission for the social integration of Roma in 
Greece had been established. 
In International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights v Greece259 
(‘Interights v Greece’) the complainant submitted that the Greek government was still 
violating article 16 of the Revised ESC. According to the complainant, approximately 
                                                 
254 ERRC v Greece paras 37 and 42. Mr Nikitas Aliprantis highlighted this point in his concurring opinion. 
See ERRC v Greece appendix. 
255 ERRC v Greece par 43. 
256 ERRC v Greece par 46. 
257 ERRC v Greece par 50. See ERRC Cleaning Operations 50-73. 
258 ResChS(2005)11 of 8 June 2005. 
259 Complaint No 49/2008 (Decision on the merits, 11 December 2009). 
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300 000 individuals of Roma origin were living in 52 encampments throughout Greece 
without access to basic amenities or infrastructure.260 In the 40 months between the 
ECSR’s decision on the merits in December 2004 and the registration of the complaint 
with the secretariat of the ECSR in March 2008 the Greek government only succeeded 
in building 185 houses on four newly established permanent settlements.261 This, the 
complainant argued, could be attributed to an overreliance on and a flawed 
interpretation of the housing loans scheme under the IAP which resulted in the awarding 
of loans only to those Roma who already owned a piece of land and were in possession 
of a certificate of permanent residence.262 Consequently, only 2685 additional loans had 
been approved over this period - which constituted a modest expenditure of 17% of the 
total loans budget.263  
The ECSR acknowledged that the Greek government had made some progress in 
ameliorating the living conditions of Roma through the upgrading of infrastructure in 
vulnerable areas and awarding of loans to Roma.264 However, the ECSR noted that 
various independent sources attested to the existence of serious infrastructure 
deficiencies in the large settlements of Spata and Aspropygros near Athens.265 This 
proved that the specific housing needs of the Roma were not sufficiently catered for by 
the Greek government and that the Roma were still being discriminated against for 
purposes of article 16 of the Revised ESC.266 The complainant noted that this 
discrimination manifested in the execution of twenty forced evictions without prior 
notice, adequate consultation or the provision of alternative accommodation since the 
beginning of 2005.267 The complainant submitted that this formed part of a deliberate 
policy of the Greek government to remove Roma from certain areas by demolishing 
their homes.268 
                                                 
260 Interights v Greece par 16. 
261 Interights v Greece par 17. 
262 Interights v Greece par 19. 
263 Interights v Greece paras 23 and 28. 
264 Interights v Greece par 38. 
265 Interights v Greece par 39. 
266 Interights v Greece par 40. 
267 Interights v Greece paras 42 and 43. 
268 Interights v Greece paras 44 and 46. 
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The ECSR emphasised that much of the information that the complainant submitted 
was not structured and that it was either incomplete or did not sufficiently justify some of 
the allegations made in relation to forced evictions.269 The Greek government did not 
provide any information which disputed the allegations that the regulatory framework 
was deficient in that it did not provide for notice and consultations prior to evictions or 
that adequate alternative accommodation should be provided for those that are 
subjected to forced evictions.270 Despite the lack of information on the practice of forced 
evictions, the ECSR still found that it could take note of the information available from 
other sources that do substantiate the allegations of the complainant.271 
The ESCR noted that the poor regulatory framework was aggravated by the fact that 
many of the remedies available to those subjected to forced evictions from their own 
land were complex and ineffectual.272 While there were many remedies available to the 
Roma in public and civil law, the accessibility of these remedies seemed to elude the 
Roma because they have not been educated about their rights or do not know how to 
enforce it without legal aid.273 The ECSR therefore held that the Greek government was 
violating article 16 of the Revised ESC because countless Roma families continued to 
live in intolerable conditions that did not meet the minimum standards for habitation; and 
forced evictions were still being executed without appropriate legal remedies available 
and accessible to those affected by this practice. The ECSR transmitted its report on 
the merits of the complaint to the CoM on 25 January 2010, but the CoM has not yet 
adopted a resolution on this report as of 5 August 2011. 
 
4 3 2 2 2 Italy 
In European Roma Rights Center v Italy274 (‘ERRC v Italy’) the complainant argued that 
the Italian government was denying the Roma an effective right to housing in violation of 
article 31,275 read with article E,276 of the Revised ESC because the Consolidated Law 
                                                 
269 Interights v Greece par 61. 
270 Interights v Greece paras 62 and 63. 
271 Interights v Greece par 68. 
272 Interights v Greece par 49. 
273 Interights v Greece par 65. 
274 Complaint No 27/2004 (Decision on the merits, 7 December 2005). 
275 Article 31 of the Revised ESC reads: 
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on Immigration277 (Legislative Decree) discriminated against them in a manner which 
manifested in forced evictions and banishment to camping sites of substandard quality 
on the periphery of society.278 The Legislative Decree affords foreigners the right to live 
in Italy if they entered the country lawfully in terms of either a valid “stay permit” or a 
“residence permit”279 and have obtained employment. These foreigners may then obtain 
access to collective or private social housing280 or public residential housing.281 The 
relevant authorities will then be under an obligation to remove all obstacles which may 
stand in the way of these foreigners and the full enjoyment of their housing rights.282 
The Italian government stated that the complaint was unfounded because it fell beyond 
the scope of application of the Revised ESC, seeing that the majority of the Roma in 
Italy do not lawfully reside or habitually work in the country.283 The Italian government 
further stated that it was impossible to distinguish between the Roma who are Italian 
citizens and those who were nationals of member States.284 The Italian government had 
therefore issued circulars that encouraged local authorities to include Roma on civil 
status registers that will make them eligible to receive social and medical assistance 
                                                                                                                                                             
“With a view of ensuring the effective exercise of the right to housing, the Parties undertake 
to take measures designed: (1) to promote access to housing of an adequate standard; (2) 
to prevent and reduce homelessness with a view to its gradual elimination; (3) to make the 
price of housing accessible to those without adequate resources.” 
276 Article E of the Revised ESC reads: 
“The enjoyment of the rights set forth in this Charter shall be secured without discrimination 
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national extraction or social origin, health, association with a national minority, birth or other 
status.” 
277 Legislative Decree No 286 of 25 July 1998. 
278 ERRC v Italy par 5. See European Roma Rights Center Campland - Racial Segregation of Roma in 
Italy Country Report Series No 9 (2000) 13-22 for a historical account of the arrival of Roma in Italy and 
their systematic segregation which is available online at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED459274.pdf 
(accessed on 26 August 2010) (‘ERRC Campland’). 
279 Section 5(1) of the Legislative Decree. 
280 Section 40(4) of the Legislative Decree. 
281 Section 40(6) of the Legislative Decree. 
282 Section 3(5) of the Legislative Decree. 
283 ERRC v Italy par 6. Article 1 of the appendix to the Revised ESC reads: 
“Without prejudice to Article 12, paragraph 4, and Article 13, paragraph 4, the persons 
covered by Articles 1 to 17 and 20 to 31 include foreigners only in so far as they are 
nationals of other Parties lawfully resident or working regularly within the territory of the Party 
concerned, subject to the understanding that these articles are to be interpreted in the light 
of the provisions of Article 18 and 19” (emphasis added). 
284 ERRC v Italy par 6. 
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and to issue them with work permits. The Italian government furthermore placed a 
prohibition on the imposition of bans on Roma encampments.285 
The complainant submitted that Roma camping sites in fact failed to meet minimum 
living standards because the majority of sites have limited or no access to basic 
amenities, are constantly plagued by insects and rodents, and do not have asphalt 
surfacing.286 The complainant further submitted that the Italian government actively 
pursued a policy of racial segregation that was premised on the assumption that the 
traditional lifestyle of Roma dictated that they live on the fringes of society.287 As a result 
the periphery of Italian towns and cities were replete with a network of ghettos that 
prevented the integration of Roma into mainstream Italian society.288 The Italian 
government disputed these allegations and declared that it had taken the appropriate 
legislative measures to ensure the sufficiency and adequacy of camping sites.289 The 
Italian government attributed all the inadequacies in the housing supply for Roma to the 
fact that they erected unauthorised camps or introduced new residents into authorised 
camps that could not cater for them.290  
The ECSR found that the Italian government had not provided any information which 
refuted the complainants’ allegations or showed that the number of camping sites were 
adequate and sufficient.291 The ECSR found that article 31(1), read with article E, of the 
Revised ESC enshrined a prohibition against discrimination that established an 
obligation to ensure that all population groups enjoyed the rights contained in the 
Revised ESC. The ECSR accordingly held that Italy had violated article 31(1), read with 
article E, of the Revised ESC because it failed to take adequate steps to ensure that 
                                                 
285 ERRC v Italy par 10. Carlisle K “From bad to horrific in a gypsy ghetto” Business Week (2000-07-19) 
points out that Roma with resident permits do not have any guarantee that their “citizenship” will be 
honoured by the Italian government when it is dismantling sites in an effort to “fight crime and improve the 
conditions for the Roma”. Roma often face certain deportation if they protest against policies that 
reinforce racial segregation. Roma are therefore forced to go quietly with the hope that they will be 
rewarded with placement in another camp instead of “a one-way ticket back to their countries of origin.” 
As such, Carlisle argues that, “the solution of choice seems to lie between the less frightening of two 
nightmares.” See ERRC Campland 45 for examples of how the police destroy or threaten to destroy the 
identification documents of the Roma. 
286 ERRC v Italy par 29. 
287 ERRC v Italy par 28. 
288 ERRC v Italy par 28. 
289 ERRC v Italy par 32. 
290 ERRC v Italy par 33. 
291 ERRC v Italy par 34. 
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Roma are offered housing of a sufficient quantity and quality to meet their particular 
needs, and to ensure that local authorities are fulfilling their responsibilities in this 
area.292 The ECSR found that by blaming the inadequate conditions in camping sites on 
the Roma, Italy had failed to appreciate fully its responsibilities to ensure effective 
implementation of domestic law and policy by provincial and local authorities.293 
The ECSR also held Italy to be in violation of article 31(2), read with article E, of the 
Revised ESC for failing to ensure that evictions were carried out through procedures 
and in conditions that respect the dignity of the people concerned.294 The Italian 
government furthermore failed to ensure that alternative accommodation was made 
available to those that were evicted and that no provision was made to those who 
sought redress through legal remedies.295 Finally, Italy also violated article 31(3), read 
with article E, of the Revised ESC for failing to appreciate that its regulatory framework 
that provided access to housing was based on criteria that Roma invariably could not 
satisfy.296 
The ECSR transmitted its report on the merits of the complaint to the CoM on 21 
December 2005. The CoM adopted a resolution297 where it noted that: firstly, the Italian 
authorities at local and national level have taken measures to improve the lives of Roma 
living in Italy; secondly, Italy undertook to bring the Roma housing crisis into conformity 
with the Revised ESC by adding to the measures that have already been taken; and 
lastly, it looked forward to receiving Italy’s next country report so that it could ascertain 
whether the position has improved. 
 
4 3 2 2 3 Bulgaria 
In European Roma Rights Centre v Bulgaria298 (‘ERRC v Bulgaria’) the complainant 
argued that the Bulgarian government was discriminating against Roma in terms of 
                                                 
292 ERRC v Italy par 37. 
293 ERRC v Italy paras 25 and 26 
294 See ERRC Campland 23-34 for an account of the abusive raids and arbitrary destruction of property 
by the police and other law enforcement officials. 
295 ERRC v Italy par 42. See ERRC Campland 50-51 for an account of the prolonged detention of Roma 
before trails on “flight-prevention grounds” and the severe sentencing “for crimes which might, in other 
cases, merit non-custodial punishment.” 
296 ERRC v Italy paras 43-45. 
297 Resolution ResChS(2006)4 on 3 May 2006. 
298 Complaint No 31/2005 (Decision on the merits, 18 October 2006). 
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strict planning legislation in violation of article 16, read with article E, of the Revised 
ESC.299 Both the Law on Municipal Property (1996)300 and the Law on State Property 
(1996)301 empowered a government official to seize the property if it was occupied 
unlawfully, used inappropriately, or ceased to be of any use. The Territorial Planning 
Law (2001) additionally authorised the demolition of all illegal construction that started 
during a specific period if the owner of the land did not declare it to the responsible 
authorities within six months of the commencement of the specific statute.302 The 
cumulative effect of this legislation is that Roma are confined - often with physical 
barriers - to areas on the outskirts of cities, towns and villages where they live in 
substandard conditions without adequate infrastructure or security of tenure and are 
subjected to forced evictions.303 The Bulgarian government acknowledged the 
prevalence of intolerable living conditions but disputed the allegation that these 
conditions affected the Roma disproportionately in comparison to the rest of the 
population.304 The Bulgarian government highlighted the fact that it joined the Decade of 
Roma Inclusion 2005–2015 campaign305 and that it subsequently put in place various 
framework programmes and action plans aimed at improving inter alia the living 
conditions of Roma.306 
The ECSR noted that the policy and legislative response of the Bulgarian 
government to the need for improved living conditions in Roma camps demonstrated 
                                                 
299 ERRC v Bulgaria par 7. 
300 Article 65(1) of the Law on Municipal Property (1996) reads: 
“A municipal property which is in possession or is being held on no legitimate grounds, is not 
being used as designed, or the need for which is no longer there, shall be seized on the 
basis of an order of the mayor of the municipality.” 
301 Article 80(1) of the Law on State Property (1996) reads: 
“Any State property held in possession or tenure without any legal grounds, or such as shall 
be used inappropriately or such which the purpose shall have ceased to exist shall be 
repossessed by order of the competent Regional Governor.” 
302 Article 16(3) of the Territorial Planning Law (2001) reads: 
“Any illegal construction works, commenced after the 30th day of June 1998 but not legalized 
prior to the promulgation of this Act, shall not be removed if the said works were tolerable 
under the effective detailed urban development plans and under the rules and standard 
specifications effective during the said period and according to this Act, and if declared by 
the owners thereof to the approving authorities within six months after the promulgation of 
this Act.” 
303 ERRC v Bulgaria paras 22-24. 
304 ERRC v Bulgaria paras 28 and 29. 
305 Available online at http://www.romadecade.org (accessed on 26 August 2010). 
306 ERRC v Bulgaria paras 31 and 32. 
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that legal and practical measures were necessary to redress such situation.307 The 
ECSR lauded the Bulgarian government for expressing its clear intention308 to improve 
the housing situation of Roma families in various national programmes and action plans, 
the most recent of which was the Framework Programme for Equal Integration of the 
Roma in the Bulgarian Society,309 and stated that its content mandated the observance 
of a margin of appreciation for the manner in which measures are being taken to comply 
with the obligations under the Revised ESC.310 
While the ECSR acknowledged that the implementation of the right to housing would 
require time, it expressed its concern that the programmes and plans to improve the 
lives of Roma were not being implemented effectively.311 The ECSR held that the six 
year period between 1999 and 2005 should have been enough to effect significant 
improvements in the living conditions of the Roma given the urgency of their housing 
situation.312 The ECSR reiterated that the mere guarantee of equal treatment before the 
law as a means of protecting Roma against discrimination would not suffice. The 
obligation flowing from article E requires the integration of ethnic minorities like the 
Roma into mainstream society by way of positive action.313 
The complainant noted that the Bulgarian government failed to communicate to 
Roma what they were required to do to comply with the Territorial Planning Law in order 
to obtain secure tenure of their land. As a result the Roma were disproportionately 
exposed to the realities of forced eviction because they had no procedural safeguards 
at their disposal and could not obtain affordable alternative accommodation.314 The 
ECSR recalled that it had previously held that the “illegal occupation of a site or dwelling 
could justify the eviction of the illegal occupiers315 if and when it is carried out in 
conditions that respect the dignity of the persons concerned and provision was made for 
                                                 
307 ERRC v Bulgaria par 36. 
308 ERRC v Bulgaria par 38. 
309 Available online at http://www.ncedi.government.bg/en/RPRIRBGO-English.htm (accessed on 26 
August 2010). 
310 ERRC v Bulgaria par 35. 
311 ERRC v Bulgaria par 38. 
312 ERRC v Bulgaria par 39. 
313 ERRC v Bulgaria par 42. 
314 ERRC v Bulgaria paras 44-48. 
315 ERRC v Greece par 51. 
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the acquisition of alternative accommodation.316 The ECSR therefore found that, given 
the fact that the current policy and legislative framework in Bulgaria could not ensure 
that evictions were conducted in this way, it was perfectly understandable for the Roma 
to partake in otherwise inexcusable behaviour in order to satisfy their housing needs.317 
The ECSR further held that Bulgaria had violated article 16 because it had failed to 
appreciate that Roma families are extremely vulnerable to evictions as a result of the 
precariousness of their tenancy.318 
The ECSR transmitted its report on the merits of the complaint to the CoM on 30 
November 2006. The CoM adopted a resolution319 where it noted that: firstly, Bulgaria 
had undertaken to bring the Roma housing crisis into conformity with the Revised ESC 
by implementing measures that had been adopted to improve the housing situation of 
Roma at local and national government level. Bulgaria had further undertaken to adopt 
an Act to amend and supplement the Territorial Planning Act and to enact a Housing 
Association Act. The CoM further noted that it looked forward to receiving Bulgaria’s 
next country report so that it could ascertain whether the position has improved. 
 
4 3 2 2 4 France 
In International Movement ATD Fourth World v France320 (‘Fourth World v France’) the 
complainant alleged that the French government was violating articles 16, 30321 and 31 
alone or taken in conjunction with article E of the Revised ESC on various grounds. 
Firstly, the complainant argued that the French government did not give effect to various 
pieces of domestic legislation that would guarantee many poor and otherwise destitute 
                                                 
316 Conclusions 2003 225 (France), 345 (Italy), 557 (Slovenia) and 653 (Sweden) which is available online 
at www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Conclusions/Year/2003Vol1_en.pdf and www.coe.int/t/dghl/ 
monitoring/socialcharter/Conclusions/Year/2003Vol2_en.pdf (accessed on 26 August 2010). 
317 ERRC v Bulgaria par 53. 
318 ERRC v Bulgaria par 56. 
319 Resolution ResChS(2007)2 of 5 September 2007. 
320 Complaint No 33/2006 (Decision on the merits, 5 December 2007). 
321 Article 30 of the Revised ESC reads: 
“With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to protection against poverty and 
social exclusion, the Parties undertake: (a) to take measures within the framework of an 
overall and co-ordinated approach to promote the effective access of persons who live or 
risk living in a situation of social exclusion or poverty, as well as their families, to, in 
particular, employment, housing, training, education, culture and social and medical 
assistance; (b) to review these measures with a view to their adaption if necessary.” 
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people access to decent housing.322 The complainant alleged that the French 
government was reluctant to build social housing, despite numerous official reports 
attesting to the malfunctioning of the housing market.323 The complainant cited a 2008 
report on social protection and social inclusion strategies which indicated that a mere 
9% of all social housing built during 2005 (compared to 12% and 30% during 2000 and 
1998 respectively) was targeted at people living in extreme poverty.324 The government 
informed the ECSR that construction work had started on 410 000 houses during 2005, 
that the rate of completion was at its highest in 25 years and that 81 000 houses were 
being financed during the first year of the re-launched social cohesion plan.325 
The ECSR recalled that there must be an adequate supply of affordable housing and 
that it will be affordable if the household can afford to pay the deposit, the rent and 
maintenance costs on a long term basis and still be in a position to maintain a good 
standard of living compared to the other households of the society in which it is 
located.326 The ECSR further recalled that it had previously concluded that the stock of 
social housing in France was manifestly inadequate because only 80 000 social housing 
units were scheduled for construction in 2004 to cater for the 1 640 000 outstanding 
applications for social housing at the end of May 2002.327 The ECSR acknowledged that 
there were significant changes in practice and the law since the beginning of 2005,328 
but noted that there was still a considerable shortage of housing.329 The ECSR 
therefore held that the implementation of the social cohesion policy itself did not 
constitute a sufficient step for ensuring that priority is given to the provision of social 
housing for those living in abject poverty.330 
The complainant further argued that the information which the government provided 
did not indicate how the social housing units were allocated or if any were in fact 
                                                 
322 Section 6 of the Tenancy Act, No 89-462 of 6 July 1989 states that a “landlord shall provide the tenant 
with decent housing with no manifest risks to the latter’s physical safety and health, fitted out in such a 
way as to make it habitable.” See also section 187 of the Urban Solidarity and Renewal Act, No 2000-
1208 of 13 December 2000 and Decree No 2002-120 of 30 January 2002. 
323 Fourth World v France par 85. 
324 Fourth World v France paras 87-90. 
325 Fourth World v France par 92. 
326 Conclusions 2003 232 (France) and 655 (Sweden). 
327 Fourth World v France par 96. 
328 Fourth World v France par 97. 
329 Fourth World v France par 98. 
330 Fourth World v France par 100. 
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allocated to those in desperate need of social housing.331 In this regard the complainant 
alleged that the eligibility criteria for social housing were suspect;332 the département’s 
housing action plans for disadvantaged persons did not function;333 there were 
considerable risks for the least well off in the management of the prefectoral housing 
quota;334 the procedure for allocating social housing were not transparent;335 and 
inadequate appeal procedures were available in the event of excessive waiting periods 
to be allocated social housing.336 
The ECSR noted that the French government did not submit any information that 
addressed the key arguments presented by the complainant.337 There was clear 
evidence that the system for allocating social housing was still dysfunctional because a 
large part of the demand for social housing remained unsatisfied and the average 
waiting period for allocation was still in excess of two years.338 The ECSR also found 
that the procedure for allocating social housing did not ensure sufficient fairness and 
transparency339 because it did not provide guidance in determining who qualified as 
being in a priority situation of need.340 The ECSR further found that mediation 
commissions were only established in a few local authorities and that those did not 
address the problem of protracted waiting periods for allocation of social housing.341 
Secondly, the complainant argued that the government discriminated against the 
Roma and Travellers because the government refused to provide family plots for them 
to station their caravans. The complainant alleged that there were discrepancies 
between the provisions of the département’s plans and the number of camp sites 
constructed.342 In this regard the complainant submitted that the government was 
misguided in arguing that the integration of travellers depended on the funding provided 
                                                 
331 See section 4 of the Right to Housing Act No 90-449 of 31 May 1990. 
332 Fourth World v France par 102. 
333 Fourth World v France paras 103-106. 
334 Fourth World v France paras 107-108. 
335 Fourth World v France par 109. 
336 Fourth World v France paras 110-113. 
337 Fourth World v France par 128. The submissions of the French government are available at paras 
114-127. 
338 Fourth World v France par 129. 
339 Fourth World v France par 130. 
340 Fourth World v France par 132. See article L 441-1 of the Building and Housing Code. 
341 Fourth World v France par 131. 
342 Fourth World v France par 135. See sections 1 and 2 of the Reception and Accommodation of 
Travellers Act No 2000-614 of 5 July 2000. 
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to local authorities for setting up family plots that could be leased in terms of the 
Reception and Accommodation of Travellers Act No 2000-614 of 5 July 2000.343 
The ECSR found that there was a delay in implementing the plans for receiving 
Roma and that an estimated 41 800 plots needed to be constructed.344 This delay 
forced many Roma to occupy sites illegally, which exposed them to the risk of forcible 
eviction. This is exacerbated by the fact that local authorities and the French 
government had failed to take into account the specific needs of the Roma community 
over extended periods in the past.345 The ECSR accordingly held that the French 
government was in violation of its obligations in terms of article 31 alone and taken 
together with article E of the Revised ESC.346 The ECSR’s findings on whether the 
French government was in violation of articles 16 and 30 alone or taken together with 
article E of the Revised ESC followed its conclusion on article 31.347 
On the same day the ECSR delivered another decision on the merits of alleged 
violations of article 31 alone or in conjunction with article E of the Revised ESC by the 
French government. In European Federation of National Organisations working with the 
Homeless v France348 (‘FEANTSA v France’) the complainant lodged a complaint that 
was slightly narrower in scope than the complaint in Fourth World v France. The tailored 
scope of the FEANTSA v France complaint can be attributed to the fact that the 
complainant organisation had nearly ten months (from 26 January 2006 to 2 November 
2006) to study the Fourth World v France complaint and to gather more recent statistics 
and progress reports before it filed its complaint with the ECSR. At its 221st session (19 
to 23 March 2007) the ECSR decided to hear arguments in Fourth World v France and 
FEANTSA v France on the same day and set the date for the hearing for 25 June 2007. 
The reasoning of the ECSR in terms of this narrower complaint is the same in all 
material aspects as the reasoning adopted in Fourth World v France and is therefore 
not discussed separately. In FEANTSA v France the ECSR also unanimously held that 
                                                 
343 Fourth World v France par 137. 
344 Fourth World v France par 151. 
345 Fourth World v France par 154. 
346 Fourth World v France paras 83, 100, 133 and 155. 
347 Fourth World v France paras 158, 170 and 174. 
348 Complaint No 39/2006 (Decision on the merits, 5 December 2007). 
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France was in violation of its obligations in terms of article 31, alone or in conjunction 
with article E, of the Revised ESC. 
The ECSR transmitted its reports on the merits of the complaints in Fourth World v 
France and FEANTSA v France to the CoM on 4 February 2008. The CoM adopted two 
resolutions349 where it noted that France had adopted measures to address the housing 
crisis in France so as to bring the rights of vulnerable people into conformity with the 
Revised ESC by enacting the Enforceable Right to Housing Act No 2007-290 of 5 
March 2007. The so-called DALO Act established an enforceable right to housing and 
came into effect on 1 January 2008. The DALO Act also established an effective appeal 
process in cases where the application for social housing had been refused to those 
considered to be in a priority situation. The DALO Act further created a programme 
whereby appropriate budgetary resources would be directed to the protection of those in 
a priority situation against social exclusion. 
In European Roma Rights Center v France350 (‘ERRC v France’) the complainant 
argued that the Travellers in France suffered social exclusion because they were denied 
access to adequate housing351 on racial grounds352 and that their insecure position was 
exacerbated by the fact that there was a shortage of halting sites and permanent 
housing that would enable them to sustain an adequate standard of living. The 
complainant submitted that the housing situation in France amounted to a violation of 
                                                 
349 ResChS(2008)7 and ResChS(2008)8 of 2 July 2008. 
350 Complaint No 51/2008 (Decision on the merits, 19 October 2009). 
351 Section 1 of the Enforceable Right to Housing Act, No 2007-290 of 5 March 2007 reads: 
“The State shall secure the right to decent and independent housing, as referred to in 
Section 1 of the Right to Housing Act, No. 90-449 of 31 May 1990, for all persons residing in 
French territory lawfully and on a permanent basis, as defined in an order of the Conseil 
d'Etat, who have insufficient resources to obtain or retain such housing themselves. This 
right shall be exercised through a conciliation procedure followed, if necessary, by a judicial 
appeal as specified in this Section and in Articles L. 441-2-3 and L. 441-2-3-1.” 
352 Section 1 of the Tenancy Act, No 89-462 of 6 July 1989 reads: 
“No one may be refused a tenancy on grounds of origin, family name, physical appearance, 
sex, family situation, state of health, disability, morals, sexual orientation, political opinions, 
trade union activities or real or supposed membership of a specified ethnic group, nation, 
race or religion. In the event of a dispute concerning the application of the preceding 
paragraph, the person who has been refused the tenancy shall present evidence to support 
the presumption of direct or indirect discrimination. In the light of this information, the 
respondent must establish that the decision was justified. The court shall reach a decision 
after ordering any investigations it may deem necessary.” 
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articles 16, 30 and 31, taken alone or in conjunction with article E, of the Revised 
ESC.353 
The complainant submitted that a quarter of the demand for halting sites was 
satisfied at the end of 2006 and that in some cases the government was only 
contributing 50% of what it was actually supposed to subsidise the construction of these 
sites.354 The complainant further noted that the intransigent attitude of the residents and 
officials in some départements reduced the delivery of halting sites even further as an 
increasing number of départements were applying to be exempted from the provisions 
requiring it to receive Travellers in their jurisdiction.355  
The ECSR noted that it had not seen any appreciable change in the provision of 
halting sites since it assessed the position in Fourth World v France and FEANTSA v 
France.356 This was clearly in conflict with the French government’s undertaking to 
ensure the effective implementation of legislation that would create an adequate supply 
of halting sites for Roma in accordance with article 31(1) of the Revised ESC.357 
The complainant also submitted that many of the halting sites were located on the 
outskirts of large urban centres and that only 58% of these halting sites could be 
regarded as fit for human habitation. The complainant further noted that many of the 
sites that could be regarded as fit for human habitation did not comply with technical 
specifications for the provision of facilities,358 services359  or management360 at those 
halting sites.361 
                                                 
353 ERRC v France par 7. 
354 ERRC v France par 31. 
355 ERRC v France paras 32-33. Section 15 of the Orientation and Planning of Municipalities and Urban 
Renovation Act No 2003-710 of 1 August 2003 reads: 
“Municipalities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, half of whom or more live in ‘sensitive’ 
urban areas as defined by Section 42.3 of the Orientation for Spatial Planning and 
Development Act, No. 95-115 of 4 February 1995, shall, at their request, be exempted from 
the Reception and Accommodation of Travellers Act, No. 2000-614 of 5 July 2000, and in 
particular from the obligation provided for in Section 2 of the said [A]ct.” 
356 ERRC v France paras 37-38. 
357 ERRC v France par 41. 
358 Circular NOR/INT/D/06/00074/C of 3 August 2006 on the “Implementation of the prescriptions of the  
département  plan for receiving Travellers” states that: 
“The site shall be equipped with sanitary facilities including a sanitary block, comprising at 
least one shower and two lavatories, for every five caravan spaces. While the creation of 
sites should help to ensure that Travellers are accommodated on a temporary basis in a 
dignified and decent manner, and facilitate their integration into the urban community, it 
should not render authorities liable to grossly excessive expenditure, such as has already 
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The ESCR held that the French government did comply with the technical standards 
for the provision of facilities, services and management at halting sites,362 but noted that 
many of these sites were created outside urban areas or near to facilities which were 
major sources of nuisance.363 However, the government violated the legislative 
requirements pertaining to sanitation and access to water and electricity to the extent 
that the location of these halting sites was dangerous for families with young children.364 
To this extent the French government violated article 31(1) of the Revised ESC.365 
The complainant, relying on a report commissioned by the Directorate General of 
Town Planning, Housing and Construction, noted that 70 départements conducted a 
needs assessment of family plots within its jurisdiction and that only 30 of those 
départements could provide specific statistical data on demand for family plots.366 The 
complainant submitted that the shortage of nearly 5100 family plots throughout France 
could be attributed to the fact that, on the one hand, the establishment of these sites 
was not compulsory, and on the other hand, many départements could not understand 
the apparently conflicting desires of Travellers to maintain an itinerant lifestyle when 
possible and to be sedentary for purposes of education and employment.367 The 
complainant submitted that the Travellers’ lack of access to adequate housing was 
further exacerbated because they are precluded from receiving various social benefits 
                                                                                                                                                             
incurred in some cases.  The use of technical design offices, which can significantly increase 
these costs, should be envisaged only with the utmost caution.” 
359 Article 3 of Decree No 2001-569 of 29 June 2001 reads: 
“The stopping place shall have at least one sanitary block comprising at least one shower 
and two lavatories for every five caravan spaces, within the meaning of the foregoing article.  
Each caravan space shall have ready access to sanitary facilities as well as to drinking water 
and electricity supply.” 
360 Circular UHC/IUH1/12 No 2001-49 of 5 July 2001 implementing the Reception and Accommodation of 
Travellers Act, No. 2000-614 of 5 July 2000 states that: 
“A single system for several sites located in the same geographical area is possible. The 
site, however, must be staffed for a sufficient time every day, thereby making it possible to 
receive Travellers and deal with arrivals and departures, and ensure that the user charge is 
paid and that the regulations are properly complied with.” 
361 ERRC v France paras 42-43. 
362 ERRC v France par 48. 
363 ERRC v France par 49. 
364 ERRC v France par 49. 
365 ERRC v France par 50. 
366 ERRC v France par 51. 
367 ERRC v France par 52. 
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that they could be eligible for if caravans were recognised as a form of social 
housing.368 
The ECSR found that a caravan could not qualify as a form of social housing 
because owning a caravan did not require a building permit which, in turn, rendered the 
owner of a caravan ineligible for housing allowances or a loan.369 The ECSR further 
found that the government was misguided in arguing that Travellers could only claim a 
right of access to housing if they were willing to purchase an ordinary dwelling.370 The 
ECSR accordingly held that the government was in violation of article 31(1) of the 
Revised ESC to the extent that it failed to appreciate that the needs of Travellers 
required special attention.371 This conclusion led the ECSR to hold that the government 
was also in violation of articles 16 and 31 taken in conjunction with article E of the 
Revised ESC.372 
The complainant finally submitted that the absence of an overall national policy on 
housing for families which have adopted a sedentary lifestyle contributed to their social 
exclusion, prosecution and eviction for trespassing. The ECSR found that it would be 
inimical to the human dignity of people if they were forced to live in a state of social 
exclusion. The ECSR recalled that the right to protection against such social exclusion 
required 
“States Parties to adopt an overall and co-ordinated approach, which should consist 
of an analytical framework, a set of priorities and measures to prevent and remove 
obstacles to access to fundamental rights. There should also be monitoring 
mechanisms involving all relevant actors, including civil society and persons affected 
by exclusion. This approach must link and integrate policies in a consistent way.”373 
 
The ECSR noted that it had already found the housing policy for Travellers inadequate 
for purposes of its assessment of article 31 and that this policy also falls short of 
constituting a co-ordinated approach in protecting those susceptible to social exclusion 
for purposes of article 30.374 
                                                 
368 ERRC v France par 53. 
369 ERRC v France par 54. 
370 ERRC v France par 55. 
371 ERRC v France par 56. 
372 ERRC v France paras 85 and 89. 
373 Conclusions 2003 214 (France). 
374 ERRC v France par 95. 
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The ECSR transmitted its report on the merits of the complaint to the CoM on 26 
October 2009. The CoM adopted a resolution375 where it noted that: firstly, the French 
government undertook to maintain its efforts to bring the housing situation in France into 
conformity with the Revised ESC; and secondly, that it looked forward to receiving the 
next country report from France so as to ascertain whether the measures that France 
had taken are being effectively implemented. 
 
4 3 2 3 Conclusion 
The ECSR, unlike the ECtHR, has adopted an approach whereby it clearly defines the 
scope of the right to family protection, the right to protection against poverty and social 
exclusion, and the right to housing. Against this background the ECSR has developed a 
substantive understanding of the purpose and scope of these rights. In ERRC v Greece 
the ECSR confirmed that article 16 required the provision of an adequate supply of 
housing that is of a suitable size considering the composition of the family.376 The right 
further required a dwelling to be equipped with or have access to essential amenities.377 
Finally, the right requires that a certain measure of security from unlawful eviction must 
be provided for the families.378  
In relation to article 30 the ECSR found that access to fundamental social rights 
should be assessed by taking into account the effectiveness of policies, measures and 
actions undertaken379 to prevent the occurrence of poverty and social exclusion. The 
ECSR added that appropriate budgetary appropriations formed an integral part of the 
overall strategy to fight social exclusion and poverty.380 
Concerning article 31 the ECSR found that the criteria of illegal occupation should 
not be too wide and that evictions should take place in accordance with the principle of 
due process which must be sufficiently protective of the rights of the persons 
concerned.381 In FEANTSA v France the ECSR added that States Parties must ensure 
that evictions are carried out in conditions that respect the human dignity of those that 
                                                 
375 Resolution ResChS(2010)5 of 30 June 2010. 
376 ERRC v Greece par 24. 
377 ERRC v Greece par 24. 
378 ERRC v Greece par 24. 
379 Conclusions 2005 580 (Norway). 
380 Conclusions 2005 674 (Slovenia). 
381 ERRC v Greece par 51. See also ERRC v Italy par 41. 
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stand to be affected and that alternative accommodation must be made available.382 In 
the event that alternative accommodation is not available, the special circumstances of 
those who stand to be evicted must ensure that “special support should be available 
including targeted advice on availability of legal aid and on appeals.”383 In Fourth World 
v France the ECSR added that article 31 required States Parties to 
“a. adopt the necessary legal, financial and operational means of ensuring steady 
progress towards achieving the goals laid down by the Charter;  b. maintain 
meaningful statistics on needs, resources and results; c. undertake regular reviews 
of the impact of the strategies adopted; d. establish a timetable and not defer 
indefinitely the deadline for achieving the objectives of each stage; e. pay close 
attention to the impact of the policies adopted on each of the categories of persons 
concerned, particularly the most vulnerable.”384 
 
The more explicit right to housing in the Revised ESC has enabled the ECSR to 
scrutinise the arguments advanced as justification for the limitation of housing and 
family interests with greater rigour and jurisprudential discipline than the ECtHR. The 
ECSR has identified numerous systemic barriers in housing policy and practice that 
prevent Roma from accessing affordable housing and impede their social integration 
into mainstream society. Again unlike the ECtHR, the ECSR has been prepared to 
incorporate the right to non-discrimination in Article E of the Revised ESC to its 
interpretation of abovementioned rights. This has made it far easier to accept the 
emerging consensus amongst Contracting States of the Council of Europe that the 
rights and needs of Roma require special consideration in domestic law and policy.  
However, it must be noted that the ECSR has been afforded the freedom to be 
adventurous in its interpretations of articles 16, 30, 31 and E because its decisions are 
subordinate to the COM and thus subject to political control. On the other hand, the 
ECtHR’s decisions are directly binding on the States Parties without the interference of 
a political mediating body. This contributes - along with a far less direct right to housing 
provision in the ECHR - to a more cautious approach by the ECtHR with greater 
deference to national sovereignty. 
 
 
                                                 
382 FEANTSA v France par 163. 
383 Interights v Greece par 69. 
384 Fourth World v France par 60. 
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4 3 3 The American Convention on Human Rights 
4 3 3 1 Introduction 
The second regional human rights system was created when the Organization of 
American States (‘OAS') adopted the American Convention on Human Rights385 (‘Pact 
of San José’). The purpose of the Pact of San José is to “consolidate … a system of 
personal liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man”.386 
While the Pact of San José provides for a range of civil and political rights,387 it only 
provides for socio-economic rights in a single provision. Article 26 of the Pact of San 
José reads: 
 
“The States parties undertake to adopt measures, both internally and through 
international cooperation, especially those of an economic and technical nature, with 
a view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate means, the full 
realisation of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and 
cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States as 
amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires.” 
 
In an effort to complement this provision, the OAS has adopted the Additional Protocol 
to the American Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights388 (‘Protocol of San Salvador’) which includes a range of socio-economic 
                                                 
385 OASTS No 36. The Convention was adopted on 22 November 1969 and came into force on 18 July 
1978. As at 15 July 2011 24 of the 35 Organisation of American States countries have ratified the 
Convention. 
386 Preamble of the Pact of San José. 
387 These rights includes the right to legal personality (article 3); the right to life (article 4); the right to 
humane treatment (article 5); the right to be free from slavery (article 6); the right to personal liberty 
(article 7); the right to a fair trial (article 8); the right to be free from prosecution under ex post facto laws 
(article 9); the right to compensation for miscarriages of justice (article 10); the right to privacy (article 11); 
the right to freedom of conscience and religion (article 12); the right to freedom of thought and expression 
(article 13); the right to reply (article 14); the right of assembly (article 15); the right to associate freely 
(article 16); family rights (article 17); the right to a name (article 18); the rights of children (article 19); the 
right to nationality (article 20); the right to property (article 21); the right of free movement and residence 
(article 22); the right to participate in government (article 23); the right to equal protection before the law 
(article 24) and the right of access to courts (article 25). 
388 OASTS No 69. The Protocol was adopted on 17 November 1988 and came into force on 16 November 
1999. Melish TJ “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights - Defending social rights through 
case-based petitions” in Langford M (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence - Emerging Trends in International 
and Comparative Law (2008) 339-371 344 (‘Melish “The Inter-American Commission”’) explains that while 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights can apply all of abovementioned socio-economic rights 
to States Parties of the OAS under its promotional mandate, it is only competent to apply the right to 
unionise and the right to education under its contentious mandate. The result is that the other rights 
contained in the Protocol may only be used by the Commission to the extent that they are invoked to aid 
the interpretation of the scope and content of the “congruent but less precisely defined” right to 
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rights.389 However, the Protocol of San Salvador does not provide for the right to 
housing. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights390 (‘IACHR’) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights391 (‘IACtHR’) therefore has had to adjudicate housing 
rights cases with reference to the right to life in article 4392 and the right to humane 
treatment in article 5393 of the Pact of San José.394 
 
4 3 3 2 Case law 
In Corumbiara v Brazil,395 500 families occupied a small part of a privately-owned farm 
that was not being used productively. The land owner hired private security guards to 
assist the military police to execute the eviction order which the owner obtained the 
previous day. In the process nine squatters were shot from behind and killed and more 
than 100 squatters were wounded as a result of the violent and brutal confrontation. 
Afterwards the entire settlement was destroyed and all the belongings of the squatters 
were burned. 
                                                                                                                                                             
development in the Pact of San José. See also Melish TJ “The Inter-American Court of Human Rights - 
Beyond progressivity” in Langford M (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence - Emerging Trends in International 
and Comparative Law (2008) 372-408 376-377 (‘Melish “The Inter-American Court of Human Rights”’). 
389 The Protocol provides for the rights to work (article 6); just, equitable and satisfactory conditions of 
work (article 7); trade unionization (article 8); social security (article 9); health (article 10); a healthy 
environment (article 11); food (article 12); education (article 13); the benefits of culture (article 14); 
formation and protection of the family (article 15); children (article 16); protection of the elderly (article 17) 
and the handicapped (article 18). 
390 The Commission was established in 1959 and reports to the General Assembly of the OAS. The 
IACHR consist of 7 commissioners “with high moral character and recognized competence in the field of 
human rights” (article 34 of the Pact of San José). The commissioners serve in their personal capacity 
(article 36) and are appointed for a four year term with the possibility of one re-election (article 37 of the 
Pact of San José). The IACHR convenes several times per year in Washington DC to “promote the 
observance and defence of human rights” through inter alia human rights awareness campaigns, 
conducting studies and hearing petitions and other communications (article 41 of the Pact of San José). 
391 The IACtHR was established in 1979 and reports to the General Assembly of the OAS. The IACtHR 
consist of 7 judges who possess “the qualifications required for the exercise of the highest judicial 
functions” (article 52 of the Pact of San José). The judges serve in their personal capacity and are 
appointed for a six year term with the possibility of one re-election (article 54 of the Pact of San José). 
The IACtHR convenes in San José, Costa Rica where it hears cases from OAS members (article 58 of 
the Pact of San José). 
392 Article 4 of the Pact of San José states inter alia that “[e]very person has the right to have his life 
respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one 
shall be deprived of his life.” 
393 Article 5 of the Pact of San José states that “(1) Every person has the right to have his physical, 
mental, and moral integrity respected. (2) No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for 
the inherent dignity of the human person.” 
394 Melish TJ “The Inter-American Commission” 356. 
395 Case 11.556, Report No 77/98, Inter-Am CHR, OEA/Serv.L/V/II.95 doc 7 rev 2 (1998). 
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The petitioners framed their claim within the narrow bounds of the rights to life and 
humane treatment by focussing on the death and physical injury that was caused as a 
result of the excessive force that was used to evict them. The IACHR ordered adequate 
reparation for them in terms of the violations of articles 4, 5, 8 (right to a fair trial) and 25 
(right to judicial protection) of the Pact of San José and recommended, as a result of the 
failure to properly investigate the individual killings, that the formal competence of 
eviction-related investigations be transferred to the civilian police forces. 
This case was decided on very narrow grounds because it focussed on the rights of 
those that were injured and killed during the execution of the eviction. This limited focus 
shifted the international housing rights violations committed against those that did not 
bear wounds to the background.396 A broader claim in terms of articles 11 (right to 
privacy) and 26 would have placed the IACHR in a position to address the other ways in 
which the eviction could be evaluated. These included the lack of notice; the execution 
of the eviction order at dawn; the destruction of the settlement and burning of the 
families’ possessions; the failure to provide alternative accommodation; and the lack of 
a programme that can address the immediate needs of poor and otherwise destitute 
people.397 
In Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua398 the Awas Tingni 
Community, under the leadership of Jaime Castillo Felipe, lodged a complaint with the 
IACHR on the grounds that the Nicaraguan government failed to demarcate their 
communal land and therefore violated their property rights over their ancestral land. The 
cause of the complaint was a concession of 62 000 hectares of tropical forest to the 
Korean company of Sol del Caribe for purposes of felling trees and to pursue 
commercial development. 
The IACHR found the Nicaraguan government in violation of articles 1, 2, 21 and 25. 
The IACHR referred the case to the IACtHR along with its report on the violations. The 
IACtHR concluded that the Nicaraguan government violated articles 21 and 25. The 
IACtHR found that the violation of the property rights of the Awas Tingni Community 
                                                 
396 Melish TJ “Rethinking the ‘less is more’ thesis: Supranational litigation of economic, social and cultural 
rights in the Americas” (2006) 39 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 171-343 
317. 
397 Melish TJ “The Inter-American Commission” 356. 
398 Judgment of 31 August 2011 by the IACtHR, (Ser.C) No. 79 (2001). 
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was significant because their property rights flowed directly from their indigenous 
tradition which made it impossible for the government to award any concession over 
that land.  
The IACtHR ordered the Nicaraguan government to adopt the measures that are 
necessary to properly demarcate the communal land of the Awas Tingni Community 
and to ensure that the title of the land is registered in their name. The IACtHR further 
ordered the government to refrain from any acts that affected the existence, value, use 
or enjoyment of the property located on the communal land where the community lives 
and carries out its activities. The IACtHR also awarded the Awas Tingni Community 
$ 50 000 compensation for the violation of their rights by the Nicaraguan government. 
 
4 3 3 3 Conclusion 
Melish argues that both the IACHR399 and the IACtHR400 are well positioned to play a 
leading role in the development of socio-economic rights in the Inter-American human 
rights system. However, both bodies are currently reluctant to consider the existence of 
an independent socio-economic right to housing in terms of article 26. Instead, both 
bodies prefer to consider housing issues in terms of classic civil and political rights. 
Melish argues that this does not raise serious concerns in practice because the 
indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights ensures that housing issues can 
be adjudicated and vindicated in terms of civil and political rights.401 She notes that this 
can occur in terms of certain neutral procedural norms like access to courts, due 
process or the principle of non-discrimination. This purpose can also be achieved in 
terms of the broad rights to life, dignity, political participation and privacy.402 However, 
the latter approach presents an unique problem because the very broad nature of these 
rights make it extremely difficult to litigate issues that relate to the specifics of the 
adequacy, availability, accessibility and quality of housing. Melish accordingly argues 
that both the IACHR and the IACtHR must consider housing claims as claims for the 
                                                 
399 Melish “Inter-American Commission” 372. 
400 Melish “Inter-American Court” 405. 
401 Melish “Inter-American Court” 406. 
402 Melish “Inter-American Court” 406. 
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protection against arbitrary or unreasonable conduct that harms the enjoyment of an 
individually-held right to housing.403 
 
4 3 4 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
4 3 4 1 Introduction 
The third regional human rights system was created when the Organisation of African 
Unity, now known as the African Union,404 adopted the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights405 (‘Banjul Charter’) at the 18th Conference of Heads of State and 
Government. The Banjul Charter was adopted as a result of the external pressure that 
was placed on African governments to establish a regional human rights regime for 
Africa and as a response to the gross human rights violations committed by some 
African leaders.406 The Banjul Charter affirms the interdependence and indivisibility407 of 
all human rights within the African context and sets the stage for the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights408 (ACHPR) to consider the facts of the 
communications before it in light of all the applicable rights.409 
Although the Banjul Charter contains a number of socio-economic rights,410 it has 
been criticised for not expressly recognising inter alia the right to adequate housing and 
                                                 
403 Melish “Inter-American Court” 407. 
404 Viljoen F “The African regional human rights system” in Krause C and Scheinin M (eds) International 
Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (2009) 503-527 505 (‘Viljoen “The African regional human rights 
system”’) notes that it is the role of the African Union to ensure compliance by member states of the 
commitment to respect human rights and the principles underpinning democracy, the rule of law and good 
governance. 
405 1520 UNTS 217. The Charter was adopted on 27 June 1981 and came into force on 21 October 1986. 
South African ratified the Charter on 9 July 1996. 
406 Chirwa DM “African regional human rights system” in Langford M (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence - 
Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 323-338 323 (Chirwa “African regional 
human rights system”). 
407 Preamble of the Banjul Charter. 
408 The ACHPR was established in 1981 and reports to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
of the African Union. The ACHPR consists of 11 members from the African continent who are known “for 
their high morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in matters of human and peoples’ rights” for a 
renewable six-year term (article 31). The ACHPR convenes bi-annually (during March/April and 
October/November) to interpret the Banjul Charter and conduct tasks that are related to the promotion 
and protection of human and peoples’ rights (article 45). 
409 Chirwa “African regional human rights system” 324. 
410 These rights include: the right to work (article 15); the right to health (article 16); the right to education 
(article 17); the right to freely dispose of wealth and natural resources (article 21); the right to economic, 
social and cultural development (article 22) and the right to a general satisfactory environment (article 
24). 
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the right to an adequate standard of living.411 This apparent absence of key socio-
economic rights in the Banjul Charter is remedied by the fact that the ACHPR is 
empowered to draw inspiration from international human rights law.412 This is exactly 
what the ACHPR did in The Social and Economic Rights Action Group & the Centre for 
Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria413 (‘SERAC v Nigeria’) when it found that a right 
to housing was implicitly entrenched in articles 14,414 16415 and 18(1)416 of the Banjul 
Charter. 
 
4 3 4 2 SERAC v Nigeria 
In SERAC v Nigeria it was alleged that the Nigerian government condoned and 
facilitated the oil production operations of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company 
(NNPC), a majority shareholder in a consortium with the Shell Petroleum Development 
Company, without due regard for the environmental degradation and resultant health 
problems it caused for the people in Ogoniland. It was further alleged that the combined 
effect of substandard maintenance, no operation oversight and questionable safety 
mechanisms resulted in the pollution of waterways near villages that were used by the 
Ogoni people for fishing and irrigation of their farmland. The Nigerian security forces 
                                                 
411 Oloka-Onyango J “Beyond the rhetoric: Reinvigorating the struggle for economic, social and cultural 
rights in Africa” (1995) 26 California Western International Law Journal 1-71 51. Article 10 of the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child OAU doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (concluded on 11 July 1990 
and entered into force on 29 November 1999) states that  
“[n]o child shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family home 
or correspondence, or to the attacks upon his honour or reputation, provided that parents or 
legal guardians shall have the right to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of 
their children. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.” 
Article 16 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa OAU doc CAB/LEG/66.6 (concluded on 11 July 2003 and entered into force on 25 November 
2005) provides that “[w]omen shall have the right to equal access to housing and to acceptable living 
conditions in a healthy environment. To ensure this right, States Parties shall grant women whatever their 
marital status, access to adequate housing.” 
412 Article 60 of the Banjul Charter. 
413 Communication 155/96, Ref. ACHPR/COMM/A044/1 (27 May 2002). 
414 Article 14 of the Banjul Charter reads: “The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be 
encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in 
accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.” 
415 Article 16 of the Banjul Charter reads: “(1) Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best 
attainable state of physical and mental health. (2) States Parties to the present Charter shall take the 
necessary measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical 
attention when they are sick.” 
416 Article 18(1) of the Banjul Charter reads: “The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It 
shall be protected by the State which shall take case of its physical health and moral.” 
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(army, air force, police and navy) responded to the protests of the Ogoni leaders by 
attacking villages, destroying homes and then setting everything alight. The 
complainants therefore argued that the Nigerian government was in violation of articles 
2,417 4,418 14, 16, 18(1), 21419 and 24420 of the Banjul Charter. 
 The complainants alleged that the Nigerian government contaminated the air, water 
and soil and thereby harmed the health of the Ogoni people; failed to protect the Ogoni 
people from the harm caused by the NNPC and Shell; and failed to conduct or permit 
studies of potential or actual environmental and health risks caused by the oil 
operations.421 In this regard the ACHPR noted that the rights contained in articles 16 
and 24 where closely linked to economic and social rights “in so far as the environment 
affects the quality of life and safety of the individual.”422 The ACHPR found that these 
rights imposed clear obligations on the Nigerian government to “prevent pollution and 
ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically 
sustainable development and use of natural resources” and to “desist from directly 
threatening the health and environment of their citizens.”423 These obligations would 
also include permitting or ordering independent scientific monitoring of threatened 
environments; providing information and the right to be heard to those communities 
                                                 
417 Article 2 of the Banjul Charter states that “[e]very individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without discrimination of any kind 
such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and 
social origin, fortune, birth or other status.” 
418 Article 4 of the Banjul Charter provides that “[h]uman beings are inviolable. Every human being shall 
be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. Non one may be arbitrarily deprived of this 
right.” 
419 Article 21 of the Banjul Charter reads: 
“(1) All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be 
exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall people be deprived of it. (2) 
In case of spoliation the disposed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its 
property as well as to an adequate compensation. (3) The free disposal of wealth and natural 
resources shall be exercised without prejudice to the obligation of promoting international 
economic cooperation based on mutual respect, equitable exchange and the principles of 
international law. (4) States parties to the present Charter shall individually and collectively 
exercise the right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a view to 
strengthening African unity and solidarity. (5) States parties to the present Charter shall 
undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation particularly that practiced by 
international monopolies so as to enable their people to fully benefit from the advantages 
derived from their natural resources.” 
420 Article 24 of the Banjul Charter states that “[a]ll peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development.” 
421 SERAC v Nigeria par 50. 
422 SERAC v Nigeria par 51. 
423 SERAC v Nigeria par 52. 
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affected by these activities.424 The ACHPR therefore held that the Nigerian government 
did not show the Ogoni people the care and concern that they were entitled to under the 
Banjul Charter.425 
The complainants also alleged that the Nigerian government failed to monitor or 
regulate the operations of the NNPC and Shell which enabled it to exploit the oil 
reserves in Ogoniland and that it failed to involve the Ogoni Communities in the 
decisions that affected the development of the land that they occupied and cultivated.426 
In this regard the ACHPR noted that article 21 served “to remind African governments of 
the continent’s painful legacy and restore co-operative economic development to its 
traditional place at the heart of African Society.”427 The ACHPR found that this provision 
imposed an obligation on governments to protect citizens not only by enacting 
legislation and providing appropriate enforcement mechanisms, but also by protecting 
them from harmful acts that are committed by private parties.428 The ACHPR held that 
the conduct of the Nigerian government facilitated the destruction of the Ogoniland with 
devastating effects to the general well-being of the Ogonis.429 
The complainants further alleged that the Nigerian government systematically 
violated the right to adequate housing of the Ogoni community on a large scale.430 
While the ACHPR acknowledged that the Banjul Charter does not contain an explicit 
right to housing, it reasoned that the combined effect of articles 14, 16 and 18(1) 
encapsulated the essence of a right to shelter or housing in the African context.431  
The ACHPR explained that the right to housing placed an obligation on governments 
to desist from destroying the homes of its citizens and to afford individuals and 
communities the opportunity to rebuild homes that were damaged or destroyed. 
Governments must further ensure that no government agency or third parties violated 
the housing rights of individuals and communities. In the event that such a violation 
occurred, governments should act decisively against those parties by prosecuting them 
                                                 
424 SERAC v Nigeria par 53. 
425 SERAC v Nigeria par 54. 
426 SERAC v Nigeria par 55. 
427 SERAC v Nigeria par 56. 
428 SERAC v Nigeria par 57. 
429 SERAC v Nigeria par 58. 
430 SERAC v Nigeria par 59. 
431 SERAC v Nigeria par 60. 
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to the full extent of the law. Finally, the right to housing encompasses more than the 
right to have a roof overhead. The right to housing also embodies the right of every 
individual to be left alone to live in peace - “whether under a roof or not.”432 
The ACHPR held that the demolition of Ogoni homes and the subsequent 
obstruction, harassment, violent attacks and murder of those that attempted to rebuild 
the homes constituted a serious violation of the right to shelter.433 The ACHPR echoed 
the CESCR in holding that the right to housing entailed more than a right to shelter 
because it also encompassed the right to protection against forced eviction given that 
evictions cause distress (physical, psychological and emotional), increased 
impoverishment and the loss of means of economic sustenance.434 
The ACHR accordingly held that the Nigerian government was in violation of all the 
articles cited. It recommended435 that it ensure the protection of the environment, health 
and livelihood of the people of Ogoniland by ceasing all attacks on their communities. 
The Nigerian government should conduct investigations into the human rights violations 
committed against the Ogoni people and award compensation to the victims of these 
violations. It should initiate comprehensive cleaning operations of the farms and rivers 
affected by pollution and ensure that appropriate environmental and social impact 
assessments were prepared. It should further provide information on the health and 
environmental risks of possible oil pollution and ensure that the Ogoni people obtain 
access to regulatory and decision-making bodies.436 
 
4 3 4 3 Conclusion 
The value of SERAC v Nigeria is that the ACHPR found that the right to housing was 
implicitly recognised in the Banjul Charter by relying on a combined interpretation of the 
rights to property, the best attainable state of physical and mental health, and to the 
protection of the family. As such the ACHPR affirmed the fact that all human rights are 
                                                 
432 SERAC v Nigeria par 61. 
433 SERAC v Nigeria par 62. 
434 SERAC v Nigeria par 63. 
435 Viljoen “The African regional human rights system” 505 notes that the recommendations of the 
ACHPR is not formally binding. This, together with the fact that it does not have a clear competence to 
order remedial action and the lack of visibility for its protective work, is cited as some of the deficiencies 
that is currently crippling the ACHPR’s mandate. 
436 SERAC v Nigeria 15. 
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indivisible and that they are mutually supporting. This enabled the ACHPR to craft a 
comprehensive response to the systemic violation of the implied right to housing. The 
ACHPR furthermore provided the Nigerian government with detailed guidance on what 
its obligations were in order to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the implied right to 
housing. Liebenberg notes that the coming into force of the Protocol to the African 
Charter on the establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights437 will 
hopefully provide more impetus towards developing a binding jurisprudence on all the 
rights in the Banjul Charter,438 in general, and the implied right to housing, specifically. 
 
4 4 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that South African courts can consider a range of international 
and regional human rights instruments to develop a substantive understanding of the 
concepts of “adequacy” for purposes of section 26 of the Constitution. General 
Comment 4’s description of the right to housing as living “somewhere in security, peace 
and dignity” accords with the Constitutional Court’s assessment that section 26 amounts 
to “more than bricks and mortar”. General Comment 4 further states that the right to 
housing is more complex than simply having a roof over one’s head. This is in 
accordance with how the Constitutional Court has described the right of access to 
adequate housing. The similarities between General Comment 4  and the jurisprudence 
of the Constitutional Court is indicative of the fact that South Africa is on the correct path 
to giving substantive content to the right of access to adequate housing. South Africa 
simply requires an organising framework within which to consider the right of access to 
adequate housing. This organising framework can be found in General Comment 4 
where the CESCR stated that the characteristics of adequate housing include having 
some sort of security of tenure, receiving services, living in a home that is accessible 
both financially and physically, living in a home that is fit for human habitation, having 
your home in close proximity to employment opportunities and social amenities, and 
                                                 
437 OAU doc CM/2051 (LXVIII). As at 15 July 2011 there were 25 ratifications of and 50 signatories to this 
Protocol. South African ratified the Protocol on 3 July 2002.  See Mubangizi JC and O’Shea A “An African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights” (1999) 24 SAYIL 256-269. 
438 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 110. 
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living in a home that embraces your culture. The question is just how to reach this point 
of development. 
The ECtHR’s contentment with the fact that adequate procedural protections existed 
in the English land use system to vindicate the housing rights of gypsies/travellers has 
dwindled from Buckley to Connors. The ECtHR has now limited the margin of 
appreciation or amount of deference that it shows to States Parties and replaced it with 
a firm requirement that States Parties must take positive steps to embrace the emerging 
consensus amongst the Council of Europe member states to improve the living 
conditions and lives of gypsies/travellers. This requires States Parties to accept the fact 
that there is a dimension to the awarding of planning permission that goes beyond the 
environmental and other concerns listed in article 8(2) of the ECHR. This is the 
dimension that encompasses the personal circumstances of the gypsies/travellers. 
South Africa has already achieved this with section 26(3) of the Constitution and the 
subsequent jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court which states that the legally 
relevant circumstances in post-apartheid South Africa include both the personal 
circumstance of the unlawful occupiers and the history and duration of their unlawful 
occupation. The only way to embrace this dimension in the European context is to 
escape the vicious circle that the English land use system creates by giving substantive 
content to the right to a home. The ECtHR has reached this point of development in its 
jurisprudence on the right to respect the home and family life without adhering to the 
two-stage constitutional analysis that it applies in other instances. Despite this failure to 
engage first with the content of a right before moving on to a limitation analysis, the 
ECtHR has started to engage with the content of article 8(1) by framing its reservations 
about justifications advanced by the United Kingdom to reflect some of the 
characteristics that are contained in General Comment 4. South African courts, 
especially the Constitutional Court, have similarly not adhered to a strict two-stage 
constitutional analysis in adjudicating section 26 of the Constitution. The result is that 
the South African understanding of the right of access to adequate housing is that it 
amounts to “more than bricks and mortar.” The ECtHR has shown that it is possible to 
engage to some extent with the substantive content of the right to housing in the second 
stage of constitutional analysis if the first stage is avoided. 
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The South African courts can also learn a great deal from the jurisprudence that the 
ECSR has generated in terms of articles 16, 30, 31 and E of the Revised ESC by giving 
substantive interpretations to these rights. The resulting independent content that has 
been afforded to these rights has enabled the ECSR to scrutinise the justifications 
advanced by Greece, Italy, Bulgaria and France with greater rigour and jurisprudential 
discipline than the ECtHR has done under the ECHR. This is in accordance with the 
approach that the CESCR prescribes in General Comment 7 when it requires States 
Parties to establish adequate procedural and substantive safeguards against forced 
evictions. Establishing these safeguards forces States Parties to establish better 
justifications for proceeding with planned forced evictions. South Africa has already 
achieved this in the democratic dispensation by ensuring that unlawful occupiers 
receive notice of the pending eviction and have an opportunity to place their personal 
circumstances before the court for its consideration. Recently the joinder of organs of 
state, the obligation to engage meaningfully with unlawful occupiers and the provision of 
alternative land or accommodation has been added to this list of protections against 
forced evictions. This shows that the development of these safeguards are possible in 
an approach that first engages with the content of the right before it proceeds to an 
evaluation of the reasons advanced by States Parties for not respecting, protecting or 
fulfilling these rights. 
Finally, the South African courts can learn from the jurisprudence that the IACHR, 
the IACtHR and the ACHPR have generated in terms of the Pact of San José and the 
Banjul Charter respectively. While neither of these regional human rights systems has 
an explicit right to housing, the supervisory bodies in both systems have relied on 
classic civil and political rights to vindicate violations of housing interests. This is in 
accordance with the internationally accepted fact that all human rights are 
interdependent and mutually supporting. However, this approach to the adjudication of 
housing interests is problematic, because it is difficult to give content to a right to 
housing from these broad norms. South African courts, most notably the Constitutional 
Court in Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and 
Others,439 have regularly stated that the right of access to housing must be interpreted 
                                                 
439 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
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and understood in relation to the other rights in the Bill of Rights. However, the reliance 
on the broad norms of equality, human dignity and life has only allowed the 
Constitutional Court to interpret the right of access to adequate housing as amounting to 
“more than bricks and mortar”. This interpretation of the content of section 26(1) of the 
Constitution is by no means insignificant because it indicates that there is more to 
housing than a physical structure. The fact remains that it is still unclear what the 
landscape of the right of access to adequate housing looks like beyond the physical 
structure of a home. 
The South African courts are ideally placed to develop the substantive content of the 
right of access to adequate housing by tapping into the human rights dialogue on the 
scope and content of the interrelated concepts of “adequacy” and “home” discussed 
above. The establishment of an organising framework within which to develop the 
content and scope of the right of access to adequate housing will, however, turn on how 
the South African courts can interpret the statutory obligations that flow from the 
Housing Act 107 of 1997 and the Prevention of Illegal Evictions from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 to achieve its full transformative potential.
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5 
Obligations of the State 
 
5 1 Introduction 
The state has an obligation to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil” the right of access to 
adequate housing.1 This obligation binds the legislature to enact legislation that gives 
effect to section 26 of the Constitution;2 the executive to implement that legislation;3 and 
                                                 
1 Section 7(2) read with section 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the 
Constitution’). Shue H Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy (1980) developed this 
typology of duties as a response to the argument which erroneously assumes that a distinction can be 
drawn between negative or security rights and positive or subsistence rights. Shue explains that this 
argument fails to appreciate that neither security nor subsistence rights fit neatly into the assigned sides 
of a simplistic positive/negative dichotomy (at 37) because while it may be possible to avoid violating the 
physical security of another (for example, by refraining to murder, rape or assault another), it is only 
possible to protect that security by taking positive action (for example, by developing a criminal justice 
system to apprehend, prosecute and detain individuals that commit crime). Shue similarly explains that 
while subsistence rights sometimes require the provision of commodities to those that cannot do so for 
themselves (for example, providing shelter, water, food, social security or health care), it may also require 
negative action (for example, by not interfering with the access people have to shelter, water, food, social 
security or health care). Shue rejects the idea that the distinctions should be drawn between the types of 
rights (at 52) and argues that distinctions should rather be drawn between the types of duties that those 
rights impose on society. Shue therefore proposes the following “tripartite of duties”: firstly, duties to avoid 
depriving; secondly, duties to protect from deprivation; and finally, duties to aid the deprived. Liebenberg 
S Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) (‘Liebenberg Socio-
Economic Rights’) 87 explains that section 7(2) of the Constitution embraces this holistic framework of 
duties which forms a firm basis from which to develop a substantive and contextual approach to the 
adjudication of human rights. See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 54-49 for a discussion of the 
positive/negative rights dichotomy. See further Liebenberg S "Violations of socio-economic rights: The 
role of the South African Human Rights Commission" in Andrews P and Ellman S (eds) The Post-
Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa's Basic Law (2001) 405-443 and De Vos P "Pious 
wishes or directly enforceable human rights? Social and economic rights in South Africa's 1996 
Constitution" (1997) 13 SAJHR 67-101 for a discussion of the application of this typology of duties in the 
context of socio-economic rights in South Africa. 
2 Section 8(1) read with sections 43, 55(1), 68(1), 76(3), 104(1)(b)(i), 156(1) and schedule 4A of the 
Constitution. The following national legislation has been enacted to give effect to section 26 of the 
Constitution: the Housing Act 107 of 1997 (‘the Housing Act’); the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (‘PIE’); the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 and the Social 
Housing Act 16 of 2008. 
3 Section 8(1) of the Constitution. The following offices are responsible for the implementation of 
legislation: at national government level, the President, as head of the national executive, and the 
Minister for Human Settlements (section 85(2)(a) of the Constitution read with the definition of “Minister” 
in section 1 of the Housing Act); at provincial government level, the Premier, as head of the provincial 
executive, and the MEC responsible for housing (section 125(2)(b) of the Constitution read with the 
definition of “MEC” in section 1 of the Housing Act); at local government level, the Municipal Council 
(section 156(1) of the Constitution read with the definition of “municipality” in section 1 of the Housing 
Act). 
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the judiciary to adjudicate whether the legislation as implemented can lead to the 
progressive realisation of the right of access to adequate housing.4 The executive 
authority is perhaps the most accessible and visible sphere of government, because it is 
at the coalface of the housing needs of the poor. In Grootboom CC, Yacoob J explained 
the obligations of the executive as follows: 
 
“All levels of government must ensure that the housing program is reasonably and 
appropriately implemented in the light of all the provisions in the Constitution. All 
implementation mechanisms and all State action in relation to housing falls to be 
assessed against the requirements of s 26 of the Constitution. Every step and every 
level of government must be consistent with the constitutional obligations to take 
reasonable measures to provide access to adequate housing.”5 
 
The executive - at national,6 provincial7 and local8 government level - therefore fulfils an 
instrumental role in the implementation of housing development projects9 that have 
been incorporated into a national housing programme.10 As such the executive must 
                                                 
4 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) 
(‘Grootboom CC’); Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and 
Others (Mukhwevho Intervening) 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 
2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) (‘PE Municipality’); Jaftha v Schoeman and Others, Van Rooyen v Stoltz and 
Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC); President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Others, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) (‘Modderklip CC’); Occupiers 
of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and 
Others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) (‘Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road’); Residents of Joe Slovo Community, 
Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) (‘Residents of Joe Slovo’); Joseph and Others 
v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) (‘Joseph’); Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement SA 
and Another v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal and Others 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) (‘Abahlali 
baseMjondolo’); and Nokotyana and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and Others 2010 (4) 
BCLR 312 (CC) (‘Nokotyana’). 
5 Grootboom par 82. 
6 Section 3 of the Housing Act describes the functions of the Minister of Human Settlements. 
7 Section 7 of the Housing Act describes the functions of the MEC responsible for housing in each of the 
nine provinces of South Africa. 
8 Section 9 of the Housing Act describes the functions of the municipal council of each municipality. 
9 Section 1 of the Housing Act defines “housing development project” as “any plan to undertake housing 
development as contemplated in any national housing programme.” Section 1 defines “housing 
development” as  
“the establishment and maintenance of habitable, stable and sustainable public and private 
residential environments to ensure viable households and communities in areas allowing 
convenient access to economic opportunities, and to health, educational and social 
amenities in which all citizens and permanent residents of the Republic will, on a progressive 
basis, have access to - (a) permanent residential structures with secure tenure, ensuring 
internal and external privacy and providing adequate protection against the elements; and 
(b) potable water, adequate sanitary facilities and domestic energy supply.”  
10 Section 1 of the Housing Act defines a “national housing programme” as  
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respect, protect, promote and fulfil11 the right of access to adequate housing; observe 
and adhere to the principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental 
relations;12 and comply with all other applicable provisions of the Constitution.13 The 
executive must ensure that housing development provides a range of housing and 
tenure options14 that are affordable and sustainable.15 These housing development 
projects must form part of an integrated development plan16 and must be administered 
in a transparent, accountable and equitable manner.17 
The primary obligation of the executive in implementing housing development 
projects is to ensure that priority is given to the needs of the poor.18 The executive is 
therefore obliged to ascertain the needs of the poor by fostering a dialogic relationship 
between itself and, on the one hand, the individuals and communities affected by 
housing development and, on the other hand, all other stakeholders in housing 
development.19 The corollary of this dialogic relationship is that the executive will 
transfer the requisite skills and empower individuals and communities to fulfil their own 
housing needs20 and spend its budget on housing development in a manner which 
stimulates private investment.21 
In terms of the Housing Act, the executive is obliged to promote inter alia the 
establishment, development and maintenance of viable communities and to ensure that 
slums and slum conditions are prevented by fostering safe and healthy living 
                                                                                                                                                             
“any national policy framework to facilitate housing development, including, but not limited to, 
any housing assistance measures referred to in section 3(5) or any other measure or 
arrangement to - (a) assist persons who cannot independently provide for their own housing 
needs; (b) facilitate housing delivery; or (c) rehabilitate and upgrade existing housing stock, 
including municipal services and infrastructure.” 
11 Section 2(1)(h)(i) of the Housing Act. 
12 Section 2(1)(h)(ii) of the Housing Act. See also the principles of co-operative government and 
intergovernmental relations contained in section 41 of the Constitution. 
13 Section 2(1)(h)(iii) of the Housing Act. The obligation in section 2(1)(f) to “take due cognisance of the 
impact of housing development on the environment” creates a direct link to section 24 of the Constitution. 
14 Section 2(1)(c)(i) of the Housing Act. 
15 Section 2(1)(c)(ii) of the Housing Act. 
16 Section 2(1)(c)(iii) of the Housing Act. 
17 Section 2(1)(c)(iv) of the Housing Act. 
18 Section 2(1)(a) of the Housing Act. In Residents of Joe Slovo par 350, Sachs J explained that section 
26 of the Constitution laid down “in great detail the approach the state must adopt when dealing with the 
claims of the homeless.” 
19 Section 2(1)(l) of the Housing Act. 
20 Section 2(1)(d) of the Housing Act. 
21 Section 2(1)(k) of the Housing Act. 
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conditions.22 The executive must also spearhead the process of integration in urban and 
rural areas23 by ensuring that measures are put in place to prohibit discrimination on 
any of the listed grounds in the Constitution in the housing development process.24 
In practice, municipalities incur the primary obligation to provide access to adequate 
housing because “in some instances, the full realisation - or at least the ultimate 
administration – of programmes designed to make good the promise of th[is] right … 
rests on municipalities.”25 The Constitution foresees that the realisation of section 26 
can intersect with the functions of municipalities in a direct way through the assignment 
of specific powers in terms of legislation.26 Section 9(1)(a)(i) of the Housing Act assigns 
municipalities the power to ensure that the inhabitants of its area of jurisdiction have 
access to adequate housing, which is a competence listed in schedule 4A of the 
Constitution. Sections 3(2)(e) and 7(2)(c) of the Housing Act places an obligation on 
national and provincial government to provide any assistance that local governments 
may need to support and strengthen its capacity to fulfill its duties in terms of the 
Housing Act. The Constitution also foresees that the realisation of section 26 can 
intersect with the functions of municipalities in an indirect way through the contributory 
and supportive role they fulfil in rendering basic services27 to their communities.28 
                                                 
22 Section 2(1)(e)(iii) of the Housing Act. 
23 Section 2(1)(e)(iv) of the Housing Act. 
24 Section 2(1)(e)(vi) of the Housing Act. 
25 Steytler N and De Visser J “Local Government” in Woolman S, Bishop M and Brickhill J (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd edition (Original Service, June 2008) 22-67 (‘Steytler and De Visser 
“Local Government”’). 
26 Section 156(1) of the Constitution provides that  
“[a] municipality has executive authority in respect of, and has the right to administer – (a) 
the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5; and 
(b) any other matter assigned to it by national or provincial legislation” (emphasis added).  
Section 156(4) of the Constitution further provides that  
“[t]he national government and provincial governments must assign to a municipality, by 
agreement and subject to any conditions, the administration of a matter listed in Part A of 
Schedule 4 or Part A of Schedule 5 which necessarily relates to local government, if - (a) 
that matter would most effectively be administered locally; and (b) the municipality has the 
capacity to administer it” (emphasis added).  
See also sections 155(6) and (7) of the Constitution. 
27 The range of basic municipal services that a municipality should provide includes, in terms of schedule 
4B of the Constitution, electricity and gas reticulation; municipal health services; municipal public 
transport; municipal public works; stormwater management systems in built-up areas; and water and 
sanitation services limited to potable water supply systems and domestic waste-water and sewage 
disposal systems. Schedule 5B of the Constitution adds cleansing; local amenities; municipal parks and 
recreation; municipal roads; refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal; and street lighting. 
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The aim of this chapter is to trace the recent jurisprudential developments in the law 
of evictions that have provided greater clarity on the nature of the obligations of the 
state imposed by section 26 of the Constitution. The first part of this chapter analyses 
the case law on the necessary joinder of local authorities to eviction proceedings and 
the development of the concept of meaningful engagement. The second part of the 
chapter proposes an organising framework for the consideration of the availability of 
alternative accommodation in terms of the rights and needs of vulnerable people.  
 
5 2 Current developments 
5 2 1 Joinder 
5 2 1 1 Introduction 
Joinder refers to the situation where more than one party or more than one cause is 
joined in a single action. Joinder of convenience is usually pursued in cases where a 
multiplicity of actions will be avoided or time, costs and effort will be saved.29 However, 
joinder can also occur where the circumstances dictate that it is essential for a party to 
be joined due to the interest of that party in the case. This joinder of necessity will be 
required where “a party has, or may have, a direct and substantial interest in any order 
                                                                                                                                                             
See Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) on water and 
sanitation, Joseph on electricity and Nokotyana on street lighting. 
28 Section 152(1)(b) of the Constitution. Steytler and De Visser “Local Government” 22-66 argue that 
section 152(b) of the Constitution does not provide a strong basis for claiming the provision of services 
other than those which the municipality provides to the community on a daily basis - water, sanitation and 
refuse removal - because these services are located within the broad objects of a municipality in terms of 
section 153 of the Constitution. They argue that a much stronger basis for claiming a broader range of 
services from a municipality can be found in section 227(1)(a) read with section 139(5) of the 
Constitution. Section 227(1)(a) of the Constitution provides that municipalities are “entitled to an equitable 
share of revenue raised nationally to enable it to provide basic services and perform the functions 
allocated to it.” The Minister of Human Settlements is therefore empowered to “negotiate for the national 
apportionment of the state budget for housing development” in terms of section 3(4)(b) of the Housing 
Act. Section 139(5)(a) of the Constitution enables the relevant provincial executive to “impose a recovery 
plan” when “a municipality, as a result of a crisis in its financial affairs, is in serious or persistent material 
breach of its obligations to provide basic services or to meet its financial commitments, or admits that it is 
unable to meet its obligations or financial commitments” (emphasis added). 
29 Cilliers AC, Loots C and Nel HC Herbstein and Van Winsen The Civil Practice of the High Courts and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa (2009) 208 (‘Cilliers et al Civil Practice’). These instances of 
joinder of convenience are regulated exclusively by Rule 10(1) of the Uniform Rules of the High Court. In 
Dendy v University of the Witwatersrand 2005 (5) SA 357 (W) par 71 it was stated that the questions of 
law and fact must “in the main” or in their “principal essentials” be essentially the same. See the 
conflicting judgments of the Witwatersrand Local Division of the High Court (now the South Gauteng High 
Court, Johannesburg) in Vitorakis v Wolf 1973 (3) SA 928 (W) at 930 and Rabinowitz NNO v Ned-Equity 
Insurance Co Ltd 1980 (3) SA 415 (W) at 419E on the question of whether Rule 10(1) has replaced the 
common law rules on joinder. 
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the court might make”30 or if the order “cannot be sustained or carried into effect” 
without prejudicial effect to that party.31  
The numerous examples of joinder of necessity in case law32 indicate that a party 
will have a direct and substantial interest in a case when that party has an interest in the 
right which is the subject-matter of the litigation and not merely a financial interest.33 
The classic example in this regard is where the constitutional validity of an 
administrative action or piece of legislation is challenged.34 In Mabaso v Law Society, 
Northern Provinces and Another, O’Regan J explained the rationale for joining the 
relevant organ of state in these circumstances as follows: 
 
“In a constitutional democracy, a Court should not declare the acts of another arm of 
government to be inconsistent with the Constitution without ensuring that that arm of 
government is given a proper opportunity to consider the constitutional challenge 
and to make such representations to the Court as it considers fit. There are at least 
two reasons for this. First, the Minister responsible for administering the legislation 
may well be able to place pertinent facts and submissions before the Court 
necessary for the proper determination of the constitutional issue. Secondly, a 
constitutional democracy such as ours requires that the different arms of 
government respect and acknowledge their different constitutional functions.”35 
 
Where such an interest of a party becomes apparent a court must postpone the 
proceedings until that party has either received judicial notice of the proceedings, been 
                                                 
30 Haroun v Garlick [2007] 2 All SA 627 (C) par 14. 
31 Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949 (3) SA 637 (A); Van der Walt v Saffy 1950 
(2) SA 578 (O) at 581; Henri Viljoen (Pty) Ltd v Awerbuch Brothers 1953 (2) SA 151 (O) at 165; Harding v 
Basson 1995 (4) SA 499 (C) and Rosebank Mall (Pty) Ltd v Cradock Heights (Pty) Ltd 2004 (2) SA 353 
(W). 
32 These cases are discussed in Cilliers et al Civil Practice 219-223. 
33 Bohlokong Black Taxi Association v Interstate Bus Lines (Edms) Bpk 1997 (4) SA 635 (O) at 644A-B. 
This test is not very strict because a court only has to satisfy itself that the possibility of such an interest 
exists and not that this interest in fact exists. See Abrahamse v Cape Town City Council 1953 (3) SA 855 
(C) at 859. 
34 See Rule 10A of the Uniform Rules of the High Court and Rule 5 of the Constitutional Court Rules, 
2003. Both Rules were inserted in the respective rules as a result of the reasoning of Ackerman J in 
Parbhoo and Others v Getz NO and Another 1997 (4) SA 1095 (CC) par 5. 
 
35 2005 (2) SA 117 (CC) par 13. See also Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (6) SA 
169 (CC) par 52; Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd (Minister of Labour intervening) 1999 (2) 
SA 1 (CC) paras 7-9; Beinash and Another v Ernst & Young and Others 1999 (2) SA 116 (CC) par 27 and 
Hofmeyr K “Rules and procedure in constitutional matters” in Woolman S, Bishop M and Brickhill J (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd edition (Original service, June 2008) 5-3. 
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joined or unequivocally waived the right to be joined and undertook to abide by any 
decision the court may make.36 
The discussion of case law that follows below provides an overview of the reasoning 
adopted in the High Courts for postponing eviction proceedings instituted in terms of the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Law Act 18 of 1998 
(‘PIE’) and ordering the necessary joinder of organs of state to those proceedings. 
 
5 2 1 2 Joinder of organs of State to evictions from private land 
5 2 1 2 1 Murray 
In ABSA Bank Ltd v Murray and Another37 (‘Murray’) the applicant approached the 
Western Cape High Court, Cape Town for an eviction order against the respondents in 
terms of sections 4(7) and (8) of PIE. The first respondent was sequestrated after he 
defaulted on the repayments of a mortgage bond that was registered over the property 
in favour of the applicant. The applicant subsequently purchased the property at a sale 
by public auction that was held in terms of section 83(8)(d) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 
1936. The respondent’s refusal to vacate the property made it impossible for the 
applicant to provide vacant possession to the persons to whom it subsequently sold the 
property. 
Binns-Ward AJ found that it would be inappropriate to assign an ultimate onus38 to 
place relevant information before the court on either the unlawful occupier(s) or owner in 
a purely adversarial sense because that would imply that evidence of certain facts will 
give rise to specific and predictable legal consequences.39 This would be the antithesis 
of affording the courts a broad discretion in considering the justice and equity of an 
eviction after considering all the relevant circumstances.40 Instead, Binns-Ward AJ 
focussed on the procedural duty that section 4(2) of PIE places on an owner to serve 
                                                 
36 Cilliers et al Civil Practice 208 note that it is a principle in South African law that an interested party 
should be afforded an opportunity to be heard in matters in which it has a direct and substantial interest. 
See also Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949 (3) SA 637 (A) at 659; Toekies 
Butchery (Edms) Bpk v Stassen 1974 (4) SA 771 (T) at 774H; Smith v Conelect 1987 (3) SA 689 (W) at 
694; BHT Water Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie 1993 (1) SA 47 (W) at 49F-I; Pretorius v Slabbert 2000 (4) 
SA 935 (SCA) at 939C-F and Ex parte Body Corporate of Caroline Court 2001 (4) SA 1230 (SCA) par 9. 
37 2004 (2) SA 15 (C). 
38 Ndlovu v Ngobo; Bekker and Another v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) par 19. 
39 Murray par 39. 
40 Murray par 39. 
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notice of the eviction proceedings on the municipality within which the property is 
located. In this regard he reiterated that municipalities must obtain the required financial 
and other support from provincial and national government to fulfil one of their primary 
constitutional obligations of progressively realising the right of access to adequate 
housing.41 The notice served upon municipalities fulfilled a much broader purpose than 
merely informing them of pending eviction proceedings. Municipalities are in a position 
to provide a court with valuable information in eviction proceedings regarding the 
availability of land, alternative accommodation, amenities and health care facilities that 
will enable a court to consider the justice and equity of the eviction.42 Viewed in this way 
the notice requirement in section 4(2) of PIE entrusts municipalities with a duty to place 
information before a court which would enable it to properly consider the justice and 
equity of the eviction.  
Binns-Ward AJ furthermore found it alarming that municipalities have adopted an 
attitude of not filing reports about the circumstances which prevail in their jurisdiction. 
This failure to compile reports not only rendered the service of such notices superfluous 
and an unnecessarily costly exercise, but also frustrated the attempts of a court to 
determine the justice and equity of the eviction after considering all the relevant 
information.43 However, in the specific circumstances of the case44 he could not justify 
the further delay which would result if the municipality was directed to provide a report 
on the availability of land and alternative accommodation within its jurisdiction. An 
eviction order was thus granted against the respondents.45 
 
5 2 1 2 2 Cashbuild 
In Cashbuild (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Scott and Others46 (‘Cashbuild’) the applicant 
approached the South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg for an eviction order against 
the respondents in terms of section 4(6) of PIE. The applicant cancelled the contract of 
sale in terms of which the respondents purchased a piece of land in the Lebowakgomo 
                                                 
41 Murray par 40. 
42 Murray par 40. 
43 Murray par 41. 
44 Murray paras 45-47. 
45 Murray par 50, Order 2 and 3. 
46 2007 (1) SA 332 (T). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
235 
informal settlement from the applicant after the respondents failed to respond to 
requests to rectify a breach of the deed of alienation. The applicant subsequently 
served a notice on the respondents that informed them of their unlawful occupation of 
the property and instructed them to vacate the property. 
During the hearing Poswa J asked counsel for the applicant whether the Lepelle-
Nkumpi Municipality was under a statutory obligation to respond to a notice that it 
received in terms of section 4(2) of PIE and, if so, why the municipality was not joined in 
the proceedings.47 Counsel for the applicant argued that the application was launched 
within six months of the date on which the occupation of the property became unlawful 
and that the municipality was therefore not required to ensure that land was made 
available for the relocation of the respondents as it would be if the application was 
launched in terms of section 4(7) of PIE.  
The applicant also argued that the municipality was under no statutory or 
constitutional obligation to intervene in the eviction proceedings because it had no 
obligation analogous to that of the Master of the High Court in sequestration 
proceedings. Finally, it was argued that the applicant was the only party that stood to be 
prejudiced in an unopposed application for eviction where the respondents failed to 
place relevant information, which is within their exclusive knowledge, before the court.48 
Poswa J was not convinced that it could have been the intention of the legislature 
that the notice in terms of section 4(2) was merely to inform the municipality of the 
pending eviction proceedings within its jurisdiction, without an obligation to do 
something with the information. However, he agreed that it was trite that there was no 
obligation on a municipality to ensure the provision of alternative accommodation for the 
relocation of unlawful occupiers in terms of section 4(6) of PIE.49 On the other hand, he 
held that section 7(1) of PIE created an obligation for a municipality to respond to a 
                                                 
47 Cashbuild par 10. 
48 Cashbuild par 11.  
49 Cashbuild par 20. In Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele 
2010 (9) BCLR 911 (SCA) par 13 (‘Occupiers of Shulana Court’), Theron AJA stated: 
“There is nothing to suggest that in an enquiry in terms of s 4(6), a court is restricted to the 
circumstances listed in that section. The court must have regard to all relevant 
circumstances. The circumstances identified are peremptory but not exhaustive. The court 
may, in appropriate cases, have regard to the availability of alternative land. However, where 
the availability of alternative land is relevant, then it is obligatory for the court to have regard 
to it” (emphasis in original text and footnote omitted). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
236 
section 4(2) notice which has no bearing on whether or not the application falls under 
sections 4(6) or s 4(7) of PIE.50  
Section 7(1) provides that a municipality “may ... appoint one or more persons with 
expertise in dispute resolution” in an “attempt to mediate and settle any dispute” 
between interested parties which arises in terms of PIE. The application of this provision 
is not constrained by any time limitations and clearly instructs a municipality to apply its 
mind in taking a decision on appointing people to mediate a dispute that is the result of 
the provisions in PIE.51 Poswa J stated that the proceedings in court would be greatly 
facilitated if a municipality could mediate an agreement between the parties as to 
whether the occupation is unlawful and whether the date when the property must be 
vacated is just and equitable.52 A court would then be in a position to simply make this 
mediated agreement an order of court in the event that it finds the eviction to be just and 
equitable.53 He further reasoned that, although the wording of section 7(1) of PIE may 
indicate the contrary,54 it could not have been the intention of the legislature to afford a 
municipality an option whether to resolve a dispute between an owner and unlawful 
occupiers because it would first have to decide whether there was a dispute at all.55 Any 
municipality would thus have a legal interest in proceedings to evict unlawful occupiers 
from land within its jurisdiction as a result of its statutory obligation in section 7(1) of 
PIE.56  
Poswa J accordingly found that a municipality should take it upon itself to intervene, 
even in cases where the section 4(2) notice is defective, by ensuring that it is joined to 
any eviction proceedings where it is clear that there is a dispute between an owner and 
unlawful occupiers.57 Any other interpretation would lose sight of the underlying purpose 
of PIE and would render the provisions of the Constitution superfluous.58 He 
                                                 
50 Cashbuild par 21. 
51 Cashbuild par 21. 
52 Cashbuild par 22. 
53 Cashbuild par 23. 
54 Cashbuild par 24. 
55 Cashbuild par 25. 
56 Cashbuild par 25. 
57 Cashbuild par 27. 
58 Cashbuild paras 28 and 32. In PE Municipality paras 36-37, Sachs J formulated the underlying purpose 
of PIE as follows:  
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emphasised that the application could not be concluded without the proper citation of 
the Lepelle-Nkumpi municipality and it being afforded an opportunity to consider the 
facts of the case.59 He also found it inappropriate to consider an unopposed application 
for eviction where the interests of children were not placed before court by the parent(s) 
or guardian(s) of those children.60 As a result he ordered the joinder of the municipality61 
and the postponement of the proceedings sine die.62 
 
5 2 1 2 3 Lingwood 
In Lingwood and Another v The Unlawful Occupiers of R/E of Erf 9 Highlands63 
(‘Lingwood’) the applicant sought the eviction of the respondents in the South Gauteng 
High Court, Johannesburg in terms of section 4(7) of PIE. The proximity of the property 
to the inner city of Johannesburg provided the respondents with access to informal 
employment, which enabled them to lawfully occupy the nine bed-roomed building 
against payment of rent in the amount of R300 per month for a period that exceeded 
three years. The previous owner of the property notified the respondents that the 
property had been sold to the applicant during November 2005. However, the 
respondents did not receive any communication from the applicant about the lawfulness 
of their occupation or what the applicant planned to do with the property, until the water 
supply to the property was disconnected four months later. The respondents were 
served with a copy of the eviction application shortly thereafter. The respondents 
opposed the eviction application on the basis that their personal circumstances and lack 
of alternative accommodation in the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 
would render their eviction unjust and inequitable.64 The respondents therefore sought 
                                                                                                                                                             
“The Constitution and PIE require that in addition to considering the lawfulness of the 
occupation the court must have regard to the interests and circumstances of the occupier 
and pay due regard to broader considerations of fairness and other constitutional values, so 
as to produce a just and equitable result. Thus, PIE expressly requires the court to infuse 
elements of grace and compassion into the formal structures of the law. It is called upon to 
balance competing interests in a principled way and promote the constitutional vision of a 
caring society based on good neighbourliness and shared concern” (paras 36–37). 
59 Cashbuild par 35. 
60 Cashbuild par 37. 
61 Cashbuild par 42, Order 1. 
62 Cashbuild par 42, Order 4. 
63 2008 (3) BCLR 325 (W). 
64 Lingwood par 7. 
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an order to stay proceedings until the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 
was properly joined.65 
The applicants opposed the joinder of the City on the grounds that it would have no 
legal effect on their right to evict the respondents.66 The City also opposed its joinder 
with the filing of a notice which stated that it had no land or alternative accommodation 
available to accommodate the respondents if the court evicted them from the building.67 
Mogagabe AJ found this “terse and unsubstantiated statement” by the municipality 
lacking because it failed to properly appreciate its constitutional obligations.68 He further 
noted that the allegation was not contained in an affidavit and therefore invited the court 
without more to accept its accuracy ex facie the notice.69 He found that this was 
unacceptable because the City was in violation of its legislative obligations to inter alia 
identify and designate land for housing development70 and to conduct appropriate 
housing development in its area of jurisdiction.71 
Mogagabe AJ proceeded to consider whether it would be just and equitable to evict 
the respondents if the municipality was not joined to the proceedings. In this regard he 
observed that a private landowner had no obligation in terms of the common law, 
legislation or the Constitution to provide access to adequate housing, “let alone suitable 
alternative accommodation to homeless or unlawful occupiers in the position of the 
respondents”.72 The obligation to provide access to adequate housing and alternative 
accommodation is placed squarely on the government in terms of section 26(2) of the 
Constitution, in casu on the City, in terms of inter alia sections 9(1)(c) and (e) of the 
Housing Act. He found that it would be impossible to continue with the eviction 
                                                 
65 Lingwood par 12. 
66 Lingwood par 16. 
67 Lingwood par 15. 
68 Lingwood par 15. 
69 Lingwood par 15. 
70 Section 9(1)(c) of the Housing Act. 
71 Section 9(1)(f) of the Housing Act. 
72 Lingwood par 19. See also Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 
(4) SA 385 (W) (‘Modderklip W’) at 394J-395B, Groengras Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
Elandsfontein Unlawful Occupants and Others 2002 (1) SA 125 (T) par 23, Modderklip CC par 49 and 
City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 (6) SA 404 (SCA) paras 36-39. 
However, in Grootboom Yacoob J stated that in certain circumstances the 
“right of access to adequate housing also suggests that it is not only the State who is 
responsible for the provision of houses, but that other agents within our society, including 
individuals themselves, must be enabled by legislative and other measures to provide 
housing” (par 35). 
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proceedings because the non-joinder of the City would make it difficult to sustain and 
implement an order, given that the order would only be enforceable inter partes.73  
It would be unjust and inequitable in the circumstances of the case to order the 
eviction of relatively settled74 respondents if the municipality was not joined to the 
proceedings and requested to report on the availability of land and alternative 
accommodation within its jurisdiction.75 He noted that a court may, if the parties did not 
do so, raise the issue of non-joinder of the municipality mero motu.76 The eviction 
application was postponed sine die,77 and the joinder of the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality was ordered.78 
 
5 2 1 2 4 Sailing Queen Investments 
In Sailing Queen Investments v The Occupants La Colleen Court79 (‘Sailing Queen 
Investments’) the applicant instituted eviction proceedings against the respondents in 
terms of section 4(7) of PIE in the South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg. The 
respondents lawfully occupied the property in terms of a lease agreement until May 
2005, when they could no longer afford to pay the rent and keep themselves alive at the 
same time with an average monthly income of R 805 per person. The respondents 
continued to occupy the property unlawfully after that date, despite the lack of water and 
electricity, because they were waiting to obtain formal housing in terms of the housing 
programme that the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality devised. The 
respondents therefore submitted that it was necessary to join the City to the 
proceedings. 
Jajbhay J found that the City had a direct and substantial interest in any order that a 
court may make in an eviction application because it would be impossible to sustain or 
                                                 
73 Lingwood par 26. 
74 In PE Municipality the Constitutional Court stated that “a court should be reluctant to grant an eviction 
against relatively settled occupiers unless it is satisfied that a reasonable alternative is available, even if 
as an interim measure pending ultimate access to housing in the formal housing programme” (par 28). 
75 Lingwood par 37. 
76 Lingwood par 32. See Rosebank Mall (Pty) Ltd v Cradock Heights (Pty) Ltd 2004 (2) SA 353 (W); 
Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949 (3) SA 637 (A); Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 
104 and 112 Short Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others 2010 (4) 
BCLR 354 (SCA) par 12 (‘Occupiers of Short Retreat’) and Cilliers et al Civil Practice 208-209. 
77 Lingwood par 38, Order 1. 
78 Lingwood par 38, Order 2. 
79 2008 (6) BCLR 666 (W). 
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carry out the order without triggering the constitutional obligations of the City.80 These 
obligations assign responsibility to the municipality to accommodate the respondents 
and similarly placed people when they become homeless as a result of the eviction or 
succumb to the need to resort to further unlawful occupation upon eviction.81  
He further stated that the justice and equity requirement for evictions warranted 
obtaining information from the City on the availability of alternative accommodation. In 
this regard he referred with approval to Ritama Investments v Unlawful Occupiers of Erf 
62 Wynberg,82 where it was held that a municipality was best placed to provide the court 
with information regarding the availability of housing and land within its jurisdiction.83 He 
observed that information regarding alternative accommodation and the implementation 
of housing programmes which flow from the constitutional and statutory obligations of 
local government is fundamental to a court which is seized with the question of whether 
it is just and equitable to grant an eviction order.84 The municipality’s claim that there 
was neither land nor alternative accommodation available does not pass constitutional 
muster and is a “far cry” from fulfilling its constitutional and statutory obligations.85 
The applicant based its opposition to the joinder of the municipality on the reasoning 
of Boruchowitz J in Xantium Trading 387 (Pty) Ltd v Molefe and Others.86 Boruchowitz J 
held that PE Municipality did not justify the joinder of a municipality because it merely 
requires a court to consider all the circumstances that might be relevant where the 
duration of the occupation was longer than six months. Boruchowitz J further held that 
Rule 10 of the Uniform Rules of the High Court did not allow joinder at the instance of a 
party and that it was improper for a court to raise the issue of non-joinder mero motu.  
Jajbhay J criticised Boruchowitz J for failing to appreciate the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court, which identifies the central role of local authorities as mediators in 
                                                 
80 Sailing Queen Investments par 6. 
81 Sailing Queen Investments par 9. 
82 [2007] JOL 18960 (T). 
83 At 13 it was stated that “[n]ormaly the information regarding available housing for the homeless will be 
critical to determine whether an eviction order should be made at all, and if so, on what terms and 
conditions justice and equity would best be served.” See also the reasoning in Murray par 42; Cashbuild 
par 21 and Lingwood par 26. 
84 Sailing Queen Investments par 9. 
85 Sailing Queen Investments par 10. See Murray par 41 and Lingwood par 15, where the attitude of 
municipalities with regard to the compilation of reports was also mentioned. 
86 Case No 23758/05, unreported judgment of Boruchowitz J in the South Gauteng High Court, 
Johannesburg dated 2 April 2007. 
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eviction proceedings and the duty local authorities have in providing alternative 
accommodation for the poor. Jajbhay J further stated that local authorities should apply 
their mind to the matter in an endeavour to resolve the dispute.87 Viewed from this 
perspective it would be hard to think of a scenario where a local authority would be 
under no obligation to respond to a notice served on it in terms of section 4(2) of PIE.88 
He concluded that the interests of all the parties involved would be properly protected 
once the City was joined to the eviction proceedings89 because justice and equity 
requires that the City be present during court proceedings to furnish the court with 
progress reports in cases where individuals in desperate need are defending 
themselves against eviction.90 He accordingly ordered the City to be joined and 
postponed the eviction proceedings pending the determination of Part B of the 
application.91 
 
5 2 1 2 5 Chieftain Real Estate 
In Chieftain Real Estate Incorporated in Ireland v Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 
and Others92 (‘Chieftain Real Estate’) the applicant launched motion proceedings 
against the first respondent to fulfil its undertaking to remove the 20 000 unlawful 
occupiers that were in occupation of portions of two of the applicants’ farms known as 
Hoekplaats 384 and Mooiplaats 355.93 The proposed relocation of the unlawful 
occupiers was delayed because the first respondent had difficulty in obtaining funding 
from the MEC responsible for housing in Gauteng. The first applicant further stated that, 
even if it were to obtain funding, it lacked the capacity to carry out the relocation 
because the unlawful occupiers had damaged the vehicles of the first respondent and 
threatened the officials with violence when they attempted to access the properties on a 
previous occasion.94 
                                                 
87 Sailing Queen Investments par 14. 
88 Sailing Queen Investments par 14. 
89 Sailing Queen Investments par 18. 
90 Sailing Queen Investments par 19. 
91 Sailing Queen Investments par 20, Orders 1 and 2. 
92 2008 (5) SA 387 (T). 
93 Chieftain Real Estate par 1. 
94 Chieftain Real Estate paras 6 and 7. 
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The applicant cited the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the MEC for 
Housing in Gauteng as the second and third respondents respectively. The second and 
third respondents opposed their joinder to the proceedings in terms of Rule 6(5)(d)(iii) of 
the Uniform Rules of the High Court.95 The second respondent argued that the applicant 
did not reveal any cause of action against it, that the applicant did not make any factual 
allegations to which it could answer and that no issue arose between it and the 
applicant that depended on the determination of substantially the same question of law 
or fact to justify the joinder.96 If was further argued that section 6 of PIE gave the second 
and third respondents a discretion to institute eviction proceedings and that the primary 
obligation to do so rested with the applicant in terms of section 4 of PIE.97 In conclusion, 
it was argued that an order for the joinder of the second and third respondents would 
amount to misjoinder for its failure to meet the requirements of Rule 10(3) of the 
Uniform Rules of the High Court.98 
Makhafola AJ stated that the starting point in answering this question of joinder 
should be founding the values of the rule of law and the supremacy of the 
Constitution.99 The state is obliged to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the 
Bill of Rights. In this case the applicant is entitled to enforce its property rights contained 
in section 25 while the unlawful occupiers are equally entitled to the protection afforded 
by the right of access to adequate housing in section 26.100 
Makhafola AJ noted that the first respondent left the problem of eviction in the hands 
of the applicant when it failed to stand by its undertaking to relocate the unlawful 
occupiers at its expense.101 He also found the argument that the applicant should first 
                                                 
95 Chieftain Real Estate paras 4 and 10. 
96 Chieftain Real Estate par 11. 
97 Chieftain Real Estate par 11. 
98 Rule 10(3) provides that  
“[s]everal defendants may be sued in one action either jointly, jointly and severally, 
separately or in the alternative, whenever the question arising between them or any of them 
and the plaintiff depends upon the determination of substantially the same question of law or 
fact which, if such defendants were sued separately, would arise in each separate action.”  
See Cilliers et al Civil Practice 240-241 on raising the issue of misjoinder by way of exception. 
99 Chieftain Real Estate par 19. 
100 Chieftain Real Estate paras 20-22. 
101 Chieftain Real Estate par 28. 
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obtain an eviction order as owner lacking because the Modderklip cases102 showed that 
it is difficult, if not impossible,103 to evict a large number of unlawful occupiers without 
the assistance of the state.104 He therefore argued that the other organs of state, the 
second and third respondents, should intervene as higher echelons of the organs of 
state in cases where the municipality does not have the capacity to fulfil its duties.105 
These organs of state have a direct and substantial interest in the promotion and 
fulfilment of the municipality’s duties.106 He accordingly granted the application for 
joinder107 and postponed the proceedings pending the determination of the main 
application.108 Makhafola AJ’s reasoning is fortified by the fact that both national109 and 
provincial110 government have an obligation to support and strengthen the capacity of 
municipalities to fulfil their housing development obligations. In this case the Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality required financial support to relocate the unlawful occupiers to 
another piece of land at its own cost111 and additional (human and other) resources to 
execute the relocation of the hostile community.112 
 
5 2 1 2 6 Blue Moonlight Properties 
In Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and 
Others113 (‘Blue Moonlight Properties’) the applicant instituted eviction proceedings 
against the occupiers in terms of section 4(7) of PIE in the South Gauteng High Court, 
                                                 
102 Modderklip W; Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die RSA en Andere 2003 (6) BCLR 
638 (T); Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA 
and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae), President of the RSA and Others v Modderklip Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA) and Modderklip CC. 
103 Chieftain Real Estate par 29. 
104 Chieftain Real Estate par 29. 
105 Chieftain Real Estate par 31. 
106 Chieftain Real Estate par 30. 
107 Chieftain Real Estate par 32. 
108 Chieftain Real Estate par 33. 
109 See section 3(2)(e) of the Housing Act. 
110 See section 7(2) of the Housing Act. 
111 Chieftain Real Estate par 6. See also section 3(4)(a) and 7(3) of the Housing Act. 
112 Chieftain Real Estate par 7. 
113 2009 (1) SA 470 (W). This judgment follows the order that Mophosho AJ made on 23 October 2007 in 
the following terms: 
“(1) Directing that the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (‘the City’) be joined in 
these proceedings by virtue of its interest in the relief sought in the main application and in 
Part B of this application. (2) Directing that the main application be stayed pending the 
determination of this application.”  
This order is reproduced in Blue Moonlight Properties par 2.  
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Johannesburg.  Kernel Carpets, the previous owner and former employer of the majority 
of the occupiers, erected a double storey office building, two large garages and a small 
factory on the property. When Kernel Carpets stopped trading it allowed the occupiers 
to stay on the property against payment of rent to the caretaker. The occupiers 
continued paying rent to various individuals until the end of 2005, at which time the 
buildings had deteriorated to the point of being uninhabitable and without any water 
supply. Many of the occupiers relied on informal trading for their income, which made it 
impossible to find other lawful and affordable accommodation within the inner city of 
Johannesburg. 
The applicant alleged that it had no knowledge of the events prior to 2004, when it 
purchased the property, and that it did not receive any rent from any of the 
respondents.114 The applicant also alleged that it would not be economically viable to 
restore the commercial property so that it complied with the provisions for residential 
use.115 In turn the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality contended that it only 
implements housing policy and that the obligation to progressively provide access to 
adequate housing did not rest on it alone. 
Masipa J stated that it was unclear why the municipality refused to assist the 
occupiers in light of its constitutional and statutory obligations.116 She also noted that 
the municipality erred in adopting the attitude whereby it would only assist unlawful 
occupiers of public land because that indicated an aversion to assist those living in 
crisis situations on private land.117 Masipa J furthermore noted that, on the one hand, 
the applicant was suffering prejudice because it could not use its property. On the other 
hand, the municipality was neglecting to fulfil its obligations to these occupiers who 
would be rendered homeless despite their valiant efforts to stay employed so that they 
could pay rent and restore the deteriorating buildings.118 This tension between the 
property rights of the owner and the housing rights of the occupiers could only be 
resolved if the municipality provided the court with information on the alternatives that 
                                                 
114 Blue Moonlight Properties par 17. 
115 Blue Moonlight Properties par 18. 
116 Blue Moonlight Properties par 36. 
117 Blue Moonlight Properties par 37. 
118 Blue Moonlight Properties paras 39-40. 
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are available within its jurisdiction.119 Masipa J noted that this information had to be 
“comprehensive but must also be meaningful and specific to assist the court to come to 
a just decision in a particular case.”120 
The City filed a report with the court after its fruitless attempts to prove that it was not 
required to do so in Lingwood and Sailing Queen Investments. The fact that a report 
was filed in this case distinguishes it from the previous cases where the court did not 
have detailed information on the status of programmes aimed at housing provision 
within the jurisdiction of the relevant municipality. In this report the City stated that it 
received almost 300 notices in terms of section 4(2) of PIE per month and that it would 
be impossible for it to prepare a separate report in respect of each eviction 
application.121 
Masipa J found the report entirely inadequate because it focused on those people 
that were evicted from buildings that pose health and safety risks in terms of the 
National Building Regulations and Building Standard Act 103 of 1977122 (‘NBRSA’). The 
report therefore did not provide the specifically tailored information that was required to 
determine whether the eviction would be just and equitable in the particular 
circumstances.123 In fact it was an attempt to distance itself even further from the plight 
of the occupiers by showing them that they were not important enough to be included in 
the City’s plans. 
She observed that the report was interesting and useful as a progress report 
because it provided an overview of the specific housing programme in the City.124 
However, she emphasised that each eviction was different and that the specific 
circumstances of each individual or group warranted a tailored response from 
government.125 She accordingly instructed the municipality to investigate the 
circumstances of the case and to consult the interested parties so as to provide the 
                                                 
119 Blue Moonlight Properties paras 43 and 52. 
120 Blue Moonlight Properties par 52. 
121 Blue Moonlight Properties par 57. 
122 Blue Moonlight Properties paras 59-61. 
123 Blue Moonlight Properties par 58. Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 289 notes that this part of 
Masipa J’s judgment is important because it emphasises the fact that the justice and equity enquiry of 
each eviction requires an individualised assessment of the circumstances of the unlawful occupiers. 
124 Blue Moonlight Properties par 63. 
125 Blue Moonlight Properties par 64.  
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court with a full and meaningful report.126 She postponed the proceedings sine die and 
ordered the City to report back to the court on the steps that it has taken and what can 
be done in future to provide the respondents with emergency shelter.127 
It took the City five months - and the additional motivation of contempt proceedings 
brought against it by the applicant - to file a report with the court.128 This report indicated 
that there were more than 160 000 people on the official housing waiting list in the 
Gauteng Province and that the provincial government had denied the City’s request for 
funding in terms of Chapter 12 of the National Housing Code.129 The City argued that it 
only implemented national and provincial housing policy, which made it a passive role 
player in housing delivery and that its budget did not provide for the acquisition of 
housing for occupiers of private land elsewhere within its jurisdiction. Finally, the City 
noted that it provided shelter to occupiers of dangerous buildings who found themselves 
in a crisis situation without there being any obligation on it to do so from its own 
funding.130 
The applicant, in its replication, noted that the buildings on its land were declared 
dangerous by the City and that the respondents could be prosecuted if they continued 
to inhabit the buildings in contravention of the safety warning.131 The respondents, on 
the other hand, focussed on the fact that the City deliberately excluded unlawful 
occupiers of privately owned land from its relief programmes even though their plight 
was similar to or worse than those who occupied publicly owned land.132  
The respondents accordingly brought another application that sought relief in the 
following terms: firstly, a declaration that the City’s housing policies were 
                                                 
126 Blue Moonlight Properties par 75.  
127 Blue Moonlight Properties par 78. Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 290 notes that this part of 
Masipa J’s judgment is important because it highlights the fact that the housing and local government 
officials of a local authority must make special efforts to secure alternative accommodation for those 
people who stand to be evicted by an eviction. 
128 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue & Another [2010] JOL 25031 
(GSJ) par 30 (‘Blue Moonlight Properties II ’). 
129 Chapter 12 of the National Housing Code, entitled Housing Assistance in Emergency Housing 
Situations, was adopted in 2004 to give effect to the Grootboom CC judgment where the government was 
ordered to “devise and implement within its available resources a comprehensive and coordinated 
programme progressively to realize the right of access to adequate housing” (par 99(2)(a)). 
130 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 31 (emphasis in the original text). 
131 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 34. See City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality Emergency 
Services By-Laws Provincial Gazette Extraordinary No 179 (21 May 2004) chapter 2, which deals with fire 
prevention and fire protection. 
132 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 35. 
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unconstitutional because they excluded unlawful occupiers of privately owned land from 
its relief programmes in a discriminatory and arbitrary manner; secondly, an order 
directing the City to rectify this policy and to report back to the court; and thirdly, an 
interdict that prevented the applicant from evicting them until suitable alternative 
accommodation was procured by the City or became available to them.133 
In response to this application the City raised the objection of non-joinder because, 
so the argument went, the provincial government had to be joined to the proceedings in 
terms of Rule 10A and Rule 16A of the Uniform Rules of the High Court if the unlawful 
occupiers wished to pursue the relief sought in their first prayer.134 The unlawful 
occupiers disputed the fact that they were challenging the constitutionality of a law, but 
nonetheless sought a further postponement of the main eviction application in order to 
join the MEC for Housing in Gauteng.135 
The MEC for Housing in Gauteng only became aware of this case, nearly three 
years after the eviction proceedings commenced, when she received a letter from the 
City which requested financial assistance in the amount of R 50,4 million to purchase, 
convert and administer the acquisition of warehouses in and around the inner city of 
Johannesburg for purposes of providing temporary housing.136 The MEC rejected the 
request for financial assistance, but assured the City that the request would be 
reconsidered if the provincial government received additional funding during the 
financial year.137 The City accordingly declared that it had fulfilled its obligations by 
requesting financial assistance from the provincial government and, since there was no 
funding available, that it could not be required to do anything more because it was 
simply a passive player in the provision of housing.138 
Spilg J, who heard the second application, took issue with the way in which the City 
characterised its role by summarising the case law of the Constitutional Court139 which 
                                                 
133 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 36. 
134 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 37. 
135 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 37. 
136 Blue Moonlight Properties II paras 50-54. 
137 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 55. 
138 Blue Moonlight Properteis II par 57. 
139 Blue Moonlight Properties II paras 59-66. In Residents of Joe Slovo, Ngcobo J (as he then was) 
stated: 
“The effect of the failure by the City to evict the residents and its willingness to provide them 
with services must be understood in the context of the obligations imposed on the 
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rendered local government directly responsible for the implementation of the 
constitutional and statutory obligations to provide access to adequate housing for the 
most desperate in society.140 He accordingly found that the City was incorrect in arguing 
that it had no obligation other than to seek financial assistance from the provincial 
government. 
Spilg J noted that he could not order the joinder of the provincial government 
because the constitutional challenge of the unlawful occupiers did not pertain to any 
law, but instead referred to the discriminatory and arbitrary exclusion of unlawful 
occupiers of privately owned land from the City’s housing relief policies.141 This finding 
made it easier to comprehend why the City was in actual fact so determined to get the 
provincial government joined to the proceedings - namely, to obtain an order that would 
direct the provincial government to provide the City with the funding it required to 
provide emergency housing to the unlawful occupiers in terms of chapter 12 of the 
Housing Code. Spilg J therefore had to consider whether it would be appropriate, 
considering the principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations, 
to join another organ of state in order to clarify or resolve issues between them.142 He 
was concerned that joinder in the circumstances of this case would amount to a court- 
directed allocation of funds which would help the provincial and local government to fulfil 
their respective obligations in terms of section 26 of the Constitution and sections 7 and 
9 of the Housing Act.143 He found that the City’s reason for insisting on getting the 
provincial government joined to the proceedings concerned the application of budgeting 
priorities and the weighing of policy considerations.144 Joining the provincial government 
on these grounds would not only be contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers, but 
                                                                                                                                                             
government in relation to access to adequate housing.  In Grootboom, we held that the right 
of access to adequate housing, for some, requires the government to provide ‘access to 
services such as water, sewage, electricity and roads.’ This obligation is not limited to lawful 
residents. It is imposed in respect of all who are living in deplorable circumstances. The 
government has an obligation to act positively to ameliorate the conditions of those who 
have no access to basic services. As we pointed out in Port Elizabeth Municipality, while 
awaiting access to new housing development programmes, homeless people must be 
treated with dignity. When the City provided services to the residents it was doing no more 
than fulfilling its statutory and constitutional obligations” (par 209, footnotes omitted). 
140 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 58. 
141 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 69. 
142 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 70. See section 41(1) of the Constitution. 
143 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 71. 
144 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 79. 
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would also interfere with the constitutional and statutory framework for the resolution of 
intergovernmental disputes.145 
He reiterated that the primary obligation to provide access to adequate housing on a 
progressive basis and within available resources rested with the local government and 
that this fact militated against joining a provincial or the national government.146 He 
accordingly refused to postpone the main eviction application further in order for the 
provincial government to be joined to the proceedings.147 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another148 (‘Blue Moonlight 
Properties SCA’) the court considered the non-joinder of the provincial government to 
the eviction proceedings. Navsa JA and Plasket AJA conceded that provincial 
governments, in general, have an important role to play in the progressive realisation of 
section 26 of the Constitution as stipulated in section 7 of the Housing Act.149 However, 
it was unclear to them why the facts of this case required the joinder of the Gauteng 
provincial government to the eviction proceedings. They noted that the City approached 
the provincial government with its request for funding to deal with the housing need of 
the unlawful occupiers long after it became aware of the problem. The provincial 
government’s involvement with the case came to an end when it refused the City’s 
request for funding on account of the fact that it did not have the budget for such 
support during the specific financial year.150 It would further be inappropriate to join the 
provincial government to the eviction proceedings because neither the unlawful 
                                                 
145 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 80. Section 41(2) of the Constitution states that legislation must be 
enacted to “(a) establish or provide for structures and institutions to promote and facilitate 
intergovernmental relations; and (b) provide for appropriate mechanisms and procedures to facilitate 
settlement of intergovernmental disputes.” The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005 
was enacted to give effect to this provision. See also the Intergovernmental Dispute Prevention and 
Settlement: Practice Guide: Guidelines for Effective Conflict Management GG 29845 GN 491 of 26 April 
2007 and Implementation Protocol Guidelines and Guidelines on Managing Joint Programmes GG 30140 
GN 696 of 3 August 2007. 
146 Blue Moonlight Properties II par 81. 
147 See section 3 4 2 2 in chapter 3 for a discussion of the merits of the case and the ultimate order that 
required the government to pay rent to the applicant so that the respondents could stay on the property 
while the government acquired temporary emergency housing for the respondents. 
148 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA). 
149 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 68. 
150 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 68. 
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occupiers, nor the owner or the City sought any relief from the provincial government.151 
The City sought the joinder of the provincial government purely because it was under 
the mistaken belief that it had no primary constitutional or statutory obligations to assist 
the unlawful occupiers in obtaining temporary emergency housing upon eviction.152 The 
court further held that it could not find anything in the financial records of the City which 
indicated that it would be unable to provide temporary emergency housing for the 
unlawful occupiers in terms of its own housing policy.153 Navsa JA and Plasket AJA 
accordingly held that the provincial government had no direct or substantial interest in 
the outcome of the case that would warrant its joinder to the eviction proceedings.154 
 
5 2 1 2 7 Evaluation 
The cases discussed above show that the courts have not adopted a uniform approach 
in their reasoning for the joinder of local authorities to eviction proceedings. The courts 
have consistently relied on a combination of arguments founded on the cumulative force 
of the notice requirement in section 4(2) of PIE; the requirement to attempt mediation in 
section 7(1) of PIE; and finally, the constitutional and statutory obligations of 
municipalities. The overall effect of this reasoning is convincing and powerful, but there 
are problems with the reasoning that attach to the first two grounds when they are 
considered on their own. 
It is correct that it would be an expensive and pointless exercise if it was the intention 
of the legislature to require service of eviction notices on a local authority without it 
having some effect on the action of the local authority. However, it is not a convincing 
reason to join a local authority to eviction proceedings simply because the serving of the 
notice in terms of section 4(2) of PIE would otherwise be costly and pointless. It is only 
when the notice requirement is read with the obligations of the local authority to ensure 
that the inhabitants of its area of jurisdiction have access to adequate housing155 and 
that harmful and dangerous conditions must be prevented or removed156 that the 
                                                 
151 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 68. 
152 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 68. 
153 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 68. 
154 Blue Moonlight Properties SCA par 68. 
155 Section 9(1)(a)(i) of the Housing Act. 
156 Section 9(1)(a)(ii) of the Housing Act. 
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underlying principle for the notice becomes apparent. The notice informs the local 
authority that it will be required, if the eviction order is granted, to fulfil its constitutional 
and statutory obligations with regard to those evicted from the property. 
It is similarly problematic to situate the reason for joinder of a local authority 
exclusively in the fact that it may appoint a person with expertise in dispute resolution to 
attempt to mediate a dispute between a landowner and unlawful occupiers, because it is 
not clear why the local authority must then be joined to eviction proceedings that flow 
from a partially or wholly unsuccessful attempt at mediation. It is again only when this 
power to initiate a mediation attempt is read with the obligation of the local authority to 
promote the resolution of conflicts arising in the housing development process157 that 
the underlying principle of the mediation becomes apparent. The mediation process will 
more often than not reveal that the unlawful occupiers do not wish to leave the property 
because it is in close proximity to (formal and informal) employment opportunities and, if 
they were evicted, they would have nowhere else to go. This is indicative of the fact that 
the local authority needs to reconceptualise and improve the housing development 
projects in its jurisdiction. 
A more nuanced approach for the joinder of local authorities would therefore focus 
exclusively on the obligations of local authorities that flow from section 26(3), read with 
sections 26(1) and (2), of the Constitution and section 9 of the Housing Act. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Occupiers of Shorts Retreat confirmed this when it stated 
that 
“[t]he municipality’s position in eviction proceedings under PIE differs from that of a 
third party in ordinary litigation because it has constitutional obligations it must 
discharge in favour of people facing eviction. It should therefore not be open to it to 
choose not to be involved.”158 
 
The necessary joinder of local authorities is buttressed by the fact that the principal 
parties to the eviction are often so embroiled in a debate about the unlawfulness of the 
occupation because, on the one hand, the owner is claiming his right to exclusive 
                                                 
157 Section 9(1)(e) of the Housing Act. 
158 Occupiers of Short Retreat paras 13-14. See Occupiers of Shulana Court par 14 and Eagle Valley 
Properties 250 CC v Unidentified Occupants of Erf 952, Johannesburg situated at 124 Kerk Street, 
Johannesburg; In re: Unidentified Occupants of Erf 952, Johannesburg situated at 124 Kerk Street, 
Johannesburg v The City of Johannesburg [2011] ZAGPJHC 3 (17 February 2011). 
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possession in terms of section 25 of the Constitution while, on the other hand, the 
unlawful occupiers are claiming access to emergency or permanent housing in terms of 
section 26 of the Constitution. As a consequence, the court is frequently deprived of any 
information about the prevailing circumstances in the local authority’s area of 
jurisdiction. 
It is therefore incorrect to submit that joining the relevant local authority would have 
no force or effect, because the local authority is often the only party with information that 
will equip a court to properly satisfy itself of the justice and equity of the eviction. This 
could include, but is not limited to, information about the backlog and actual delivery of 
housing; the demographics of those in need of housing; land that has been earmarked 
for housing development or land that can be expropriated in its jurisdiction; the 
availability of emergency, temporary or permanent alternative accommodation, should 
the court evict the unlawful occupiers; and the amenities provided and infrastructure in 
place at the alternative accommodation sites. 
This approach acknowledges that local authorities have a direct and substantial 
interest in eviction proceedings because a range of its constitutional and statutory 
obligations will be triggered when a court finds that it is just and equitable to evict 
unlawful occupiers. 
 
5 2 1 3 Further development 
It remains unclear from the jurisprudence what precisely the reports that local 
authorities must file with the court should include for it to satisfy the requirements of a 
full and meaningful report. Nevertheless, it is possible to give guidance to local 
authorities on what should be included in these reports with reference to the 
constitutional and statutory obligations that made it necessary for them to be joined to 
the eviction proceedings. 
A report should, arguably, include information on firstly, the housing policies and 
programmes adopted by the specific local authority;159 secondly, how these policies and 
                                                 
159 In Grootboom CC par 42, Yacoob J stated that the adoption of legislative measures alone would not 
be enough to fulfill the constitutional obligations that flow from section 26(2) of the Constitution. He added 
that legislative measures would have to be supported by the implementation of appropriate, well-directed 
policies and programmes. 
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programmes address the housing needs of the unlawful occupiers in the particular 
case;160 thirdly, what the housing needs are in the local authorities’ area of jurisdiction; 
fourthly, the history161 and duration162 of the occupation; fifthly, demographic information 
on the unlawful occupiers or community of unlawful occupiers;163 sixthly, whether and to 
what extent the local authority is in a position to address the housing needs of the 
unlawful occupiers;164 seventhly, whether and to what extent the local authority has 
sought financial and other assistance from provincial and/or national government;165 
eighthly, whether and to what extent the local authority has engaged meaningfully with 
                                                 
160 In Blue Moonlight Properties par 63, Masipa J found that the general report which the City of 
Johannesburg filed with the court was useful as a progress report. She added that the pro forma report on 
the housing policies and programmes that have been adopted was not designed to address the housing 
needs of the unlawful occupiers of that particular case. She held that a general report which included no 
particular information on how a housing policy or housing programmes affected the specific unlawful 
occupiers of a case would not serve its purpose of aiding a court in making a just and equitable decision. 
161 In PE Municipality par 26, Sachs J stated that courts had to consider whether the unlawful occupiers 
were occupying privately or publicly owned land. Unlike private owners, the government will generally 
have other land that it could use to fulfill its obligations in terms of section 26 of the Constitution. He 
added that courts also had to consider the status of the land or buildings. He explained that private 
owners who have allowed its land or buildings to become derelict may have no real interest in how it is 
utilised, while the government may have earmarked a specific property for housing development and 
have a significant interest in fulfilling its constitutional obligations. He added that courts further had to 
have regard to the degree of the housing emergency of the unlawful occupiers and whether they invaded 
that land or buildings in a deliberate attempt to disrupt the comprehensive and co-ordinated efforts of the 
government to provide access to adequate housing. 
162 In PE Municipality par 27, Sachs J explained that the Prevention of Illegal Evictions from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 created a link between the duration of the occupation and the fairness 
of the eviction. Section 4 of PIE expressly distinguishes between those unlawful occupiers that have 
occupied the land or buildings for less than six months and those that have occupied the land or buildings 
for more than six months. Section 6(3)(b) of PIE makes the duration of unlawful occupation a specific 
consideration that courts must have regard to in determining the justice and equity of the eviction from 
public land. 
163 I foresee the inclusion of general statistics about the number of men and women; the number of 
children between 0 and 6 (infants), between 7 and 13 (primary school) and between 14 and 18 (high 
school); the number of elderly people; the number of people with disabilities; the number of female-
headed households; the type of structure that the unlawful occupiers currently occupy; whether and what 
types of basic services that unlawful occupiers have access to; the unemployment rate in the community; 
the type of economic activities that the unlawful occupiers engage in to sustain their livelihoods and the 
average distance travelled to employment opportunities on a daily basis. 
164 In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg and Others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) the parties reached an agreement that committed the 
City of Johannesburg to provide two buildings in the inner city of Johannesburg for the occupiers as well 
as providing interim services to the buildings. See Tissington K “Challenging inner city evictions before 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa: The Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road case in Johannesburg, South 
Africa” (2008) 5(2) Housing and ESC Rights Law Quarterly 1-6. 
165 Section 3(2)(e) of the Housing Act 107 of 1997 places an obligation on the Minister of Human 
Settlements to “support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs, to 
exercise their powers and perform their duties in respect of housing development.” Sections 7(2)(c) and 
(e) place similar obligations on the MEC for Housing and Local Government of each province. 
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the unlawful occupiers with the aim of ascertaining their housing need;166 ninthly, the 
availability of alternative land or housing to serve as either emergency or temporary 
alternative accommodation for the unlawful occupiers if they are evicted;167 and finally, 
how these prospective sites for emergency or temporary alternative accommodation will 
fulfil the housing needs of the unlawful occupiers in the particular case. 
A report with all this information would be sufficiently tailored to the specific 
circumstances of a particular case. Such an individualised report would provide a court 
with a lot of information about both the social and historical context as well as the 
textual context of the proposed eviction. An individualised report of this nature would 
contribute to a substantive understanding of section 26 of the Constitution and the 
obligations for local authorities that flow from it. An individualised report will provide a 
court with information that will enable it to grapple with the justice and equity evaluation 
in a more principled manner.168 The necessary joinder of local authorities and the filing 
of individualised reports will go a long way in finding the concrete and case-specific 
solutions that the Constitution and PIE requires.169  
The compilation of individualised reports will require local authorities to direct human 
and financial resources to the process of data collection. One way to obtain this 
information is to request the Director-General of Human Settlements to extract the 
relevant data from the national housing data bank and information system.170 In the 
                                                 
166 After hearing oral argument in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC), Langa CJ (as he then was) 
issued an interim order that directed the parties to engage with each other meaningfully on firstly, whether 
the values of the Constitution, the constitutional and statutory obligations of the municipality and the rights 
of the applicants could direct the parties to resolve the difficulties of the application amicably (interim 
order 1); and secondly, whether the plight of the applicants would be alleviated if the dangerous and ailing 
buildings that they occupied could be upgraded (interim order 2). The interim order was issued on 30 
August 2007 and is available online at www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/ Archimages/10731.PDF (accessed 
on 7 March 2010). 
167 In Blue Moonlight Properties par 66, Masipa J included the availability of alternative accommodation 
as a specific requirement for a full and meaningful report. 
168 Ritama Investments v Unlawful Occupiers of Erf 62 Wynberg [2007] JOL 18960 (T) page 13, 
Bertelsmann J stressed that meaningful information regarding the availability of alternative land or 
accommodation for the unlawful occupiers would be critical in order to determine whether an eviction 
order should be made at all and, if so, on what terms and conditions justice and equity would be served. 
169 See PE Municipality par 22. 
170 Section 6(1) of the Housing Act places an obligation on the Director-General to establish and maintain 
this data base and information system. Section 6(2) of the Housing Act 107 of 1997 stated that the 
objects of the data bank and information system are to firstly, record information for purposes of the 
development, implementation and monitoring of the national housing policy; secondly, provide reliable 
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event that this information is not available in the data bank and information system, the 
specific local authority can also rely on its constitutional obligation to engage 
meaningfully with the unlawful occupiers to obtain the requisite information from them 
directly. 
 
5 2 1 4 Conclusion 
It is disturbing that local authorities carelessly declare, without supporting evidence, that 
they do not have any alternative land or accommodation available in their jurisdiction. 
Private landowners sustain this attitude with their contention that the joinder of 
municipalities would have no legal consequence for their right to evict unlawful 
occupiers. This position undermines the impact of the Constitution and fails to 
appreciate the obligations of local authorities in providing access to adequate housing 
properly.  
The cases discussed above draw a clear link between the obligations of the 
executive - at national, provincial and local government level – and the discretion courts 
exercise in determining the justice and equity of an eviction in terms of PIE.171 Joinder 
achieves this by creating an express link between, on the one hand, the constitutional 
and statutory obligations of government as stated by the Constitutional Court in 
Grootboom and, on the other hand, the power courts have in terms of section 26(3) of 
the Constitution and PIE to grant eviction orders if it is just and equitable to do so as 
stated by the Constitutional Court in PE Municipality. Liebenberg notes that the 
interrelatedness of all three subsections of section 26172 is upheld by this new approach 
to the determination of the justice and equity of an eviction order. Liebenberg 
emphasises the importance of joinder in eviction cases when she states that it would be 
impossible to promote a caring society that is founded on mutual interdependence and 
respect without meaningful and proactive involvement by the government. She adds 
                                                                                                                                                             
information that can be used during the planning of new housing developments; thirdly, to enable the 
Department of Human Settlements to monitor every aspect of the housing development process; fourthly, 
to generate information that can be used by the Department of Human Settlements to integrate the 
national housing policy with macro-economic and fiscal policy; fifthly, serve and promote housing 
development and related matters; and finally, collect, compile and analyse data about inter alia gender, 
race, age and geographic location. 
171 Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights 289. 
172 Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights 289. 
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that it is only through this involvement of the government and the provision of suitable 
alternative accommodation that solutions can be found for the complex housing problem 
in South Africa in a manner that will respect both the property rights of land owners and 
the housing rights of unlawful occupiers.173 Put differently, joinder provides the court 
with the possibility to involve the government in instances where the owner established 
her right to evict the unlawful occupiers from her property and the unlawful occupiers 
convinced the court that their current access to housing would be infringed if evicted. In 
these circumstances the joinder of the government will enable the court to move beyond 
the stalemate that is created by the competing rights through the consideration of the 
constitutional and statutory obligations of the government. None of this would be 
possible without the joinder of local authorities to eviction proceedings.174 
A further development that flowed from the case law on joinder is the obligation that 
local authorities now have to compile reports that will provide a court with 
comprehensive and meaningful information on how the local authority has prioritised the 
individualised needs of a particular community175 and when they can expect to be 
provided with relief.176 These reports will have to contain information on the special 
efforts that local authorities make to accommodate people that stand to be evicted in 
temporary emergency housing pending their resettlement to permanent housing. The 
joinder of local authorities therefore ensures that courts have all the information 
pertaining to the eviction and housing situation in the local authorities’ area of 
jurisdiction at their disposal so that they can properly evaluate the justice and equity of 
the proposed eviction. This goes a long way in finding the case specific solutions that 
Sachs J in PE Municipality had in mind for the complex housing crisis in South Africa. 
The added benefit of joinder is that it ensures that the local authority can be held to 
                                                 
173 Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights 290. 
174 Wilson S “Breaking the tie: Evictions from private land, homelessness and a new normality” (2009) 126 
SALJ 270-290 285 (‘Wilson “Breaking the tie”’). 
175 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 289. 
176 Wilson “Breaking the tie” 286. See Drakenstein Municipality v Hendricks and Others 2010 (3) SA 248 
(WCC) par 32 where Blignault J stated that: 
“One cannot define the boundary line [between individuals and groups of desperately poor 
people] in abstracto. Classifications will have to be made on a case-by-case basis. In case of 
doubt the municipality would probably be well advised to file a report. The court, furthermore, 
as pointed out above, has a discretion and may call for information from the municipality, 
should it become necessary for a proper adjudication of the particular case.” 
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account in future if it is unable to provide a permanent housing solution for the 
community over time because a court order is enforceable inter partes.177 One way of 
obtaining the requisite information on the demographics and needs of the community for 
purposes of obtaining such permanent housing is to enter a process of meaningful 
engagement. 
 
5 2 2 Meaningful engagement 
5 2 2 1 Introduction 
In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road the City of Johannesburg sought to evict approximately 
400 people from six buildings in terms of the fire bylaws of the city, section 20 of the 
Health Act 63 of 1977 and section 12(4)(b) of the National Building Regulations and 
Building Standards Act 103 of 1977. The City contended that the buildings posed 
serious fire risks because the rooms were partitioned with combustible materials and 
the building had no functioning emergency exits. This eviction formed part of the Inner 
City Regeneration Strategy that the City adopted during 2003. One of the pillars upon 
which this regeneration strategy rests is the project on addressing “sinkholes”. These 
“sinkholes” are properties that are slummed, abandoned, overcrowded, poorly 
maintained, often owned and neglected by the public sector. The occupiers opposed the 
application because an eviction and relocation to an informal settlement on the outskirts 
of the city would destroy their livelihood strategies that depended on being able to 
conduct informal trading, domestic work and recycling in the inner city of 
Johannesburg.178 
After hearing oral argument the Constitutional Court issued an interim order179 that 
directed the parties “to engage with each other meaningfully”.180 The purpose of this 
engagement was to determine whether the values of the Constitution, the constitutional 
and statutory obligations of the municipality and the rights of the applicants could direct 
the parties to resolve the difficulties of the application amicably.181 The engagement 
                                                 
177 Wilson “Breaking the tie” 286. 
178 See section 4 4 in chapter 3 for a discussion of the case. 
179 The interim order was issued on 30 August 2007 (‘Interim order Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road’) 
available online at www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/ Archimages/10731.PDF (accessed on 7 March 2010). 
180 Interim order Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Order 1. 
181 Interim order Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Order 1. 
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between the parties also had to determine whether the plight of the applicants would be 
alleviated if the dangerous and ailing buildings that they occupied could be upgraded.182 
The interim order furthermore directed the parties to report back to the Court on the 
results of the engagement between them.183 This engagement process resulted in the 
parties reaching an agreement184 on the interim measures that the City would take to 
improve the living conditions on the properties185 and the status of the City’s eviction 
application against the occupiers.186 The Court subsequently endorsed this 
agreement.187 
 
5 2 2 2 Creating a new concept 
Five months later, the Court explained in its judgment that a municipality would be 
acting in a manner that was at odds with the spirit and purpose of a range of 
constitutional obligations if it evicted people from their homes without first meaningfully 
engaging with them.188 The Court explicitly linked meaningful engagement with the 
obligation to take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available 
resources to provide access to adequate housing.189 The Court affirmed its interpretive 
approach to the right of access to adequate housing by also linking the obligation to 
engage with the right to human dignity190 and the right to life.191 Finally, the Court linked 
                                                 
182 Interim order Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Order 2. 
183 Interim order Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Order 3. 
184 The parties reached the agreement on 29 October 2007. The agreement is available online at 
http://web.wits.ac.za/NR/rdonlyres/4B183D1D-C77A-493C-9CEF-526A5076438C/0/197MainStreet51Olivi 
aRoadAgreement.pdf (accessed on 7 March 2010) (‘Agreement Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road’). 
185 Agreement Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road clause 1.1.1. 
186 Agreement Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road clause 1.1.2. 
187 The order was issued on 5 November 2007 and is available online at www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/ 
Archimages/11584.PDF (accessed on 7 March 2010).  
188 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 16. See section 19 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 
117 of 1998 and sections 16(1) and 17 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
These provisions echo the emphasis that the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has 
placed on the importance of “genuine consultation” in General Comment No 4 The right to adequate 
housing, UN Doc E/1992/23 as an aspect of the right to adequate housing which contributes to tenure 
security (par 8); as a means of achieving full realisation of the right to adequate housing (par 12). The 
need for genuine consultation also appears in General Comment No 7 The right to adequate housing: 
forced evictions, UN Doc E/1998/22 as a way of exploring all possible alternatives in an attempt to avoid 
or minimise the effect of eviction (par 13); and as a procedural protection against eviction (par 15). 
189 Section 26(2) of the Constitution and section 9(1)(a)(i) of the Housing Act. 
190 Section 10 of the Constitution provides that “[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have their 
dignity respected and protected.” See Grootboom CC par 83 and Liebenberg S “The value of human 
dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights” (2005) 21 SAJHR 1-31. See also See also Nedelsky J 
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meaningful engagement with the obligations that municipalities have to strive towards 
the provision of services in a sustainable manner;192 the promotion of social and 
economic development;193 and the involvement of communities and community 
organisations in the affairs of local government.194 
The Court makes it plain in these reasons for the engagement order that 
homelessness as a result of eviction is still a very real possibility for many people. Local 
authorities should therefore engage these people before any decision is taken on the 
formulation and implementation of a housing policy or programme that will inevitably 
lead to their eviction and relocation.  
The Court proceeded to define meaningful engagement as “a two-way process” in 
which a local authority and those that stood to be affected by the eviction would talk to 
each other meaningfully with the aim of achieving certain objectives.195 The Court 
emphasised that there is no numerus clausus of objectives that must be achieved, but 
stated that where an organ of state institutes eviction proceedings in circumstances 
where it is likely that people will be rendered homeless as a result of the eviction, some 
of the objectives would include firstly, what the exact consequence will be of the 
eviction; secondly, whether and to what extent the local authority could ameliorate the 
consequences of the eviction; thirdly, whether and to what extent it was possible to 
upgrade dilapidated buildings to a point where they would be safe and conducive to 
human habitation for an interim period; fourthly, what the constitutional and statutory 
obligations of the local authority demanded of it in the prevailing circumstances; and 
finally, when and how the local authority would fulfil these obligations.196 The Court was 
of the view that meaningful engagement had the potential to contribute towards the 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Reconceiving rights as relationship” (1993-1994) 1 Rev Const Stud 1-26; Nussbaum MC Women and 
Human Development - The Capabilities Approach (2000) and Nussbaum MC “Capabilities, human rights 
and the Universal Declaration” in Weston BH and Marks SP (eds) The Future of International Human 
Rights (1999) 25-64. 
191 Section 11 of the Constitution provides that “[e]veryone has the right to life.” 
192 Section 152(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
193 Section 152(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
194 Section 152(1)(e) of the Constitution. 
195 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 14. Chenwi L and Tissington K Engaging Meaningfully with 
Government on Socio-Economic Rights - A Focus on the Right to Housing (2010) 9 observe that the 
objectives to be achieved will depend on the specific situation. They add that the government should not 
be the only party to state what these objectives should be or how such objectives could be achieved. 
196 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 14 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
260 
resolution of disputes and to develop an increased understanding and sympathetic care 
of the plight of the urban poor197 if both the local authority and the unlawful occupiers 
grappled with the issues that pertain to the achievement of these objectives.198 
The Court found that the constitutional obligations of local authorities dictated that it 
should initiate the engagement process and continue to make reasonable efforts to 
engage unlawful occupiers when their initial efforts are resisted or rebuffed.199 The 
Court foresaw that the unlawful occupiers would acquiesce in this process if it was 
managed by careful and sensitive people with experience in housing matters.200 This 
process will enable a municipality to explore the vast range of possibilities that are 
available on the continuum spanning from eviction without more to the provision of 
permanent housing.201 The Court found that the nature and extent of the engagement 
process would be determined by the underlying purpose of the eviction and the number 
of people that stood to be affected by the eviction.202 Yacoob J noted that the City of 
Johannesburg should have been conscious of the fact that their Inner City Regeneration 
Strategy would have drastic consequences for its rapidly increasing poor population and 
that it would require structured, consistent and careful engagement with all the affected 
parties.203  
The Court further underscored that the engagement process must be conducted in 
good faith and any attempt by the unlawful occupiers to derail the engagement process 
through unreasonable demands or by adopting an intractable attitude should not be 
tolerated.204 The Court emphasised this point by clearly stating that “[p]eople in need of 
housing are not, and must not be regarded as a disempowered mass.”205 In conclusion, 
                                                 
197 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 15. 
198 See also Centre for Applied Legal Studies Workshop Report: Meaningful Engagement (2009) 30-32 
available online at http://web.wits.ac.za/NR/rdonlyres/D1176AF9-340B-413B-AF79-2F1152BE0CDA/0/ 
Meaningful engagementreport_Dec09.pdf (accessed on 7 March 2010). 
199 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 15. 
200 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 15. 
201 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 18. 
202 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 19. 
203 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 19. 
204 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 20. 
205 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 20. Ross T “The rhetoric of poverty: Their immorality, our 
helplessness” (1991) 79 Geo LJ 1499-1547 (‘Ross “The rhetoric of poverty”’) argues that the first step in 
the rhetoric of poverty is to use economic wealth as a variable to create an abstraction of the poor 
(“them”) as a class of people that are different from the affluent (“us”). This classification makes it possible 
to conceive of “them” as morally weak, degenerate or deviant because “they” are unable or unwilling to 
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the Court noted that the constitutional value of openness should guide the engagement 
process so as to avoid the destructive allure of secrecy by ensuring that “a complete 
and accurate account of the process of engagement, including at least the reasonable 
efforts of the municipality within that process” is considered the norm.206 
In Residents of Joe Slovo, Ngcobo J (as he then was) emphasised that the purpose 
of meaningful engagement should not be construed as a process whereby the parties 
must reach agreement on every aspect of the dispute.207 Instead, the parties should 
approach the engagement process in good faith and with a willingness to listen to the 
concerns of the other party. Conceived in this way meaningful engagement will lead to 
mutual understanding and accommodation of the concerns that unlawful occupiers have 
and the limits (both human and financial) of government in its pursuit of providing 
access to adequate housing on a progressive basis.208  
Ngcobo J added that the primary objective of the engagement process in the 
context of the implementation of a programme to upgrade an informal settlement was to 
provide the residents with the details of the programme, its purpose and its 
implementation.209 This would include engagement on the purpose of the relocation to 
another site, the notice period required before the relocation takes place so the people 
can organise their lives, the details of the relocation, the consequences of the relocation 
and the extent of the disruption that this will cause, whether the government can 
mitigate the negative consequences of the relocation, the arrangements for temporary 
accommodation in those instances where an in situ upgrade is not possible, the right of 
return to the developed and upgraded site, and the plans for those who will be unable to 
return to the developed and upgraded site.210 
                                                                                                                                                             
accept and commit to the norms “we” embrace. This failure to “straighten up and fly right” (at 1501) has 
lead to the further division of “them” into the deserving (the elderly, children and disabled persons) and 
undeserving (able bodied persons) poor through history. Ross notes that the idea of the undeserving poor 
- the “paupers”, the “peasants”, the “strangers” and most recently the “underclass” - has contributed to the 
widely held sentiment that the poor in general are “unwilling to pull themselves up by their bootstraps” (at 
1507). This rhetoric depicts poverty as “an inescapable societal tragedy” that we cannot remedy if the 
poor refuse to change (at 1509) which in turn fortifies “our inability to imagine the poor as strong, 
successful, ambitious, and responsible people who win the battles of life” (at 1542). 
206 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 21. 
207 Residents of Joe Slovo par 244. 
208 Residents of Joe Slovo par 244. 
209 Residents of Joe Slovo par 242. 
210 Residents of Joe Slovo par 242. 
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The Constitutional Court developed its jurisprudence further when it affirmed the fact 
that meaningful engagement must be seen in its broader constitutional context. In this 
regard Ncgobo J explained that 
“[t]he requirement of engagement flows from the need to treat residents with respect 
and care for their dignity. Where, as here, the government is seeking the relocation 
of a number of households, there is a duty to engage meaningfully with residents 
both individually and collectively. Individual engagement shows respect and care for 
the dignity of the individuals.”211 
 
Sachs J added that the obligations of local government extended beyond the mere 
development and implementation of housing policy. Local authorities must denounce 
practices whereby unlawful occupiers are regarded as obstinate and obnoxious social 
nuisances and rather focus on treating those living in its area of jurisdiction with insight 
and a sense of humanity.212 Sachs J explained that meaningful engagement also 
expanded the concept of citizenship beyond its traditional contours to include the 
substantive benefits and entitlements envisaged by the Constitution for all the people 
who live in South Africa.213 
In Abahlali baseMjondolo the applicants argued that certain provisions of the 
KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Act 7 of 2007,214 
specifically section 16, were in conflict with section 26(2) of the Constitution because 
they did not constitute reasonable legislative measures that enabled the progressive 
realisation of the right of access to adequate housing. The applicants alleged that 
section 16 obliged owners and municipalities to launch eviction proceedings even where 
there had not been compliance with the provisions of PIE, and allowed no place for 
meaningful engagement between the unlawful occupiers and the municipality. 
Yacoob J explained that private land owners had to engage with unlawful occupiers 
before they instituted eviction proceedings in terms of section 16. Moseneke DCJ added 
that it would be impossible to proceed with the eviction until the results of the 
engagement process are known. He explained that meaningful engagement in the 
context of the Act would require the taking into consideration of inter alia the wishes of 
                                                 
211 Residents of Joe Slovo par 238. 
212 Residents of Joe Slovo par 406. 
213 Residents of Joe Slovo par 408. 
214 The applicants expressly abandoned their attack on the constitutionality of sections 9, 11, 12 and 13 of 
the Act. See Abahlali baseMjondolo par 9. 
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the people that stand to be affected by the eviction, the availability of alternative 
accommodation and the details of the eviction.215 
In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Yacoob J noted that the need for meaningful 
engagement could be inferred from the applicant’s contention that the local authority 
was under a constitutional and statutory obligation flowing from section 33 of the 
Constitution to give the occupiers a hearing before it took the decision to evict them.216 
However, the Court found that the obligation to engage meaningfully with occupiers who 
would be rendered homeless after an eviction was squarely grounded in section 26(2) 
of the Constitution. The question then is to what extent there is an intersection or 
duplication between the concept of meaningful engagement, in terms of section 26(2) of 
the Constitution, and procedurally fair administrative action, in terms of section 33(1) of 
the Constitution. 
 
5 2 2 3 Procedural fairness 
5 2 2 3 1 Introduction 
The rules of natural justice has been defined as “the stereotyped expression which is 
used to describe those fundamental principles of [procedural] fairness which underlie 
every civilised system of law.”217 These principles have been reduced over time to the 
maxims nemo iudex in sua causa218 and audi alteram partem219 which, according to 
Anglo-American jurisprudence,220 constitute the core of fair administrative action. The 
audi principle affords people the opportunity to participate in decisions that will affect 
them by apprising the administrative functionary of additional facts and possible 
alternatives that might influence the outcome of those decisions.221 It is argued that this 
                                                 
215 Abahlali baseMjondolo par 114. 
216 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 9. In Residents of Joe Slovo O’Regan J added that “the obligation to 
engage meaningfully imposed by section 26(2) of the Constitution should be understood together with the 
obligation to act fairly imposed by section 33 of the Constitution, as spelt out in PAJA” (par 297). 
217 Minister of the Interior v Bechler 1948 (3) SA 409 (A) at 451. 
218 See Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 404-412 (‘Hoexter Administrative Law’). 
219 Corbett JA in Attorney-General, Eastern Cape v Blom 1988 (4) SA 645 (A) at 660H paved the way for 
South African courts to refer to this maxim simply as the audi principle or audi rule. 
220 Corder H “The content of the audi alteram partem rule in South African administrative law” (1980) 43 
THRHR 156-177 158. 
221 Hoexter Administrative Law 326. See Janse van Rensburg NO v Minister of Trade and Industry NO 
2001 (1) SA 29 (CC) par 24 for a description of the link between the importance of fairness and the 
growth of discretionary power. 
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ensures the legitimacy of the decision because the quality and rationality of the decision 
is enhanced through respect for the dignity and worth of the people that stand to be 
affected.222  
The application of the audi rule to administrative action was limited during the era of 
parliamentary sovereignty by the illogically rigid classification of administrative 
functions223 and the focus on decisions that prejudicially affected the property or liberty 
of an individual.224 However, towards the end of apartheid the former Appellate Division 
of the High Court (currently the Supreme Court of Appeal) changed this position 
dramatically by introducing the doctrine of legitimate expectation in South African law.225 
Since then the courts have retreated from the narrow and formalistic approach to 
natural justice to embrace a broader and more flexible duty to act fairly in all cases.226 
This change of direction gained constitutional legitimacy with the inclusion of a right to 
just administrative action in both the interim227 and final228 Constitutions and the 
enactment of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’).229 
                                                 
222 De Smith SA, Woolf HK and Jowell J Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1995) 375-376. In De 
Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) Mokgoro J stated that 
“everyone has the right to state his or her own case, not because his or her version is right, 
and must be accepted, but because, in evaluating the cogency of any argument, the arbiter, 
still a fallible human being, must be informed about the points of view of both parties in order 
to stand any real chance of coming up with an objectively justifiable conclusion that is 
anything more than chance” (par 131). 
223 Hoexter Administrative Law 351-355. 
224 R v Ngwevula 1954 (1) SA 123 (A) at 127F. 
225 This doctrine was adopted in South African law by Corbett CJ in Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 
1989 (4) SA 731 (A). The term “legitimate expectation” was first used by Lord Denning in Schmidt v 
Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch 149 and was defined by Lord Fraser in Council of Civil 
Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 (HL) as arising “either from an express 
promise given on behalf of a public authority or from the existence of a regular practice which the 
claimant can reasonably expect to continue” (at 943j-944a). See Hlophe J “Legitimate expectation and 
natural justice: English, Australian and South African Law” (1987) 104 SALJ 165-185 and Pretorius DM 
“Ten years after Traub: The doctrine of legitimate expectation in South African administrative law” (2000) 
117 SALJ 520-547. 
226 Hoexter Administrative Law 327. 
227 Section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 provided everyone with 
a right to 
“(a) lawful administrative action where any of his or her rights or interests is affected or 
threatened; (b) procedurally fair administrative action where any of his or her rights or 
legitimate expectations is affected or threatened; (c) be furnished with reasons in writing for 
administrative action which affects any of his or her rights or interests unless the reasons for 
such action have been made public; and (d) administrative action which is justifiable in 
relation to the reasons given for it where any of his or her rights is affected or threatened.” 
228 Section 33(1) of the Constitution reads: 
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5 2 2 3 2 Administrative action affecting the public 
PAJA, like meaningful engagement, provides adequately for public participation with an 
individual or specific household of unlawful occupiers, in terms of section 3, and with a 
community of unlawful occupiers, in terms of section 4, who stand to have their right of 
access to adequate housing adversely affected by the administrative decision to evict. 
Section 4 of PAJA concerns administrative action that “materially and adversely affects 
the rights of the public”.230 This is an innovative provision that incorporates new 
procedures for public participation into the general administrative law that has nearly no 
equivalent in the common law.231 However, this provision is somewhat puzzling232 
because it is uncertain what the precise relationship is with administrative action “which 
materially and adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person” in 
terms of section 3 of PAJA. 
                                                                                                                                                             
“(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. 
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the 
right to be given written reasons. 
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must – (a) provide 
for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an independent and 
impartial tribunal; (b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsection (1) 
and (2); and (c) promote an efficient administration.” 
229 PAJA came into operation on 30 November 2000, with the exception of sections 4 and 10, which came 
into operation on 31 July 2002. 
230 Section 1 of PAJA defines “public” as “any group or class of the public”. 
231 Decisions that affected large numbers of people were usually classified as legislative administrative 
action during the pre-democratic era and therefore the audi principle did not apply to them. In South 
African Roads Board v Johannesburg City Council 1991 (4) SA 1 (A) (‘South African Roads Board’) Milne 
JA rejected the classification of administrative functions as being either quasi-judicial, purely 
administrative or legislative. Milne JA proposed  
“that a distinction should be drawn between (a) statutory powers which, when exercised, 
affect equally members of the community at large and (b) those which, while possibly also 
having a general impact, are calculated to cause particular prejudice to an individual or 
particular group of individuals. Here I use the word 'individual' to include a legal persona 
such as a corporation or a local authority, clothed with corporate personality; and the word 
'calculated' to mean not 'intended' but 'likely in the ordinary course of things' to have this 
result” (at 12E-G). 
The effect was that cases which fell into the first category (the equivalent of section 4 of the PAJA) would 
not attract procedural fairness while cases which fell into the second category (the equivalent of section 3 
of the PAJA) would attract procedural fairness unless a statutory provision specifically provided 
otherwise. 
232 Hoexter Administrative Law 364. 
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Mass233 argues that sections 3 and 4 are linked because there is no longer a need to 
limit the application of the audi rule if the aim is to create a culture of accountability, 
openness and transparency in the administration.234 She insists that there is a close link 
between section 4 and the more general requirements for procedural fairness in section 
3.235 She finds support for this argument in the fact that that section 4 does not contain 
all the requirements stipulated in section 3(2)(b). She therefore submits that section 4 
cannot be freestanding because it is an incomplete provision that must be interpreted 
with recourse to the more general provisions for procedural fairness contained in 
section 3. The effect is that the relationship between sections 3 and 4 is “one of lex 
generalis and (incomplete) lex specialis.”236 Mass argues further that this approach to 
the relationship between sections 3 and 4 promotes the spirit, purport and object of the 
right to just administrative action much better than one founded on the semantic 
distinctions drawn between administrative action affecting any person and 
administrative action affecting the public.237 
Currie and Klaaren point to the drafting history of section 4 in support of their 
argument that this provision is completely freestanding.238 Currie and Klaaren argue that 
the Justice and Constitutional Development Portfolio Committee severed the link 
between clauses 4 and 5 of the South African Law Reform Commission’s Draft Bill239 
(currently sections 3 and 4 of PAJA) by changing the heading of clause 4 from 
                                                 
233 Mass C “Section 4 of the AJA and procedural fairness in administrative action affecting the public: A 
comparative perspective” in Lange C and Wessels J (eds) The Right to Know - South Africa’s Promotion 
of Administrative Justice and Access to Information Acts (2004) 63-80 (‘Mass “Section 4”’). 
234 Preamble of PAJA. 
235 Section 3(2)(b) of PAJA reads: 
“In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an administrator, 
subject to subsection (4), must give a person referred to in subsection (1) – (i) adequate 
notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action; (ii) a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations; (iii) a clear statement of the administrative action; (iv) 
adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where applicable; and (v) adequate 
notice of the right to request reasons in terms of section 5.” 
See Hoexter Administrative Law 332-339 and Currie I and Klaaren J The Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act Benchbook (2001) 97-100 (‘Currie and Klaaren Benchbook’) for a discussion of these general 
requirements of procedural fairness. 
236 Mass “Section 4” 66-67. 
237 Mass “Section 4” 67. 
238 Currie and Klaaren Benchbook 110-113. 
239 South African Law Reform Commission, Project 115 Report on Administrative Justice (August 1999) 
available online at www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj115_aja_1999aug.pdf (accessed on 30 January 
2010). 
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“procedurally fair administrative action” to “procedurally fair administrative action 
affecting any person”. This, according to Currie and Klaaren, created two separate and 
unrelated procedural fairness regimes.240 Administrative action with a particular effect 
would then fall under the purview of section 3, while administrative action with a general 
effect would fall under the purview of section 4.241  
This approach to the relationship between section 3 and 4 is problematic because 
there is no statutory right to procedural fairness for administrative action affecting the 
public parallel to that of section 3(1). Currie and Klaaren argue that section 3(1) must be 
read as creating an indirect general right to procedural fairness. This general right to 
procedural fairness would then also shape the minimum requirements administrators 
must adhere to in instances of administrative action affecting the public, since the 
requirements of section 3(2)(b) would simply not apply.242 
Hoexter also points to the drafting history of section 4 in support of her argument that 
this provision is not linked to section 3. Hoexter notes that the Justice and Constitutional 
Development Portfolio Committee mistakenly left a reference to section 3 in section 
4(1)(e) during its amendment process. Hoexter attributes this to poor drafting and 
recommends that the reference should simply be expunged through the amendment of 
section 4.243 Hoexter also notes that there are minimum requirements for procedurally 
fair administrative action in section 4 similar to those contained in section 3(2)(b).244 
Finally, Hoexter argues that the attempted uncoupling of the two provisions and the 
narrower focus of section 3 is indicative of the “gulf” that exists between sections 3 and 
4.245 
The fact remains that section 4(1)(e) contains a reference to section 3 that cannot be 
ignored. Mass provides a workable approach that links sections 3 and 4 through this 
“hangover” of the South African Law Reform Commission’s Draft Bill.246 According to 
this approach an administrator will not be required to superficially classify an 
administrative action affecting any person in terms of section 3 or administrative action 
                                                 
240 Currie and Klaaren Benchbook 113. 
241 This is in accordance with the distinction that Milne JA made in South African Roads Board at 12E-G. 
242 Currie and Klaaren Benchbook 113. 
243 Hoexter Administrative Law 369. 
244 Hoexter Administrative Law 375. 
245 Hoexter Administrative Law 375. 
246 Currie and Klaaren Benchbook 130. 
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affecting the public in terms of section 4 when it is clear that it is both.247 Currie and 
Klaaren conceded this point when the administrative action presents itself in a South 
African Roads Board scenario. In this case the South African Roads Board declared an 
existing road a toll road. Currie and Klaaren explain that this decision would have a 
particular impact (section 3 of PAJA) on the Johannesburg City Council because it 
would have to upgrade its current roads infrastructure and increase maintenance to 
support the additional traffic congestion caused by motorists choosing alternative 
routes. The decision would also have a general effect (section 4 of PAJA) on all the 
motorists’ freedom of movement. The result will be exactly the same where a local 
authority evicted a community of unlawful occupiers. The decision will have a particular 
impact on the surrounding local authorities because they would have to expand their 
housing programmes while also having a general impact on the community’s right of 
access to adequate housing. Hoexter confirms that decisions with a general impact 
frequently have a special impact on a particular group of people.248 
Furthermore, Mass does not focus disproportionately on the supposed intention of 
the legislature or its poor drafting abilities. Instead, her approach constitutes a purposive 
interpretation of the right to just administrative action that gives effect to the 
constitutional value of openness by making simpler and more efficient ways of public 
participation possible to the poor population of South Africa.  
 
5 2 2 3 3 Participation procedures in section 4 of PAJA 
It is clear from the structure of section 4 that a notice and comment procedure or a 
public inquiry or both are the default options available to an administrator.249 However, 
section 4 does not provide specific instructions for an administrator to guide her in 
deciding which procedure to follow. Currie and Klaaren recommend that the following 
criteria should be used to decide the appropriate procedure:250 (a) the geographic 
impact; and (b) the subject matter of the proposed administrative action. A notice and 
comment procedure is based on the consideration of written submissions, which makes 
                                                 
247 Currie and Klaaren Benchbook 116. 
248 Hoexter Administrative Law 368. 
249 Mass “Section 4” 73. 
250 Currie and Klaaren Benchbook 120. 
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it more suited to administrative action on general issues with national or regional impact. 
A public inquiry is driven by hearing testimony at a particular place on a given time, 
which makes it more suited to administrative action on specific issues with a local 
impact. Mass adds that the following criteria could also be helpful:251 (c) the cost and 
efficiency of the procedure; and (d) the size and duration of the process. A notice and 
comment procedure is often simple and cheap because the administrator may not 
delegate her powers and thus the procedure does not require many logistical 
arrangements. Public inquiries have the potential to be very complex and expensive 
because the administrator may delegate her powers to “a suitably qualified person or 
panel of persons”252 who will conduct the public hearing.  
A proposed decision to evict a community of unlawful occupiers will have a very 
specific impact on that particular community and could possibly extend to the 
surrounding local authorities as the unlawful occupiers move into other jurisdictions to 
find a place to stay. According to the abovementioned guidelines, circumstances of this 
nature will require conducting a public inquiry. 
Regulation 5 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000: Regulations on 
Fair Administrative Procedures253 adds a new dimension to a public inquiry that may be 
invaluable to unlawful occupiers that stand to be evicted. The aim of regulation 5 is to 
provide assistance to communities consisting of a substantial proportion of people who 
cannot read or write or who otherwise need special assistance. Hoexter explains that 
“[t]his regulation sets out special steps to be taken to solicit the views of such people 
where they are likely to be affected by administrative action that may be taken as a 
consequence of a public inquiry. These steps may include the holding of public or 
group meetings where the issues are explained and views recorded, a survey of 
public opinion and the provision of secretarial assistance.”254 
 
This goes beyond the common law understanding of the audi principle and embraces 
the constitutional value of openness in a way that ensures broad public participation.255 
The public hearing will still be the core feature256 of the public inquiry. While a public 
hearing is an effective way of obtaining the views and proposals of a community, it may 
                                                 
251 Mass “Section 4” 73-74. 
252 Section 4(2)(a) of PAJA. 
253 Published in GG 23674 GN R1022 on 31 July 2002. 
254 Hoexter Administrative Law 372. 
255 Mass “Section 4” 74. 
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be too adversarial257 in the housing context to ascertain anything of significance 
regarding the rights and needs of the community given that the impact of an eviction on 
the lives of the poor may preclude any meaningful interchanges. It is similarly 
problematic to expect impoverished communities to make effective use of a notice and 
comment procedure.  
In these instances an administrator may follow “another appropriate procedure which 
gives effect to section 3”.258 Mass suggests that this provision allows an administrator to 
interact with the public on an individual basis by affording them a distinct opportunity to 
make representations or to follow other innovative procedures like consultations, 
mediation, and negotiated rule-making.259 These procedures require participation on a 
much smaller scale and their inquisitorial nature makes them cheaper and more 
efficient.260 
 
5 2 2 3 4 Procedural fairness does not equal meaningful engagement 
In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Residents of Joe Slovo the amici curiae261 argued 
that procedural fairness relates to the notion of participatory democracy because it 
guarantees individuals an active role in state administration.262 In Doctors for Life 
International v The Speaker of the National Assembly and Others263 the Constitutional 
Court explained that participation represents a powerful response to the legacy of 
apartheid by ensuring that excluded voices are empowered in wider participatory 
processes.264 This conception of participatory democracy creates a unique link between 
                                                                                                                                                             
256 Currie and Klaaren Benchbook 121. 
257 Mass “Section 4” 78. 
258 Section 4(1)(e) of PAJA. 
259 Mass “Section 4” 78. 
260 Hoexter C (with Lyster R and Currie A) (ed) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law, Volume 
II, Administrative Law (2002) 49. 
261 In both cases the amici curiae were the Community Law Centre from the University of the Western 
Cape and the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) from Geneva, Switzerland. The 
submission of the amici in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road is available online at 
www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/10661.PDF (accessed on 7 March 2010). The submission of 
the amici in Joe Slovo is available online at www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/12720.PDF  
(accessed on 7 March 2010). 
262 Submission of the amici in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 136 and submission of the amici in Joe 
Slovo par 167. 
263 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC). 
264 J Morison “Models of democracy: From representation to participation?” in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds) 
The Changing Constitution (2004) 144 154. 
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the obligation of government to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the fundamental 
rights in the Constitution and the right of excluded voices to access adequate housing. 
Section 4 of PAJA enables local government to fulfil this duty because the public are 
likely to participate energetically when their rights are materially and adversely 
affected.265 Nedelsky explains that procedural fairness “offers the potential for providing 
subjects of bureaucratic power with some effective control as well as a sense of dignity, 
competence, and power.”266 
This conception of procedural fairness must be understood against the background 
that administrative decisions are often taken in stages267 and that procedural fairness 
must only be observed during the stage where a final decision is made.268 Hoexter 
notes that it would be impossible to have an efficient administration if it had to provide 
full-scale hearings at every stage of the administrative process.269 This is supported by 
the fact that “administrative action”270 must have a direct effect. Pre-democratic 
reasoning271 further dictated that the interpretation of the requirement that a right must 
be adversely affected by the administrative action.272 This amplifies the likelihood that 
preliminary decisions do not require the observance of procedural fairness.  
This conceptualisation of the audi principle is problematic in the housing context 
because any investigation into the living conditions of unlawful occupiers or the 
upgrading of their informal settlement could result in the lodging of an eviction 
application and relocation to another site that is far away from inter alia employment 
                                                 
265 K Govender “An assessment of section 4 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2000 as a 
means of advancing participatory democracy in South Africa” (2003) 18 SAPR/PL 404 409. 
266 J Nedelsky “Reconceiving autonomy: Sources, thoughts and possibilities” (1989) 1 YJLF 7 27. 
267 Hoexter Administrative Law 392. 
268 See Chairman, Board on Tariffs and Trade v Brenco Inc 2001 (4) SA 511 (SCA). 
269 Hoexter Administrative Law 393. 
270 Section 1 of PAJA defines “administrative action” as 
“any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by - (a) an organ of state, when - (i) 
exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or (ii) exercising a 
public power of performing a public function in terms of any legislation; or (b) a natural or 
juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public power or performing a 
public function in terms of an empowering provision, which adversely affects the rights of any 
person and which has a direct, external legal effect, (…).” 
271 Hoexter Administrative Law 396. 
272 According to pre-democratic reasoning, preliminary inquiries did not “prejudicially affect … the property 
or liberty of an individual” because it was “purely administrative” in nature and as such did not require the 
observance of procedural fairness unless it was explicitly required by legislation. See Hoexter 
Administrative Law 351-353 and Law Society, Northern Provinces v Maseka 2005 (6) SA 372 (B) at 
382D-E. 
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opportunities. This will not only worsen the already insecure existence of the unlawful 
occupiers, but will also erode the fundamental values of accountability, responsiveness 
and openness273 upon which our democracy is founded.274 This is demonstrated 
unmistakably by the events leading up to the Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Residents of 
Joe Slovo and Abahlali baseMjondolo cases, where the applicants alleged that the 
conduct of municipal officials towards them was characterised by tactics aimed at 
persuading them to accept the plans that the government had for their future, threats of 
violence when they did not succumb to these tactics, attacks on their person when they 
denounced the government plans which were made without addressing their concerns 
or incorporating their proposals, and announcements that decisions had been taken 
about their future. These examples of abuse of power and blatant disregard for the 
inputs of the unlawful occupiers at the beginning of multi-stage decision making 
processes may fail to pass constitutional muster in the sense that they fall short of the 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action that the drafters of the 
Constitution had in mind or could even be excluded as action that does not attract the 
protection of just administrative action. The fact remains that these actions are 
commonplace and reflect the lived reality for many poor people of just administrative 
action. Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Joe Slovo and Abahlali baseMjondolo demonstrate 
that disastrous results can flow from preliminary inquiries into the housing conditions of 
unlawful occupiers where procedural fairness is not observed. 
It is furthermore important to note that procedural fairness only applies to 
administrative action. The definition of administrative action explicitly excludes the 
executive powers and function of the provincial executive - which includes the powers 
referred to in sections 126 and 139 of the Constitution275 - and the executive powers and 
functions of a municipal council.276 These exclusions are significant in the housing 
context because section 126 of the Constitution enables a MEC responsible for housing 
in a specific province to assign any power or function in terms of section 7 of the 
                                                 
273 Section 1(d) of the Constitution. 
274 See E Mureinik “Reconsidering review: Participation and accountability” 1993 Acta Juridica 35-46 and 
Quinot G “Snapshot or participatory democracy? Political engagement as fundamental human right” 
(2009) 25 SAJHR 392-402. 
275 Subsection (bb) of the definition of “administrative action” in section 1 of PAJA. 
276 Subsection (cc) of the definition of “administrative action” in section 1 of PAJA. 
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Housing Act to a municipality while section 139 of the Constitution obliges a MEC 
responsible for housing in a specific province to intervene where a municipality cannot 
or does not fulfill its obligations in terms of section 9 of the Housing Act. Section 156 of 
the Constitution provides that local authorities have executive authority over and the 
right to administer all matters listed in schedule 4B and 5B of the Constitution which, 
significantly, includes the provision of electricity and gas reticulation; water and 
sanitation; local amenities; refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal; and 
street lighting. The result is that many housing related decisions are excluded from the 
operation of PAJA because they are considered to be of an executive nature. 
Meaningful engagement would therefore play an important role in adjudicating this 
category of decisions that do not require the observation of procedural fairness in terms 
of PAJA. This is where meaningful engagement transcends procedural fairness. 
 
5 2 2 4 Meaningful engagement as a long term relationship 
Sections 2(1)(b) and 2(1)(l) of the Housing Act lay the foundation for the establishment 
of a dialogic relationship between the executive and other role players in housing 
development. These general principles then concretise in obligations for municipalities 
to ensure that they promote the resolution of conflicts that arise in the housing 
development process,277 and facilitate and support the participation of other role players 
in the housing development process.278 However, these general principles and 
obligations stop short of ensuring that the dialogue is managed by careful and sensitive 
people who will continue to make good faith efforts to engage so as to ensure that an 
increased understanding of the interests involved and sympathetic care for the unlawful 
occupiers are developed. Meaningful engagement therefore clearly foresees a change 
in the approach to and practice of participation – specifically its duration and nature – in 
housing development. 
In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road the Constitutional Court stated that meaningful 
engagement should ordinarily be initiated before litigation commences279 because the 
outcome of the engagement process will be important for any court in determining 
                                                 
277 Section 9(1)(e) of the Housing Act. 
278 Section 9(2)(a)(vi) of the Housing Act.  
279 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 30. 
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whether it would be just and equitable to grant an eviction order.280 In Residents of Joe 
Slovo the Court ordered the parties to engage on certain issues as part of the final 
order.281 Meaningful engagement therefore requires the fostering of participation over a 
long period of time that commences with the conceptualisation of a plan, policy or piece 
of legislation and culminates with the implementation and preservation of that plan, 
policy or legislation.282 
Participation during this process cannot be characterised by the manipulation, 
threats of violence, violent attacks and announcements which the applicants in 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Residents of Joe Slovo and Abahlali baseMjondolo 
attested to because it would be at odds with the dialogic, transparent and structured, 
coordinated, consistent and comprehensive engagement that the Constitutional Court 
described. The nature of the participation during the engagement process can be 
determined with reference to the ladder of citizen participation that Arnstein283 
developed in the housing context from the terminology used in federal programmes of 
the United States of America that are directed at inter alia urban renewal.  
The ladder consists of eight rungs, with each rung representing a form of 
participation.284 The bottom two rungs, manipulation285 and therapy,286 describe levels 
where there is no participation. These rungs are used as a substitute for genuine 
participation because the objectives of these forms of participation are to educate and 
cure citizens.287 The following three rungs, informing;288 consultation289 and placation,290 
                                                 
280 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road par 18. See also Residents of Joe Slovo par 338. 
281 Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Order 5 reads: 
“The applicants and the respondents are ordered, through their respective representatives, 
to engage meaningfully with each other with a view to reaching agreement on the following 
issues: 5.1 a date upon which the relocation will commence different to that contemplated in 
annexure “A”; 5.2 a timetable for the relocation process different to that contemplated in 
annexure “A”; and 5.3 any other relevant matter upon which they agree to engage.” 
282 See Chenwi L and Tissington K Engaging Meaningfully with Government on Socio-Economic Rights - 
A Focus on the Right to Housing (2010) 21 notes that meaningful engagement should ordinarily take 
place before policies, strategies or development projects are planned. They add that meaningful 
engagement must also take place while these policies, strategies or projects are being implemented and 
when they are evaluated. 
283 Arnstein SR “A ladder of citizen participation” (1969) 35 JAIP 216-224 (‘Arnstein “Ladder”’). 
284 Arnstein “Ladder” 217 for the limitations of her typology. 
285 Arnstein “Ladder” 218.  
286 Arnstein “Ladder” 218. 
287 Arnstein “Ladder” 217. 
288 Arnstein “Ladder” 219. 
289 Arnstein “Ladder” 219. 
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indicates that participation in housing development currently occurs on the first five 
rungs of the participation ladder.296 Conversely, the description of meaningful 
engagement indicates that it could not extend to the final two rungs of the participation 
ladder because that would have the effect of delegating or abdicating the constitutional 
powers of the executive to the unlawful occupiers. It is therefore clear that partnership, 
as a form of participation, most closely resembles the contours of meaningful 
engagement. Arnstein explains that partnership, as a form of participation, would only 
work for as long as all the possible parties to the partnership find it useful to maintain 
the partnership.297 The possible parties to an engagement process - the community that 
stands to be affected by the eviction and the government - will find it useful to maintain 
this partnership if their concerns and limitations are appreciated as legitimate and real. 
However, this will only occur if the parties, their legal representatives and other possible 
parties re-evaluate their respective roles.  
A community cannot be allowed to persist with unreasonable demands and must 
rather focus its energy and resources on electing a community leader or committee that 
is empowered with a clear mandate to organise and mobilise the community. The 
community leader or committee must ensure that communication with the community is 
done in clear language and in a culturally appropriate manner. The community leader or 
committee must be able to engage openly with other parties and ensure that all 
outcomes of any engagement are referred back to the community for approval before 
finalisation.298 
The legal representatives of the community must be prevented from approaching the 
case with so much vigour that they prejudice the rights of their clients. Instead, the legal 
representatives must ensure that they obtain a clear mandate from the community so as 
to position themselves as the secondary voice to the community leaders during the 
engagement process. This will not only ensure the fostering of a trust relationship 
                                                 
296 In Residents of Joe Slovo, Sachs J observed that 
“[t]he evidence suggests the frequent employment of a top-down approach where the 
purpose of reporting back to the community was seen as being to pass on information about 
decisions already taken rather than to involve the residents as partners in the process of 
decision-making itself” (par 378, footnote omitted). 
297 Arnstein AR “Ladder” 221. 
298 Centre for Applied Legal Studies Workshop Report: Meaningful Engagement (2009) 37. 
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between the community leaders and the legal representatives, but will also allow the 
legal representatives to facilitate the mobilisation and organisation of the community.299 
Non-governmental organisations will also have to apply their advocacy300 and 
research skills to support the engagement process. They can do so by facilitating the 
organisation and mobilisation of the community; ensuring that the legal representatives 
of the community are properly informed of existing international norms and examples 
from comparative jurisdictions that can be relied on to develop the law; and, finally, 
providing a court with a range of statistical data and budgetary information that may not 
appear in the papers of the parties.301 
The government cannot be allowed to persist with its intractable institutional and 
bureaucratic attitude which dictates that all people living in intolerable conditions must 
be viewed as criminals or as morally degenerate.302 The government must rather 
ensure that it trains careful and sensitive officials to engage with communities in a 
manner that is characterised by access to information, flexibility, reasonableness and 
transparency so that it can fulfil its constitutional and statutory obligations to provide 
access to adequate housing. 
Conceived in this way, meaningful engagement is a type of public participation that 
transcends procedural fairness in terms of section 33 of the Constitution and sections 3 
and 4 of PAJA in two ways. First, the process of meaningful engagement occurs over a 
long period of time, as opposed to the moment of decision-making in multi-staged 
administrative decision-making. Second, the nature of the participation required by 
meaningful engagement for it to be meaningful mandates the forging of a partnership 
between the government and the occupiers. It is only through the fostering of this long 
term relationship that unlawful occupiers will be able to rise above the often 
misconceived perceptions of being helpless, passive and weak recipients of 
government largesse.303  
                                                 
299 Centre for Applied Legal Studies Workshop Report: Meaningful Engagement (2009) 38.  
300 Ray B “Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road: Enforcing the right to adequate housing through ‘engagement’” 
(2008) 8 HRLR 703-713 711 (‘Ray “Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road”’) for an explanation of why it is 
significant that the Constitutional Court envisaged an active role for civil society in the engagement 
process. 
301 Centre for Applied Legal Studies Workshop Report: Meaningful Engagement (2009) 39. 
302 Centre for Applied Legal Studies Workshop Report: Meaningful Engagement (2009) 42. 
303 See Nedelsky “Reconceiving autonomy” 27. 
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5 2 2 5 Further development 
The need for meaningful engagement has become all the more important with the rising 
number of violent service delivery protests. These protests indicate that communities 
are feeling increasingly disconnected from and neglected by local government. This can 
be ascribed to the intransigent attitude of local government in dealing with the people 
living within its area of jurisdiction,304 severe instances of underspending,305 and the 
general lack of capacity to respond to the needs of communities.306  
Local authorities should take the obligation of meaningful engagement seriously 
because a large amount of money is currently being wasted on rebuilding housing 
development projects that are destroyed in violent service delivery protests and in 
conducting protracted litigation proceedings. In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road litigation 
                                                 
304 See the examples of abuse of power and blatant disregard for the inputs of the unlawful occupiers in 
the events leading up to Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Residents of Joe Slovo and Abahlali baseMjondolo, 
where the applicants alleged that the conduct of municipal officials towards them was characterised by 
tactics aimed at persuading them to accept the plans that the government had for their future, threats of 
violence when they did not succumb to these tactics, attacks on their person when they denounced the 
government plans which were made without addressing their concerns or incorporating their proposals, 
and announcements that decisions had been taken about their future.  
305 National Treasury Press Release, Provincial Budgets: 2010/11 Financial Year, Mid-Term Provincial 
Budgets and Expenditure Report, 18 November 2010 (2010) 5 shows that provincial housing and local 
government departments spent R 8 billion or 38.6% of the R 20.8 billion budget appropriated to them 
collectively. This represents a 14.9% year-on-year decrease in spending.  The spending per province 
was: R 1.129 million or 44.6% of the R 2.533 million budget in the Eastern Cape, R 0.449 million or 
26.7% of the R 1.684 million in the Free State, R 1.738 million or 38.5% of the R 4.511 million budget in 
Gauteng, R 1.459 million or 35% of the R4.173 million budget in KwaZulu-Natal, R 0.882 million or 46.8% 
of the R 1.885 million budget in Limpopo, R 0.650 or 40.6% of the R 1.601 million budget in Mpumalanga, 
R 0.267 million or 54.2% of the R 0.493 million budget in the Northern Cape, and R 0.652 million or 
38.3% of the R 1.704 million budget in the Western Cape. The press release is available online at 
www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2010/2010111801.pdf (accessed on 11 July 2011). 
306 National Treasury Estimates of National Expenditure (2011) 669 shows that the Department of Human 
Settlements’ budget vote of R 22.578 billion has been appropriated as follows: R 234.4 million or 1.04% 
for administration; R 39.2 million or 0.17% for housing policy, research and monitoring; R 156.2 million or 
0.69% for housing planning and delivery support; R 21.995 billion or 97.42% for housing development 
finance; and R 155.5 million or 0.69% for strategic relations and governance. On 30 September 2010 only 
697 of the 922 positions were filled in the Department of Human Settlements. Most of these vacancies 
were in the housing planning and delivery support division. The underspending on human resources in 
this division are as follows: 20 staff who accounts for 10% of the R 12.6 million budget for programme 
implementation; 19 staff who accounts for 67% of the R 13.2 million budget for rental housing and 
people’s housing process; 21 staff who accounts for the 67% of the R 13.7 million budget for stakeholder 
mobilisation; 35 staff who accounts for the 48.9% of the R 24.5 million budget for capacity development; 
10 staff who accounts for the 100% of the R 9.9 million budget for priority projects facilitation; 25 staff who 
accounts for the 68.2% of the R 12.4 million budget for human settlement planning; and 97 staff who 
accounts for the 53.7% of the R 65.9 million budget for sanitation services. See National Treasury 
Estimates of National Expenditure (2011) 676. The National Treasury Estimates of National Expenditure 
(2011) is available online at www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2011/ene/FullENE.pdf 
(accessed on 25 July 2011). 
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commenced in the South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg on 6 February 2006 and 
the parties submitted an agreement following the process of meaningful engagement to 
the Constitutional Court on 27 October 2007. The parties would have saved at least 21 
months’ worth of litigation costs if the City of Johannesburg engaged with all the 
unlawful occupiers of the inner city of Johannesburg when the Inner City Regeneration 
Strategy was adopted during 2003.  
The recent judgment of the Constitutional Court in Residents of Joe Slovo 
Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others (Centre on Housing Rights 
and Evictions and Another as Amici Curiae)307 (‘Residents of Joe Slovo II’) serves as a 
further example of the fact that a great deal of public money is being wasted on litigation 
costs because government prefers not to engage with the people living in its area of 
jurisdiction. In this case litigation commenced on 20 September 2007 in the Western 
Cape High Court, Cape Town and the Constitutional Court delivered its judgment on 30 
June 2009. On 31 March 2011 the Constitutional Court delivered the follow-up judgment 
of Residents of Joe Slovo II which focussed on whether the original order it made in 
Residents of Joe Slovo should be rescinded or discharged in the light of the changed 
circumstances.308 In this regard the Court emphasised that the prerequisite of the 
eviction order in Residents of Joe Slovo was that it was just and equitable.309 The Court 
added that it probably would not have made the relocation order had it not found that 
the relocation was necessary to facilitate the housing development.310 The Court 
emphasised that the change in circumstances since the judgment in Residents of Joe 
Slovo made it impossible to comply with various aspects of the order in that 
judgment.311 The Court therefore concluded that, save for the cost order contained in 
Order 22 of Residents of Joe Slovo, Orders 4-21 of Residents of Joe Slovo should be 
discharged for the following reasons: firstly, the government failed to take adequate 
steps to carry out the supervised eviction order that the Court made on 10 June 2009; 
secondly, the respondents indicated that it had no intention of proceeding with the 
supervised eviction order because it made alternative plans for an in situ upgrade of the 
                                                 
307 2011 (7) BCLR 723 (CC). 
308 Residents of Joe Slovo II par 1. 
309 Residents of Joe Slovo II par 29. 
310 Residents of Joe Slovo II par 29. 
311 Residents of Joe Slovo II paras 30-36. 
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site; thirdly, it would be impossible to execute the eviction order in the absence of an 
agreement between the parties or a complex amendment of the initial order; fourthly, 
the eviction and relocation order pertained to thousands of people; fifthly, the 
circumstances that underpinned the Court’s reasoning to grant the eviction order has 
since fallen away; and finally, the plans for the in situ upgrade of the Joe Slovo site 
posed no threat to the appellants.312 In this case the parties would have saved at least 
36 months’ worth of litigation costs if Thubelisha Homes, the MEC for Housing and 
Local Government in the Western Cape and - perhaps also - the City of Cape Town 
engaged with the residents of the Joe Slovo informal settlement since the Breaking New 
Ground Policy: Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human 
Settlements was adopted during 2004. 
The number of service delivery protests and the instances in which these protests 
turn violent will decrease if local authorities start engaging with the people resident 
within their areas of jurisdiction. During this process the residents living in the area of a 
local authority’s jurisdiction will have to appreciate the budgetary and policy challenges 
of providing for a range of interests, while the local authority will have to listen and 
respond with compassion to the plight of the urban poor. If the engagement process is 
unsuccessful the parties will at least have a full record of the instances when they 
attempted to engage with each other and what the concerns were that prevented them 
from finding a solution for housing development in the area. The result would be a 
narrower focus of disputes and fewer costs being wasted on unnecessary litigation 
proceedings. 
In the long term, individual instances of meaningful engagement have the potential to 
produce the comprehensive and co-ordinated housing policies and programmes that the 
Constitutional Court envisaged.313 Individual instances of meaningful engagement will 
show municipalities what it can in actual fact achieve in fulfilment of its constitutional 
and statutory obligations to provide access to adequate housing. Instances of 
successful engagement processes in specific municipalities will provide the blueprint for 
other municipalities to follow their example. The sheer force of positive results flowing 
                                                 
312 Residents of Joe Slovo II par 37. 
313 Grootboom par 40. 
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from instances of successful engagement processes can create a ripple effect for the 
re-evaluation and amendment of housing policies and programmes that could include 
local-, provincial- and national government. 
 
5 2 2 6 Conclusion 
Meaningful engagement creates a space for public participation that transcends 
procedural fairness in terms of PAJA. In this space the unlawful occupiers are required 
to appreciate the budgetary and policy challenges of providing for a range of interests, 
while the government must listen and respond with compassion to the plight of the 
urban poor.314 Meaningful engagement must be viewed as an innovative mechanism for 
enforcing socio-economic rights.315 In the long term individual engagement processes 
will create an incentive to develop the intricate and strong housing policies that section 
26 requires316 by incorporating the range of housing needs of unlawful occupiers. 
Meaningful engagement requires government to take certain positive steps without 
mandating it to implement a specific court-directed housing development programme. 
The immediate remedial effect of an engagement process is that the unlawful occupiers 
may be able to retain their existing access to housing - with some improvements to 
render it safer and more suitable for human habitation - or to gain access to alternative 
accommodation that is of a relatively better standard.317  
Liebenberg notes that a mandatory order by a court for the parties to participate in a 
process of meaningful engagement can lead to the provision of concrete benefits to a 
particular group of people.318 Meaningful engagement furthermore ensures that a 
dialogic relationship is established between the local government and the unlawful 
occupiers.319 This is preferable to a relationship which requires judicial intervention and 
                                                 
314 See Chenwi L and Tissington K Engaging Meaningfully with Government on Socio-Economic Rights - 
A Focus on the Right to Housing (2010) 9. 
315 B Ray “Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road: Enforcing the right to adequate housing through ‘engagement’” 
(2008) 8 HRLR 703 708. 
316 709. 
317 See Agreement Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Clauses 5-13 and Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Order 
10. 
318 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 420. 
319 In Residents of Joe Slovo Sachs J observed that “[w]hen all is said and done, and the process 
[referring to meaningful engagement] has run its course, the authorities and the families will still be 
connected in ongoing constitutional relationships” (par 408). 
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control. Liebenberg argues that the terms of the agreement which the parties reached in 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road went further than an order which even a sympathetic court 
would have granted because the occupiers were afforded accommodation in the inner 
city of Johannesburg.320 This is evidence of the change that meaningful engagement 
has already brought about and will ensure that the government re-appreciates the 
nature and scope of its constitutional and statutory obligations to provide access to 
adequate housing. Meaningful engagement will transform the way in which government 
approaches housing development projects in the sense that it will have to appraise itself 
of inter alia: firstly, the full range of consequences that could flow from the proposed 
housing development; secondly, what will be required to alleviate the plight of those 
living in deplorable conditions and, finally, the cost and extent of interim measures it 
may need to take.  
The only way in which this will happen is if both government and the unlawful 
occupiers approach the engagement process in good faith and a renewed appreciation 
of their respective roles. This will ensure that that the engagement process which 
creates the space for public participation and dialogue is open, honest and transparent. 
Proceeding from this foundation will make it easier for the parties to find common 
ground and thereby to foster an increased understanding and appreciation of the 
limitations of government by unlawful occupiers while simultaneously enabling 
government to respond to the plight of the unlawful occupiers with sympathetic care and 
concern. To this extent, meaningful engagement is a welcome addition to the South 
African law because it opens up space for prolonged, intense and honest contestation. 
In Residents of Joe Slovo the Constitutional Court made it clear that meaningful 
engagement could even have a role to play in the remedial stage of litigation in relation 
to controlling the effects of an eviction order. While engagement at this stage should by 
no means be viewed as a substitute for the engagement that precedes litigation, 
engagement at this stage could concern the upgrading of the properties where the 
                                                 
320 The Supreme Court of Appeal in City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 
(6) SA 404 (SCA) stated that it was hesitant to create an entitlement which would allow the unlawful 
occupiers to demand alternative accommodation in the inner city of Johannesburg (par 75), but added 
that it would be remiss if it did not consider the consequences that might flow from an eviction order 
where it was likely that the unlawful occupiers would become homeless or otherwise destitute. See 
Wilson S “Litigating housing rights in Johannesburg’s inner city” in Jenkins C, Du Plessis M and 
Govender K (eds) Law, Nation-Building and Transformation (forthcoming). 
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unlawful occupiers currently reside in order to make it safer or more suitable for human 
habitation.321 However, engagement at this stage322 will invariably pertain to the details 
of the eviction,323 possible relocation to temporary accommodation,324 and ultimately the 
provision of permanent alternative accommodation.325 
 
5 3 Pending developments: Alternative accommodation 
5 3 1 Introduction 
Courts have recently been at pains to incorporate detailed descriptions of the squalid 
conditions326 that prevail in informal settlements and inner city buildings that have been 
abandoned by their owners as a reminder - perhaps for themselves - of the 
circumstances that unlawful occupiers have to endure every day. It has also become 
customary for courts to include a detailed overview of the history of the occupation327 to 
highlight the daily struggles of these unlawful occupiers.328 Despite this 
acknowledgment of the realities of the accommodation of impoverished groups, the 
courts have continued to issue eviction orders that are sought in the name of health and 
safety considerations329 or development330 without any serious regard to the disastrous 
impact that the evictions and subsequent relocations to distant accommodation will 
have on the livelihoods of these unlawful occupiers.331 
                                                 
321 See Interim order Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Orders 1 and 2. 
322 The recent judgment of the Constitutional Court in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape 
v Thubelisha Homes and Others (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions and Another as Amici Curiae) 
2011 (7) BCLR 723 (CC) illustrates that meaningful engagement at this late stage may not bare any fruits. 
323 See Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Orders 4-7 and 11-15. 
324 See Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Orders 8-10. 
325 See Residents of Joe Slovo par 7, Orders 17-20.  
326 See Grootboom CC par 7 and City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 (6) 
SA 404 (SCA) par 10. 
327 See Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 (4) SA 199 (SCA) par 3; Pedro and 
Others v Greater George Transitional Council 2001 (2) SA 131 (C) paras 5–6; City of Cape Town v 
Rudolph and Others 2003 (11) BCLR 1236 (C) at 1239D-F; Baartman and Others v Port Elizabeth 
Municipality 2004 (1) SA 560 (SCA) paras 2-3 and Murray par 6. 
328 See Sailing Queen Investments par 4 and Lingwood par 5. 
329 See Groengras Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Elandsfontein Unlawful Occupants 2002 (1) SA 125 (T) and 
Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 (4) SA 199 (SCA). 
330 See City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 (1) SA 78 (W); City of 
Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2007 (6) SA 404 (SCA); Occupiers of 51 Olivia 
Road; Thubelisha Homes & Others v Various Occupants and Others [2008] JOL 21559 (C) and 
Residents of Joe Slovo. 
331 See Residents of Joe Slovo par 321 (O’Regan J). 
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Against this background it is important to note that the availability of alternative 
accommodation is widely regarded as the most important factor for a court to consider 
in determining whether it is just and equitable to issue an eviction order.332 It is therefore 
sad that the courts do not use the social and historical context of the unlawful 
occupation that they narrate at the beginning of most judgments to craft context 
sensitive remedies. This lack of real engagement with the intolerable conditions that 
unlawful occupiers live in significantly reduces the impact that the availability of 
alternative accommodation has as a consideration. This is furthermore at odds with the 
principle that courts should be hesitant to evict relatively settled occupiers unless it is 
satisfied that alternative accommodation is available.333 
In Residents of Joe Slovo the Constitutional Court had to determine whether it was 
just and equitable to evict 20 000 people from the Joe Slovo informal settlement in 
terms of the N2 Gateway Project. One of the issues the Court grappled with was a 
decision by Thubelisha Homes and the MEC for Local Government and Housing that it 
was not feasible to conduct an in situ upgrade of the settlement. It was therefore 
decided that the unlawful occupiers had to be relocated to temporary residential units in 
Delft while the site was upgraded. The unlawful occupiers initially supported the 
temporary relocation to Delft because they would be able to return to the developed site 
and occupy low-income housing against payment of an agreed rental. When it became 
clear that Thubelisha and the MEC would not be able to honour their commitments the 
remaining unlawful occupiers on the site refused to relocate fearing that they too would 
not be able to return from Delft. This brought the whole N2 Gateway Project to an 
abrupt halt. The Court held that it was just and equitable to evict the unlawful 
occupiers334 and to relocate them to temporary residential units in Delft that had to 
comply with certain quality standards.335 The Court must be lauded for giving specific 
                                                 
332 Lingwood par 18. 
333 PE Municipality par 28. 
334 Residents of Joe Slovo Order 4. 
335 Residents of Joe Slovo Order 10 states that the temporary residential units had to comply with the 
following requirements: (a) “be at least 24m2 in extent”; (b) “be serviced with tarred roads”; (c) “be 
individually numbered for purposes of identification”; (d) “have walls constructed with a substance called 
Nutec”; (e) “have a galvanised iron roof”; (f) “be supplied with electricity through a pre-paid electricity 
meter”; (g) “be situated within reasonable proximity of a communal ablution facility”; (h) “make reasonable 
provision (which may be communal) for toilet facilities with water-borne sewerage”; and (i) “make 
reasonable provision (which may be communal) for fresh water.”  
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content to the obligation to provide alternative accommodation in this order. Liebenberg 
observes that the order of the court is the “strongest affirmation to date of suitable 
alternative accommodation as a critical factor in evaluating the justice and equity of 
evicting a large settled community.”336 However, the focus of the order was still very 
much on the bricks and mortar side of the right of access to adequate housing and 
therefore failed to appreciate that the relocation to Delft might not appropriately respond 
to the rights and needs of the unlawful occupiers. This is attributable to the lack of a 
central organising framework within which to locate the home interest of the 
occupiers,337 and the failure to use existing legislation to craft orders that are responsive 
to the housing rights and needs of those living in informal settlements and inner city 
buildings that have been abandoned by their owners. 
What follows is an attempt to show how courts can tailor their orders to provide 
alternative accommodation in terms of the existing legislative framework and with 
reference to international law. 
 
5 3 2 The rights and needs of vulnerable people 
5 3 2 1 Introduction 
People living in informal settlements338 are poor because they suffer from a combination 
of income poverty, human development poverty and social exclusion.339 Policies which 
                                                 
336 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 311. 
337 Fox L Conceptualising Home - Theories, Laws and Policies (2007) 12. See section 2 1 2 in chapter 3 
for a discussion of the intangible elements of the right of access to adequate housing. See also the 
submissions of the amici curiae in Residents of Joe Slovo paras 27-49. These submissions are available 
online at http://www.constitutional court.org.za/Archimages/12720.PDF (accessed on 1 August 2011). 
338 The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa Development Indicators 2009 (2010) 30 (‘The 
Presidency Development Indicators 2009’) indicate that the 13,448 million households in South Africa 
during 2008 can be divided into the following types of households: 9,879 million or 73,5% of households 
were in a formal dwelling; 1,8 million or 13,4% of households were in informal dwellings; and 1,417 million 
or 10,5% of households were in traditional structures. Available online at http://italcoop.co.za/Public 
Documents/SA%20%20Development%20Indicators_2009.pdf (accessed 18 June 2010). 
339 Sengupta A Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development UN doc A/HRC/7/15 (28 February 2008) par 23. 
Available online at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/111/56/PDF/G0811156.pdf 
(accessed on 28 February 2011). In this report the former independent expert on the question of human 
rights and extreme poverty explained that social exclusion is viewed as something “quite distinct” from 
income and human development poverty because it explains in relational terms why the “the poor, the 
unemployed, ethnic minorities and vulnerable groups have remained ‘outsiders’ in the social hierarchy.” 
Human development poverty is formulated as the deprivation of “health, education, food, nutrition and 
other basic needs” that supports a “person’s ability to lead a life that she or he values with freedom of 
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are developed to uplift impoverished people without their participation on the most 
appropriate way to do so fail to acknowledge their dignity and impede their right to enjoy 
all rights and freedoms equally.340 This position is exacerbated in the case of evictions 
that are sought in the name of health and safety considerations or development. Policy 
guidance in this regard is usually dominated by the rhetoric of economic growth and its 
trickle-down benefits for the alleviation of poverty. Such policies do not take into 
consideration the human cost involved in the process of development and consequently 
they fail to appreciate the inconvenience341 and extreme hardship342 that an eviction and 
relocation will bring about for the communities that stand to be affected.  
The reality of an eviction is that the evictees are unable to take the physical site and 
its intangible elements as a home with them to the alternative accommodation. The 
result is that an eviction order usually breaks the strong emotional ties between a 
community and the place that they called home for many years or, perhaps, 
generations. An eviction will cause many people to lose the support structure that they 
have established for themselves as well as for others who have come to rely thereon. 
An eviction will furthermore, perhaps most dramatically, destroy the livelihoods of 
individuals and their families because relocation to another area brings with it various 
uncertainties. These uncertainties vary from their ability to earn an income as informal 
traders or take up other unskilled employment343 that depends on living in close 
proximity to those employment opportunities;344 the general safety of the area and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
‘being and doing.’” Income poverty can be defined in absolute terms “as a per capita level of expenditure 
or poverty line, such as $1 or $2 per day, in terms of a comparable level of purchasing power” or in 
relative terms according to “the sociocultural context of a country, while defining capacity to fulfill basic 
needs.” The Presidency Development Indicators 2009 23 indicates that the per capita income of the 
poorest 10% of people in South Africa during 2008 where R 1 041 per month. The mean per capita 
income per race group during 2008 where R 845,83 (African); R 1 495,53 (Coloured); R 2 986,67 (Asian); 
and R 8 141,15 (White). The Presidency Development Indicators 2009 26 further indicates that 49% of 
the population lives below the poverty of R 524 per month, the 39% of the population live below the 
poverty line of R 388 per month and that 22% of the population lives below the poverty line of R 283 per 
month. 
340 Section 9(2) of the Constitution. 
341 See Residents of Joe Slovo paras 107 (Yaccob J), 169 (Moseneke DCJ) and 384 (Sachs J). 
342 See Residents of Joe Slovo par 321 (O’Regan J). 
343 The Presidency Development Indicators 2009 20 indicates that 2,109 million or 15,78% of the 
population in South Africa have employment in the informal sector and that 1,194 million or 8,93% of the 
population have employment as domestic workers. In contrast, 23,6% (official, narrow definition) and 
32,5% (unofficial, broad definition) of the population were unemployed during June 2009. 
344 See the arguments of the occupiers in City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 (1) SA 
78 (W) par 20 and the submissions of the amicus curiae in Residents of Joe Slovo. 
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prevalence of gang related violence; the closeness of health care facilities, recreational 
facilities, religious institutions and schools; infrastructure; and service delivery. 
These circumstances should be taken into consideration by any court in determining 
the justice and equity of an eviction because a failure to do so may perpetuate or even 
exacerbate the impoverished position345 of the occupiers who sacrifice their homes and 
livelihoods in the name of development and economic growth.  
In Residents of Joe Slovo all the judgments acknowledged that the relocation to Delft 
would cause considerable inconvenience and bring about immeasurable suffering for 
the occupiers. The court, most notably in the judgments of Moseneke DCJ346 and 
O’Regan J,347 held that any order that granted an eviction order without making 
provision for alternative accommodation according to the rights and needs of occupiers 
that stand to be affected would be far less likely of being just and equitable. Residents 
of Joe Slovo is therefore the strongest affirmation of the importance of alternative 
accommodation348 because it emphasises that the government must adopt legislative 
and other measures that cater for the emergency and short term housing needs of 
people who stand to be evicted.349 The provision of emergency or temporary alternative 
accommodation upon eviction is a manifestation of this obligation. This obligation must 
be fulfilled by ascertaining what the needs of the unlawful occupiers are and to then 
attempt to provide alternative accommodation that matches these needs. However, this 
task is hampered by the fact that the composition of communities differs and the 
respective interests of individuals, and families, within each community exponentially 
increase the scope of concerns that can be harboured and may require consideration. It 
is therefore necessary to reduce the circumstances that a court must take into 
consideration to a realistic number in a principled and non-discriminatory manner, 
                                                 
345 Sengupta A Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Human Rights questions, including 
Alternative Approaches for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms UN doc A/63/274 (13 August 2008) paras 14-15 (‘A/63/274’) available online at http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/459/30/PDF/N0845930.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on 18 March 
2011). 
346 Residents of Joe Slovo par 138. 
347 Residents of Joe Slovo par 313. 
348 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 311. 
349 See section 2 2 2 in chapter 3 for the model of reasonableness review. 
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without perpetuating the rhetoric associated with the deserving and undeserving 
poor.350  
I appreciate that by focussing on the housing rights of specific groups to the 
exclusion of all other groups the discussion below could be perpetuating this rhetoric. 
However, it is convenient to limit the enquiry here to the housing interests of the elderly, 
children, persons with disabilities and female-headed households because these are 
also the categories of people which PIE explicitly includes in sections 4(7) and 6(3)(c) 
for purposes of considering the availability of alternative land or accommodation. The 
discussion below shows how courts could create an organising framework for the 
consideration of alternative accommodation in terms of the housing and housing-related 
rights in international law, regional human rights instruments, and national legislation 
and policy guidance that focuses on the elderly, children, persons with disabilities and 
female-headed households. This does not exclude the possibility that similar arguments 
could be made for other groups of people. Courts should tailor their approach to the 
consideration of alternative accommodation based on the cumulative home interests of 
the community as a whole and its constitutive groups. 
 
5 3 2 2 The elderly 
Recent advances in medicine have led to the rapid increase of the number and 
percentage of the elderly population of the world.351 In many instances this increase in 
life expectancy352 has required the elderly to relocate to urban areas to ensure that 
health care facilities are readily available. Such resettlements have brought the elderly 
                                                 
350 See Ross T “The rhetoric of poverty” 1501. 
351 Currently there are 737.3 million people (11% of the total world population) in the world older than 60 
years of age. This includes the 103.2 million people that are older than 80 years of age. During 2009 
there were 4.013 million people in South Africa (7% of the population) older than 60 years of age and 
321040 people (0.5% of the population) older than 80 years of age. During the same time the sex ratio 
(number of men per 100 women) was 70 for all the men older than 60 years of age and 43 for all the men 
older than 80 years of age. During the period from 2005 to 2010 the life expectancy at 60 years of age 
was 14 years for men and 18 years for women. Of all the people older than the age of 60 years of age, 
78% of men were still married and 37% were still employed, while only 46% of women were still married 
and only 18% were still employed. In 2009 there were 15 people in the work force (between the ages of 
15 and 64 years of age) for every person older than 60 years of age. United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division Population Ageing and Development 2009 (‘UN 
Population Ageing and Development’) available online at www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ 
ageing/ageing2009chart.pdf (accessed on 7 March 2010). 
352 Globally the life expectancy at the age of 60 is an additional 18 years for men and an additional 21 
years for women. See UN Population Ageing and Development 1. 
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closer to their children and the much needed care and financial support that they can 
provide. The increased dependence353 of the elderly on their children and extended 
families ensures that they feature among the most vulnerable and unprotected 
groups354 in any community. The rights and interests of the elderly therefore require 
special attention and protection during evictions and relocations. 
The Vienna International Plan of Action on Ageing355 (‘International Plan’) was the 
first international instrument dedicated to addressing the humanitarian and 
developmental aspects of ageing. One of the primary aims of the plan is to strengthen 
the capacity of countries to cater for their ageing populations and their needs.356 The 
World Assembly on Ageing recognised that the activities, safety and well-being of the 
elderly should be protected and developed according to certain principles. These 
principles require states to improve the welfare of the entire population357 by developing 
responses to its changing demography according to its own traditions and cultural 
values.358 Countries are encouraged to consider all development costs for the 
accommodation of the elderly as a perpetual investment in the community for the wide 
array of contributions the elderly make during their lives and will continue to make 
through their legacy. 359 Countries are therefore encouraged to protect, maintain and 
strengthen the family as a fundamental unit360 in a manner that will promote cohesion 
and support among generations.361 The homes of the elderly cannot be considered as 
constituting mere shelter because homes acquire a certain psychological and social 
significance after years of functioning as the centre of their existence.362 Every effort 
should therefore be made to secure their social integration363 by ensuring that they are 
                                                 
353 Globally the old-age support ratio (the number of persons aged 15 to 64 years per person aged 65 or 
older) is 9. See UN Population Ageing and Development 1. 
354 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 6 The economic, social 
and cultural rights of older persons, UN Doc E/1996/22 (‘General Comment No 6’) par 17. 
355 UN doc A/RES/37/51 available online at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r051.htm 
(accessed on 18 March 2011). The World Assembly on Ageing adopted this plan when it convened in 
Vienna from 26 July to 6 August 1982. 
356 Par 2 of the International Plan. 
357 Par 25(a) of the International Plan. 
358 Par 25(d) of the International Plan. 
359 Par 25(e) of the International Plan. 
360 Par 25(f) of the International Plan.  
361 Par 25(h) of the International Plan. 
362 Recommendation 19 and General Comment No 6 par 33. 
363 Recommendation 20. 
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relocated to a familiar environment where their involvement in the community will be 
welcomed and where they will have the opportunity to lead a normal life without fear of 
falling prey to crime.364 
Every effort should further be made to support, protect and strengthen the family 
unit365 by adopting social policies that encourage family continuity.366 These policies 
should ensure that appropriate support from the wider community is available to families 
because that will make it possible for families to care for their elderly relatives.367 
Secondly, an integrated approach to planning and development should be adopted 
because that will recognise the special needs and characteristics of older persons368 
and, finally, social services must be established to support families with meagre income 
who wish to keep elderly people at home.369 
The Older Persons Act 13 of 2006 was enacted to protect older persons370 by 
ensuring that an enabling environment371 is created where they can continue to make 
constructive and meaningful contributions to a society that recognises them as 
important sources of knowledge and wisdom.372 The objectives of the Act are to373 
firstly, maintain and promote the status, well-being, safety and security of older persons; 
secondly, protect the rights of older persons;374 thirdly, ensure that an elderly person 
remains in his or her home within a community for as long as possible; fourthly, regulate 
                                                 
364 Recommendation 23. 
365 General Comment No 6 par 31.  
366 Recommendation 25. 
367 Recommendation 26. 
368 Recommendation 28. 
369 Recommendation 29. 
370 Long title of the Act. 
371 Section 6(1) of the Act empowers the Minister of Social Development to prescribe national norms and 
standards for acceptable levels of services that may be provided to older persons and in terms of which 
these services must be monitored and evaluated. 
372 Preamble of the Act. 
373 Section 2(a)-(e) of the Act. 
374 See section 7 of the Act for the rights that older persons enjoy. 
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the establishment and management of services375 and residential facilities376 for older 
persons and, finally, address the abuse of older persons.377 
Elderly people are vulnerable during relocations because they can either lose their 
homes or be separated from their families and then placed in an institution. This will not 
only deprive the elderly from the possibility of living independently and earning a living, 
but will also prevent them from flourishing in an enabling environment and contributing 
to the society. Local government should therefore compile a comprehensive report that 
includes inter alia the following information about the elderly people in the community: 
the total number of elderly people; the number of married couples; the number of 
widows and widowers; how many are employed; how many are or could be living 
independently; how many are or would like to live with their families; and how the 
relocation site will be able to accommodate these people. 
When a court decides to evict a community it could formulate an order that would 
direct the local government to establish an enabling environment to suit the rights and 
needs of elderly people or to comply with sections 6 and 7 of the Act; the National 
Norms and Standards regarding the Acceptable Levels of Services to Older Persons 
and Service Standards for Community-Based Care and Support Services;378 and the 
National Norms and Standards regarding the Acceptable Levels of Services to Older 
Persons and Service Standards for Residential Facilities.379 
 
5 3 2 3 Children 
Children are vulnerable because the biological and psychological fact of their childhood 
makes them susceptible to influences that prey on their physical and mental immaturity, 
so that constant care and protection from their family is required, or suitable alternative 
                                                 
375 Section 1 of the Act defines a “service” as “any activity or programme designed to meet the needs of 
an older person.” See also section 9 of the Act for the requirements of the environment in which these 
services must be rendered. 
376 Section 1 of the Act defines a “residential facility” as “a building or other structure used primarily for the 
purpose of providing accommodation and of providing a 24-hour service to older persons.” 
377 Section 1, read with section 30(2), of the Act defines “abuse” as “[a]ny conduct or lack of appropriate 
action, occurring within any relationship where there is an expectation of trust, which causes harm or 
distress or is likely to cause harm or distress to an older person.” See also section 30(3) of the Act for a 
description of the types of abuse that the elderly can be subjected to. 
378 GG 33075, GN 9255 of 1 April 2010, Annexure B (Part 1). 
379 GG 33075, GN 9255 of 1 April 2010, Annexure B (Part 2). 
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care, if they lack or are removed from their families.380 The Convention on the Rights of 
the Child381 (‘CRC’) recognises that children are entitled to special care and 
assistance382 because they are “disproportionately vulnerable to the negative effects of 
[in]adequate and insecure living conditions.”383 The family of a child should therefore be 
afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can care for that child.384 
However, the real concern is that many children in South Africa do not have access to 
adequate housing385 and are forced to live in overcrowded households386 that do not 
have electricity,387 basic sanitation388 or safe drinking water.389 Living in these conditions 
                                                 
380 Brett R “Rights of the child” in Krause C and Scheinin M (eds) International Protection of Human 
Rights: A Textbook (2009) 227-246 227 (‘Brett “Rights of the child”’) and Van Bueren G “Committee on 
the Rights of the Child - Overcoming inertia in this age of no alternatives” in Langford M (ed) Social Rights 
Jurisprudence - Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 569-587 575 (‘Van 
Bueren “Overcoming inertia”’). 
381 1577 UNTS 3. The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention on 20 November 
1989 and it came into force on 2 September 1990. South Africa signed the Convention on 29 January 
1993 and ratified the Convention on 16 June 1995 without filing any reservations or interpretive 
declarations. As at 18 March 2011 there were 194 States Parties to the Convention. The Committee on 
the Rights of the Child (article 43(1) of the Convention) monitors the implementation of the rights 
contained in the Convention by receiving and considering States Parties reports (articles 44 and 45 of the 
Convention). The Committee consists of 10 experts that serve in their personal capacity (article 43(2) of 
the Convention) for a four year term that may be renewed once (article 43(6) of the Convention). The 
Committee reports to the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council biannually (article 44(5) of 
the Convention). 
382 Preamble of the CRC. 
383 United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right of access to adequate housing as a component of the 
right to an adequate standard of living, Mr Miloon Kothari, UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/51 par 69. 
384 Preamble of the CRC. 
385 Children living in formal housing, as opposed to informal or traditional housing, have increased from 
11.92 million (68%) in 2002 to 12.48 million (68.3%) in 2007. See Pendlebury S, Lake L and Smith C 
(eds) South African Child Gauge 2008/2009 (2009) 98 (‘Pendlebury et al Child Gauge’). 
386 Children living in households with a ratio of more than two people per room have increased from 4.19 
million (24%) in 2002 to 4.76 million (26.1%) during 2007. In addition to the lack of privacy and a difficult 
learning environment children are increasingly susceptible to sexual abuse and the spread of 
communicable diseases. See Pendlebury et al Child Gauge 99. 
387 Children living in households that are connected to the main electricity supply increased from 12.63 
million (72%) in 2002 to 14.56 million (79.6%) during 2007. People living in informal housing and 
traditional dwellings have, however, not abandoned the use of flammable fuels for cooking, lighting and 
heating purposes. Children are therefore still exposed to rampaging fires, inadequate lighting for study 
purposes and smoke inhalation. See Pendlebury et al Child Gauge 102. 
388 Children living in households with access to toilet facilities have increased from 8.3 million (47.4%) in 
2002 to 10.76 million (58.9%) during 2007. The continued use of pit latrines, the bucket system or open 
land by nearly 8 million children still poses significant health, safety and nutritional risks that can lead to 
diarrhoea, cholera, malaria, bilharzia, eye infection and skin diseases. See Pendlebury et al Child Gauge 
101. 
389 Children living in households with access to a safe and reliable supply of drinking water in the home or 
on the site have increased from 10.62 million (60.6%) in 2002 to 11.47 million (62.7%) during 2007. The 
continued use of public taps, water tankers, dams and rivers still poses significant health, safety and 
nutritional risks that can lead to diarrhoea and cholera. See Pendlebury et al Child Gauge 100. 
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is not in the “best interest of the child” and this constitutional principle should therefore 
be used to inform the interpretation of a child’s right to shelter and adequate housing.390 
In Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality and Others391 (‘Grootboom HC’) the 
Western Cape High Court, Cape Town used the principle of the best interests of the 
child to interpret a child’s right to shelter in section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution.392 The 
applicants argued that the children of the Wallacedene community and their parents 
should be provided with shelter from the government in terms of section 28(1)(c) read 
with section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution.393  
Davis J found that section 28(1)(b) would be redundant if “shelter” in section 28(1)(c) 
was defined in terms of chapter 5 of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983, which envisaged the 
establishment and maintenance of places of safety for the reception, custody, 
observation, examination and treatment of children in government institutions. Davis J 
reasoned that this definition of shelter left no room for children to receive care and 
protection from their family and would result in children being taken from their families 
and any form of parental control.394 He found that this would not be in the best interests 
of the child especially where there is no suggestion that the parents have neglected 
their children.395 He therefore found that section 28(1)(c) provided a right to be 
protected from the elements in circumstances where there is no need to remove healthy 
children from their parents.396 
                                                 
390 Section 28(2) of the Constitution provides that “[a] child's best interests are of paramount importance in 
every matter concerning the child.” This was modelled on article 3(1) of the CRC, which states that “[i]n all 
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of 
law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration”. See also article 4 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child OAU doc 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49. 
391 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C). 
392 Section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution states that “[e]very child has the right to basic nutrition, shelter, 
basic health care services and social services”. 
393 Section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution states that “[e]very child has the right to family care or parental 
care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment”. 
394 Grootboom HC at 288G. 
395 Grootboom HC at 288H. 
396 Grootboom HC at 287J-288A. Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 235 explains that Davis J’s 
reasoning appreciates the fact that many families require the assistance of the government to meet their 
socio-economic needs because they are unable to so as a result of their historical and social 
circumstances. However, she also points out that this approach to the interpretation of sections 26 and 
28(1)(c) of the Constitution makes the short-term provision of shelter for adults dependent on them being 
parents or primary caregivers of children and therefore excludes those adults who are neither. 
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On appeal the Constitutional Court in Grootboom CC found that the interpretation 
that Davis J afforded section 28(1)(c) gave rise to an anomaly. Yacoob J explained that 
Davis J’s interpretation afforded the parents of children with an immediate right to 
housing in terms of section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution to the exclusion of people with 
no children or whose children are adult and do not attract the protection of section 28 of 
the Constitution.397 He therefore held that Davis J erred in drawing a distinction between 
the right to housing in section 26 and the right to shelter in section 28(1)(c) of the 
Constitution. He explained that housing and shelter are related concepts and that one of 
the aims of providing access to adequate housing is to provide physical shelter398 from 
inclement weather and life threatening danger. The obligation in section 28(1)(c) of the 
Constitution must therefore be ascertained with regard to the context of the rights and, 
in particular, the obligations created by sections 25(5), 26 and 27 of the Constitution.399 
When subsections 28(1)(b) and (c) are read together the former provision defines those 
responsible for providing care while the latter simply  lists various aspects of the care 
entitlement.400 The primary duty to fulfil a child’s socio-economic rights therefore rests 
with the parents or extended family.401 On the other hand, where children are being 
cared for by their families the primary obligation of the government is to provide “the 
legal and administrative infrastructure necessary to ensure that children are accorded 
the protection contemplated by section 28.”402 He accordingly held that the government 
did not incur any primary obligation in terms of section 28(1)(c) to provide the children 
and, through them, their parents with shelter because they were in the care of their 
parents.403 
This judgment has been criticised by many commentators for the way it 
characterised the obligations of government in the provision of shelter to children that 
                                                 
397 Grootboom CC par 71. 
398 Grootboom CC par 73. 
399 Grootboom CC par 74. Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 237 observes that the Constitutional Court 
is reluctant to recognise direct entitlements to the provision of social goods and services “even when this 
is strongly suggested by the text of the relevant provision.” 
400 Grootboom CC par 76. 
401 Grootboom CC par 76. See also articles 19 and 20 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child OAU doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49. 
402 Grootboom CC par 78. See also S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) 
par 20. 
403 Grootboom CC par 79. 
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lack parental care404 due the realities of extreme poverty. Pieterse argues that 
Grootboom CC limited the enforcement of the rights contained in section 28(1)(c) of the 
Constitution to the confines of impoverished families that cannot provide the most basic 
forms of social goods to their children. He argues further that the Constitutional Court 
created the impression that it would be better for the well-being of the children to be 
removed - forcibly or voluntarily - from their parents because then the government 
would have obligations to provide social goods to the children.405 
In Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) the Constitutional Court 
appeared to retreat from its initial interpretation of the obligations that section 28 of the 
Constitution imposes on government when it held that the government had to protect 
children “when the implementation of the right to parental or family care is lacking.”406 
This is in accordance with the CRC, which requires States Parties to render material 
assistance and support programmes407 to parents that are unable to provide their 
children with an adequate standard of living.408 States Parties must provide this 
assistance according to what the prevailing national conditions demand so that the 
living conditions needed for the development of the child can be fostered.409 This 
requires the establishment of an environment that will advance the child’s physical, 
                                                 
404 An orphan is defined as a child under the age of 18 years whose mother, father, or both biological 
parents have died. Maternal orphans (children whose mother has died but whose father is alive) have 
increased from 488 000 (2.8%) in 2002 to 614 000 (3.4%) in 2007. Paternal orphans (children whose 
father has died but whose mother is alive) have increased from 2.15 million (12.3%) in 2002 to 2.36 
million (12.9%) in 2007. This can be attributed to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, the high mortality rates of 
men and the general absence of fathers from households. Double orphans (children whose mother and 
father have died) have increased from 352 000 (2%) in 2002 to 701 000 (3.8%) in 2007. South Africa, 
however, has a long history of children not living consistently in the same dwelling as their biological 
parents due to poverty, labour migration, educational opportunities or cultural practice. This is also why 
the right to family care in section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution includes the care provided by the extended 
family according to customary law. This protection is significant in view of the fact that the number and 
proportion of children living in a household with both biological parents has decreased from 6.63 million 
(37.8%) in 2002 to 6.27 million (34.3%) in 2007. See Pendlebury et al Child Gauge 72-75. See also 
Centre for Child Law v Minister of Home Affairs 2005 (6) SA 50 (T) and The Centre for Child Law v MEC 
for Education, Gauteng 2008 (1) SA 223 (T). 
405 Pieterse “Reconstructing the private/public dichotomy?” 11. 
406 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) par 78. See also article 18 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child OAU doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49. 
407 Article 27(3) of the CRC. 
408 Article 27(1) of the CRC. 
409 Article 27(2) of the CRC. Van Bueren “Overcoming inertia” 576-577 argues that the “national 
conditions” of States Parties do not function as a limitation for the application of the provision in addition 
to the limitations provided for in article 4 of the CRC. 
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mental, spiritual, moral and social development.410 The best interests of the child411 then 
imply that a home be established for a child in an environment that promotes her well-
being412 by encouraging her to learn,413 to partake in social activities,414 to discover her 
culture and to practice a religion415 while living in close proximity to health care and 
other services.416 
Children are vulnerable during relocations because they may be required to enrol in 
new schools - perhaps in the middle of a semester - and to partake in social activities in 
an area that is unfamiliar and often more dangerous. Every effort should be made to 
ameliorate the impact of the relocation because the impact that this will have on a child 
cannot be underestimated. Local government should therefore compile a 
comprehensive report that includes inter alia information on the total number of children 
in the community, the name and age of each child, whether the child attends school and 
which grade she is in, and how the relocation site will be able to facilitate the “physical, 
mental, spiritual, moral and social development” of the children. 
When a court then decides to evict a community it could formulate an order that 
would direct the local government to establish an environment to suit the rights and 
needs of children or to comply with articles 24, 26, 28(1)(a), 29(1)(a), 30, 31 and 32 of 
                                                 
410 Article 27(1) of the CRC. 
411 The Constitutional Court has considered the obligations contained in the CRC in detail in other 
contexts. See S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 (3) SA 322 (CC) par 16 (in 
considering whether to impose imprisonment on the primary caregiver of young children) and Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, and Others 2009 (4) 
SA 222 (CC) paras 71-79 (whether the protection afforded to child complainants in criminal proceedings 
involving sexual offences in terms of sections 153(3) and (5), 158(5), 164(1), and 170A(1) and (7) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 are sufficient). 
412 Article 32 of the CRC requires States Parties to protect children from “economic exploitation and from 
performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or be harmful 
to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.” 
413 Article 28(1)(a) of the CRC requires States Parties to “make primary education compulsory and 
available free to all” while article 29(1)(a) of the CRC requires education to be directed to “[t]he 
development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential”. 
414 Article 31 of the CRC affords children the right “to rest and leisure, to engage in play and recreational 
activities appropriate to the age of the child and to participate freely in cultural life and the arts.” 
415 Article 30 of the CRC affords children the right “to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practice 
his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language.” See also article 12 of the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child OAU doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49. 
416 Article 24 of the CRC requires States Parties to ensure that children enjoy “the highest attainable 
standard of health” while article 26 of the CRC require State Parties to ensure that children “benefit from 
social security.” See also article 14 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child OAU doc 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49. 
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the CRC and articles 12, 14, 18, 19 and 20 of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child. 
 
5 3 2 4 Persons with disabilities 
The issues that relate to disability were traditionally approached from a welfare 
perspective. This approach focused on the maintenance of persons with disabilities 
because it was believed that their lack of human capacities eroded rather than simply 
complicated their existence.417 The requisite “mixture of charity, paternalism and social 
policy”418 in legislation and best practices reinforced the perception that persons with 
disabilities were of inferior worth and contributed to the continued formation of 
dependency relationships. However, there has been a shift to a rights-based 
approach419 that is conceptually and instrumentally different from the welfare approach. 
The rights-based approach is premised on the ability and inclusion of persons with 
disabilities by focusing on the ways in which barriers to their participation in society can 
be eliminated so that their voices can become the principal point of departure for the 
evaluation of their rights and needs.  
This shift in approach is significant because it regards persons with disabilities as 
“subjects” with full legal capacity as distinct from “objects” that require maintenance.420 
This approach furthermore enables critical reflection on firstly, whether difference 
requires special treatment; secondly, whether non-discrimination is currently adequately 
conceptualised; thirdly, the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights and, 
finally, how socio-economic rights can contribute to the creation of inclusive societies 
and economies.421 
This gradual shift in perspective gained inspiration from the norms and standards 
contained in various awareness campaigns,422 declarations,423 resolutions,424 General 
                                                 
417 Quinn G “Disability and human rights: A new field in the United Nations” in Krause C and Scheinin M 
(eds) International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (2009) 247-271 247 (‘Quinn “Disability and 
human rights”’). 
418 Quinn “Disability and human rights” 247. 
419 See Stein MA “Disability human rights” (2007) 95 California Law Review 75-122. 
420 Quinn “Disability and human rights” 248. 
421 Quinn “Disability and human rights” 248–249. 
422 The United Nations Decade of Disabled Persons (1983-1992). During the final year of the UN Decade 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific adopted the Asian and Pacific Decade 
of Disabled Persons (1993-2002) to inspire reform in the east - available online at 
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Comments on disability,425 Special Rapporteur reports426 and the inclusion of rights for 
persons with disabilities in other international human rights instruments.427 This paved 
the way for the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities428 
(‘CRPD’). 
                                                                                                                                                             
www.unescap.org/esid/psis/disability (accessed on 7 March 2010). The Asian and Pacific Decade was 
extended to 2012 after the adoption of the Biwako Millennium Framework for Action towards an Inclusive, 
Barrier-free and Rights-based Society for Persons with Disabilities in Asia and the Pacific during 2002. 
The African Union was the benefactor of the African Decade of Persons with Disabilities (2000-2009) 
which had to be the catalyst of reform throughout the continent - available online at 
www.africandecade.org (accessed on 7 March 2010). The African Decade was extended to 2019 upon 
completion of the Africa Regional Conference on the Millennium Development Goals and Disability that 
was held in Nairobi during 2008. The League of Arab States and the Arab Organization of Disabled 
Persons declared the Arab Decade of Disabled Persons (2003-2012) available online at 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/disarabdecade.htm (accessed on 7 March 2010). The Organization 
of American States declared a Decade of the Americas for the Rights and Dignity of Persons with 
Disabilities (2006–2016) that was thematically entitled Equality, Dignity, and Participation available online 
at www.oas.org/DIL/persons_ with_disabilities.htm (accessed on 7 March 2010). The European Union 
adopted a Disability Action Plan (2003-2010) while the Council of Europe adopted its own Disability 
Action Plan (2006-2015). The Secretary of the United Nations has stated that these “[r]egional decades 
and strategies on disability are crucial for raising awareness and establishing information and support 
networks for mainstreaming.” See Economic and Social Council Mainstreaming disability in the 
development agenda, UN doc E/CN.5/2010/6 par 12. 
423 The United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, General 
Assembly resolution 2865 (XXVI) on 20 December 1971 and supplemented it with the Declaration on the 
Rights of Disabled Persons, General Assembly Resolution 3447 (XXX) on 9 December 1975.  
424 In 1982 the United Nations adopted its World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons 
General Assembly Resolution 61/106, annex I which defined the role of persons with disabilities as both 
agents and beneficiaries and provided an international policy framework for disability-inclusive 
development. In 1993 the principles of inclusive policies, plans and activities were reaffirmed in the 
Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities General Assembly 
resolution 48/96, annex. These rules also established a Special Rapporteur on Disability that is tasked to 
monitor the implementation of these rules for the Commission for Social Development. The Commission 
on Human Rights passed resolutions on disability in 1994 (Resolution 1994/27) and 1996 (Resolution 
1996/27) which required UN treaty bodies to monitor States Parties compliance with their obligations with 
respect to persons with disabilities, and in 1998 (Resolution 1998/31) which declared that a violation of 
the right to equality of persons with disabilities would amount to an infringement of their human rights. 
425 See UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 5 Persons with 
disabilities, UN Doc E/1995/22 and UN Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No 9 The 
rights of children with disabilities, UN doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev 9(vol II). 
426  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education The Right to Education of Persons with 
Disabilities, UN doc A/HRC/4/29 (19 February 2007) and the Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN doc A/63/175 (28 July 
2008). 
427 Article 23 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 18(4) of the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights, Art 18 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in 
the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
428 999 UNTS 171. The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention on 13 
December 2006 and it came into force on 3 May 2008. South Africa ratified the Convention on 30 March 
2007 without filing any reservations or interpretive declarations. As at 18 March 2011 there were 78 
States Parties to the CRPD. The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (article 34(1) of the 
Convention) monitors the implementation of the rights contained in the Convention by receiving and 
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The CRPD describes persons with disabilities as “those who have long-term 
physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various 
barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with 
others.”429 Put differently, discrimination on the basis of disability amounts to the denial 
of reasonable accommodation.430 This requirement of reasonable accommodation is 
unique to the CRPD and has proved to be very controversial.431 Quinn explains that the 
requirement of reasonable accommodation requires States Parties to respond directly to 
the individual needs of a person with a disability and a failure to do so may be cause for 
litigation. While the requirement of reasonable accommodation falls short of the classic 
construction of positive obligations, it nevertheless requires States Parties to take action 
that go beyond negative obligations.432 
The requirement of reasonable accommodation establishes an obligation through its 
link with the definition of discrimination that is cast in the form of an obligation of 
result.433 The requirement of reasonable accommodation accordingly sets the standard 
                                                                                                                                                             
considering States Parties reports (articles 35 and 36 of the Convention). The Committee was elected by 
secret ballot (article 34(5) of the Convention) on 3 November 2008 (article 34(6) of the Convention) in 
New York. The Committee currently consist of 12 experts, which will be increased to 18 experts with the 
80th ratification of the Convention, that serve in their personal capacity (article 34(3) of the Convention) for 
an four year term that may be renewed once (article 34(7) of the Convention). The Committee reports to 
the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council biannually. The Committee may also receive 
individual complaints in terms of article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities 46 ILM 443. The Optional Protocol entered into force on 3 May 2008 and had 88 
signatories and 49 States Parties as at 18 March 2011. 
429 Article 1 of the CRPD. 
430 Article 2 of the CRPD. The full definition of “discrimination on the basis of disability” provides for  
“any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the purpose or 
effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with 
others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural, civil or any other field. It includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of 
reasonable accommodation”. 
See also sections 9, 29 and the schedule (illustrative unfair practice 9) of the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (‘PEPUDA’). 
431 During the drafting of the CRPD the EU Presidency argued that the principle of reasonable 
accommodation should be severed from the definition of discrimination because “it could become a 
Trojan horse for the enforceability of more and more slices of social and economic rights.” See Quinn 
“Disability and human rights” 258. 
432 Quinn “Disability and human rights” 258. 
433 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights reprinted in (1998) 20 
Human Rights Quarterly 691-705 defines an obligation of result is an obligation that “requires States to 
achieve specific targets to satisfy a detailed substantive standard” (par 7). In the housing context the 
obligation of result could, for example, translate into giving effect to Millennium Development Goal 7 
(Ensure environmental sustainability), target 11 by achieving “a significant improvement in the lives of at 
least 100 million slum dwellers” by 2020. However, South Africa has misinterpreted this target as 
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for the evaluation of individual claims and the crafting of tailored remedies where there 
is a violation of the provisions of the CRPD.434 The CRPD requires States Parties to 
respect the home of persons with disabilities435 and to protect their aspirations of an 
adequate standard of living436 by ensuring that their homes are accessible437 in a 
manner that will promote an independent existence438 and personal mobility.439 The 
CRPD thus provides a framework against which a specific relocation site can be 
evaluated for its suitability as alternative accommodation. 
The prevalence of physical barriers prevents persons with disabilities440 from having 
access to housing,441 water,442 electricity443 and employment.444 In a home the most 
common barriers include inaccessible toilets and other sanitary facilities, grab rails to 
assist mobility, the lack of security from intruders, and health and safety problems 
caused by incomplete structures.445 The impairments of these people usually prevent 
them from reaching objects that are too high; carrying heavy objects; travelling in 
                                                                                                                                                             
requiring the elimination of slums and subsequently adopted the KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and 
Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Act 6 of 2007 to eliminate slums by 2015. 
434 Quinn “Disability and human rights” 258. 
435 See article 23 of the CRPD. 
436 See article 28(1) of the CRPD. 
437 See article 9(1) and (2) of the CRPD. 
438 See article 19(1) of the CRPD. 
439 See article 20 of the CRPD. 
440 According to Statistics South Africa there were 2 255 982 people (or 5% of the total population) living 
with some sort of disability in South Africa. These disabilities include sight (32.1%), hearing (20.1%), 
communication/speech (6.5%), physical (29.6%), intellectual (12.4%) and emotional (15.7%). The census 
showed that 1 854 376 (879 680 males and 974 696 females) black people, 191 693 (92 230 males and 
99 462 females) white people, 168 678 (88 583 males and 80 095 females) coloured people, and 41 235 
(21 550 males and 19 685 females) Indian people suffered from some sort of disability. See Statistics 
South Africa Prevalence of Disability in South Africa: Census 2001 (2005) 11-12 and 14-15. Available 
online at www.statssa.gov.za/census01html/ Disability.pdf (accessed on 21 August 2010) (‘Stats SA 
Prevalence of Disability’). 
441 The census showed that households headed by disabled people had access to the following types of 
dwelling: house or brick structure on separate stand or yard (53.2%), traditional dwelling/hut/structure 
(22.4%), flat in block of flats (4.1%), town-/cluster-/semi-detached house (1.9%), house/flat/room in 
backyard (2.7%), informal dwelling/shack in backyard (3.5%), informal dwelling/shack not in backyard 
(11%), and room/flatlet not in backyard (0.9%). See Stats SA Prevalence of Disability 26. 
442 The census showed that 22.3% of households headed by disabled people did not have access to 
piped water. See Stats SA Prevalence of Disability 30. 
443 Stats SA Prevalence of Disability 30 indicates that 38.2% of households headed by disabled people 
did not have access to electricity for lighting. 
444 Stats SA Prevalence of Disability 21 indicates that only 18.6% of disabled people were employed 
compared to the 34.6% of able-bodied people. 
445 Coulson J, Napier M and Matsebe G “Disability and universal access: Observations on housing from 
the spatial and social periphery” in Watermeyer B, Swartz L, Lorenzo T, Schneider M and Priestley M 
(eds) Disability and Social Change - A South African Agenda (2006) 325-349 332 (‘Coulson “Disability 
and universal access”’). 
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narrow doorways and down stairs; moving on uneven, stony or steep surfaces; 
maintaining the structure of the home; and cooking and completing household 
chores.446 The barriers in the community environment include unsurfaced roads; 
uneven, muddy, rocky and high pavements; crossing busy streets; accessing buildings; 
utilising public toilets, public phones and automated teller machines; long distances 
between public transport hubs and their homes or other destinations and accessing 
public transport vehicles.447 
These barriers are usually created by architects, contractors, designers and 
developers that do not have a firm grasp of the needs of persons with disabilities. The 
effect is that persons with disabilities are precluded from enjoying certain opportunities, 
receiving services and actively participating in normal community life. This has a 
significant impact on the families, friends and communities of persons with disabilities 
because they are forced into relationships of dependency when they are capable of 
leading productive lives in an enabling environment.448 Local government should ideally 
include comprehensive information on the number of persons with disabilities within the 
community they want to relocate, the nature of the impairments and how the relocation 
site will be able to accommodate these people.  
When a court decides to evict the community it could formulate an order that would 
direct the local government to alter an existing environment to suit the needs of persons 
with disabilities or to comply with Part S (Facilities for Persons with Disabilities) of the 
National Building Regulations;449 and the key principles of accessibility, self-sufficiency, 
access to appropriate services and social integration of the Policy on Disability.450 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
446 Coulson “Disability and universal access” 335. 
447 Coulson “Disability and universal access” 337-340. 
448 Mji G “Disability and homelessness: A personal journey from the margins to the centre and back” in 
Watermeyer B, Swartz L, Lorenzo T, Schneider M and Priestley M (eds) Disability and Social Change – A 
South African Agenda (2006) 350-360 354-355. 
449 GG 12780 GN R.2378 (12 October 1990) 1. 
450 Available online at www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/090317disabilitypolicy.pdf (accessed on 21 August 
2010). 
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5 3 2 5 Female-headed households 
Women may be vulnerable in situations where they “experience structural discrimination 
and inequality”451 as a result of inadequate protection against the implementation of 
gender neutral legislative provisions that are used to discriminate against them in 
various areas of life. This often forces women into relationships of dependence and 
subjugation, which discriminates against them and in turn makes them susceptible to 
homelessness and abject poverty.452 This position is exacerbated when the relationship 
breaks down or the husband/partner dies and leaves the woman in charge of the 
household because women find it particularly difficult to obtain tenure security.453 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women454 
(‘CEDAW’) is uniquely placed to address the lived experience of discrimination and 
unequal treatment of women because it is the only treaty devoted exclusively to 
elaborating the right to equality and non-discrimination against women in different 
spheres.455 CEDAW recognises that discrimination against women violates the 
principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity because it prevents women 
from participating in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their countries on 
                                                 
451 Farha L “Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women - Women claiming economic, 
social and cultural rights - The CEDAW potential” in Langford M (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence - 
Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 553-568 555 (‘Farha “The CEDAW 
potential”’). 
452 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions Source 5: Women and Housing Second Edition (2008) 
available online at http://www.cohre.org/store/attachments/COHRE%20Sources%20 5%20%5B2%5D.pdf 
(accessed on 4 September 2010) 13 (‘COHRE Women and Housing’). 
453 COHRE Women and Housing 36-37. 
454 1249 UNTS 13. The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention on 18 
December 1979 and it came into force on 3 September 1981. South Africa signed the Convention on 29 
January 1993 and ratified it on 15 December 1995. As at 18 March 2011 there were 182 States Parties to 
the Convention. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (article 17(1) of the 
Convention) monitors the implementation of the rights contained in the Convention by receiving States 
Parties reports (article 18 of the Convention). The Committee can also receive individual complaints in 
terms of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women 2131 UNTS 83, which the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted on 6 October 1999 
and which entered into force on 22 December 2000. The Committee consists of 23 experts of “high moral 
standing and competence” that serve in their personal capacity (article 17(1) of the Convention) for a four 
year term that may be renewed once (article 17(5) of the Convention). The Committee annually reports to 
the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council on its activities and “may make 
suggestions and general recommendations based on the examination” of States Parties reports (article 
21 of the Convention). 
455 Farha “The CEDAW potential” 555. 
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an equal footing with men456 and therefore “hampers the growth of the prosperity of 
society and the family”, which in turn makes it more difficult to achieve “the full 
development of the potentialities of women in the service of their countries and of 
humanity.”457 CEDAW defines discrimination against women as  
“any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the 
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by 
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural, civil or any other field.”458 
 
CEDAW affords women the right to substantive equality and protects them against 
discrimination in certain areas of daily life that include education;459 employment;460 
health care;461 family benefits, forms of financial credit, and participation in recreational 
activities, sport and cultural life;462 rural life;463 equality before the law;464 and 
marriage.465 However, CEDAW recognises the indivisibility and interdependence of all 
human rights and therefore acknowledges that the infringement of one right will 
invariably lead to the infringement of another right.466 This is particularly true in the case 
of evictions, where relocation to another area could have a detrimental impact on inter 
alia the employment relationship of the breadwinner of a female-headed household. In 
this regard CEDAW recognises that women have the right to work,467 that they have the 
                                                 
456 See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 16: The equal right of 
men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights (art. 3 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc E/C.12/2005/4 (‘General Comment No 16’) 
paras 6-9. 
457 Preamble of CEDAW. 
458 Article 1 of CEDAW. See also General Comment No 16 par 11 and Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20: Non-discriminaiton in economic, social and cultural rights 
(art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc 
E/C.12/GC/20 par 20. 
459 Article 10 of CEDAW. 
460 Article 11 of CEDAW. 
461 Article 12 of CEDAW. 
462 Article 13 of CEDAW. 
463 Article 14 of CEDAW. 
464 Article 15 of CEDAW. 
465 Article 16 of CEDAW. 
466 Farha “The CEDAW potential” 557. 
467 Article 11(1)(a) of CEDAW. See also General Comment No 16 par 24. 
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right to the same employment opportunities as men,468 and that they have the right to 
choose their profession and a right to job security.469 
These rights are complemented by the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa470 (‘Maputo Protocol’). The 
Maputo Protocol includes a range of civil and political rights471 alongside economic, 
social and cultural rights472 that have been specifically tailored to the rights and needs of 
women in the African context. The Maputo Protocol, like CEDAW, specifically 
recognises a number of economic rights that the breadwinner of a female-headed 
household could have recourse to should a proposed eviction and relocation threaten 
her employment. In this regard States Parties must promote equal access to 
employment473 and the right to receive equal remuneration for jobs of equal worth.474 
States Parties must guarantee women the freedom to choose their occupation and must 
protect them against exploitation by their employers.475 The Maputo Protocol, 
significantly, recognises that States Parties must create conditions to promote and 
support the occupations and economic activities of women in the informal sector.476 
These rights must be read in conjunction with the right to adequate housing which 
                                                 
468 Article 11(1)(b) of CEDAW. 
469 Article 11(1)(c) of CEDAW. 
470 OAU doc. CAB/LEG/66.6. The African Union adopted this Protocol on 11 July 2003 and it came into 
operation on 25 November 2005 when the fifteenth African Union member nation deposited its instrument 
of ratification with the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union in terms of article 28(2) of the 
Protocol. South Africa signed the Protocol on 16 March 2004 and ratified the Protocol on 17 December 
2004. South African has filed reservations with regard to articles 6 and 7 of the Protocol. As at 15 July 
2010, 46 African Union member states were signatories to the Protocol and 28 member states have 
ratified the Protocol. 
471 These rights include the elimination of discrimination against women (article 2); the right to dignity 
(article 3); the right to life, integrity and security of the person (article 4); the elimination of harmful 
practices (article 5); marriage rights (article 6); the right to separate, divorce and annul a marriage (article 
7); the right of access to justice and equal protection before the law (article 8); the right to participation in 
the political and decision-making process (article 9); the right to peace (article 10); the right to protection 
in armed conflicts (article 11); the right of elderly women to receive special protection (article 22); the right 
of women with disabilities to receive special protection (article 23) and the right of women in distress to 
receive special protection (article 24). 
472 These rights include the right to education and training (article 12); the rights to economic and social 
welfare (article 13); health and reproductive rights (article 14); the right to food security (article 15); the 
right to adequate housing (article 16); the right to a positive cultural context (article 17); the right to health 
and a sustainable environment (article 18); the right to sustainable development (article 19); rights for 
widows (article 20); and the right to inheritance (article 21). 
473 Article 13(a) of the Maputo Protocol. 
474 Article 13(b) of the Maputo Protocol. 
475 Article 13(d) of the Maputo Protocol. 
476 Article 13(e) of the Maputo Protocol. 
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requires States Parties to guarantee that women, irrespective of their marital status, will 
have the right to equal access to housing and to acceptable living conditions in a 
healthy environment.477 
A female-headed household stands to be affected during an eviction because 
relocation destroys the support structures that enable a woman to care for her family478 
and invariably requires her to travel further to her place of employment, at substantial 
cost, to retain her employment so that she can keep providing for her family. The 
increased time and cost of commuting means that she can spend less time with her 
family and has even less money available to provide food and other basic necessities 
for her family. Rospabe and Selod explain that the distance between places of work and 
places of residence drive unemployment and that this can be ascribed to the spatial 
organisation of cities.479 They use the “spatial mismatch hypothesis” of Kain480 to 
explain that the disconnection between the place of employment and place of residence 
increases the duration as well as the cost of commuting to work.481 They note further 
that the disconnection is exacerbated by the congestion, quality and infrequency of 
public transport systems, which, except for the modes of self-propelled transportation, is 
often the only form of transport that people living in informal settlement can afford.482 
Women face the structural barriers of commuting from their homes to their places of 
employment at costs that are disproportionately high in comparison with the wages they 
are offered.483 
Local government should therefore provide a court with comprehensive information 
on the number of female-headed households, how many dependents there are in each 
female-headed household, where the breadwinners are employed, the average income 
of these breadwinners, the current cost of commuting to work every day and how that 
                                                 
477 Article 16 of the Maputo Protocol. 
478 See Mortensen D and Vishwanath T “Personal contacts and earnings: It is who you know!” (1994) 1 
Labour Economics 187-201. 
479 Rospabe S and Selod H “Does city structure cause unemployment? The case of Cape Town” in 
Bhorat H and Kanbur R (eds) Poverty and Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa (2006) 262-287 262 
(Rospabe and Selod “Does city structure cause unemployment?”). 
480 Kain J “Housing segregation, negro employment and metropolitan decentralization” (1968) 82 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 175-183. 
481 Rospabe and Selod “Does city structure cause unemployment?” 263. 
482 Rospabe and Selod “Does city structure cause unemployment?” 263. 
483 Rospabe and Selod “Does city structure cause unemployment?” 263. 
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would change upon relocation to another area, and how the infrastructure of the 
relocation site will be able to ameliorate the impact of the eviction. When a court then 
decides to evict the community it could formulate an order that would direct the local 
government to alter the public transport infrastructure of or services provided in an 
existing environment to the extent that the breadwinner of a female-headed household 
should be able to remain secure in her employment, without any unreasonable 
disruption to her private life and family responsibilities. 
 
5 3 3 Conclusion 
This section proposed an organising framework for the consideration of alternative 
accommodation as part of the evaluation that courts must go through to satisfy 
themselves of the justice and equity of the proposed eviction. This organising 
framework is based on the categories of people that PIE explicitly requires courts to 
have regard to in section 4(6) for purpose of the justice and equity evaluation. This 
organising framework shows how courts can use provisions in various international and 
regional human rights instruments to create standards against which the suitability of 
alternative accommodation can be measured. This is then supplemented with an 
exploration of the applicable national legislation and policy instruments that courts can 
refer to for further guidance on how a specific site should be improved to bring it in 
conformity with the ultimate goal of providing people with access to adequate housing. 
This organising framework builds on the joinder case law where local authorities are 
required to submit individualised and meaningful reports to courts and the obligation to 
engage with communities. Courts can use the information in these reports on the 
demographics of the community and the current infrastructure of the proposed 
relocation site to evaluate whether relocation to that site will be in accordance with both 
international and domestic law. This information and the outcomes of the process of 
meaningful engagement can then be used to craft orders that are sensitive to the limits 
of government resources, but also ensure that government adheres to its constitutional, 
statutory and international obligations. 
This organising framework for the consideration of alternatives ensures that courts 
observe the fundamental values that underpin the Constitution; respect, protect, 
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promote and fulfil the rights and needs of vulnerable people; and appropriately consider 
all the relevant circumstances that could render an eviction unjust and inequitable. This 
organising framework provides substantive safeguards to unlawful occupiers that have 
its origins in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and 
Displacement of the United Nations.484 The Basic Principles state that it must be a 
priority to ensure housing and land allocation “to disadvantaged groups such as the 
elderly, children and persons with disabilities.”485 States Parties should therefore 
conduct and compile “comprehensive and holistic impact assessments” prior to the 
initiation of any project that could result in development-based eviction and 
displacement. These assessments must include basic statistical data about the 
demography of the community that stands to be affected. These assessments should 
further indicate whether the potential impact of development-based evictions can be 
mitigated through compliance with national building regulations and standards486 or best 
practice guidelines and by indicating the availability of alternative strategies.487 
 
5 4 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to analyse the development of the necessary joinder of local 
governments to eviction proceedings and the concept of meaningful engagement. 
These developments were considered from the perspective of the obligations that the 
Constitution and the Housing Act place on the government to provide access to 
adequate housing. 
The discussion of the case law on the joinder showed that the High Courts have not 
adopted a uniform approach in their reasoning for the joinder of local authorities to 
eviction proceedings. In Murray the court failed to appreciate that any prejudice that 
would flow to the applicant bank could be ameliorated by the joinder of the local 
authority and any subsequent orders that required the latter party to fulfil its 
constitutional and statutory obligations. In Cashbuild and Sailing Queen Investments the 
                                                 
484 UN doc A/HRC/4/18 annex 1 of the report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a 
component of the right to an adequate standard of living (‘Guidelines for development-based evictions’). 
The Guidelines for development-based evictions is the successor of the Comprehensive Human Rights 
Guidelines on Development-based Displacement UN doc E/CN.4/sub.2/1997/7, annex. 
485 Guidelines for development-based evictions par 31. 
486 See the NBRSA and SABS Code of Good Practice 0400. 
487 Guidelines for development-based evictions par 32. 
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courts placed much emphasis on the operation of sections 4(2) and 7(1) of PIE so that 
they lost sight of that fact that there is a more compelling, constitutional reason for 
joining local authorities to eviction proceedings.  
The Lingwood, Chieftain Real Estate and Blue Moonlight Properties cases started to 
engage with the fact that the joinder of local authorities to eviction proceedings 
exceeded any reasons founded on convenience. The courts emphasised that the 
overarching reason for joining local authorities to eviction proceedings flows from the 
constitutional and statutory obligations that local authorities have to provide access to 
adequate housing. This elevated the rationale for the joinder of local authorities to 
eviction proceedings to a matter of necessity. 
In Occupiers of Short Retreat, Occupiers of Shulana Court and Blue Moonlight 
Properties SCA the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that the joinder of local 
authorities flowed from their constitutional and statutory obligations. These obligations 
originate in section 26(2) of the Constitution and are expanded on in sections 2 and 9 of 
the Housing Act. The court buttressed its conclusion by identifying statutory provisions 
in the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 that place additional 
obligations on local government to promote housing development projects. 
These constitutional and statutory obligations confirm that local authorities have a 
direct and substantial interest in the outcome and order that a court may make in all 
eviction cases. In the event that a court considers that it would be just and equitable to 
evict the unlawful occupiers without more, a local authority must render emergency 
assistance to the unlawful occupiers in terms of Chapter 12 of the National Housing 
Code. On the other hand, should the court consider it to be just and equitable to evict 
the unlawful occupiers subject to certain conditions, a local authority could be required 
to provide temporary alternative accommodation pending the acquisition of permanent 
housing in terms of Chapter 12 of the National Housing Code. As a result the joinder of 
a local authority to eviction proceedings is a matter of necessity and not of convenience. 
These constitutional obligations of local authorities make it impossible to proceed 
with an eviction from private land without joining the relevant local authority in the 
eviction application. Once joined, the case law shows that local authorities incur an 
additional obligation to provide a court with an individualised report that contains a 
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comprehensive overview of the measures taken to alleviate the plight of the unlawful 
occupiers and to provide them with housing in their jurisdiction. These reports ensure 
that courts have all the relevant information about the eviction available so that they can 
make considered decisions about the justice and equity of any particular eviction. 
In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Residents of Joe Slovo the Constitutional Court 
emphasised that the absence of meaningful engagement would be an important factor 
in determining the justice and equity of an eviction. This is why it is important to view 
meaningful engagement as a significant manifestation of participatory democracy that 
affords poor people a unique opportunity to actively engage government in its attempts 
to improve their living conditions. Meaningful engagement affirms their inherent human 
dignity, their right to life and their right to equal treatment before the law. Meaningful 
engagement has the potential of ensuring that unlawful occupiers receive the care and 
concern that is becoming to all citizens in a country that set out to improve the lives of 
inter alia those living in abject poverty. 
Meaningful engagement creates a space for public participation that transcends 
procedural fairness in terms of PAJA and mediation in terms of PIE. In this space local 
authorities must develop a deep understanding of the plight of the urban poor through a 
greater appreciation for their own obligations to provide access to adequate housing. 
Unlawful occupiers must similarly develop a greater appreciation for what local 
authorities are able to do within the narrow confines of their budgets by finding ways in 
which they can escape the perception of being passive, weak and subjugated recipients 
of government largesse. The defining nature of meaningful engagement requires the 
establishment of a long term relationship between a particular community and a 
particular local authority so that they can craft context-specific solutions to the housing 
crisis of the area and eviction treats. This re-appreciation of the context from which the 
other party in this process enters the space created by meaningful engagement opens 
up the potential for finding truly effective and transformative solutions for the housing 
problems in South Africa.  
The Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road case shows that concrete benefits can flow 
immediately from an engagement process between a local authority and unlawful 
occupiers. In some instances these benefits may even be better than what a 
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compassionately tailored court order could require. In this regard meaningful 
engagement is an innovative mechanism for enforcing the right of access to adequate 
housing because individual instances of engagement can lead to the development of a 
substantive understanding of the constitutional and statutory obligations of local 
authorities in housing development. 
This chapter also proposed an organising framework for the consideration of 
alternative accommodation as part of the evaluation that courts must go through to 
satisfy themselves of the justice and equity of a proposed eviction. This organising 
framework is based on the categories of people that PIE explicitly requires courts to 
have regard to in section 4(6) for purpose of the justice and equity evaluation. This 
organising framework shows how courts can use provisions in various international and 
regional human rights instruments to create standards against which the suitability of 
alternative accommodation can be measured. This is then supplemented with an 
exploration of the applicable national legislation and policy guidance that courts can 
refer to for further guidance on how a specific site should be improved to bring it in 
conformity with the ultimate goal of providing people with access to adequate housing. 
This organising framework builds on the joinder case law where local authorities are 
required to submit individualised and meaningful reports to courts and on the obligation 
to engage with communities. Courts can use the information in these reports on the 
demographics of the community and the current infrastructure of the proposed 
relocation site to evaluate whether relocation to that site will be in accordance with both 
international and domestic law. This information and the outcomes of the process of 
meaningful engagement can then be used to craft orders that are sensitive to the limits 
of government resources, but also ensure that government adheres to its constitutional, 
statutory and international obligations. 
This chapter has shown that recent developments in the law of eviction are 
inextricably linked to the constitutional and statutory obligations of the government to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the right of access to adequate housing. The 
necessary joinder of local authorities to eviction proceedings, the obligation to engage 
meaningfully with unlawful occupiers and the obligation to provide alternative 
accommodation afford the government an opportunity to get involved in housing matters 
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in a manner that is markedly different from how it got involved with housing during 
apartheid. During apartheid the government abused its normal police powers to evict 
black people under the veil of ensuring their health, safety and security while it was 
actively creating a land-use system that was segregated along racial lines. The 
necessary joinder of local authorities, meaningful engagement and the provision of 
alternative accommodation places an obligation on government to take a very real 
interest in the constitutional commitment of establishing a society where each person 
will benefit from an enhanced quality of life and the opportunity to attain their full 
potential. Conceived in this way, the impact of the necessary joinder of local authorities 
to eviction proceedings, obligation to engage meaningfully with unlawful occupiers and 
the provision of alternative accommodation has a profound impact on the law of 
evictions in South Africa because it foster a greater understanding of the normative 
purpose and substantive content of section 26 of the Constitution. 
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6 
Conclusion 
 
The rei vindicatio is regarded as the most important real action available to an owner 
and in the case of immovable property it adopted the form of an eviction application. To 
succeed with this real action the owner had to allege and prove that she was the owner 
of the property and that the property was in possession of the defendant.1 The owner 
would satisfy these requirements by proving that the property was registered in her 
name2 and that the defendant occupied it. The onus then shifted to the defendant to 
establish a valid and enforceable right of occupation, which could take the form of a real 
or personal right, acquired in terms of legislation or a right, permission or licence 
granted by the owner. However, if the owner acknowledged that the occupier had a right 
of occupation, without there being any obligation to admit this fact, the owner had to 
prove that the right no longer existed or was no longer enforceable. The owner would 
satisfy this additional requirement by proving that the right of occupation has expired or 
has been terminated.3 The owner would only bear this additional onus in cases where 
she acknowledged the existence of or relied on the termination of the right of occupation 
from the outset and the defendant relied on the right as a defence.4 Once the owner 
satisfied these requirements, the court would have no discretion to refuse the eviction 
order based on the social and economic circumstances of the unlawful occupiers or any 
other general policy considerations.5 
The common law of evictions underwent a dramatic transformation throughout 
apartheid. During this period government abused its normal police powers to evict 
people in terms of ostensibly ensuring their health, safety and security. This normal 
                                                 
1 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) at 20A (‘Chetty’). See also Keightley R “The impact of the Extension 
of Security of Tenure Act on an owner’s right to vindicate immovable property” (1999) 15 SAJHR 277-307 
283. 
2 She can prove this inter alia by producing the title deeds in court. See Goudini Chrome (Pty) Ltd v MCC 
Contracts (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 77 (A) at 82A and Ex parte Menzies et Uxor 1993 (3) SA 799 (C) at 804F. 
3 See Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (2006) 
244 and Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) 410-411. 
4 Chetty at 21. 
5 Van der Walt AJ Property in the Margins (2009) 54 (‘Van der Walt Property in the Margins’). 
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exercise of regulatory powers was in actual fact undertaken to further its objective of 
racial segregation and the systemic oppression of black people.6 In the process a link 
was established between the regulatory powers of government and property law 
because the requirements of the rei vindicatio accommodated the eviction of squatters 
through its abstract application.7 This has been described as the normal position 
because the owner was presumed to be entitled to exclusive possession of her property 
and the unlawful occupier had no legal basis on which to base its continued occupation 
of the land.8 
This normal state of affairs was legislatively enhanced during apartheid with rural 
and urban land measures that sought to limit the ways in which black people could 
lawfully reside on land. These rural and urban land measures were discussed in chapter 
2. The aim of that chapter was to place forced evictions in their legal-historical context 
by analysing these measures through a limited historical study. The chapter set out to 
prove that the prevalence of homelessness and the scope of the housing crisis in 
present day South Africa originated with these measures that the government used in 
conjunction with the common law remedies of private owners to conduct large-scale 
forced evictions during apartheid. 
The purpose of the Black Land Act 27 of 19139 was to identify “traditional” black land 
and to reserve this land for exclusive use and occupation by black people. The Act 
ensured that the movement of black people was limited to these traditional areas and 
that their ownership of land could not increase in those rare instances where they 
owned land outside the traditional areas. Any person found to be occupying land in 
contravention of this Act would be guilty of an offence. However, black people could 
avoid these fines and possible imprisonment if they worked as labour tenants on white 
                                                 
6 Van der Walt Property in the Margins 60. 
7 Van der Walt Property in the Margins 63. 
8 See section 2 1 in chapter 1 for a discussion of the assumption that it is normal for a landowner to be 
allowed exclusive and undisturbed possession of her property. See Van der Walt AJ “Exclusivity of 
ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate South African land-reform 
legislation” 2002 TSAR 254-289 256-258 where he notes that Rosemary Coombe uses the term 
“normality” assumption in her important article - “‘Same as it ever was’: Rethinking the politics of legal 
interpretation” (1989) 34 McGill Law Journal 603-652 - to point out that convention does not present us 
with a ready-made, neutral and objective source of stable meaning. 
9 See section 2 2 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this Act. 
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farms. The Black Service Contract Act 24 of 193210 was the first comprehensive attempt 
to regulate labour tenancy in the Union. The Act defined a labour tenant, created 
reciprocal obligations for the parties to the labour tenancy contract and limited the 
duration of the contract to three years. The Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 
193611 was the legislative embodiment of the government’s growing concern with the 
large number of black people who were living and working on white farms as labour 
tenants. Chapter 4 of the Act contained a number of provisions that sought to regulate 
the tenure of black people who resided on land other than the traditional and “released” 
areas. The strengthened measures for regulating rural land tenure of black people 
intensified the need for land in the traditional and released areas as the employment 
conditions worsened on white farms. Industrial growth and the promise of employment 
opportunities in urban areas created a way for black people to avoid the nearly 
impossible task of acquiring suitable accommodation in the traditional or released areas 
and to escape the prospect of criminal prosecution for not being a registered labour 
tenant or squatter.  
The process of urbanisation that ensued created a severe shortage in the availability 
of formal housing12 in urban areas, which led to the creation of informal settlements and 
urban squatting. The purpose of the Black (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 192313 was to 
ensure that black people had adequate accommodation in or near urban areas. Only 
black people were allowed to acquire a right to, interest in or servitude over a piece of 
land in a location or native village that was created in terms of this Act. Any person who 
was party to any agreement that attempted to circumvent the operation of this Act would 
be guilty of an offence. The Act furthermore prohibited owners, lessees and lawful 
occupiers of land to allow the congregation of black people on their land if that land was 
situated within three miles of the urban authorities’ jurisdiction. Any person who allowed 
black people to congregate on their land in contravention of the Act would be guilty of 
an offence. This ensured that black people congregated in certain defined areas for 
domestic employment purposes where they could be carefully managed and could have 
                                                 
10 See section 2 2 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this Act. 
11 See section 2 2 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this Act. 
12 See section 2 3 in chapter 1 for statistics on the backlog in formal housing, informal housing, hostels 
and “squatter housing” in 1994. 
13 See section 2 3 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this Act. 
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their living conditions inspected on a regular basis. The Black (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act 25 of 194514 copied many provisions from the Black (Urban Areas) 
Act 21 of 1923 and tailored it to the needs of those black people that sought to work in 
mines. The provisions of this Act led to the proclamation of the Regulations Governing 
the Control and Supervision of an Urban Bantu Residential Area and Relevant 
Matters.15 Chapter 2 of these regulations provided for various forms of urban tenure for 
black people that conformed to the policy whereby the presence of black people in 
urban areas was considered to be of a temporary nature. However, black people started 
occupying vacant land and buildings closer to work because they could not afford the 
daily commute from the periphery, nor could they risk the possibility of losing their jobs 
on account of being late for work on a regular basis. Government subsequently 
criminalised the tenure of black people in white areas in terms of the Group Areas Act 
36 of 1966.16  
This Act was used in conjunction with the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 
1951 to conduct large-scale forced evictions. The purpose of this Act was to prevent 
and control illegal squatting on public or private land. This was achieved by criminalising 
the entering onto and remaining on land or in buildings/structures without any lawful 
reason.17 PISA further contained provisions that firstly, enabled a court to order the 
eviction of squatters and authorised the demolition of any buildings/structures that were 
erected on the land without the permission of the owner/lawful occupier;18 secondly, 
afforded administrative powers to magistrates and native commissioners to effect the 
removal of squatters;19 and finally, afforded local authorities the power to establish 
emergency camps.20 The peremptory nature of these provisions obliged owners to evict 
unlawful occupiers and therefore significantly extended the scope of evictions based on 
the stronger right to possession under apartheid land law. 
                                                 
14 See section 2 3 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this Act. 
15 See section 2 3 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this Act. 
16 See section 2 3 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this Act. 
17 See section 3 2 1 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this power. 
18 See section 3 3 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this power. 
19 See sections 3 2 2 and 3 2 3 for a discussion of these powers. 
20 See section 3 4 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this power. 
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However, a change in the national urbanisation strategy led to the enactment of the 
Black Communities Development Act 4 of 1984.21 The purpose of this Act was to 
provide for the development of black communities outside the national states. The Act 
empowered the Minister of Co-operation and Development to declare certain areas to 
be development board areas and to establish a development board for each of those 
areas. These development boards were bestowed with certain local government, 
housing and development, and agency functions. Significantly, the Act empowered the 
board and the local authority or the township developer to grant a competent person a 
leasehold for a period of 99 years. These provisions paved the way for the enactment of 
the Conversion of Certain Rights into Leasehold or Ownership Act 81 of 1988 as part of 
the range of legislative provisions, enacted during President FW de Klerk’s term in 
office, which started dismantling apartheid land law.22 
Chapter 2 showed that a renewed appreciation of the legal-historical context23 of 
forced evictions must form the background against which the exploration of the process 
to “transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and 
equality”24 must begin. This renewed appreciation of the legal-historical context of 
forced evictions has enabled courts to understand the social and historical context of 
section 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (‘the Constitution’). 
The aim of chapter 3 was to provide an analysis of the impact of section 26 of the 
Constitution and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of 
Land Act 19 of 1998 (‘PIE’) in an attempt show how the common law of evictions has 
changed since the advent of democracy. This chapter set out to show that the coming 
into force of the right of access to adequate housing and the enactment of PIE marked a 
decisive break from the apartheid past where evictions occurred without any regard for 
the personal circumstances of unlawful occupiers to the current position under the 
democratic dispensation where each eviction application requires a careful appreciation 
of all the relevant circumstances surrounding the eviction. 
                                                 
21 See section 2 3 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this Act. 
22 See section 2 3 in chapter 2 for a discussion of this Act. 
23 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) 
par 21, Yacoob J stated that section 26 of the Constitution must be construed in its social and historical 
context. 
24 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) par 8. 
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In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers25 the Constitutional Court 
confirmed that the traditional enquiry into evictions had been recast into a new 
“constitutional matrix” of relationships that flow from the intersection of sections 25 and 
26 of the Constitution. Put differently, the rights of the owner could no longer be 
presumed to be superior to the housing rights of the unlawful occupiers. In this 
constitutional matrix the question of eviction will not be approached from the position 
where the property rights of the owner and the housing rights of the unlawful occupiers 
are characterised as diametrically opposed interests. Instead the question of eviction 
will be approached in a manner that tries to reconcile the interests of the landowner and 
the unlawful occupiers by engaging with the specific circumstances of the case so as to 
reach a just and equitable solution.26 
During apartheid the government used its police power to evict people for health, 
safety and public interest reasons because it wanted to establish and maintain a land-
use system that was segregated along racial lines.27 Section 26 of the Constitution 
envisages that the government will become involved in housing and eviction cases in a 
manner that is markedly different. Section 26(2) of the Constitution imposes positive 
obligations on the government to adopt reasonable legislative and other measures 
within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of the right of 
access to adequate housing.28 In Grootboom the Constitutional Court developed the 
model of reasonableness review which it uses to determine whether the measures 
taken by the government to realise section 26 of the Constitution are reasonable. The 
Court emphasised that it was not its prerogative to question whether better measures 
could have been adopted or whether public funds could have been better spent. The 
Court would focus on whether the measures that the government adopted could 
contribute to the realisation of the right of access to adequate housing. 
However, the government also has negative obligations to desist from impairing or 
preventing the right of access to adequate housing.29 In Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; 
                                                 
25 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
26 See section 1 in chapter 3 for a discussion of this constitutional matrix. 
27 See section 1 in chapter 2 for a brief discussion of the Slums Act 53 of 1934, the Trespass Act 6 of 
1959, the Physical Planning Act 88 of 1967 and the Health Act 63 of 1977. 
28 See section 2 2 2 in chapter 3 for a discussion of the model of reasonableness review. 
29 See section 2 3 1 in chapter 3 for a discussion of this negative obligation. 
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Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others30 and Gundwana v Steko Development and Others31 
the Constitutional Court confirmed that judicial oversight was required of all sales in 
execution proceedings if the property to be executed against is the home of the 
judgment debtor. These judgments enjoin judicial officers to weigh the interests of the 
creditor in securing payment of the judgment debt against the interests of the debtor in 
retaining the tenure security that her home provides her. This balancing requires more 
than the mechanical application of legal rules to objective facts. It requires engagement 
with all the relevant circumstances of the case.32 The fact that the rights and interests of 
poor and otherwise destitute people must be taken into consideration in legal 
proceedings that threaten to deprive them of their current access to adequate housing, 
however basic, is a substantial addition to the law of evictions. 
PIE was enacted to give effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution. With its 
enactment there was a shift in the focus of evictions - away from preventing squatting to 
preventing illegal eviction. This shift in focus coincided with the provision of procedural 
protections and substantive safeguards against illegal evictions. In Residents of Joe 
Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes33 (‘Residents of Joe Slovo’) the 
Constitutional Court emphasised that courts cannot resort to the common law definition 
of consent to determine the meaning of consent for purposes of PIE because the 
common law definition of consent limits the definition of unlawful occupation and 
through that the application of PIE.34 Once it is clear that unlawful occupiers meet this 
threshold requirement they must receive notice of eviction proceedings that have been 
instituted against them.35 This notice must identify them as unlawful occupiers of the 
property, be properly served upon them and be in a language that they will be able to 
understand. Furthermore, this notice must contain information regarding the nature of 
the proceedings; the date and time of the hearing; the grounds for the proposed 
eviction; their right to appear and defend the case; and that they may request legal aid. 
Once a court is satisfied that the proposed eviction is just and equitable it must 
                                                 
30 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC). 
31 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC). 
32 See section 2 3 2 in chapter 3 for a discussion of the requirement that courts must consider all relevant 
circumstances. 
33 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC). 
34 See section 3 2 2 in chapter 3 for a discussion of consent for purposes of PIE. 
35 See section 3 3 in chapter 3 for a discussion of the notice requirement. 
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determine a date upon which the unlawful occupiers must vacate the property and a 
date upon which the eviction order can be executed should the unlawful occupiers not 
vacate the property voluntarily.36 These procedural protections are significant because 
during apartheid the local authority officials did not give the squatters notice of pending 
eviction proceedings, nor did they wait for a just and equitable day or time to execute 
the eviction order in a humane and dignified manner. 
The substantive safeguards that PIE affords unlawful occupiers are animated by the 
overarching requirement that all evictions must be just and equitable37 - to both the 
unlawful occupiers and the landowner. This requires careful consideration of the rights 
and needs of the unlawful occupiers in general, but specifically the rights and needs of 
the elderly, people with disabilities, children en female-headed households. Courts are 
further required to ascertain whether land or alternative accommodation is available or 
can reasonably be made available to the unlawful occupiers upon their eviction. Finally, 
courts are also required to consider whether the local authority with jurisdiction over the 
area in which the property is situated made any mediation attempts to resolve disputes 
between the unlawful occupiers and the private landowners. These substantive 
safeguards to the eviction of unlawful occupiers arguably represent the most significant 
development in the law of evictions. 
In general, courts have discharged their obligation to grapple with the conflicting 
interests of unlawful occupiers and landowners in an effort to find case specific solutions 
admirably well. The analysis of the constitutional and statutory context of evictions in 
post-apartheid South Africa has enabled courts to understand both the social-historical 
and textual context as well the values and purpose of section 26 of the Constitution and 
PIE. Courts have immersed themselves in the intricacies of applications for evictions 
from private land,38 urgent evictions39 and evictions from public land40 by way of creative 
reasoning and crafting of responsive remedies. 
However, to date the Constitutional Court has refused to build on the normative 
foundations of the right of access to adequate housing which it laid in Grootboom when 
                                                 
36 See section 3 3 4 in chapter 3 for a discussion of the eviction order and its execution. 
37 See section 3 4 in chapter 3 for a discussion of this overarching requirement. 
38 See section 3 4 2 in chapter 3 for a discussion of this type of eviction. 
39 See section 3 4 3 in chapter 3 for a discussion of this type of eviction. 
40 See section 3 4 4 in chapter 3 for a discussion of this type of eviction. 
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it stated that the right amounted to “more than bricks and mortar”. Chapter 3 therefore 
also sought to develop the normative content of section 26(1) of the Constitution by 
drawing on literature about the affective value of the “home” and its relevance in the 
law.41 This section in chapter 3 showed that it is possible to develop the normative 
content of the right to housing with reference to the home interests of the unlawful 
occupiers. Developing the substantive content of section 26(1) of the Constitution with 
reference to the affective value of ‘home’ will give better effect to the purposes of the 
right of access to adequate housing within the broader transformative goals of the 
Constitution and enable the courts to craft more responsive remedies. 
However, this is not the end of the development that is required to give content to the 
right of access to adequate housing. Courts find it difficult to decide whether or not a 
violation of the right has occurred in the absence of a developed independent and 
substantive content of what it means to have access to adequate housing. The aim of 
chapter 4 was to identify international instruments that can be considered by South 
African courts in their effort to develop a substantive understanding of the scope and 
content of the concept of “adequacy”. The chapter set out to identify treaties and 
regional human rights instruments that can be used by South African courts to interpret 
the scope and content of adequacy given the peremptory constitutional obligation in 
section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution to interpret the rights in the Bill of Rights with regard 
to international law. 
The most important provision is article 11(1) of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,42 which provides that everyone has a right to an 
adequate standard of living. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights issued General Comment No 4 The right to adequate housing43 to 
provide clarity on the obligations of States Parties in terms of article 11(1) of the 
Convention. General Comment 4’s description of the right to housing as living 
“somewhere in security, peace and dignity” accords with the Constitutional Court’s 
assessment that section 26 amounts to “more than bricks and mortar”. General 
Comment 4 further states that the right to housing is more complex than simply having a 
                                                 
41 See section 2 1 2 in chapter 3 for a discussion of the home interests of unlawful occupiers. 
42 993 UNTS 3. See section 2 1 1 in chapter 4 for a discussion of this Convention. 
43 UN Doc E/1992/23. See section 2 1 2 in chapter 4 for a discussion of this General Comment. 
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roof over one’s head. This is in accordance with how the Constitutional Court has 
described the right of access to adequate housing. The similarities between General 
Comment 4 and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court is indicative of the fact that 
South Africa is on the correct path to giving substantive content to the right of access to 
adequate housing. South Africa simply requires an organising framework within which to 
consider the right of access to adequate housing.44 
South African courts can also receive interpretive guidance from article 8 of 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms45 which 
provides everyone with a right to respect for their private and family life, their home and 
correspondence. An analysis of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights on article 8 shows that there is a dimension to the awarding of planning 
permission that goes beyond the environmental and other concerns listed in article 8(2) 
of the Convention. The analysis showed that it is possible to engage to some extent 
with the substantive content of the right to housing in the second stage of constitutional 
analysis if the first stage is avoided. 
The European Committee of Social Rights has interpreted articles 16, 30, 31 and E 
of the Revised European Social Charter46 in a manner that gives concrete substantive 
meaning to the rights of social, legal and economic protection for the family; the right of 
protection against poverty and social exclusion; the right to housing and the provision of 
non-discrimination. The resulting independent content that has been afforded to these 
rights has enabled the Committee to scrutinise the justifications advanced by Greece, 
Italy, Bulgaria and France with greater rigour and jurisprudential discipline than what the 
ECtHR has done under the ECHR. This is in accordance with the approach that the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights prescribes in General Comment 
No. 7: The right to adequate housing: forced evictions47 when it requires States Parties 
to establish adequate procedural and substantive safeguards against forced evictions. 
Finally, the South African courts can receive guidance on the interpretation of section 
26(1) of the Constitution from the jurisprudence that the Inter-American Commission on 
                                                 
44 See section 2 2 in chapter 4 for a discussion of the development of this organising framework. 
45 213 UNTS 221. See section 3 1 in chapter 4 for a discussion of this Convention. 
46 CETS no 163. See section 3 2 in chapter 4 for a discussion of this Charter. 
47 UN Doc E/1998/22. See section 2 1 2 in chapter 4 for a discussion of this General Comment. 
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Human Rights, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights and the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights have generated in terms of the American Convention on 
Human Rights48 and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.49 While neither 
of these regional human rights systems have an explicit right to housing, the 
supervisory bodies in both systems have relied on classic civil and political rights to 
adjudicate housing interests. This is in accordance with the internationally accepted 
view that all human rights are interdependent and mutually supporting. However, this 
approach to the adjudication of housing interests is problematic because it is difficult to 
give content to a right to housing from the broad rights to life, dignity, political 
participation and privacy. South African courts, most notably the Constitutional Court in 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others,50 
have regularly stated that the right of access to housing must be interpreted and 
understood in relation to the other rights in the Bill of Rights. However, the reliance on 
the broad norms of equality, human dignity and life has only allowed the Constitutional 
Court to interpret the right of access to adequate housing as amounting to “more than 
bricks and mortar”. This interpretation of the content of section 26(1) of the Constitution 
is by no means insignificant because it indicates that there is more to housing than a 
physical structure. An overview of the jurisprudence generated at the United Nations 
and at regional human rights level in terms of the housing and related provisions in 
these international law sources will assist South African courts in developing the 
substantive content of section 26(1) of the Constitution.  
However, the development of the substantive content will depend a great deal on the 
interpretation of the constitutional obligations of the government. Chapter 5 sought to 
analyse this aspect, tracing the recent jurisprudential developments in the law of 
evictions that have provided clarity on the obligations of the state for purposes of 
section 26 of the Constitution. This chapter set out to see whether these developments 
have the potential of ushering in a new phase in the adjudication of the right to housing. 
There is a burgeoning jurisprudence on the joinder of local government as a party to 
the eviction proceedings on account of its direct and substantial interest in the outcome 
                                                 
48 OASTS No 36. See section 3 3 in chapter 4 for a discussion of this Convention. 
49 1520 UNTS 217. See section 3 4 in chapter 4 for a discussion of this Charter. 
50 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
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of eviction proceedings, flowing from its constitutional and statutory obligations to 
provide access to adequate housing. This joinder of necessity enables a court to 
consider whether the legislative and other measures that government has taken to fulfil 
its obligations are reasonable in the specific case. The case law on joinder shows that 
the High Court has not been consistent on the reasons advanced for ordering the 
joinder of local authorities to eviction proceedings.51 Recently the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112 Short Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v 
Daisy Dear Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others,52 Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon 
Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele53 and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another54 clarified the position 
by holding that the overarching rationale for ordering the joinder of local authorities to 
eviction proceedings was the obligations of local authorities that flow from section 26(3), 
read with sections 26(1) and (2), of the Constitution and section 9 of the Housing Act. 
These constitutional obligations of local authorities make it impossible to proceed 
without its joinder in applications for evictions from private land. 
In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg 
v City of Johannesburg and Others55 and Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western 
Cape v Thubelisha Homes56 the Constitutional Court similarly held that the absence of 
meaningful engagement would be an important factor in determining the justice and 
equity of an eviction.57 This is why it is important to view meaningful engagement as a 
significant manifestation of participatory democracy that affords poor people a unique 
opportunity to engage government actively in its attempts to improve their living 
conditions. Meaningful engagement affirms their inherent human dignity, their right to 
life and their right to equal treatment before the law. Meaningful engagement has the 
potential of ensuring that unlawful occupiers receive the care and concern that is 
becoming to all citizens in a country that set out to improve the lives of inter alia those 
                                                 
51 See section 2 1 in chapter 5 for a discussion of the case law on the necessary joinder of local 
authorities to eviction proceedings. 
52 2010 (4) BCLR 354 (SCA) par 14. 
53 2010 (9) BCLR 911 (SCA) par 14. 
54 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA). 
55 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC). 
56 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC). 
57 See section 2 2 in chapter 5 for a discussion of meaningful engagement. 
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living in abject poverty. Meaningful engagement creates a space for public participation 
that transcends procedural fairness in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act 3 of 2000 and mediation in terms of PIE. In this space local authorities must develop 
a deep understanding of the plight of the urban poor through a greater appreciation for 
its own obligations to provide access to adequate housing. Unlawful occupiers must 
similarly develop a greater appreciation for what local authorities are able to do within 
the narrow confines of its budget by finding ways in which it can escape the perception 
of being passive, weak and subjugated recipients of government largesse. The defining 
nature of meaningful engagement requires the establishment of a long term relationship 
between a particular community and a particular local authority so that they can craft 
context-specific solutions to the housing crisis of the area and eviction treats. This re-
appreciation of the context from which the other party in this process enters the space 
created by meaningful engagement opens up the potential for finding truly effective and 
transformative solutions for the housing problems in South Africa. This chapter showed 
that the necessary joinder of a local authority to eviction proceedings within its 
jurisdiction and the development of meaningful engagement flow from a proper 
understanding of the normative purpose and substantive content of the right of access 
to adequate housing.  
In chapter 5 I further proposed an organising framework for the consideration of 
alternative accommodation as part of the evaluation that courts must go through to 
satisfy themselves of the justice and equity of the proposed eviction.58 The organising 
framework shows how courts can use provisions in various international and regional 
human rights instruments to create standards against which the suitability of alternative 
accommodation can be measured. The organising framework builds on the joinder case 
law where local authorities are required to submit individualised and meaningful reports 
to courts and the obligation to engage with communities. Courts can use the information 
in these reports on the demographics of the community and the current infrastructure of 
the proposed relocation site to evaluate whether relocation to that site will be in 
accordance with both international and domestic law. This information and the 
outcomes of the process of meaningful engagement can then be used to craft orders 
                                                 
58 See section 3 in chapter 5. 
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that are sensitive to the limits of government resources, but also ensure that 
government adheres to its constitutional, statutory and international law obligations. 
The summary of the chapters in this dissertation and the conclusions that I reached 
reveal the new normality for the law of evictions pertaining to unlawful occupiers. The 
law of evictions has moved from a position under apartheid where courts had no 
discretion to refuse an eviction order based on the personal circumstances of the 
squatters to a position under the new constitutional dispensation where courts are 
equipped with a discretion to determine what would be just and equitable to both the 
land owner and the unlawful occupiers. In this new normality courts are required to 
adjudicate eviction disputes with regard to the personal circumstances of the unlawful 
occupiers. Unlawful occupiers now have procedural protections and substantive 
safeguards against illegal evictions that were either absent or removed during 
apartheid. The normality requires courts to evaluate eviction disputes in a new 
constitutional matrix where the rights of the landowner are not presumed to be superior 
to the interests of the unlawful occupiers. This new normality further requires the 
government to become involved in eviction disputes where the land owner established 
his rights in terms of section 25 of the Constitution and the unlawful occupiers 
established their right to have access to adequate housing. Courts have therefore joined 
local authorities to eviction proceedings and instructed them to file reports on the 
housing situation within their areas of jurisdiction. Recently the Constitutional Court 
placed a further obligation on local government to engage meaningfully with the 
unlawful occupiers living in its area of jurisdiction. This is a dramatic shift away from the 
abstract adjudication of evictions in terms of the common law of evictions and apartheid 
legislation. 
This dissertation set out to consider whether unlawful occupiers will be afforded 
greater protection through a substantive interpretation of section 26 of the Constitution 
that is influenced by a contextual understanding of evictions and international law. The 
adjudication of the eviction of unlawful occupiers now requires a context-sensitive 
analysis that seeks to find concrete and case-specific solutions for each individual case. 
Courts therefore require more information than what the land owner and the unlawful 
occupiers may be able to provide them. The government is called on to provide 
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information on the housing situation within its area of jurisdiction when it is joined as a 
necessary party to the eviction proceedings. All this contextual information enables 
courts to discharge their constitutional obligation to have regard to all relevant 
circumstances of the particular case to satisfy themselves of the justice and equity of 
the eviction. The abundance of contextual information allows courts to explore the range 
of possibilities that exist between eviction without more and no eviction. In between 
these opposite ends of the continuum there lies the possibility to evict the unlawful 
occupiers, but to firstly, allow them to stay on the property until the local government 
can provide them with alternative accommodation and to then award the land owner 
damages for the loss of the temporary use of her property; or secondly, mitigate the 
impact of the eviction by ordering the local authority to engage meaningfully with the 
unlawful occupiers and  provide emergency or temporary alternative accommodation 
and to also issue an order that would make the execution of the eviction just and 
equitable. In sum, the impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the eviction of unlawful 
occupiers in South African law is, quite simply, profound. 
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